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ABSTRACT

KANT WITH FOUCAULT:
ON THE DANGERS OF THE THEORETICAL REIFICATION OF THE SUBJECT TO
FREEDOM AND THE NEED FOR A PRACTICAL PSYCHOLOGY

By
Matthew Valentine
May 2016

Dissertation supervised by Doctor James Swindal, Ph.D, Dean and Professor
In this dissertation I consider the question, “Is it possible to think the subject qua subject
or must any theoretical attempt to understand the subject necessarily reify it?” To answer this
question, I appealed to Immanuel Kant’s distinction between theoretical and practical reason,
noting that practical reason could think the subject as a free soul rather than as a naturallydetermined object. I then divided the sciences of the subject into four general types to determine
which science could think the subject qua subject. Three sciences were shown to necessarily
reify the subject: empirical psychology, rational psychology, and heteronomous ethics. I then
paralleled Kant’s insight with Michel Foucault’s analyses of the human sciences, showing the
concrete consequences of objectification. Using Foucault’s work on ethical practice and askesis
as a guide, I returned to Kant and explained how practical reason can think the subject qua
subject only insofar as it considers the subject as something to be made rather than a theoretical
object to know. I then posed the question, “What are the necessary conditions for someone to be
a subject of possible experience?” which led into a Kantian-inspired theory of love and
intersubjectivity. Finally, I concluded that contemporary psychology is mired in an impasse
between happiness and freedom, insofar as therapeutic practice is no longer an ethic. I suggest
the need for a practical psychology to solve this impasse.
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And so also the irresistibility of [nature’s] might, while making us recognize our own physical impotence,
considered as beings of nature, discloses to us a faculty of judging independently of, and a superiority over, nature;
on which is based a kind of self-preservation, entirely different from that which can be attacked and brought into
danger by external nature. Thus, humanity in our person remains unhumiliated, though the individual might have to
submit to this domination.
Section 28
The Critique of Judgment
'By itself,' [O’Brien] said, 'pain is not always enough. There are occasions when
a human being will stand out against pain, even to the point of death.
But for everyone there is something unendurable--something that cannot be
contemplated. Courage and cowardice are not involved. If you are falling
from a height it is not cowardly to clutch at a rope. If you have come up
from deep water it is not cowardly to fill your lungs with air. It is
merely an instinct which cannot be destroyed. It is the same with the
rats. For you, they are unendurable. They are a form of pressure that you
cannot withstand, even if you wished to. You will do what is required of
you.’[…]
The cage was nearer; it was closing in. Winston heard a succession of
shrill cries which appeared to be occurring in the air above his head. But
he fought furiously against his panic. To think, to think, even with a
split second left--to think was the only hope. Suddenly the foul musty
odour of the brutes struck his nostrils. There was a violent convulsion of
nausea inside him, and he almost lost consciousness. Everything had gone
black. For an instant he was insane, a screaming animal. Yet he came out
of the blackness clutching an idea. There was one and only one way to save
himself. He must interpose another human being, the BODY of another human
being, between himself and the rats.
1984 italics mine
“The fact that electrodes compel rats to consume large quantities of a food that is not bringing them pleasure is
evidence that wanting and liking are controlled by different mechanisms of the brain…Wanting is not liking.”
The Joyful Mind
Scientific American (August 2012)

1.1 The Ego that is Not: Kant’s Rejection of the Empirical Ego and its Pleasures
Introduction
In all embodied and rational beings, there is a fundamental division between the formal
and the material. For Kant, this division manifests as a necessary divide within the faculty of
desire itself; the faculty of desire, or the will,1 can comply with formal practical laws of reason of

Kant writes in his copy of the first edition: “Transcendental definitions: The causality of representations of
representations of a being in respect of the objects of them is life. The determinability of the power of
representation to this causality is the faculty of desire. This power of representation, if it is reason, hence is the
determinability of its causality in respect of objects, i.e., its faculty of desire [is] will. If pure reason has causality,
then the will is a pure will, and its causality is called freedom.” Footnote to page A538/B566 :
Kant, Immanuel Critique of Pure Reason, ed. and trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W, Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 535 – 536 [A538/B566]
1

1

its own devising, and by actively submitting to them, emancipate itself from the sway of the
natural order; pleasure, on the other hand, being but a product of our passive physiology
(receptivity), shackles the will to the incessant pressures of the natural order. A war for the
subject’s freedom is perpetually waged within, since the inertia of the will seems to be the
pursuit of pleasure, which reduces autonomy to a natural mechanism, while compliance with the
formal law preserves autonomy. In this respect, desire can aim for two horizons: the formal law
or material pleasure. And while Kant not only accepts but endorses the pursuit of happiness in
non-moral matters, he reminds us that we are but higher beasts bound by natural necessity when
we do so. This rigid choice, which determines the very nature of subjectivity, is an antinomy in
its own right, since a moral life without happiness may be free but it is not worth living, while
one that is only happy barely counts as living, since it is not free. Neither would be considered
‘the good life’ in a genuine sense. Reason, whose demands compel ultimate unity, as strongly as
any instinct, cannot help but to find that its moral law becomes but one of two horses pulling at
opposite directions, tearing the hapless human into two separate beings: angel and animal. It is
this choice of agency and its prima facie conflict with animal nature that I ultimately intend to
explore and resolve.
Sciences of the Self
When the desiring being is considered as a being that strives towards fundamentally
divergent ends in the manner Kant describes, it can be cognized as if it were two different
species for study. Each species would be an object of investigation for a different discipline,
which I will call a ‘science of the self.’ When humanity is considered merely as a species that
aims towards acquiring pleasure (‘the human animal’), we necessarily recognize that different
causal principles are at play than otherwise. Here we encounter a being that is empirically

2

‘calculable and regular’2: an empirical ego known a posteriori that can be studied by empirical
psychology. This is because pleasure is a natural phenomenon produced by natural processes,
which an empirical science is equipped to study. To use Kant’s language, the ego is
phenomenal, belonging only to the world of possible experience rather than the world as it really
is. But there is another self, one that can allegedly be grasped a priori: the soul. The soul is the
subject of what Kant calls ‘Rational psychology.’ Rational psychology, like empirical
psychology, takes up the self as a theoretical subject of investigation but instead replaces a
posteriori observation with a priori reasoning. Ultimately however, the result is the same for
both empirical and rational psychology: theoretical reason reifies the self into an object. Only
ethics, which bypasses the limitations of theoretical reason, encounters a self that is a subject
rather than an object.
To shed light on the sciences of the self, I take as my two philosophical critics Immanuel
Kant and Michel Foucault, whose fundamental differences, like Sun and Moon, are in rare
instances occluded like an eclipse. Both are suspicious of theoretical attempts to attain
knowledge of the subject. Both consider ethics a promising alternative to psychology. Foucault
goes so far as to say “the entire art of life consists in killing off psychology” (L’art de vivre, c’est
de tuer la psychologie).3 This dissertation, while still presuming a place for empirical
psychology, nonetheless argues that we will only encounter the subject as a genuine subject (in
other words, as a free agent) rather than as a docile scientific object by acknowledging these
concerns, tracing alternative trajectories, and only then attempting unitary reconciliation of the
sensible ego with the ideal soul.

2

To use the language Nietzsche does in the Second Treatise of the Genealogy of Morality.
Halperin, David M, What Do Gay Men Want? An Essay on Sex, Risk, and Subjectivity (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 2007) 4.
3

3

Kant’s Critique of Empirical Psychology
I start however with Kant’s critique of empirical psychology. Once the epistemological
problems with empirical psychology are outlined I will then proceed to discuss the
epistemological problems Kant identifies with non-empirical ‘rationalist’ approaches to the
subject. Foucault’s critique of the human sciences will follow in Chapter 4, in line with the
Kantian framework of heteronomy of choice established in Chapter 3.
Kant did not conceive of empirical psychology as we do today. When contrasting
empirical psychology with logic, Kant divides the disciplines by faculty in a manner similar to
our contrast between ego and soul (and, as we will see, the sensible self and the intelligible self):
The lower cognitive power is characterized by the passivity of the inner sense of sensations; the
higher by the spontaneity of apperception – that is, of pure consciousness of the activity that
constitutes thinking – and belongs to logic (a system of the rules of understanding), just as the
former belongs to psychology (to a sum-total of all inner perceptions under laws of nature) and
establishes inner experience.4

It would seem that empirical psychology has one primary method: introspection.5 This method
alone would give the modern reader pause: What kind of data does introspection uncover? Can
such a method uncover the laws of nature that underlie inner experience? What kind of science
can be produced by means of an introspective method?
It is clear from as early as the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science that Kant is
skeptical of the “empirical doctrine of the soul.” At best he seems to condone
a historical…systematic natural doctrine of inner sense, i.e. a natural description of the soul, but
not a science of the soul, nor even a psychological experimental doctrine…This is because
mathematics is inapplicable to the phenomena of the internal sense and their laws, unless one
might want to take into consideration merely the law of continuity in the flow of this sense’s
internal changes. 6

Kitcher, Patricia, Kant’s Transcendental Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 12.
Kitcher Transcendental Psychology 12.
6
Kant, Immanuel, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, trans. James Ellington (Indianapolis: The BobbsMerrill Company, Inc., 1970) 8
4
5

4

In this passage, Kant assumes that “a doctrine of nature will contain only so much science as
there is ‘applied mathematics’ in it.”7 Put otherwise,
Were empirical psychology to attempt to ground itself as a natural science it could do nothing
other than plot a line as the (spatial) representation of a possible succession of objects of inner
sense. This line would tell us nothing about how or why objects of intuition succeed each other in
the order in which they do; it would indicate the form of a merely descriptive listing of the
succession of inner events – i.e. “and then…, and then…,” etc.8

Unfortunately for empirical psychology, the empirical study of inner sense (or of inner
psychological states) would amount to little more than the one-dimensional plotting of a
continuous, straight line, strewn out without apparent rhyme or reason.9 In other words,
empirical psychology10 would merely collect and assemble a narrative account of inner sense,
not study the empirical ego per se (unless of course the empirical ego is nothing but a sequence
of inner states without determinate lawful connections between them, which seems unlikely).11
If the term ‘empirical ego,’ indicates a substantive, persisting psychic structure, Kant agrees with
Hume: no such ‘self’ is ever found introspectively, only a sequence of changing inner states,
states that are themselves experimentally inaccessible and defy sophisticated mathematical

7

Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science 7
Cutrofello, Andrew, Imagining Otherwise: Metapyschology and the Analytic A Posteriori (Evanston, Illinois:
Northwestern University Press, 1997) 58. Cutrofello follows this up by bringing up an option that did not occur to
Kant:
“Here it is interesting to consider whether developments in mathematics since Kant’s day would force him to
complicate this picture. Topology…is in many ways an offshoot of geometry, but one whose development required
that appeals to intuition be given up…[It is] the study of continuity…For Kant, it will be remembered, time is the
form by which the continuity of the subject’s experience is given. Yet Kant takes arithmetic, not topology, to
provide a mathematical model of time. Even if we were to grant that the line is the basic form of time, topology
shows that lines are far richer in their mathematical possibilities than Kant suggests…What if, without ceasing to be
a “line,” time could undergo topological transformation? Would this provide a mathematical basis for something
like empirical psychology?” Imagining Otherwise 58. The current author must confess that while this option is
suggestive, Cutrofello does not concretely explain just how topology could provide the mathematical basis for
empirical psychology.
9
. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science 8
10
Goldman, Avery, Kant and the Subject of Critique: On the Regulative Role of the Psychological Idea
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012) 189. Empirical psychology is called the ‘physiology of the human
understanding’ as opposed to the rationalist ‘physiology of inner sense.’
11
Hume’s principles of association, insofar as they seem to concern the principles that dictate why one
psychological state (or conceived idea) triggers another, may be an exception, since it is concerned more with the
relation of psychological states than it is an ego entity.
8

5

schematization. If the proper object of empirical psychology is the ego (not a transcendental I),
and the ego cannot be observed, then empirical psychology fails to materialize.
As Avery Goldman notes of any critic who may cite eighteenth century scientific
ignorance and the subsequent rise of experimental psychology in the late nineteenth century,
…there has no doubt been progress made in the way that we are able to investigate the mind and
so map its varied powers. Yet Kant’s criticism of empirical psychology is not that he found
himself in the unfortunate position of lacking some data or tool that could at some later point be
found, offering a solution for the vexing difficulties concerning self-knowledge;12

Rather, if empirical psychology is a study of causal relations, it lacks the resources to grasp an
adequate object for its study; it cannot know the causes of the representations of inner sense,
only their order. This epistemological limitation is likely due to the peculiar nature of inner
sense itself since those empirical sciences Kant sanctions all concern objects of outer sense (most
notably, physics).
Since inner sense is a pure intuition, and pure intuitions, as a necessary structural part of
the mind, can be understood a priori, a reasoned rather than empirical examination of inner sense
should be sufficient to reveal its relevant limitations (such ‘armchair psychologizing,’ to which I
am limited, would thus be legitimate). In order to fully outline the intrinsic limitations of inner
sense, I will first look at its formal limitations, then its material limitations, and finally the
methodological limitations of introspection.
The Formal Limitations of Inner Sense
It is perhaps with a sense of humor that Kant rejects empirical psychology on a priori
grounds. If we assume that empirical psychology takes both the structure of psychic experience
(pure intuitions) as well as its contents (empirical intuitions, or sensations)13 as its initial
investigative objects (like physics takes all pure and empirical intuitions of outer sense as its
12

Avery 12-13
“Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in general its matter.” Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, ed.
and trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W, Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 185 [A42/B60]
13

6

initial objects) then we can first determine the limitations of the object of empirical psychology
by considering the form inner intuitions necessarily must take to be objects of inner sense at all
(i.e. by looking at pure intuitions first, and then only afterward the nature of empirical intuitions
themselves). From there it may then become possible to see why the application of the concepts
of the understanding to the inner manifold is not sufficient to synthesize it into a possible
experiential field receptive enough to be adequately mathematized.
For Kant, time and space are not objective features of real world things or their relations,
nor do they stand alone as metaphysical entities in their own right. Time and space are the forms
phenomena must take in order to be given in perception at all. Rather than having objective
existence, time and space are forms of (our) sensibility. Space is the form all phenomena
perceived by the five senses must take to be externally perceived (‘extension’). This is what
gives space its proper name: outer sense. Time, space’s sensible twin, is more pervasive, since
all phenomena, be they inner intuitions like thoughts and feelings, or outer intuitions like
physical objects, seem to pass successively from one state to another. Thus, at first it seems that
time is the form of both outer and inner sense. But this is technically not the case. Kant qualifies
this time-determination: all phenomena are temporal either immediately (objects of inner sense)
or mediately (external objects). This becomes more evident when we consider that inner
phenomena are presented solely in time, not in space. That would imply that time is the form of
inner sense. If we take as given that appearances are appearances for a mind, then all
appearances are but ‘determinations of the mind’ itself, and thus conditioned by the form it must
be presented in (the form of inner sense). 14

“Time is the a priori formal condition of all appearances in general. Space, as the pure form of all outer
intuitions, is limited as an a priori condition merely to outer intuitions. But since, on the contrary, all
representations, whether or not they have outer things as their object, nevertheless as determinations of the mind
themselves belong to the inner state, while this inner state belongs under the formal condition of inner intuition, and
14

7

In a certain respect, a form of sensibility, be it inner sense or outer sense, is nothing but
the a priori set of particular dimensions an intuition must conform to if it is to be an intuition at
all. Mathematics is thus derived from pure intuitions precisely because mathematics is but the
formalizaion of dimensions. In that respect, the ideality of space and time, which forecloses the
(potentially Newtonian) absolute and self-sufficient nature of either, in no way undermines
mathematics, but instead provides a possible explanation for how its conclusions are a priori and
have absolute necessity.15 The pure intuitions upon which mathematics is based are not mere
empirical concepts derived from experience, since the latter can only provide general, plausible
conclusions. They are instead necessary structures of the mind bearing absolute weight since
they condition and structure possible experience absolutely.
Kant contrasts philosophical and mathematical cognition in the often-neglected ‘Doctrine
of Method’ section of the Critique of Pure Reason:
Philosophical cognition is rational cognition from concepts, mathematical cognition that from
the construction of concepts. But to construct a concept means to exhibit a priori the intuition
corresponding to it. For the construction of a concept, therefore, a non-empirical intuition is
required, which consequently, as intuition, is an individual object, but that must nevertheless, as
the construction of a concept (of a general representation), express in the representation universal
validity for all possible intuitions that belong under the same concept. Thus I construct a triangle
by exhibiting an object corresponding to this concept, either through mere imagination, in pure
intuition, or on paper, in empirical intuition, but in both cases completely a priori, without having
to borrow the pattern for it from any experience. 16

Here we see Kant’s fundamental necessary epistemological condition for theoretical cognition
met in an interesting way: theoretical cognition always requires an intuition to be wed to a
concept, but that intuition need not be empirical. For Kant, the form of mathematical cognition
is like a mirror image of the form of philosophical cognition: “Philosophical cognition thus
thus of time, so time is an a priori condition of all appearance in general, and indeed the immediate condition of the
inne intuition (of our souls), and thereby also the mediate condition of outer appearances.” Kant, Critique of Pure
Reason 180 – 181 [A34/B50 – B 51]. But is the mind that outer sense is presented wthin the same mind as the mind
of inner sense?
15
Kant, Immanuel, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, 2e, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, 2001), 23 [280].
16
Kant, Immanuel, The Critique of Pure Reason, ed. and trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998) 630 [A713/B741 – A714/B742].
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considers the particular only in the universal, but mathematical cognition considers the universal
in the particular, indeed even in the individual, yet nonetheless a priori and by means of
reason.”17
This distinction may be lost if we merely focus on how mathematics is quantitative while
philosophy is qualitative. The more traditional qualitative/quantitative divide does exist between
philosophy and mathematics, respectively, but this later distinction derives from the former
distinction rather than the former deriving from the latter: “The form of mathematical cognition
is the cause of its pertaining solely to quanta.”18 Kant bolsters this claim by implicitly falling
back on the principles of the understanding (also referred to as ‘the physiological principles’),
which “are nothing other than rules for the objective use of the categories”:19 quality necessarily
presumes content, or empirical intuition (only sensations have intensities), while quantity does
not.20 Since qualities are only ‘exhibited’ in empirical intuition, “rational cognition of [qualities]
can be possible only through concepts.”21
Another way of putting this is to say that the intuitions that correspond to the Qualitative
categories of Reality, Negation, and Limitation (or even those of Relation or Modality) can only
be provided through experience, while Quantitative categories are not bound by such a
restriction.22 “The shape of a cone can be made intuitive without any empirical assistance,
merely in accordance with the concept, but the color of this cone must first be given in one
experience or another.”23 Philosophy can cognize mathematical objects and vice versa, but never
in the same manner mathematics can. Philosophy can only work with ‘general concepts,’ while
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mathematics must ‘exhibit’ “the concept in concreto” (i.e. ‘exhibited a priori’ or ‘constructed.’)
within intuition.24 Mathematical cognition thus seems to start with a mathematical concept (such
as ‘Triangle’) which can only be cognized when its corresponding pure intuition (let’s say, the
shape of a triangle drawn out on paper) is constructed. In this way we come to understand the
properties of a triangle a priori, even though we are technically working with only a particular
sketched triangle. All triangles of a certain kind will possess the same properties a priori.
Kant provides two illustrations of how this construction takes place, and with it insight
into how mathematical cognition is both synthetic and a priori. The first is geometrical, which is
derived from the form of outer intuition (space). Intuitively it makes sense that extensive
dimensions correlate with geometry since geometric shapes are purely extensive. The second
illustrates arithmetic, which Kant says derives from counting. Since counting is successive it is
necessarily temporal (constructed from the form of inner intuition).25
Starting with geometry, Kant illustrates geometrical cognition in the following manner:
Give a [geometer] the concept of a triangle, and let him try to find out in his way how the sum of
its angles might be related to a right angle…He begins at once to construct a triangle. Since he
knows that two right angles together are exactly equal to all of the adjacent angles that can be
drawn at one point on a straight line, he extends one side of his triangle, and obtains two adjacent
angles that together are equal to two right ones. Now he divides the external one of these angles
by drawing a line parallel to the opposite side of the triangle, and sees that here there arises an
external adjacent angle which is equal to an internal one, etc. In such a way, through a chain of
inferences that is always guided by intuition, he arrives at a fully illuminating and at the same time
general solution of the question.26

This geometrical method is synthetic, since the concept of triangle, and thus cognition of it, is
expanded based on the construction of the concept in intuition, not an analysis of the concept of
Triangle.

Ibid 631 [A715/B743 – A716/B744].
Kant, Immanuel, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing, 2001), 25 [283]
26
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24
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Arithmetic is given a similar constructive (one may even say ‘performative’) treatment
when Kant considers the simple proposition “7 + 5 = 12’:
The concept of twelve is by no means already thought merely by my thinking of that unification of
seven and five, and no matter how long I analyze my concept of such a possible sum I will still not
find twelve in it. One must go beyond these concepts, seeking assistance in the intuition that
corresponds to one of the two, one’s five fingers, say, or (as in Segner’s arithmetic) five points,
and one after another add the units of the five given in the intuition to the concept of seven. For I
take first the number 7, and, as I take the fingers of my hand as an intuition for assistance with the
concept of 5, to that image of mine I now add the units that I have previously taken together in
order to constitute the number 5, one after another to the number 7, and thus see the number 12
arise. That 7 should be added to 5 I have, to be sure, thought in the concept of a sum = 7 +5, but
not that this sum is equal to the number 12. The arithmetical proposition is therefore always
synthetic…27

Arithmetical problems can only be solved by counting, which is no more empirical than the
drawing of a triangle is. And while the image of fingers or a collection of dots seems to imply
that arithmetic depends on outer intuitions, a collection of fingers or dots alone are not sufficient
for arithmetical computation. As Kant says in the Prolegomena, “Arithmetic attains its concepts
of numbers by the successive addition of units in time” (as well as ‘pure mechanics’, since
motion requires time).28 Both Arithmetic and Algebra require a set notation by means of which
its operations can be conducted.29
Thus, inner sense seems to ground arithmetic calculation, which prompts the question: In
what way is the sensory manifold of inner sense not mathematizable if it must be given in a
mathematizable form (numerically)? Kant, as we recall, presents the problem in part as a
formal one: inner intuitions themselves structured solely by the form of inner sense are presented
mathematically only in succession as a single continuous line (a single temporal dimension).
But the problem may seem more daunting than it actually is. The form of inner sense may be the
basis for numbers (symbols that designate collections of counts) and computation (counting
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collections of counts), and thus be the condition for mathematical sciences, but those numbers
may only find their proper use when applied to the phenomena of outer sense. We forget that
outer sense too is subjected to three extensive dimensions and that very same temporal
dimension. If dimensional complexity is proportional to mathematical complexity, then it is a
foregone conclusion that the manifold of outer intuitions lends itself more to mathematical
complexity than the manifold of inner intuitions does.
It is evident that mental images, such as fantasies and memories, present themselves to
consciousness as if in three extended dimensions. I can imagine myself at the top of the Empire
State building conducting an experiment to determine the rate of free fall on an Earth-sized
planet by dropping an acorn. Nonetheless, this example only reveals the stark difference
between empirical psychology and physics. Empirical psychology (hypothetically speaking) is
not the study of the relationships between elements contained immanently within a mental image
as if they were actually in space. To attempt to take those internal relationships as an object of
investigation is merely to simulate an investigation of outer sense, not inner sense. This
imagined experiment may only help me imagine how I might design and conduct a real
experiment. The imagined experiment could never qualify as an experiment that could verify a
single hypothesis about its imagined objects, but instead is a mental act that at best tests the
capacities of imagination itself (‘How must images appear in the mind?’ ‘What are the limits of
what I can imagine?’). The dimensions presented in mental images are not the dimensions of the
mental process that hypothetically condition the objects of introspective investigation. Most
certainly the limits of what the mind can imagine are relevant to empirical psychology, but
introspection immediately reveals any imagined extension to be impossible to measure and thus
not technically extensive at all. I may certainly imagine something I know to be six feet tall, or
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remember seeing an acorn in free fall at a rate of 9.8/m/s/s, but the content of the mental image
reveals nothing about the mind’s dimensions, only the world’s dimensions. Even venturing the
question ‘What is the rate of free fall of a fantasied object’ borders on absurdity since no hard
and fast rule seems to govern it, only the caprice of the imaginer (limited only by the
imagination’s capacities), or the actual experience of falling objects. While experience of
objects in outer sense may determine the content of psychological objects, it is almost as if the
form of outer sense is revealed to be yet another kind of content given in inner sense once
introspection seizes upon it in an imagined image.30
From the perspective of the four general kinds of Categories of the Understanding, Kant
determines the four kinds of natural science - all of which pertain to ‘corporeal nature’31 (i.e.
bodies of outer sense) – from the four general classes of Categories of the Understanding (which
are mere ‘forms of thought’32 and thus not contents proper).33 Each progressively adds “a new
determination of matter’ by means of progressing from Quantity, to Quality, Relation, and finally
Modality:34
The first may be called Phoronomy; and in it motion is considered as pure quantum, according to
its composition, without any quality of the matter. The second may be termed Dynamics, and in it
motion is regarded as belonging to the quality of the matter under the name of an original moving
force. The third emerges under the name of Mechanics, and in it matter with this dynamical
quality is considered as by its own motion to be in relation. The fourth is called Phenomenology;
and in it matter’s motion or rest is determined merely with reference to the mode of representation,
or modality, i.e., as an appearance of the external senses.35

Kant’s own proof for space being the outer form of time seems to rely on an imagined scenario in which all
content has been subtracted from a space and yet a space still remains. Kant Critique of Pure Reason 159
[A26/B42]. This is why I qualify this statement with ‘almost.’
31
Kant Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science 11 [473]
32
Kant Critique of Pure Reason 334 [B288].
33
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presented in mathematical construction, or that can be given in experience as a determinate object of experience,
must be capable of being brought.” Kant Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science 12 [475-476].
34
Ibid 13 [476].
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From each example it is clear that, according to Kant, a science must always take matter and
motion as its object. Both are only found in outer intuition. But why matter and motion?
Answering this question with Kant’s own words will further demonstrate why he concludes that
inner intuition, when mathematized will only produce a continuous straight line.
It can be agreed that a science ultimately attempts to explain why certain alterations occur
(for example, what the causal principle behind a series of alterations is). Starting from this
position, Kant says:
In order to exhibit alteration as the intuition corresponding to the concept of causality, we must
take motion, as alteration in space, as our example, indeed only by that means can we make
alterations, the possibility of which cannot be comprehended by any pure understanding,
intuitable. Alteration is the combination of contradictorily opposed determinations in the
existence of one and the same thing. Now how it is possible that from a given state an opposed
state of the same thing should follow not only cannot be made comprehensible by reason without
an example, but cannot even be made understandable without intuition, and this intuition is the
motion of a point in space, the existence of which in different places (as a sequence of opposed
determinations) first makes alteration intuitable to us; for in order subsequently to make even
inner alterations thinkable, we must be able to grasp time, as the form of inner sense, figuratively
through a line, and grasp the inner alteration through the drawing of this line (motion), and thus
grasp the successive existence of ourself in different states through outer intuition; the real ground
of which is that all alteration presupposes something that persists in intuition, even in order merely
to be perceived as alteration, but there is no persistent intuition to be found in inner sense.36

In the next section (regarding the material limits of inner sense), I will address the persistence of
outer intuitions. For now, however, it is enough to note that outer intuition seems to be a
precondition for even thinking about the flow of inner sense. Here Kant is presuming a
necessary spatial metaphor for even a pragmatic understanding of time, something later
philosophers such as Bergson would challenge. While Kant does not push the conclusion to its
limit, we can catch sight of it: A mathematization of the phenomena of inner sense would seem
to be a kind of spatialization of inner sense which renders the stream of inner sense into
something it is not. But what character do inner phenomena have before we spatialize them?
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The Material Limitations of Inner Sense
Previous to noting that thinking about inner intuitions requires the metaphor of a spatial
line, Kant mentions a characteristic peculiar to inner intuitions that distinguishes them from outer
intuitions:
It is even more remarkable, however, that in order to understand the possibility of things in
accordance with the categories, and thus to establish the objective reality of the latter, we do not
merely need intuitions, but always outer intuitions. If we take, e.g., the pure concept of relation,
we find that 1) in order to give something that persists in intuition, corresponding to the concept
of substance (and thereby to establish the objective reality of this concept), we need an intuition
in space (of matter), since space alone persistently determines, while time, however, and thus
everything that is in inner sense, constantly flows. 37

Alteration seems to presuppose a relationship of substance and inherence: an object in space may
change but it is still recognizable as the same object throughout its alterations. Extension, being
a primary quality of a thing, seems to be another word for that persisting substance. Kant’s
claim is that within the stream of internal consciousness, inner intuitions are not mere alterations,
or faces, of a persisting inner substance; there is just a persisting flux. Thus neither the object of
inner intuition (be it a feeling, a memory, or a fantasy) nor an observable empirical ego
undergoing change, seem to be revealed by introspection (or at least not in the same way a
physical object endures its various changes).
Furthermore, “the manifold of internal observation is separated only by mere thought, but
cannot be kept separate and be connected again at will.”38 This can mean at least one of two
things: either introspection cannot effect a consistent division of the inner manifold into discrete
mental processes for investigation, or there is no way to keep introspection from bleeding into
the internal flow of inner intuitions being observed. The latter interpretation suggests
methodological limitations that Kant also covers.

37 37
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Methodological Limitations of Empirical Psychology
Kant further notes at least two methodological considerations. First, perhaps indicating
severe naiveté on his part, Kant claims that “another thinking subject [could not (or perhaps even
‘would not’)] submit to our investigations in such a way as to be conformable to our purposes.”39
This may mean either that external observers cannot directly access the inner intuitions of others
(which is obvious), or that people would not willingly submit to psychological experiments.
Second, “the observation itself alters and distorts the state of the object observed.”40 If the object
cannot be observed in its purity, then any principles derived from psychological experimentation
would be tainted and not pertain to natural psychological phenomena. They would at best
pertain to contrived experimental settings. As Patricia Kitcher points out, many of Kant’s
criticisms stem from what he assumes to be empirical psychology’s methodology, “to search for
regularities among items revealed by introspection,”41 which he inherited from Christian Wolff.
If he had considered an empirical method besides introspection, his evaluation of empirical
psychology may have been different.
Thus, on the surface, it seems that Kant was a critic of empirical psychology as early as
the Metaphysical Foundation of Natural Science, written a year before the ‘B Edition’ of the
Critique of Pure Reason was released. And yet, a case can be made that even in the ‘B Edition’
there are still passages that indicate that Kant thought something like empirical psychology was
possible.
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Contradictions: Kant’s Position on Empirical Psychology in the Critique of Pure Reason
The critique of empirical psychology in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science
seems at odds with Kant’s own claims in Critique of Pure Reason that empirical psychology’s
limitations are merely temporary and contingent upon the advance of scientific investigation:
Once one gives up the hope of achieving anything useful a priori, where does that leave empirical
psychology, which has always asserted its place in metaphysics, and from which one has expected
such great enlightenment in our own times? I answer: It comes in where the proper (empirical)
doctrine of nature must be put, namely on the side of applied philosophy, for which pure
philosophy contains a priori principles, which must therefore be combined but never confused
with the former…[Empirical psychology] is not yet rich enough to comprise a subject on its own
and yet it is too important for one to expel it entirely or attach it somewhere else where it may well
have even less affinity than in metaphysics. It is thus merely a long-accepted foreigner, to whom
one grants refuge for a while until it can establish its own domicile in a complete anthropology
(the pendant to the empirical doctrine of nature).42

Guyer and Wood respond to the contradiction between the Metaphysical Foundations and the
first Critique in the editorial notes to the above-quoted section of the Critique:
There could still be a priori principles of inner sense, underwriting the a priori application of
concepts of causation and interaction to psychological phenomena without yielding any
mathematically interesting principles for these phenomena – indeed, that is precisely what the
“Analogies of Experience” and “Refutation of Idealism” have done.43

Thus Guyer and Wood contest Kant’s assumption that a rigorous science requires mathematics
as a necessary condition and instead suggest that its possible for the causal relations necessary
for empirical psychology to be a science can be derived from a priori principles of inner sense.
But this is not the only suggestive passage. Interestingly enough, Kant admits that the
subject has to possess an ‘empirical character’
through which its actions, as appearances, would stand through and through in connection with
other appearances in accordance with constant natural laws, from which, as their conditions, they
could be derived; and thus, in combination with these other appearances, they would constitute
members of a single series of the natural order.44
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Thus, there seems to be something like an empirical ego (an ‘empirical character’) that not only
has ‘constant natural laws’ but must also be a theorized object if a scientific theory of the world
is to be consistent and complete. 45 The empirical character of the agent seems to be an efficient
cause in a chain of efficient causes. But Kant also seems to imply that since this empirical
character is an appearance, it is not actually an agent at all; it is really an effect of an agent’s
intelligible character, which is a thing-in-itself. In the first Critique, Kant says that we can only
cognize appearances but that there is nothing logically inconsistent with supposing a coextensive intelligible realm of things-in-themselves.46 Despite how an agent’s actions seem
predictable based on a comprehensive list of empirical factors that determined an empirical
character, we are not supposed to conclude from this predictive efficacy the reality of an
empirical agent. Free choices, and thus a real agent, only exist insofar as we consider the agent
as a thing-in-itself, or an intelligible character. To say that the agent is the empirical ego is the
same thing as saying that there is no agent at all, since such an ego’s actions would be
determined by external forces (I will return to this shortly).
Thus two logically possible kinds of causal series emerge. First, there is an apparent
causal series of appearances, of which there are preceding influences that determine an empirical
character that in turn determines particular actions. Despite being merely apparent, the
“I call intelligible that in an object of sense which is not itself appearance. Accordingly, if that which must be
regarded as appearance in the world of sense has in itself a faculty which is not an object of intuition through which
it can be the cause of appearances, then one can consider the causality of this being in two aspects, as intelligible in
its action as a thing in itself, and as sensible in the effects of that action as an appearance in the world of sense. Of
the faculty of such a subject we would accordingly form an empirical and at the same time an intellectual concept of
its causality, both of which apply to one and the same effect. ” Ibid 535 [A538/B566].
“…every effective cause must have a character, i.e., a law of its causality, without which it would not be a cause at
all. And then for the subject of the world of sense we would have first an empirical character, through which its
actions, as appearances, would stand through and through in connection with other appearances in accordance with
constant natural laws, from which, as their conditions, they could be derived; and thus, in combination with these
other appearances, they would constitute members of a single series of the natural order. Yet second, one would
also have to allow this subject an intelligible character, through which it is indeed the cause of those actions as
appearances, but which does not stand under any conditions of sensibility and is not itself appearance. The first one
could call the character of such a thing in appearance, the second its character as a thing in itself.” A539/B567
46
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predictive power of this ego construct is proportional to empirical knowledge. Ultimately, the
causal laws that can explain the happenings of the world belong to this apparent series, and can
only be theorized on the basis of its examination. Second, there is a potentially real causal series
of intelligible causes determining empirical effects. Kant often refers to this series as what
grounds free choice. Both series are in perfect harmony, even though what explains the
consistency within and between each series is fundamentally different47 (similar to the divergent
series of causes (Providence) and effects (Events) Deleuze refers to in the Logic of Sense).
“Thus every human being has an empirical character for his power of choice, which is nothing other than a certain
causality of his reason, insofar as in its effects in appearance this reason exhibits a rule, in accordance with which
one could derive the rational grounds and the actions themselves according to their kind and degree, and estimate the
subjective principles of his power of choice. Because this empirical character itself must be drawn from
appearances as effect, and from the rule which experience provides, all the actions of the human being in appearance
are determined in accord with the order of nature by his empirical character and the other cooperating causes; and if
we could investigate all the appearance of his power of choice down to their basis, then there would be no human
action that we could not predict with certainly, and recognize as necessary given its preceding conditions. Thus in
regard to this empirical character there is no freedom, and according to this character we can consider the human
being solely by observing, and, as happens in anthropology, by trying to investigate the moving causes of his
actions physiologically.
But if we consider the very same actions in relation to reason, not, to be sure, in relation to speculative reason, in
order to explain them as regards their origin, but insofar as reason is the cause of producing them by themselves –
in a word, if we compare them with reason in a practical respect – then we find a rule and order that is entirely other
than the natural order. For perhaps everything that has happened in the course of nature, and on empirical grounds
inevitably had to happen, nevertheless ought not to have happened. At times, however, we find, or at least believe
we have found, that the ideas of reason have actually proved their causality in regard to the actions of human beings
as appearances, and that therefore these actions have occurred not through empirical causes, no, but because they
were determined by grounds of reason. Ibid 541 – 542 [A549/B577 – A550/B5578]
“In order to clarify the regulative principle of reason through an example of its empirical use – not in order to
confirm it (for such proofs are unworkable for transcendental propositions) – one may take a voluntary action, e.g. a
malicious lie, through which a person has brought about a certain confusion in society; and one may first investigate
its moving causes, through which it arose, judging on that basis how the lie and its consequences could be imputed
to the person. With this first intent one goes into the sources of the person’s empirical character, seeking them in a
bad upbringing, bad company, and also finding them in the wickedness of a natural temper insensitive to shame,
partly in carelessness and thoughtlessness; in so doing one does not leave out of account the occasioning causes. In
all this one proceeds as with any investigation in the series of determining causes for a given natural effect. Now
even if one believes the action to be determined by these causes, one nonetheless blames the agent, and not on
account of his unhappy natural temper, nor on account of the circumstances influencing him, not even on account of
the life he has led previously; for one presupposes that it can be entirely set aside how that life was constituted, and
that the series of conditions that transpired might not have been, but rather that this deed could be regarded as
entirely unconditioned in regard to the previous state, as though with that act the agent had started a series of
consequences entirely from himself. This blame is grounded on the law of reason, which regards reason as a cause
that, regardless of all the empirical conditions just named, could have and ought to have determined the conduct of
the person to be other than it is. And indeed one regards the causality of reason not as a mere concurrence with
other causes, but as complete in itself, even if sensuous incentives were not for it but were indeed entirely against it;
the action is ascribed to the agent’s intelligible character: now, in the moment when he lies, it is entirely his fault;
hence reason, regardless of all empirical conditions the deed, is fully free, and this deed is to be attributed entirely to
its failure to act. Ibid 544 [A554/B582-A555/B583]
47
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Granted that all appearances are only in apparent causal connection with one another (since
things-in-themselves are potentially the real causes), the agency of the empirical ego is also
apparent. The world of sense, bound up in natural laws imposed by the sensibility and the
understanding working in tandem, is a world of objects, not subjects. By definition, if a subject
necessarily has agency it cannot exist in the world of appearance. Instead, we find the subject
always behind the curtain drafting laws: theoretical and moral.48
Possible Motives behind the Rejection of the Empirical Ego
My consistent claim will be that, for Kant, there is no empirical ego (or at least that it is
not properly speaking a subject) and thus any science of the empirical ego (‘empirical
psychology’) will inevitably bypass the subject. The motivations behind Kant’s rejection of
empirical psychology may be due to his commitment to prove the existence of freedom, a task he
lays the groundwork for in the first Critique but only explicitly develops in the second. This is
not to say that Kant’s rejection of the empirical ego (and thus the empirical psychology which
studies it) is a mere assertion based on his prejudices. Rather, just like Kant defines the Critical
project, which attempts to address the problems of metaphysics by inverting the traditional
epistemological relationship between the object and cognition, as an ‘experiment,’ we are best
served looking at Kant’s positing the possibility of freedom as another such experiment.49 It is
quite possible that either experiment might disprove the entertained hypothesis, causing the
Critical edifice to come crumbling down.

This opens a Pandora’s box of questions regarding the metaphysical status of the faculties (such as sensibility,
imagination, understanding, reason, desire, and judgment) fundamental to Kant’s project, especially considering that
such psychological speculations seem to be banned by the Paralogisms. Avery Goldman’s book Kant and the
Subject of Critique deals precisely with this issue. Avery argues that the Kant’s account of the faculties and the
psychological idea overlap, which means that his account of the faculties is regulative rather than dogmatic. A
regulative use pragmatically assumes an Idea for the sake of theoretical coherence (i.e. as an organizational
principle). A dogmatic use, on the other hand, would be a claim that the psychological Idea Kant articulates actually
exists just as he says it does.
49
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Taking the thesis of freedom as a starting point, we can say the following: Identifying the
self with the empirical ego, a mere appearance, would be fatal to the notion of freedom since
“…if appearances are things in themselves, then freedom cannot be saved.”50 If the self were an
empirical ego, it would be a naturally-determinable object subject to the Second Analogy of
Experience (a principle of the pure understanding to which all appearances are subject), which
states that “All alterations occur in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and
effect.”51 That means any event in the world of sense must be understood as an effect of a
preceding cause, making all acts predetermined. Freedom would be impossible. This danger as
well as its possible resolution is directly addressed in the Third Antinomy of Reason (an
antinomy is technically any error of Reason that results when two mutually exclusive positions
seem equally as likely. Kant refers to each as either a Thesis or an Antithesis of that thesis).
More specifically, an antinomy is the form of dialectical illusion that results when Reason
attempts to find an unconditioned element that can ground a cosmological series so that
completeness of cognition can be attained. For example, an atom is an indivisible theoretical
entity that is the basic component of all compositions of matter. Without it, a chemical model of
the universe would lack a first principle to ground it as a science since compositions would have
no basic parts to make them up (I will deal with the topic of dialectical illusion more in-depth in
Chapter 2).
Preliminarily, I will note the following: Because Reason, unlike the Understanding, is not
bound to experience, it has nothing to ground it besides the law of contradiction. Unfortunately,
without the definitive verdict of experience, certain debates (cosmological ones concerned with
the world of appearance) will produce equally compelling positions for and against a particular
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cosmological thesis. The Third Antinomy in particular concerns whether or not there is a first
cause to any causal series. In other words, it is the question of whether or not there are ever
actions that are performed freely (first causes initiated by an agent). If there are no first causes,
and only an empirical character bound up in the chain of cause and effect exists, then the
antithesis of the Third Antimony would apply and “There is no freedom, but everything in the
world happens solely in accordance with laws of nature.”52
By suggesting that there are two ways to think of a thing - as it appears and as it is in
itself - and then by demonstrating that there is no logical contradiction in supposing the latter
alongside the former, Kant provides for the possibility that freedom could exist. Kant argues that
space and time are forms of sensibility that belong to appearances alone, and not to things as they
actually are. This move is crucial because the primary reason why freedom cannot exist in the
realm of appearances is because it is time-bound (Anything in time is always preceded by a
previous moment that conditions the present moment, making a first causal moment impossible).
But if the soul is a thing-in-itself, it may exist in a non-temporal state. Kant concludes that this
could allow the soul to be free. As a consequence, however, all theoretical attempts to know the
soul fail, since the soul is specifically a noumenal entity (a thing-in-itself), and never presented
in appearance. As we know, theory can only understand the world as it appears (the
phenomenal), not how it really is.
It might be said that the argument that concludes that ‘empirical psychology threatens
freedom’ confuses an epistemological point with a metaphysical one. For example, it may be
granted that empirical psychology cannot properly study the empirical ego based on the
introspective method (or perhaps any method), which would make the science impossible. But
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just because the empirical ego cannot be known does not mean we can speak to its actual
metaphysical status. In other words, empirical psychology may be impossible but the ego may
still not only exist but also be naturally-determined (unfree). After all, we have already noted
that Kant speaks of an ‘empirical character,’ which is the composite of influences based on such
factors as upbringing, company, and natural temper.53 Such a personal nexus of natural factors
seems evident every time I reflect on what experiences made me who I am in the present.
Furthermore, empirical psychology of today seems relatively successful at determining how
certain natural influences and experiences shape our characters and decisions. Thus, the claim
that we as subjects are nothing more than the puppets of nature can never be ruled out
completely on theoretical grounds. The grounds upon which the intelligible character (or
subject) is to be eventually secured will not be theoretical but practical.
What is the Empirical Ego?
If the empirical ego is not a subject (or agent), what is it? Consider the following
passage:
If more than the cogito were the ground of our pure rational cognition of thinking beings in
general; if we also made use of observations about the play of our thoughts and the natural laws of
the thinking self created from them: then an empirical psychology would arise, which would be a
species of the physiology of inner sense, which would perhaps explain the appearances of inner
sense, but could never serve to reveal such properties as do not belong to possible experience at all
(as properties of the simple), nor could it serve to teach apodictically about thinking beings in
general something touching on their nature; thus it would be no rational psychology.54

Here Kant admits that the thinking self could have ‘natural laws,’ moreover, natural laws that
can be observed and known. This would seem to be all that empirical psychology ever seeks to
know anyway. Nonetheless, empirical psychology could not “reveal such properties as do not
belong to possible experience at all” nor “teach apodictically about thinking beings in general
something touching on their nature.” The first caveat concerning ‘properties outside of possible
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experience’ is inconsequential to an empirical science and does not rule out empirical
psychology, only rational psychology. The second caveat would seem to imply that such natural
laws can only be empirical laws, since they are merely probable. Obviously, such a condition is
not a problem for an empirical science either, since it never contends to attain apodictic
knowledge.
And yet the point remains: if empirical psychology is to find psychological laws, they
had to be ‘placed’ in its experiential field of observation by the transcendental mind, since they
are the very structure of that experiential field of observation. As Kant says, “…as exaggerated
and contradictory as it may sound to say that the understanding is itself the source of the laws of
nature, and thus of the formal unity of nature, such an assertion is nevertheless correct and
appropriate to the object, namely experience.”55 If, as before noted, inner sense is merely a flux
constantly in transition, without persisting objects within it, like the shifting patterns of a
kaleidoscope, this must be because the field of inner consciousness does not permit the
application of certain categories, like Substance (we should recall that Kant’s claim seems to be
that only outer intuitions are seized by the category of substance). How could an empirical ego
exist if the one category that would act as its transcendental condition (rendering a mere
conjunction of inner intuitions into a coherent, perceived subject) cannot apply to the field of
observation it is supposed to inhabit?
A point that Kant will consistently return to now becomes more apparent: whatever
structures experience by means of the categories might not be self-reflexively cognizable by
means of them. We may be aware of ourselves as perceivers, knowers, and doers, but when we
Ibid 242 [A127]. NOTE: CONTNUING ON…”To be sure, empirical laws, as such, can by no means derive their
origin from the pure understanding, just as the immeasurable manifoldness of the appearances cannot be adequately
conceived through the pure form of sensible intuition. But all empirical laws are only particular determinations of
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assume a lawful form, just as, regardless of the variety of their empirical form, all appearances must nevertheless
always be in accord with the pure form of sensibility.” Kant Critique of Pure Reason 242 – 243 [A127-128].
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subtract the outer perceptions of our experience in an attempt to approach the subject in its
purity, it disappears from view, like a painting whose paint has been stripped away, leaving
behind nothing but a blank canvas.
Nonetheless, we may be able to concede that the field of possible psychological
experience may still exhibit observable laws even if we can never observe the self in its purity;
These very laws may even reveal themselves once we abandon the pursuit of observing the selfsubsistent ego and instead see it in the world as a nexus of natural forces (beholding it in its true
‘empirical character’). Granted that we are now contemplating a natural entity, Kant himself has
already determined which psychological causes, or impulses, determine it: the ‘pathological
sensible impulses’ characteristic of the human animal.56 Seen in this new light, the self that is
uncovered by such concessions is nothing other than the human animal.
These animal impulses ultimately aim for the acquisition of pleasure and are typically
self-serving. As long as the self determines its actions in accordance with these pathological
sensible impulses, it cleaves to its bodily contingencies, reacts passively by means of the faculty
of sensibility, is bound to the conditioning of the past moment, and for these reasons is not free.
It would seem that insofar as empirical psychology concerns itself with the causes that lie behind
human behavior insofar as it conceives of man as appearance, it can concern itself only with such
animal impulses and not ‘rational’ intentions. In its pursuit of the human subject, empirical
psychology finds only the human object. Therefore, in a certain respect, we represent ourselves
to ourselves as human animals.
Yet not all action seems pathologically-driven. Some choices we make even seem to run
counter to those we would make if pleasure were our sole interest and aim. Moral choices in
particular, Kant argues, reveal the possibility that we may be capable of determining our actions
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freely, not as reactive human objects bound to empirical circumstance like machines, but active
rational subjects stubbornly guided by moral principles. Kant has ingeniously turned what is an
epistemological disadvantage (Reason’s detachment from experience) and shown it to provide a
possible basis for Reason-driven behavior not subjected Nature’s influence. Kant refers to
ethical reasoning as practical reason, and opposes it to speculative (or theoretical) reason.
However, the intercession of practical reason into the cognitive apparatus seems to incite
further questions: 1) Is not a moral principle still an inner intuition (or empirical representation)57
by virtue of being inwardly perceived, and thus still a determining ground of the will bound up in
the world of appearance?, and 2) Do we ever have a genuine experience of deliberately making a
free choice at all, or does inner sense just perceive the passage of thoughts, such as maxims, that
then lead to an observed action?
Regarding the first question, transcendental idealism provides us with a class of causes
that can determine the will but that are not mere empirical representations: principles that can be
known a priori.58 These a priori principles are found in at least two varieties: either as
transcendental conditions for possible experience (such as “All intuitions are extensive
magnitudes”59), or as the moral law, which takes no consideration of empirical circumstances
and commands with absolute authority. The empirical representation of the contemplated
principle - namely, the actual thought of it - is not what determines the will, since this is a mere
appearance. The rational principle is. The thoughts of a moral principle are not the moral
principle itself, so we ought not to be concerned that moral principles may be bound up in the
cause-and-effect web of the phenomenal realm, only the representations of moral principles (i.e.
the thoughts themselves, not their noumenal referent). Kant merely has to interject an alternative
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impulse to the animal impulse received by our faculty of sensibility. The fact that we might have
to represent a moral impulse or principle to ourselves sensibly as an inwardly perceived moment
or flourish of sequential, particular, temporalized thoughts, or presentations60 about a moral
principle does not mean that the representation as a mere thought conditions our will to act.
Instead, it is said that the representation of the form of moral law – the form of universality itself,
which can be drafted into being only by the faculty of Reason – conditions the will, not the inner
intuition, or presentation of that representation.61 Discussion of the moral law will be provided
more in-depth in Chapter Six.
The second question – Do we ever experience a free act? – seems to drive at what may
ironically be a very Kantian response to a metaphysical question: If we cannot experience
something, can it ever be anything to us? Does noumenal freedom leave a phenomenal trace?
The Status of the Transcendental Ego
Up until this point, I have simplified the Kantian subject by reducing discussion to two
potential candidates: the a priori soul (the subject of the Critique of Practical Reason and the
inner sense of the faculty of sensibility that characterizes our internal subjective experience.
These two kinds of subject represent the dueling faculties of desire and pleasure - the tripartite
relationship of the will with the faculty of sensibility and the faculty of feeling. In the first
Critique, however, there is a third candidate: the ‘I think’ that grounds the unity of apperception.

Deleuze distinguishes between cognitions that ‘represent’ and intuitions that are presented: “Strictly speaking
intuition, even if it is a priori, is not a representation, nor is sensibility a source of representations. The important
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standpoint we no longer need to define knowledge as a synthesis of representations. It is the representation itself
which is defined as knowledge, that is to say as the synthesis of that which is presented.” Deleuze, Gilles, Kant’s
Critical Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1984)
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In our lived experience, we encounter a manifold of intuitions. For example, a trip to the
train station will initially present your senses with a patchwork of unrelated sensations: a glint of
light off of a window, a sliding door, the metallic rim of a partly concealed wheel, etc. Even
once these are taken to be a set of intuitions relatable in some way (e.g. a train), time passes and
the immediate form these objects of intuition take will be no more. In order for this patchwork
of sensations to constitute a whole, continuous, experience many things must be presupposed,
such as a retention of how a present intuition relates to a previous intuition (such as how the
intuition of a train traveling out of a station relates to the stationary train it once was 15 seconds
previous to its departure). Without retention, we could have no idea of stable objects passing
through time at all. But even the retention of an object of sense through time would be
impossible if there was no unifying consciousness to which all of these representations belonged,
what Kant calls the transcendental unity of apperception. This unity in turn gives objects their
unity (the notion of a general object that underlies all objective predication: the ‘Object = X’):
It is clear, however, that since we have to do only with the manifold of our representations, and
that X which corresponds to them (the object), because it should be something distinct from all of
our representations, is nothing for us, the unity that the object makes necessary can be nothing
other than the formal unity of the consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of the
representations. Hence we say that we cognize the object if we have effected synthetic unity in the
manifold of intuition.62

The ‘I’ of apperception, however, is a mere logical necessity devoid of content. We
know it to be the necessary subject to which all presentations and representations belong, and
that this ‘I’ actively molds intuitions into cognitions to form experience, but the subject lays
beyond all attempts to objectify it and assign it predicates. As the Paralogisms section of the first
Critique demonstrates, a transcendental illusion regarding the self occurs if content is attributed
to the transcendental subject of apperception. This, interestingly enough, follows the pattern
Kant takes up in the Critique of Practical Reason when he says that content, or ‘material’ cannot
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be assigned to the representation that determines the will without leading to heteronomy of
choice (i.e. an amoral action, at best). Purity of form over the particularity of content is the
constitutive thread of the Critical system.
The transcendental subject of apperception at first seems to complicate the situation
further since now we are left with three possible subjects rather than the original two. Kant
scholars often respond to this tripartite self by suggesting that the transcendental ego falls either
on the phenomenal side or the noumenal side. Patricia Kitcher, a representative of the former
position, insists that, granted the noumena’s foreclosure from the realm of experience and thus
from knowledge, transcendental apperception “must present a phenomenal, if highly abstract,
aspect of the self.”63
If Kant is right that anything of which we can have knowledge must be governed by causal laws,
then synthetic connection will be lawful. Imagination, understanding, and reason will all have
their own laws. The I that thinks will be phenomenal and causally determined. This I is, however,
too close to us. It is the I with which we identify. 64

However, Andrew Cutrofello (in response to Kitcher) notes, “…for Kant the transcendental
subject [of apperception] is the noumenal subject insofar as it knows nothing about itself other
than the fact that it unifies appearances of itself as empirical subject…For in the end Kant thinks
there is only one subject – the noumenal subject…”65
But a close reading of the text reveals something much more interesting. Kant refers to
the transcendental ‘I’ as:
simple and in content for itself wholly empty representation I, of which one cannot even say that it
is a concept, but a mere consciousness that accompanies every concept. Through this I, or He, or
It (the thing), which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of thoughts
= x, which is recognized only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and about which, in
abstraction, we can never have even the least concept; because of which we therefore turn in a
constant circle, since we must always already avail ourselves of the representation of it at all times
in order to judge anything about it; we cannot separate ourselves from this inconvenience, because
the consciousness in itself is not even a representation distinguishing a particular object, but rather
Kitcher, Patricia, Kant’s Transcendental Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 139.
Kitcher Kant’s Transcendental Psychology 139.
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a form of representation in general, insofar as it is to be called a cognition; for of it alone can I say
that through it I think anything. 66

The transcendental ‘I’ is both ‘the form of representation in general’ as well as, by virtue of this
formal qualification, bereft of intrinsic content and thus ‘empty.’ It is like the vanishing point in
a painting that sets the image in perspective, or the blind spot in a field of vision which is a mere
trace of the material conditions that make seeing possible. Like a vanishing point, the ‘I’
necessarily lies outside experience, except as an experienced absence that structures experience,
providing it with unity. Kant insists that the proposition “I think” must be taken
‘problematically’ (which belongs to the register of possibility), and thus does not concern an
actual object of possible experience.67 If this holds true, then it makes sense that the empirical
ego is never introspected: the appearance or representation of the noumenal ‘I’ appears as the
empty trace of the free subject. Lacking intuitional content, this ‘I’ can be thought but not
cognized. This thesis is similar to what Avery Goldman argues in Kant and the Subject of
Critique; namely, that the psychological idea is used regulatively by Kant from the start to
structure the critical analysis of the mind.68
Controversies aside, the following conclusions are nonetheless implied: 1) Kant does not
conceive of an empirical ego as a subsisting entity at all. 2) While all representations of inner
sense belong to me, I never encounter the ‘me’ to which my representations belong in any
phenomenal way.
Kant at no point suggests that we ever experience the soul acting freely - since we cannot
have intellectual intuition of the soul – only that we can become aware that it is possible that we
can act freely in a given situation. He only says that experience requires a unifying ‘I’ and that
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moral decisions require freedom. Furthermore, grounds for believing (albeit, not knowing) that
the soul is free can be found whenever we act contrary to pathological inclinations69 (such as
choosing to die rather than provide false testimony against an honorable man).
Suppose that someone says his lust is irresistible when the desired object and opportunity are
present. Ask him whether he would not control his passion if, in front of the house where he has
this opportunity, a gallows were erected on which he would be hanged immediately after
gratifying his lust. We do not have to guess very long what his answer would be. But ask him
whether he thinks it would be possible for him to overcome his love of life, however great it may
be, if his sovereign threatened him with the same sudden death unless he made false deposition
against an honorable man whom the ruler wished to destroy under a plausible pretext. Whether he
would or not he perhaps will not venture to say; but that it would be possible for him he would
certainly admit without hesitation. He judges, therefore, that he can do something because he
knows he ought, and he recognizes that he is free – a fact which, without the moral law, would
have remained unknown to him.70

Kant argues, quite plausibly, that it is at least possible for anyone to recognize that decisions can
be determined on grounds that have nothing to do with empirical considerations.
But more is revealed in this passage than the possibility of freedom. Kant’s example of
ethical action solidifies the implicit tripartite manners in which the self can be conceived: The
soul seems to be thinkable as a mere absence or trace of a unifying ‘I,’ cognizable as an animal
self, and practically as a moral agent, or soul. Chapter Two will address the problems with
developing a psychological doctrine around the empty ‘I’ and Chapter Three around the animal
self. Only in Chapter Six will I explicate Kant’s doctrine of the subject qua subject.
1.2 Overview
I will assume for now that difficulties arise in Kant’s doctrine because, granted his
arguments, he cannot conceive of the self as an empirical ego, and that any mention of an
empirical ego either contradicts his critical system or is a misattribution. Nonetheless, Kant
considers the site left by the absent empirical ego dangerous territory for at least two reasons: 1)
the empty placeholder is often filled with the dialectical illusions of reason, and 2) it is the nexus
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point of the passive faculty of sensibility (animal impulses), the faculty of pleasure and pain, and
the will (i.e. desire). The next two chapters will explore two different threats to human freedom
that Kant identifies: the theoretical threat of rational psychology and the practical threat of
heteronomy. Both involve the misuse of reason, with disastrous consequences.
A summary of these dangers are as follows:
1) Rational Psychology
Rational psychology would seem to conform to a science of the soul not bound to the
fleeting flux of inner sense, or even, if it were possible, an objective arrangement of inner
sense.71 But, for Kant, this merely presents a solution worse than the problem it addresses.
Rational psychology attempts to theoretically contemplate the soul, which, for Kant, can only
properly be addressed practically as a subject, never as a theoretical object. Thus, I will claim,
rather than rational psychology being guilty of judging the content of the soul empirically, such
as by ascribing to it empirically-verifiable predicates - such as the Epicureans judged the soul to
be made of a fine substance, like fire or wind - it is fundamentally guilty of assuming that the
soul conforms to the form of an empirical subject matter: i.e. that it is an object as such. If ‘I
think’ is the “sole text of rational psychology,” then ‘object = x’ is the paper upon which this text
is written.72 Surely it cannot be denied that rational psychology makes unjustified claims as to
the content of the soul, but this follows from the fundamental formal misrecognition of the soul
as an object first, and only then as an object of knowledge. Theoretical inquiries necessarily
reify their subject matters. As a further consequence, the fundamental position of the subject of
71
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apperception as a precondition of experience is also subverted, insofar as any attempt to use the
categories to conceive of the subject’s predicates neglects that these very same categories must
assume the subject of apperception in order to be applied.73 In both regards, the ‘subjecthood’ of
the soul is inevitably lost.
We will notice that Kant is deliberate when he calls the phenomenal world a world of
effects and then places the subject in the world of causes, or actions.74 This is done so that any
description of the transcendental predicates of the subject will describe only its effects –
primarily, the transcendental unity of apperception, which is an act of spontaneity that unifies
intuitions by means of concepts. Nowhere do we find an account of what the subject is, only the
effects of its actions. The same strategy is followed when the subject is properly conceived of by
practical reason as a doer of actions, as an agent rather than a patient. The subjecthood of the
subject is in both ways retained. Thus, any use of the categories to conceive of the subject must
use the categories in such a dynamic manner – to determine what the subject ought to become
rather than what it is – which can only be accomplished by means of practical reason.75
To understand better the various ways rational psychology reifies the soul, the
Paralogisms in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason must be reviewed. This will require a discussion
of how transcendental Ideas are produced by reason (furthermore abbreviated to ‘Ideas’). Ideas
are concepts of reason – rather than the understanding – that are not fated to wed intuitions.
Ideas refer to entities outside the proper bounds of possible experience because they are not
based on anything in the empirical world.
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To better understand what is meant by ‘possible experience,’ I will provide a brief
exposition. Let me start off as basic as possible. Right now the reader is aware of perceptions,
such as the page that is being read. Kant calls such perceptions ‘empirical intuitions,’ which are
presented in the forms of space and time; the latter are called ‘pure intuitions’. By themselves,
however, perception as such would amount to little more than a succession of perceived events
without any necessary connections made between them. Since in our everyday experiences we
do not see a world of flux but instead see objects essentially related to one another, some other
faculty of mind must be in play distinct from perception itself: the faculty of understanding.
Concepts are the means by which the understanding asserts necessary connections between
intuitions. The table of categories,76 in theory, contains all possible predicates that can either
unify predicates to an object or relate objects to one another:
 Quantity
o Unity, Plurality, and Totality
 For example, I can judge something to be one, many, or all
 Quality
o Reality, Negation, Limitation
 For example, I can assert that the Sun is not blue
 Relation
o Of Inherence and Substance, Of Causality and Dependence, Of Community
 For example, I can assert that the turning of a key starts my car
 Modality
o Possibility – Impossibility, Existence – Non-existence, Necessity-Contingent
 For example, I can assert that a square circle is not an object of possible
experience
Cognition is, typically, the combination of an intuition (a subject) to a concept (a
predicate): ‘Socrates is mortal.’ Not merely is ‘mortal’ acting here as a concept, but the
judgment is subtended by the more fundamental categories noted above: Unity (since Socrates is
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one subject), Reality (‘mortal’ is being asserted of him), Substance and Inherence (mortality is a
an inherent trait of Socrates), and Existence (Socrates was materially present).
Let us explore the application of the concept of causality, since it is the most accessible.
For example, I may be presented with a series of intuitions, such as a needle prick of a finger and
a feeling of pain. According to Kant, I only attribute the feeling of pain to the needle prick
because the understanding has connected otherwise distinct intuitions by means of the category
of causality. As Hume notes, if I just stay loyal to what I perceive, I only perceive a succession
of events, never a causal relationship between the pricking of my finger and the feeling of pain.
The act of connecting distinct intuitions in accordance with the understanding is called synthesis,
a mediating act which is performed by the imagination through what is a called a schema. The
imagination acts as the understanding’s hands that mold intuitions together in accordance with
the understanding’s directions. The final product – two intuitions synthesized – expresses a
knowledge claim, proposition, or cognition ("the needle prick caused me to feel pain”). There is
no other way, according to Kant, for knowledge to be acquired about the world of experience
other than this synthetic process whereby intuitions are united to concepts of understanding. A
perimeter of possible objects of knowledge is thus established based on the world of intuitions
(formal intuitions being the basis of mathematics and empirical intuitions of science). This
perimeter is referred to as ‘the proper bounds of possible experience.’
Ideas are not like concepts of the understanding because they do not rely on intuitions;
they order cognitions in accordance with aims of reason’s own devising, not the understanding’s.
Therefore, Ideas, which will be discussed more in detail in the next chapter, concern entities
outside the bounds of possible experience. Due to dialectical illusion – three particular
tendencies the faculty of reason naturally has to exceed the bounds of possible experience -
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however, these purely conjectural entities are treated by reason as if they were, at least, as
theoretically grounded as empirical cognitions. There are three Ideas: the Soul (and its
immortality), the World (and with it, the possibility of freedom), and God (and with Him, the
promise of eternal reward and punishment). Each idea can be taken up as both a theoretical
object and a practical subject, the latter indicated by the content in parentheses. The paralogisms
concern the Idea of the soul - although its immortality can only be properly demonstrated in
Chapter Six where I discuss practical reason. As will be discussed, the paralogisms attempt to
describe the soul through an inappropriate application of specific categories. Only after the
improper uses of these categories are explained can the groundwork be laid for their appropriate
use by reason, a task which will be the primary topic of Chapter Six of this work.
The paralogisms, furthermore, can be better understood if put in their proper historical
context. Therefore, I will also supplement the discussion of each paralogism with those
philosophical works that Kant most likely had in mind when he identified them. The following
list documents such influences and comes from ‘Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: Background
Source Materials,’ compiled and translated by Eric Watkins:77
 The Paralogisms of Pure Reason (A338/B396-A405/B432)
o Christian Wolff: Rational Thoughts (1720)
o Martin Knutzen: System of Efficient Causes (1735) and Philosophical
Treatise on the Immaterial Nature of the Soul (1744)
o Alexander Baumgarten: Metaphysics (1739)
o Christian August Crusius: Sketch of the Necessary Truths of Reason
(1745)
o Leonhard Euler: Letters to a German Princess (1760-1762)
o Marcus Herz: Observations from Speculative Philosophy (1771)
o Johann August Eberhard: Universal Theory of Thinking and Sensing: A
Treatment that Received the Prize Announced in the Year 1776 by the
Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin (1776)
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o Johann Nicolaus Tetens: Philosophical Essays on Human Nature and Its
Development (1777)
 The First Paralogism: Substantiality (A348-A351)
o Christian Wolff: Rational Thoughts (1720)
o Alexander Baumgarten: Metaphysics (1739)
o Christian August Crusius: Sketch of the Necessary Truths of Reason
(1745)
 The Second Paralogism: Simplicity (A351-A361)
o Christian Wolff: Rational Thoughts (1720)
o Martin Knutzen: System of Efficient Causes (1735) and Philosophical
Treatise on the Immaterial Nature of the Soul (1744)
o Alexander Baumgarten: Metaphysics (1739)
o Christian August Crusius: Sketch of the Necessary Truths of Reason
(1745)
o Marcus Herz: Observations from Speculative Philosophy (1771)
 The Third Paralogism: Personal Identity (A361-A366)
o Alexander Baumgarten: Metaphysics (1739)
o Johann August Eberhard: Universal Theory of Thinking and Sensing: A
Treatment that Received the Prize Announced in the Year 1776 by the
Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin (1776)
o Johann Nicolaus Tetens: Philosophical Essays on Human Nature and Its
Development (1777)
 The Fourth Paralogism: Ideality (A366-A380)
o Alexander Baumgarten: Metaphysics (1739)
2) Heteronomy of Choice
Heteronomy of choice, the other danger, is a term that indicates any attempt to direct the
will by means of empirical considerations which can neither present us with universal and
necessary moral principles, nor escape the orbit of natural domination. Kant refers to it as a
“dependence on natural laws in following some impulse or inclination; it is heteronomy because
the will does not give itself the law but only directions for the reasonable obedience to
pathological laws.”78 Heteronomy identifies the self only with the empirical character of the self,
which is an empirical object (an animal), and not a subject. It is, in a sense, the opposite of
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rational psychology, since its pursuit of ‘good’ objects makes it empirical. Since heteronomy is
ultimately rooted in sensation, in particular, ‘good’ psychological states, (namely, in achieving
happiness), it is the ethical sister of empirical psychology.
As will be discussed in detail, Kant identifies four different kinds of heteronomous
theories, each of which can be identified with a previous or contemporaneous moral theorist.

In

other words, there are four distinct ways a free subject can subvert its own subjectivity and
become an object, all of which occur when an object of some fashion acts as the grounds for
determining what the will is going to do. Provided is a brief outline of those heteronomous
theories - referred to as the Table of Heteronomy - that make up a comprehensive system of all
manners of objects, and thus, of all means of domination.
1. Subjective-External Objects
o Examples: Government and cultural authority: law and custom
o Thinkers: Michel de Montaigne, Bernard Mandeville, Thomas Hobbes
2. Subjective-Internal Objects
o Examples: Pleasure, Moral Feeling
o Thinkers: Epicureanism, Francis Hutchenson
3. Objective-Internal Objects
o Example: Moral perfection
o Thinkers: Epictetus and other Stoics
4. Objective-External Objects
o Example: The will of God
o Thinkers: Christian August Crusius and other theologians
Evident here is the role of the object once again in the subversion of the free subject, this time in
a causal rather than substantial role. In fact, this is deliberate on Kant’s part, since reason
generates the Paralogisms by means of the categorical syllogism (attended by the category of
substance), while freedom is a fundamentally distinct kind of causality apart from natural
causality.
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The claim that heteronomy of choice is at odds with what Kant calls ‘autonomy of the
will’ may seem to be a strange claim, since all non-Kantian moral theories fall under it by
design. After all, the common understanding of domination has less to do with an ill-chosen
principle than it does a passive effect suffered by one due to the influences of another. Is there a
role in Kant’s theory of domination for such external influences, or is heteronomy of choice
concerned primarily with the principles we give ourselves? It would seem that Kant conflates
both coercion and heteronomous principles, since heteronomous principles allow an object to
determine our will. The coercion is, in effect, the same, since instead of one human being
forcing another to submit, heteronomy of choice allows nature itself to coerce us, particularly the
animal body and its environment. The objects of coercion identified by the table of heteronomy
would thus fall in line with those possible objects, or forces that could coerce us in a traditional
sense. In Chapter Six, I will examine how Kant theorizes we can escape the despotism of the
object.

39

2.1 The Faculty of Reason: An Introduction to the Paralogisms
Kant claims that Rational Psychology aims at understanding the subject qua subject (or as
an ‘absolute subject’), but that we can only understand subjects by means of predicates (or
concepts), never grasp them as they are in-themselves. But when Reason disregards this
limitation and tries to reason about the soul, the Paralogisms result.79 To better understand the
paralogisms, it is necessary to know how the mind generates them. This requires an account of
the faculty of reason, which produces Ideas. Kant says, “If the understanding may be a faculty of
unity of appearances by means of rules, then reason is the faculty of unity of the rules of
understanding under principles” (Principles are the means by which cognitions can be
synthesized, and in general can be considered universal propositions).80 An interesting
consequence of this is that reason, unlike the understanding, “never applies directly to experience
or to any object, but instead applies to the understanding”.81 Such an empirical detachment
makes any direct application of reason to theoretical speculations problematic, since reason is not
bound by the parameters of possible experience, as was previously noted. Oddly enough, this
disadvantage is turned on its head by practical reason into a fundamental advantage, since reason
appears to be a faculty that is not determined by empirical considerations. Thus, the
independence of reason translates into the independence of the self: the soul’s freedom.
So, granted the transcendental rather than empirical origins of both the concepts of the
understanding and principles of reason, it is not difficult to see how the mind not only can but
has a pernicious tendency to go beyond the bounds of possible experience and fall into error.
Reason is the faculty which gives “unity a priori through concepts to the understanding’s
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manifold cognitions, which may be called “the unity of reason.””82 In other words, reason
unifies what the understanding produces through its own syntheses in an attempt to unify what
the latter could not synthesize by means of concepts alone. In itself, as we will see, there isn’t
necessarily anything wrong with this impulse to unify cognitions into a coherent system of
knowledge since such a system is more useful. The unity of reason ultimately requires the
positing of a founding element, referred to by Kant as an Idea, which will provide totality to a
series of cognitions. An Idea is “a concept of the understanding [freed] from the unavoidable
limitations of a possible experience” in order to ground the conditioned.83 In other words, it is
the concept of an ‘unconditioned’ something upon which all cognitions pertaining to a particular
field of experience rely that, by necessity, can never be an object of possible experience. An Idea
is thus a transfigured concept.
Thus, even at such a preliminary moment of discussion, we can already infer that in some
way, the Ideas of the soul, the world, and God will allegedly ground what, for Kant, must
comprise a comprehensive division of the field of knowledge into three possible disciplines:
psychology, cosmology, and theology. Kant lifts this threefold division from Christian Wolff’s
major text Rational Thoughts on God, the World, and the Soul of Human Beings, also All Things
in General.84 But, as we will see, ‘Ideas,’ by nature, if taken as indicative of something real, can
produce metaphysical doctrines little better than spooks of the imagination, pied pipers that lead
us into intellectual quagmires and squabbles we cannot get out of without critique to declare a
ceasefire and draw up an armistice.
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But why these three Ideas? To answer this question, we must turn to the two specific
ways in which the mind thinks inferentially: by means of inferences of the understanding (or
immediate inferences) and syllogisms of reason (or mediate inferences). Immediate inferences,
or those inferences in which the conclusion can be derived from a premise without a second,
mediating premise, are made by the faculty of the understanding. Thus, we can know that “All
cats are mammals” if the statement “Some cats are not mammals” is false, on the basis of the
logical rule of contradiction. No secondary premise is necessary to mediate between the premise
‘“Some cats are not mammals” is false’ and ‘“All cats are mammals.”” We can notice that an
immediate inference has only two terms; e.g. cats and mammals. It would seem that all
immediate inferences must be analytic statements.
The faculty of reason, however, is a faculty of mediate inferences, more commonly
referred to as syllogisms.85 The inferences reason is capable of making are not implicated within
the initial premise and are not analytic like immediate inferences are. Instead, syllogisms require
a third term, called the middle term, to link two premises together.
For example,
Quantifier + ‘Middle Term’ are ‘Predicate Term’
Quantifier + ‘Subject Term’ are ‘Middle Term’
Quantifier + ‘Subject Term’ are ‘Predicate Term’
Kant reworks this standard syllogistic form, associating each component with a faculty:
Major premise – a universal rule thought through the understanding
Minor premise – the cognition subsumed under the condition of the rule86
Conclusion87 - “the actual judgment that expresses the assertion of the rule in the
subsumed case.”88
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For the sake of clarity, I will use a straightforward example, since to understand how reason, the
faculty of inferences, works, it is best not to jump immediately to an example as complicated as
one involving Ideas (the unconditioned). Using a universal proposition as a major premise
(which counts as a ‘comparative’ kind of principle, according to Kant):89
All bodies are extended entities
All heavy things are bodies
Therefore, all heavy things are extended entities
Here the major premise (‘All bodies are extended entities’) is a universal principle applied to a
particular class of entities (‘Heavy things’) to produce a conclusion (‘All heavy things are
extended entities’). Or, to put it otherwise, we have here an example of an analytic proposition
concerning the relationship between all bodies and the attribute of extension. This is then
applied to a specific class of entities (‘Heavy things’) to produce a conclusion that connects the
two cognitions (A relationship between ‘heavy things’ and ‘extended entities’ is determined).
For Kant, several faculties are in play when constructing the syllogism and deriving a
conclusion from the premises. First, a rule is determined by the faculty of understanding, which
acts as the major premise of a syllogism. Reason is the faculty which infers a conclusion from
the universal rule and a subsumed case (the minor premise). As noted, the minor premise only
falls under the major premise (the rule) by means of the power of judgment.90 Deleuze, in Kant’s
Critical Philosophy refers to the power of judgment as “a complex operation which consists in
subsuming the particular under the general.”91 There are two kinds of judgment: determining
judgment and reflective judgment. In determining judgment “the general is already given,
known, and all that is required is to apply it, that is to determine the individual thing to which it
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applies.”92 In reflective judgment, however, “the general poses a problem and must itself be
found.”93 As Deleuze further points out, judgment is less a faculty than the accord between
various faculties: understanding, imagination, and reason.94 What faculties are in accord with
which depends not only on the kind of judgment (determining or reflective), but also on whether
the judgment is theoretical, practical, or aesthetical.
Reason uses syllogisms “to bring the greatest manifold of cognition of the understanding
to the smallest number of principles (universal conditions), and thereby to effect the highest
unity of that manifold.”95 In other words, while the understanding unifies the manifold of
intuition, making necessary connections between disparate perceptions by means of concepts (or
rules) to yield cognitions, reason seeks to unify the produced manifold of cognitions further by
means of principles, and ultimately, by means of Ideas. As John Sallis puts it in The Gathering
of Reason,
Ideas serve…as directive unities, that is, they serve to direct the understanding in such a way as to
bring the latter “into complete consistency with itself”…Without a directedness toward further
unification there would be within understanding an inconsistency between, on the one hand, its
character as unifying (gathering) and, on the other hand, the disunity, fragmentation, which
remains in the knowledge supplied by understanding alone. 96

The ultimate aim of reason is to systematize all cognitions, which requires all cognitions to be
derived and collected into a totality. Nonetheless, as Kant will observe, and as I have already
hinted at, this unifying inclination can produce metaphysical blunders best to be avoided.
There are two ways inferences can be used to derive a totality of cognitions; the first is an
open-ended derivation of conditioned elements by means of assumed conditions (Assuming that
“All matter is composed of atoms,” I can then say, “A chair is composed of atoms,” a dining
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room set is composed of four chairs, etc). Kant refers to the movement from conditions to the
conditioned as a descending series, or episyllogism. The conditioned elements that can be
determined by means of a given condition are theoretically endless since the series does not trace
backwards but opens up as a “potential progression…that becomes.”97 Kant mentions this kind
of syllogistic reasoning only to dismiss it, since it cannot ground all possible conditioned
elements. In other words, a descending series can never be totalized, which leaves reason
constantly frustrated in its efforts to totalize cognitions. The language of episyllogisms isn’t
commonly used by Kant, even though it seems to play a fundamental role in practical reasoning,
particularly in regards to the argument for the justified belief in the immortality of the soul (more
on this argument in Chapter Six). In other words, Kant provides grounds for believing that the
soul is immortal based on a descending series – the open-ended, asymptotic attempt for the will
to comply with the moral law – for example (it is only on the basis of Divine intuition that such
an infinite series can be grasped as a totality). Cast in another light, the ascetic practice of
freedom by means of compliance with the universal law depends on episyllogistic reasoning.
On the other hand, reason can attempt to derive a condition by means of a conditioned
element. The ascending series that results is referred to as a prosyllogism. As Kant points out,
“only under [the] presupposition…that all members of the series are given on the side of the
conditions…is the judgment [i.e. the conclusion] before us possible a priori.”98 The fewer
principles which cognitions can fall under, the more unified the manifold of cognitions becomes.
The ultimate aim of this unification is to produce a totality of cognitions, otherwise known as a
system of knowledge.
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The only way such a totality of cognitions, collected under the fewest principles, is
possible is if the unconditioned element that conditions all other (possible) conditions in a series
is derived. In the Paralogisms and the Ideal (concerning the soul and God, respectively), reason
posits a necessary unconditioned element by means of two forms of syllogistic reasoning (the
categorical syllogism and disjunctive syllogism, respectively). The Antinomies of reason are
different.99 In the Antinomies, concerning cosmological Ideas, the unconditioned element can
either be a preceding element or the total series of conditions.100 This has to do with the peculiar
nature of the hypothetical syllogism. Returning to my previous example, either an atomic unit
will condition all other aggregates of matter, or the infinite series of conditioned aggregates will
do so. This distinction will play a significant role in the Antinomies, wherein one side of an
antinomy will claim the unconditioned element to be an element, or part that precedes a series of
conditioned elements, while the other side of the antinomy will claim the total series of
conditioned elements to be the unconditioned element. The former is the dogmatic rationalist
response, since it refers to an unconditioned element that can in no way be an object of possible
experience. The latter is the empiricist response, since it refers to an unconditioned series that is
theoretically observable.101 In either case, the unconditioned element is meant to act as a
unifying principle for the series under consideration (Whether it can be proven to do so or should
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just be pragmatically assumed in order to better organize cognitions will be a question addressed
later in the chapter).
Neither the faculty of sensibility, nor the faculty of understanding, is capable of
discovering these unconditioned elements, precisely because they cannot be ‘discovered.’ They
are neither perceived, nor concepts fitted for union with anything sensible. Thus, these elements,
be they a part that conditions all intuitions of a specific kind, or the synthesized totality of all
intuitions of a specific kind, lie outside the bounds of possible experience. Nonetheless, reason
is intrinsically compelled to hypothesize the existence of these unconditioned elements in order
to unify the manifold of cognitions, since unity does not seem to be possible in any other way.
As I already noted, the hypothesized concepts reason attempts to infer in order to unify the
manifold of cognitions are called Ideas. The three unconditioned elements, or Ideas, are the
Soul, the World, and God. Thus, we now have a general account as to why and how reason
produces Ideas, but I have yet to provide specific accounts of how each Idea is generated. It is to
that task I now turn.
Just as the logical judgments provide a clue for the deduction of the categories,102 the
logical syllogisms associated with the categories of Relation will provide a clue as to how the
Ideas can be deduced. This makes sense since reason infers by means of syllogisms and the
three syllogisms associated with each category of Relation respectively make up a
comprehensive list of possible syllogisms, or mediate inferences that reason can use. Thus
reason operates in three ways, depending on “the relation of cognition to the understanding:” by
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means of categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive syllogisms.103 “What is universal in every
relation that our representations can have”104 is presented below:
I. The relation to the subject
a. Corresponds to the categorical syllogism, which concerns the relationship
between a subject and its predicates
b. E.g. All M are P
All S are M
All S are P
II. The relation to the manifold of the object in appearance
a. Corresponds to the hypothetical syllogism, which concerns the relationship
between a ground and its consequence
b. E.g. If p, then q
p
q
III. The relation to all things in general
a. Corresponds to the disjunctive syllogism, which concerns the relationship
“between the cognition that is to be divided and all of the members of the
division.”105
b. E.g. Either A or B
~B
A
Each syllogism will have a different class of unconditioned element underlying it, and each has a
rational106 science that attempts to take up that unconditioned element as an object guaranteed a
priori, without appeal to empirical evidence. As is shown below, each syllogism ultimately
concerns a kind of relation that a specific science addresses, and can allegedly be grounded in a
unique way: For example, categorical syllogisms (which concern the relationship between
subject and predicate) ultimately seek a subject that cannot be a predicate: the soul, or bearer of
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all self-predicates. Here is the comprehensive list of each rational science as well as its
corresponding Idea, each corresponding to 1, 2, and 3 above, respectively:107
1. Rational Psychology
a. Concerns the absolute (unconditioned) unity of the thinking subject – “the
unconditioned unity of the subjective conditions of all representations in general
(of the subject or the soul).” Rational psychology attempts to think of a subject
that cannot be a predicate to another subject; i.e. the soul.
2. Rational Cosmology
a. The absolute unity of the series of conditions of appearance – “the unconditioned
unity of objective conditions in appearance.” Rational cosmology attempts to
think of an element or a series of appearances to start off a causal sequence (be
this a spatial or temporal boundary, an atom [or, arguably, a soul], a first cause
[freedom], or a necessary being).
3. Rational Theology
a. The absolute unity of the cognition of all objects of thought in general – “the
unconditioned unity of objective conditions of the possibility of objects in
general.” Rational theology attempts to think of a being that “contains the
supreme condition of the possibility of everything that can be thought (the being
of all beings)”;108 i.e. God.
To clarify this further: rational psychology is concerned with finding the ultimate subject,
rational cosmology with finding the ultimate cause (or antecedent in a hypothetical syllogism),
and rational theology with finding the ultimate totalizing ground (which disjunctive syllogisms
do since disjunctive statements are concerned with dividing the whole field of possibles between
two or more explicitly demarcated, mutually exclusive options: A, B, etc.). My discussion in the
next section will focus on the first Idea of reason: the soul.
2.2 The Predicates of the Soul and Their Derivation
According to Kant, reason makes at least four fundamental claims about the soul, at least
insofar as we are addressing speculative claims about its nature. The ‘I think’ of apperception
can be interpreted in two ways: either analytically - free of dogmatic conclusions - or
107
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synthetically - which leads to dogmatism. Rational psychologists, however, as I will illustrate
below, interpret analytic implications as synthetic, making claims about the soul that step beyond
the human condition, and with it, the bounds of possible experience. In Chapter Six, I will put
my support behind what I will call ‘practical psychology,’ an approach to soul predication that is
less concerned with what the soul is than what it could be. Granted that Kant is right and
practical reason is sufficient to determine the aims of the self, then we can avoid dialectical
illusion.
The error of judgment characteristic of rational psychology, which I will return to later, is
captured succinctly by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood’s Introduction to their translation of the
Critique of Pure Reason: “Rational psychology [argues invalidly, by means of paralogisms] from
the formal unity, simplicity, and identity of the thought of the subject of thinking or the “I” to the
conclusion that the soul is a real and simple (hence indestructible) substance that is self-identical
throughout all experience.”109
The four predicates of the soul are as follow:
1. The soul is a substance, or self-subsisting being
a. By implication, the soul, taken “merely as an object of inner sense, gives us the
concept of immateriality”110
2. The soul is a simple substance
a. By implication, the soul is incorruptible
3. The soul is a self-identical being, or person persisting throughout time
4. The soul, as a thinking substance, is distinct from objects of external sense, including the
body
a. Thinking substance is “the principle of life in matter” and the “ground of
animality.”111
b. By implication, the soul interacts with bodies,112 spurring on debates as to the
manner in which two distinct substances (mental and physical) actually interact
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The immateriality, incorruptibility, and personality of the soul comprise spirituality. Combined
with thinking substance conceived of as the principle of life, the soul’s immortality is
derived.113 One has but to consider Plato’s Phaedo to see that this is not an arbitrary claim, but
resonates well with past arguments for the soul’s immortality, such as when Plato argues in the
Phaedo that the soul is immortal because it is indivisible and a giver of life.
Each soul predicate corresponds to a particular category used to derive synthetic truths
from the ‘I think’ of apperception (which must, by necessity, accompany all representations).
The soul’s substantiality derives from the category of substance, its simplicity from the category
of reality, its identity (or personality) from the concept of unity, and its distinct nature apart
from the body from the concept of existence.114 Kant argues that these four categories are
uniquely suited to conceive of the soul”
…apperception is carried through by all classes of categories, but only toward those concepts of
the understanding which in each class ground the unity of the remaining ones in a possible
perception, consequently, subsistence, reality, unity (not plurality), and existence; yet reason
represents them all here as conditions of the possibility of a thinking being, which are themselves
unconditional (CPR A404).115

As Goldman puts it, Kant starts…
with the category of substance, the very category that offers the syllogism that leads to the
Paralogisms…In the categories of relation, it is substance that offers the underlying unity that
permits the determination of causality and community; for those of quality, it is reality that
provides unity for negation and limitation; for those of quantity, it is the category of unity itself
that underlies plurality and totality; and finally, for modality, it is the category of existence that
designates the basis from which both possibility and necessity can be determined. 116
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I take both Kant and Goldman to mean the following: a category in each triad of categories,
typically the first one, provides a positive moment or posited beginning element or substrate that
must be assumed if the other categories are to be applied at all. The second category seems to be
the opposite of the first, and the third is a “combination of the first two in its class.”117 In other
words, the two remaining categories appear to be determinations of the posited substrate
indicated by the first category. Let us take the categories of Quality: reality, negation, and
limitation. Consider the following proposition about an object’s quality: “Theodore Roosevelt’s
pet, Maude, was a pig.” The proposition posits that Maude is a pig. Ignoring the veracity of the
following statement, we can only say “Maude was not a pig” if we modify the statement “Maude
was a pig” by means of the category of negation (negation negates something). On its own,
negation cannot stand as the subject of a statement, only the determination of a subject.

Lastly,

we can limit the proposition: e.g., “Maude was a non-dog.” This puts Maude in context to all
dogs while still implicitly allowing for the designation ‘pig.’ Of course, we should not ignore the
fact that “Maude is a pig” is itself a determination of some subject, but all other determinations
in the grouping assume this determination as one to modify.
2.3 Background Material on the Paralogisms
Without the appropriate historical context, the four paralogisms in the Paralogisms
chapter seem confusing and arbitrary. In other words, the force of the Paralogisms is lost if we
do not know the long-standing arguments Kant was trying to critique, most of which do not bring
themselves to the attention of the casual reader. Before doing so, we can provide a rough sketch.
So what is Kant’s true target in the Paralogisms? The obvious answer is ‘Rational psychology,’
but as Karl Ameriks notes, “the theory of mind in the Critique is much more traditional and
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rationalistic than it at first appears.”118 That is not to say that Kant is a rationalist, but that we
should not think that just because he targeted rational disciplines, such as rational psychology,
that he was rejected them wholesale. As we may recall, Kant also critiqued empirical
psychology. Furthermore, to pit Kant squarely against Rationalism ignores Kant’s own
ambitions to “synthesize Leibniz’s vision of the preestablished harmony of the principles of
nature and the principles of grace with the substance of Newtonian science and the moral and
political insights of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.”119 Clearly the former answer is not precise enough,
since it obscures the various lines of continuity between Rationalist thinkers and Kant himself.
However, Allen Wood’s and Paul Guyer’s position that Kant is attempting to synthesize
rationalist, empiricist, and Rousseauian ethics and politics into one system provides a plausible
context to the Critique that does not succumb to an all-or-nothing false dichotomy.
According to Ameriks, two of the primary targets of the Paralogisms are pneumatism and
spiritualism, two positions often adopted by the so-called Rational psychologists. Pneumatism is
“the theoretical claim that our mind, as it appears to us now, is our ultimate reality.” In other
words, the subjective experience of the noumenal soul would be no different than the
phenomenal experience of inner sense. Spiritualism is “the theoretical claim that we can exist in
worlds where the substance underlying our body doesn’t exist” or that on a fundamental level the
soul is made of “spiritual stuff.”120 It will be my task to 1) draw out the arguments of Kant’s
predecessors and contemporaries guilty of spurious doctrines such as pneumatism and
spiritualism and then to 2) demonstrate how Kant intends to disprove them by revealing them to
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be paralogistic, or guilty per Sophisma figurae dictionis (““by sophism of a figure of speech,”
i.e., a fallacy of equivocation”).121
Let us recall those predecessors and contemporaries, along with their corresponding
works which Kant had in mind while writing the Paralogisms:
 The Paralogisms of Pure Reason (A338/B396-A405/B432)
o Christian Wolff: Rational Thoughts (1720)
o Martin Knutzen: System of Efficient Causes (1735) and Philosophical
Treatise on the Immaterial Nature of the Soul (1744)
o Alexander Baumgarten: Metaphysics (1739)
o Christian August Crusius: Sketch of the Necessary Truths of Reason
(1745)
o Leonhard Euler: Letters to a German Princess (1760-1762)
o Marcus Herz: Observations from Speculative Philosophy (1771)
o Johann August Eberhard: Universal Theory of Thinking and Sensing: A
Treatment that Received the Prize Announced in the Year 1776 by the
Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin (1776)
o Johann Nicolaus Tetens: Philosophical Essays on Human Nature and Its
Development (1777)
 The First Paralogism: Substantiality (A348-A351)
o Christian Wolff: Rational Thoughts (1720)
o Alexander Baumgarten: Metaphysics (1739)
o Christian August Crusius: Sketch of the Necessary Truths of Reason
(1745)
 The Second Paralogism: Simplicity (A351-A361)
o Christian Wolff: Rational Thoughts (1720)
o Martin Knutzen: System of Efficient Causes (1735) and Philosophical
Treatise on the Immaterial Nature of the Soul (1744)
o Alexander Baumgarten: Metaphysics (1739)
o Christian August Crusius: Sketch of the Necessary Truths of Reason
(1745)
o Marcus Herz: Observations from Speculative Philosophy (1771)
 The Third Paralogism: Personal Identity (A361-A366)
o Alexander Baumgarten: Metaphysics (1739)
o Johann August Eberhard: Universal Theory of Thinking and Sensing: A
Treatment that Received the Prize Announced in the Year 1776 by the
Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin (1776)
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o Johann Nicolaus Tetens: Philosophical Essays on Human Nature and Its
Development (1777)
 The Fourth Paralogism: Ideality (A366-A380)
o Alexander Baumgarten: Metaphysics (1739)
o Johann Nicolaus Tetens: Philosophical Essays on Human Nature and Its
Development (1777)
The summary will go as follows: I will discuss how each of these philosophers, respectively,
influenced the main thrust of the Paralogisms and then I will discuss how each philosopher is
specifically targeted or at least influenced the development of each Paralogism.
In the first section, ‘Background on the Paralogisms in General’ the reader should keep
the general form of the Paralogisms found in the ‘B edition’ in mind:
What cannot be thought otherwise than as a subject does not exist
otherwise than as a subject, and is therefore substance.
Now a thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be thought
otherwise than as subject.
Therefore it also exists only as such a thing, i.e., as substance.122
There are several problems with this syllogism, according to Kant. First, the faculty of
understanding is unable to cognize the absolute subject due to the limitations of discursive
thinking:
Pure reason requires us to seek for every predicate of a thing its own subject, and for this subject,
which is itself necessarily nothing but a predicate, its subject, and so on indefinitely (or as far as
we can reach). But hence it follows that we must not hold anything at which we can arrive to be
an ultimate subject, and that substance itself never can be thought by our understanding, however
deep we may penetrate, even if all nature were unveiled to us. For the specific nature of our
understanding consists in thinking everything discursively, i.e., by concepts, and so by mere
predicates, to which, therefore, the absolute subject must always be wanting. Hence all the real
properties by which we cognize bodies are mere accidents… 123

The understanding cannot cognize a subject as a subject, only by means of its predicates.
So, before we even attempt to reason about the soul, or thinking self, we are already
defeated.

122
123

Ibid B410-11
Prolegomena 69-70 (333)

55

Nonetheless, the Paralogisms are fallacious for other reasons, primarily due to the
equivocation between the ‘I’ of apperception, which is a proper subject, and the disparate
ego of inner intuition, which is an object. As Kant points out, the major premise
concerns a subject as such. It could apply to the absolute subject (and thus substance)
that underlies all thinking or intuiting as much as it could to the absolute subject (and thus
substance) that underlies the sensible qualities of a table. The minor premise refers to the
subject of apperception, or as a logically necessary ‘I’ that is the ‘vehicle’ of the
categories. It does not refer to the ‘I’ as an object of intuition, but instead the
spontaneous, active ‘I.’ Thus, the conclusion, if it is to necessarily follow from the
premises, cannot pertain to an intuited ego that implies a subsisting self with particular
attributes. “[I]n the conclusion it cannot follow that I cannot exist otherwise than as
subject, but rather only that in thinking my existence I can use myself only as the subject
of judgment, which is an identical proposition, that discloses absolutely nothing about the
manner of my existence.”124 The syllogism can never prove what we want it to prove.
2.4 Background on the Paralogisms in General
Christian Wolff
The first interlocutor I will consider is Christian Wolff. Christian Wolff was an early 18th
century German philosopher and proponent of Leibnizian doctrine, and in a certain respect was
synonymous with Leibnizianism in Germany at the time. When Kant iconically cites in the
Prolegomena that his “remembering of David Hume was the very thing which many years ago
first interrupted [his] dogmatic slumber”125 he is subtly referencing his repudiated allegiance to
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Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysics.126 From this declaration alone, it is evident that Wolff held
great sway over Kant’s positions, both as a posthumous teacher and as a target. It is often noted
(and indeed I have myself already noted) that Kant’s “division of metaphysics into rational
psychology, rational cosmology, and rational theology”127 in the Transcendental Dialectic is
based off of Wolff’s own division. Watkins further notes that much of the terminology found in
the Critique is lifted from Wolff’s work as well.128
In some ways, Wolff’s position on the soul could not be more at odds with Kant’s critical
views, and is a continuation of the much older Cartesian tradition. In Rational Thoughts on God,
the World and the Soul of Human Beings also of All Things in General (1720), there is a curious
syllogism:
Wolff’s Syllogism regarding the Way in which I Cognize that I Exist:
Whoever is conscious of himself and other things, exists. – A self-evident fundamental principle
We are conscious of ourselves and other things. – An indubitable experience
Therefore, we exist.129

This proof in itself does not seem novel, since it is reminiscent of Rene Descartes’ own proof: “‘I
am, I exist’ is necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive of it in my mind.”130 The
presupposition here is that judgments require those who make judgments. Wolff then proceeds
to base his entire philosophy off of the observed certainty found in this syllogism, in a manner
similar in spirit to Descartes’ own method:
As Allen Wood notes, however, “…[I]t is most unfortunate that the remark has been taken as an authoritative
autobiographical report about his own philosophical development. For when it is interpreted as saying that Kant
began as an orthodox Wolffian metaphysician, only to be roused from complacent rationalism by Hume’s skeptical
doubts, the remark simply does not correspond at all to the facts of Kant’s intellectual life. A student of the
development of Kant’s philosophy will find that he was from the very start a critic of some of the most basic tenets
of Wolffian metaphysics. There never was any “dogmatic slumber” from which to awaken…” Wood, Allen, Kant.
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 7.
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For if I know why we have such great certainty about our own existence, then I am aware
of how something must be so constituted so that I can cognize it with as much certainty
as I do that I must exist. It is a great thing when I can say of important truths without
fear: “They are as certain as that I exist,” or also, “I cognize that they exist with the same
certainty as I have when I know that I exist…[E]verything that is properly demonstrated
is just as certain as our existence because what is demonstrated is proven in just the same
way as our existence is.131

In other words, the perceived existence of the self is so unassailable that in a certain respect it is
the notion of certainty itself. For both Descartes and Wolff, the certainty of self-existence is the
springboard for knowledge in general. For Kant, however, self-consciousness of the ‘I’ is a
dead-end, being both a vacuous intuition without a concept and an empty logically-necessary
supplement to all cognitions.
If Wolff’s syllogism is analyzed for suspicious assumptions, we can see how the general
paralogistic form is in play. First, it seems that Wolff is basing his inference on an intuition or
perception of the self being aware of itself. Yet something can only be said to exist based upon
the intuiting of its own existence if we assume the fallacious inference in the Paralogism, based
on equivocation. This inference assumes that there is a subject of thinking and that this subject
of thinking is the same subject that intuits itself. But just because an act of judgment – such as
when we judge ourselves to be conscious – requires a subject, does not mean that we have said
anything about an intuited subject, let alone anything about the thing in itself that I really am
(such as a ‘soul’). Thus, it also follows that if the soul continues to survive after death, it will not
be the ego – or self that intuits representations in space and time - which persists (pneumatism),
but either a being whose nature we do not intuit or cognize, or a substrate that is no longer
conscious.
In Rational Thoughts on God, the World, and the Soul of Human Beings, Also All Things
in General (1720), Wolff defines the soul as “that thing which is conscious of itself and other
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things external to it insofar as we are conscious of ourselves and of other things as external to
us.”132 He originally attempts to derive a doctrine of the soul based on experience - a method
Kant criticizes elsewhere than in the Paralogisms - 133 but as the text progresses he eventually
moves beyond the bounds of immediate experience.134 According to Wolff, consciousness
emerges from the recognition that an unchanging thought held for a noticeable duration is the
same persisting thought and that I have consistently held it then as I hold it now: “Thus memory
and reflection produce consciousness.”135
The soul has the power to represent the world based on how the senses are affected by
bodies in the world.136 Representations bear a resemblance to the affecting bodies, but only the
sizes, shapes, and motions of such bodies. This is because, as Wolff says, “A picture that is not
similar to the object that it is to represent is a picture not of it, but of another thing.”137 If we
assume that Wolff understands by bodies ‘things-in-themselves’,’ we can note a disagreement
between him and Kant, since, for Kant, (re)presentations don’t need to bear a resemblance to
things-in-themselves. If we could claim this, then we’d have access to that which must always
remain unknown. So, while both Wolff and Kant may agree that the soul has a power of
representation, they differ as to the nature of these representations.
Martin Knutzen
Martin Knutzen (1713-1751) was a German philosopher, fellow Konigsbergian, and
teacher of Kant. Kant scholar Eric Watkins describes his philosophical position as a curious
synthesis of “religious Pietism, Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysics, and Lockean
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epistemology.”138 In System of Efficient Causes (1735) Knutzen theorized that experience could
not definitively determine whether mind and body interact by means of so-called physical influx
(that mind and body directly affect one another) occasionalism, (that God effects all causal
relations be they mental and physical), and pre-established harmony ( that mental causality and
physical causality do in fact exist but that there is no real interaction between the two; God
harmonizes mental and physical causalities so that there is an appearance of interaction between
the two substances).139 However, Knutzen believed that it could be demonstrated that mental
and physical substances could and do engage in mutual interaction – i.e. that physical influx was
the more likely candidate – on the grounds that all simples, which are both physical and mental
in variety, are capable of influencing one another. Perception results from the trace of the
affecting corporeal (or bodily) simple upon the affected mental simple.140 Knutzen demonstrates
that it is possible for the mind, being simple, to affect the corporeal simples of the body by
pointing out that God is simple, immaterial, and yet affects physical simples.141 He finally notes
that physical influx is the more probable position since it is itself a simpler explanation, or
“shorter path,” when pitted against pre-established harmony and occasionalism.142
The soul, existing in place, necessarily represents the external world to itself by means of
the body and the place it inhabits.143 The body, being composed of simples, necessarily resists as must anything simple occupying a specific place another does not - the actions of the mind;
thus the influence of one implies reciprocal influence.144 Knutzen is quick to point out that this
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does not imply that the mind is merely passive, as it is when it perceives, because there are
actions of the mind that are not dependent on the body, such as contemplation.145 Even
perception does not occur as if the mind were a passive piece of clay to which are imparted
ready-made representations transmitted through the body. Bodily motions ‘modify’ the mind to
produce these representations within itself.146
At the very least, Knutzen and Kant may agree that there is some modification of the
mind that takes place which causes the mind to produce representations, and that what causes
this modification is substantially distinct from the mind itself and lies outside of it. For Kant,
what exactly influences the mind is deliberately unknown and can hardly be assumed to be the
body as Knutzen would have understood it to be. . For Kant, the body is only an appearance, or
representation of external sense, produced when the faculty of sensibility is affected by
something external to it. It is conceivable that this ‘something’ is distinct from the ‘something’
that lies behind the empirical ego, but then again, neither may be distinct from each other at all.
Possible inspiration for the Ideas found in the Critique of Pure Reason and with it the
Critique of Practical Reason can be found in the Philosophical Treatise on the Immaterial
Nature of the Soul (1744), where the ideas of freedom, immortality and God are presented:
That a God, a creator of all things, exists, whose nature is completely different from that of this
corporeal world; that our soul possesses a true freedom, is thus capable of rewards as well as
punishments, and that it is created eternal, and for that reason will not be destroyed at the death of
the body.147

Kant shares Knutzen’s contention that the immortality of the soul, freedom, and God are “the
foundation of true virtue and all religion,”148 which is a similarity we can only fully appreciate in
light of Chapter Six. These Ideas are just a repackaging, or rather, the morally-necessary
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predication of the unconditioned conditions: the Soul, the World, and God. However, pure
reason, as I have already mentioned, dogmatically attempts to develop doctrines concerning
these hypothetical entities: the Paralogisms ultimately attempt to prove the soul’s immortality,
one thesis of the Third Antinomy attempts to prove the soul’s freedom (or that some part of the
world – the soul – is a first cause), and the Ideal of Reason attempts to prove God’s existence.
As we have already noted, Kant thinks any theoretical advancements on these speculative fronts
are illusory, like a hamster spinning in its wheel, going around in circles.
What Knutzen does contribute to Kant’s theoretical doctrine of self is a precursor to the
doctrine of the synthetic unity of apperception:
Distinguishing or intuiting the distinction of things consists in a comparison of different
representations of things that are found not in many, but in a single subject and that are compared
to each other not by many but by a single subject in such a way that, due to this comparison,
something can be found in several representations that neither is nor can be found in others.149

Or put otherwise:
The representations of the distinguished things must be pictured in a single subject, and in part that
their connection must be brought about by the very same efficacious subject, or come from the
first source of them, and by their efficacious power.150

Or finally, “thought requires a proper and indivisible unity.”151 This is used to refute the
possibility of materialism,152 a position Kant is also trying to combat in the Paralogisms when he
suggests that there may be a ‘negative utility’ for the rational doctrine of the Soul 153 Knutzen
concludes his account with a proof for the imperishability of the soul based on its simplicity, an
account I will return to when I analyze each specific Paralogism in full.
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Alexander Baumgarten
Alexander Baumgarten (1714-1762) was a German philosopher, popularizer of
Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy, and the author of the Metaphysica (1739). Few influences on
Kant may be said to have been as significant as Baumgarten, particularly because Kant used the
Metaphysica in his metaphysics courses for most of his career.154 As Watkins notes, Baumgarten
was “a prominent example of the rationalist position that would stand in need of “critical”
scrutiny.”155
In the Metaphysica, Baumgarten starts off from the most basic of principles, the principle
of contradiction. From there he moves to the principle of excluded middle, and then to the
relationship between a ground (or condition) and what it grounds.156 In Baumgarten’s
terminology, a ‘sufficient ground’ for something is the ‘sufficient reason’ for it. Upon this
principle of sufficient reason Baumgarten draws the principle of things connected on both sides:
“Everything possible is a ground and a consequence, hence is connected in a two-fold manner; as
connected with its ground, it can be cognized a priori, as connected with its consequent it can be
cognized a posteriori.”157 From this he concludes that if something (A) is the immediate ground
of something else (B), it (A) is the mediate ground for all things grounded by what is
immediately grounded by it (A immediately grounds B, B immediately grounds C, A mediately
grounds C, etc).158 This parallels Kant’s discussion of the relationship between the conditioned
and its unconditioned and how only judgments concerning the condition of the conditioned can
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be known a priori.159 This is directly relevant to the Transcendental Dialectic, and with it, the
Paralogisms, since the Soul is the hypothetically posited “absolute (unconditioned) unity of the
thinking subject.”160
From here, Baumgarten draws a distinction between the determinate, the indeterminate,
and the determinable: “Something is DETERMINATE if it is posited that it is A or that it is not
A, but if it is posited only that it is either A or not A, it is INDETERMINATE…Whatever can be
determined is DETERMINABLE.”161 Furthermore, a ‘determining ground’ is “the ground by
which determining [is to occur].”162 This distinction recurs in the B Edition of the Paralogisms,
where Kant distinguishes between the determinable self (the intuitive ego: the self as object) and
the determining self (the synthesizing ‘I,’ or subject).163 It also is relevant in Kant’s ethical
works since, as Kant says, “practical philosophy…has to do only with the grounds of
determination of the will.”164
As an aside, many of the transcendental and logical categories appear in the Metaphysica
as well, and it is plausible to assume that Kant relied on them when devising the Table of
Categories. For example, reality is defined as an affirmative determination of a ‘mark’ or
predicate of a thing, and its opposite, negation.165 Quality is distinguished from quantity insofar
as it is possible or not “to conceive and understand what is given…without assuming another
thing, without a relation to another thing,” respectively (i.e. “to comprehend it distinctly” or
not).166 Quality is related to reality insofar as a thing has a certain degree of reality, 167 which is
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reminiscent of the principle of the pure understanding that corresponds to the ‘Anticipations of
Perception.’168 Unity and plurality are distinguished by means of whether or not two things are
completely or rather to some degree only partially the same.169 Something is defined as
necessary “whose opposite is impossible” while that which is not is contingent.170 Accidents are
defined as that which “cannot exist except as the determination of another” and also as that
which can exist independently as substance.171 Likewise, “the existence of accidents, as such, is
INHERENCE, the existence of substance, as such, is SUBSISTENCE.”172 Finally, Baumgarten
identifies cause as “the principle of existence.”173 In all, Baumgarten addresses at minimum the
following categories more or less by name: unity, plurality, reality, negation, substance
(subsistence and inherence), cause (causality and dependence), community (reciprocity between
agent and patient),174 and contingency-necessity.
In Part Three of the Metaphysica, Baumgarten addresses psychology. In it, he divides
psychology into two familiar types: empirical and rational.175 Baumgarten suggests that the
human soul can be analyzed mathematically. He refers to this study as ‘Anthropognosia.’
§747. The human soul does not in fact admit three-dimensional extension, yet philosophical and
mathematical cognition of it, like that of a human body, is possible. A human consists of a soul
and of a finite body, hence is internally mutable and a finite and contingent thing. Therefore,
philosophical and mathematical cognition of man, i.e., philosophical and mathematical
anthropology, or anthropometry, as of empirical [objects] through experience, is possible. The set
of rules [that are to be followed] in cognizing what is to be observed about man is
ANTHROPOGNOSIA.176

168

Kant Critique of Pure Reason 290-295 [A166/B207-A176/B218].
Baumgarten 95.
170
Baumgarten 96.
171
Baumgarten 96.
172
Baumgarten 96.
173
Baumgarten 103.
174
Compare this category Kant Critique of Pure Reason 212 [A80/B106] with Baumgarten’s treatment of the
relationship of agent and patient Baumgarten 99-100. Baumgarten does not mention ‘community’ by name, only the
relationship between agent and patient.
175
Baumgarten 115.
176
Baumgarten 125.
169

65

Although the Critique of Pure Reason, as previously mentioned, endorses an analogous position
(despite the soul not being extended in three spatial dimensions), Kant eventually rejects a
mathematical science of the soul in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science on the
grounds that the soul is not mathematically interesting. Unfortunately, Baumgarten does not
seem to develop this mathematical position further, leaving the reader to wonder both whether
Kant may have been right as well as whether Baumgarten made a claim he couldn’t back up.177
Baumgarten starts his psychological investigations with empirical psychology, and offers
the following argument:
If there is anything in a being that can be conscious of something, it is a SOUL.
There exists in me what can be conscious of something.
Therefore, a soul exists in me (I exist as a soul).178
Here we do not find a proof that ‘I’ necessarily exist, like we found in Christian Wolff’s Rational
Thoughts. Instead, self-existence is granted and this self is further qualified as a soul.
Baumgarten argues that a soul must be a power because of its capacity to think, or more
appropriately, to represent the universe by means of thinking “according to the position of my
body.”179 This sounds similar to Wolff’s position, which should come as no surprise. The soul
‘activates’ its faculties by means of the representative power.180 Regarding perception, I can
represent both the state of my soul by means of ‘inner sense’ and the state of my body by means
of ‘outer sense.’181 Both the soul’s primary capacity to represent as well as the two kinds of
perceptions it represents – inner and outer - are similar to Kant’s own position. A marked
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difference of emphasis between Baumgarten and Kant lies in Baumgarten’s commitment to the
the Leibnizian concepts of obscurity, clarity, and distinctness of perceptions and cognitions.182
Baumgarten also makes a further distinction between lower and higher ‘appetitive’
faculties reminiscent of Kant’s own division between heteronomy of choice and autonomy in the
Critique of Practical Reason. The lower appetitive faculty concerns ‘pleasant’ sensory
pleasures, or stimuli, while the higher appetitive faculty concerns ‘rational desire,’ or motives.183
Put in Baumgarten’s own words, “The faculty of desire and aversion according to what is
pleasing to the senses is SENSITIVE CHOICE, while the faculty of willing and not-willing
according to what pleases itself is (free choice) FREEDOM.”184 One can even notice a similarity
of word construction between both ‘heteronomy of choice’ and ‘sensitive choice,’ and
‘autonomy’ and ‘freedom.’ For Kant, heteronomy of choice refers to any principle that is based
on an object external to the will, and is necessarily mediated by the sensibility (because of this,
Kant will claim that all heteronomous theories are pleasure-based). Autonomy of the will refers
to the will’s rational self-determination on the basis of the moral law. Only the latter is properly
moral, for Kant (more on both in Chapters Three and Six).
Baumgarten also tackles the question of the interaction of soul and body, and evaluates
pre-established harmony, physical influx, and occasionalism, like Knutzen does. Unlike
Knutzen, Baumgarten attempts to defend pre-established harmony against the other two
positions. Baumgarten says physical influx must be rejected for three reasons. First,
Baumgarten presupposes that changes that take place by means of the harmonious interactions of
body and soul require that one is the agent and the other the patient. But since all bodily changes
are cognized by the soul, then “all changes are harmonious and the body does not act by its own
182
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power in any of these changes…and is really acted upon by the soul in everything.”185 But if the
soul doesn’t act, then it can’t react,186 since reaction is “the activity of the patient on the
agent.”187 Second, when the soul represents the world by means of passively reacting to bodily
influences, the soul itself cannot be acting, which implies that the soul’s representative acts are
not its own actions. Finally, if the soul is changed only by means of the body, freedom is
impossible.188 As previously remarked however, Knutzen’s physical influx theory does allow for
soul-acts that are not determined by bodily influences (such as contemplation), so Baumgarten’s
third criticism seems disingenuous. Baumgarten rejects occasionalism because freedom is also
impossible if all soul-acts are really the acts of an infinite thing (God).189 According to
Baumgarten, only pre-established harmony allows for the soul and the body to influence
themselves.190 Other influences Baumgarten may have had on specific Paralogisms will be noted
in the next section, which will comprehensively tackle each Paralogism one at a time (Arguably,
the previous discussion could go under the Fourth Paralogism).
Christian August Crusius
Christian August Crusius (1715-1775) was a German Pietist philosopher and theologian
critical of the Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition. In Sketch of the Necessary Truths of Reason (1745)
Crusius sought a metaphysical position not bound by the principles of contradiction and
sufficient reason that allowed for freedom and ‘causal interaction between mind and body.’191
Perhaps surprising to most readers of Kant, scholars Paul Guyer and Allen Wood note “To the
extent that Kant was a critic of the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy, his criticisms came not only
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from Hume but even more from Wolff’s Pietist critic Christian August Crusius.”192 Likewise, a
reasonable reader interested in a thorough understanding of the Critical enterprise might expect a
brief introduction to Crusius’ pertinent work.
Crusius has similar metaphysical commitments to Kant. For example, one finds the
following curious passage in the Preface to the Sketch of the Necessary Truths of Reason:
Metaphysics in this work will hopefully be what one seeks in it, namely, a universal fundamental
science from which all other human cognition that is to be established a priori can obtain its
grounds and which also contains in itself the grounds for mathematical and practical sciences,
although the determinate constitution of the necessary truths that they contain in themselves
cannot be justly incorporated into metaphysics. Accordingly, all other sciences contain further
determinations of those things that arise in metaphysics. One learns of their actuality a posteriori,
but metaphysics reveals the grounds of possibility or necessity a priori, through which cognition
thereof becomes more distinct and complete. 193

Metaphysics is distinguished from what we would call both mathematics and the natural sciences
insofar as metaphysics is the ground of all other sciences. Compare this passage with two from
the Prolegomena:
Regarding mathematical sciences:
[Here the question arises:] “How then is it possible for human reason to produce such cognition
entirely a priori?” Does not this faculty [which produces mathematics], as it is neither is nor can
it be based upon experience, presuppose some ground of cognition a priori?194

Regarding ‘practical’ sciences, which I take to refer to natural science:
I do not mean how (through experience) we can study the laws of nature; for these would not then
be laws a priori and would yield us no pure natural science; but [I mean to ask] how the
conditions a priori of the possibility of experience are at the same time the sources from which all
the universal laws of nature must be derived.195

Thus, we can see that both Kant and Crusius thought that metaphysics was necessary to account
for how mathematics and natural science could be possible a priori at all.
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Crusius also attempts to derive the most fundamental or ‘simplest’ concepts since
“ontology is supposed to treat the universal essence of things.”196 These simple concepts are
similar to Kant’s own list, with the marked difference that Crusian concepts do not serve the
same function as Kant’s pure concepts of the understanding. The list includes subsistence,
space, time, causality, somewhere and ‘external to each other,’ unity, and negation.197 Crusius
also distinguishes between essence and existence. The ‘metaphysical essence’ of a thing is
“everything that we think of with respect to a thing and by means of which we distinguish it from
others.”198 More narrowly defined, the fundamental essence of a thing is the collection of
properties not grounded in other properties.199 But the essence of a thing alone does not
completely account for it. A thing must also occupy a specific space and a specific time to be
considered real. Existence, for Crusius, would be the “the predicate of a thing due to which it
can also be found outside of thought somewhere and at some time.”200 Crusius further notes that
this definition of existence follows from the distinction we make between considering a thing as
an object of thought (i.e. as an essence) and as an existing thing (i.e. as also in space and time).201
In other words, something can be intelligible without actually existing (such as a million-andfive-sided figure), but if it were to exist, it would exist concretely in space and time (I could
point to this million-and-five-sided figure right in front of me). As Eric Watkins notes, Crusius
and Kant have very similar positions on space and time being neither relational nor absolute.202

196

Crusius 138 [Paragraph 7]
Crusius 162 [Paragraph 102].
198
Crusius 141 [Paragraph 19].
199
Crusius 145 [Paragraph 39].
200
Crusius 145 [Paragraph 46].
201
Ibid 145.
202
Watkins 134.
197

70

Crusius differs from Kant insofar as he considers time and space to be “abstractions from reality
that are brought about by the essence of our understanding” rather than being pure intuitions.203
Another crucial similarity between Crusius and Kant is the epistemological priority
afforded to experience, such as can be found in Kant’s Postulates of Empirical Thought. The
Postulates of Empirical Thought bind the limits of knowledge to possible experience. Similarly,
Crusius notes, “the distinguishing feature of actuality is ultimately always sensation in our
understanding. For sensation is precisely that state of our understanding in which we are forced
to think something immediately as existing, without first needing to cognize it through
inferences…”204 “Simple concepts [are] arrived at through abstraction from actual objects.”205
This may figure into Kant’s distinction between possibility and actuality. These are but a few of
the many fundamental similarities that can be found between the Critique of Pure Reason and
the Sketch of the Necessary Truths of Reason.
Regarding psychology specifically, Crusius develops what he calls ‘metaphysical
pneumatology,’ which is “the science of the necessary essence of a spirit and of those
distinguishing features and properties that can be understood from it a priori.”206 Metaphysical
pneumatology posits that God’s ultimate purpose involves ‘rational and free spirits,’ which in
turn implies that spirit and matter must interact – since material change is but a means for
effecting spiritual purposes.207 As Crusius puts it, “Because of divine perfection neither freedom
without reason nor a rational subject without freedom is possible.”208 Such doctrines could never
find constitutive justification, according to Kant, but they may have practical or perhaps
regulative justification.
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Furthermore, both thinking and willing – which are characteristic of spirits - are
fundamentally distinct from motion – which is the only material change possible.209 This
difference implies that spirit cannot be reduced to matter, even though both can interact with one
another. Crusius calls a spirit’s power of thinking ‘understanding’ and an understanding capable
of “cognizing the truth with consciousness” ‘reason.’210 Crusius defines the will as “the power
of a spirit of acting according to its ideas.”211 As previously mentioned, this will is ultimately
free in order to facilitate God’s rational purposes. This is but an introduction to Crusius’
psychological doctrine. I will return to other principles of metaphysical pneumatology when I
interrogate each Paralogism specifically.
Leonard Euler
Leonard Euler (1707-1783) was an eighteenth century Swiss mathematician, physicist,
and critic of Leibnizian philosophy.212 In Letters to a German Princess, Euler objects to the
Leibnizian principle that change can only be accounted for if bodies have the power to change
their own states. Euler’s account, which is more in line with the modern account, theorizes
instead that all bodies will continue in their present state unless influenced by an external force.
Bodies do not possess the power to change their own states. In other words, all things possess
inertia. A thrown ball would continue to fly through space at the same speed forever unless it
comes in contact with another body. Bodies exert a force upon other bodies, or cause their states
to change, because bodies are both extended and impenetrable. If one body occupies a place,
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another cannot, unless that body is moved first. The ability of one body to influence another is
dependent on mass.213
The nature of spiritual entities, however, is different from that of matter. Materialism, or
at least the position that the soul is either made of matter or no different than the body, must be
dismissed offhand since Euler’s account of matter could never explain how thinking, feeling, and
willing are possible. Spirit is neither extended, impenetrable, nor does it succumb to inertia.214
Spirit cannot be extended because it cannot be divided into smaller parts.215 This argument for
the unity of the soul is at minimum as old as Rene Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy
and most likely can be traced as far back as Plato’s Phaedo. Furthermore, questions of extensive
magnitude, such as the size of the soul or how it may or may not enter into the composition of
bodies, should not apply to the soul at all, a position at odds with Leibniz and Wolff. Thus, we
ought not to conclude that an extensionless thing is a point, or that the soul is a fundamental unit
or point that makes up bodies, since a point is still an extensive magnitude. Euler says that
asking such questions makes as much sense as asking “How many feet are there in an hour?”216
Euler concludes from this that the soul, being without extension, cannot exist in place either,
although it can still affect certain places. To lack a place does not necessarily mean not to exist,
just as an hour takes place somewhere but is not in a particular place217 – a position at odds with
Crusius’ definition of existence.
Euler agrees with Crusius that bodies are a means towards spiritual ends and thus in some
manner are influenced by souls, but he says that how this happens can never be known.218 In a
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point reminiscent of one Hume makes in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Euler
says:
We are perfectly sensible that the human soul cannot act immediately on all the parts of the body:
as soon as a certain nerve is cut, I can no longer close my hand, from which it may be concluded
that the soul has power only over the extremities of the nerves, which all terminate and unite in a
portion of the brain…219

It is furthermore unclear why the soul should affect only nerves rather than, say, arteries. Euler
can do no better than to characterize the spiritual control of matter as a “gift of God” whose
effects are arbitrarily limited to specific bodies by the will of God alone.220 “It is the body only
which cannot be in two places at once, but there is nothing to prevent spirit, which has no
relation to place in virtue of its nature, to act at the same time on several bodies situated in places
very remote from each other” if God so willed it. 221 Death, for Euler, does not imply the soul’s
relocation out of the body then, only a cutting off of the soul from its primary means of acquiring
knowledge: the senses.222
Notably, Euler agrees with Kant that knowledge is limited to experience; although, for
Euler, concepts such as time can be derived from the soul’s perceptions while for Kant, time is a
pure intuition.223 Nonetheless, Euler is candid about what he thinks cannot be known regarding
the soul, which may have influenced Kant’s own restraint to some degree (although this remains
speculation). It is likely though that, for Kant, Euler acts as both a sympathetic, critical voice
opposing Leibnizian dogmatism and also a possible target, particularly insofar as he attempts to
distinguish qualities of an actual soul with an actual body.
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Marcus Herz
Marcus Herz (1747-1803) was a German philosopher and physician who studied under
Kant. Kant and Herz maintained a close, reciprocally-formative correspondence. Scholars often
highlight the Second Letter Kant sent to Herz as indicating that Kant was beginning the Critical
project (i.e. the Critique of Pure Reason), as well as a critical analysis of practical reason and
taste (the Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique of Judgment [Power] respectively):
You understand how important it is, for all of philosophy – yes even for the most important ends
of humanity in general – to distinguish with certainty and clarity that which depends on the
subjective principles of human mental powers (not only sensibility but also the understanding) and
that which pertains directly to the facts. If one is not driven by a mania for systematizing, the
investigations which one makes concerning one and the same fundamental principle in its widest
possible applications even confirm each other. I am therefore busy on a work, which I call “The
Bounds of Sensibility and of Reason.” It will work out in some detail the foundational principles
and laws that determine the sensible world together with an outline of what is essential to the
Doctrine of Taste, of Metaphysics, and of Moral Philosophy.224

There are a few things to note in this anticipatory passage. The first is the distinction between
‘the subjective principles of human mental powers’ and ‘that which pertains directly to the facts.’
In Herz’ philosophical work Observations from Speculative Philosophy, Herz uses this
distinction as a way out of many traditional metaphysical problems:
I [mean to] show you how those who start from a false explanation of a concept and those who,
not heeding the correct explanation, do not properly distinguish its subjective from its objective
possibility, are rushing toward error in lockstep. However, merely look at these concepts that are
so fruitful in metaphysics, at space and time, and you will find that the notorious difficulties about
the location of the soul, the omnipresence of God, infinite divisibility, etc., which are dangerous
cliffs for philosophers, are all grounded in the fact that the limits of the actuality of external things
are taken to be the same as the limits of our cognition, and for that reason conditions that are
prescribed to this [cognition] according to the pleasure of a highest wisdom have been carried over
to the state of external things themselves… 225

This distinction is analogous to the common metaphysical criticism Kant offers when he says
that many dialectical illusions are generated by means of taking appearances as things-inthemselves. In the above passage, Herz includes three difference kinds of metaphysical
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problems which Kant seems to model in the Transcendental Dialectic. Such ‘notorious
difficulties’ as ‘the location of the soul’ fall under the heading of the Paralogisms (albeit the
location of the soul as such can only loosely be paired with the Fourth Paralogism); ‘The
omnipresence of God’ concerns theological doctrines associated with the ‘transcendental ideal;’
‘Infinite divisibility’ corresponds with the Antinomies, particularly the Second Antinomy. Of
course, this parallel could be attributed to the Wolffian distinctions between rational psychology,
rational theology, and rational cosmology, but it is more plausible to conclude that this
distinction was taught to Herz by Kant himself.
The second relevant element in the so-called ‘Herz Letter’ is the ‘mania for
systematizing’ that characterizes the faculty of Reason, as described in the First Critique. As
previously mentioned, the transcendental Ideas are concepts Reason posits (perhaps imprudently)
as necessary in order to systematize knowledge. While it is clear that systematization in itself is
not problematic and is in fact even theoretically necessary, the relentless positing of entities for
purposes beyond organizational (or ‘regulative’) ends could be characterized as ‘mania.’ Since
Herz published Observations from Speculative Philosophy ten years before the First Critique was
published, it is unclear just how much influence the text had on Kant’s work. As Herz himself
admits to Kant in the Third Letter,
You will receive my book by regular mail and I suspect you will find little in it that should cause
you to make any changes in the work you have at hand. I need hardly tell you, dearest Herr
Professor, how little I deserve credit for my book. I have merely had your own book before my
eyes, followed the thread of your thoughts and only here and there have I made a few digressions,
things that were not part of my original plan but that occurred to me while I was working.226

A discussion of how Herz discusses the simplicity of the soul – the Second Paralogoism – will be
presented in the next section.
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Johann August Eberhard
Johann August Eberhard (1739-1809) was a German philosopher, theologian, and
contemporary of Kant’s, whose philosophical work, Universal Theory of Thinking and Sensing
(1776), attempted to reconcile empiricism and Leibnizianism.227 As will be evident to those
familiar with Liebnizian philosophy, Eberhard’s focus on distinctness ought to sound familiar.
Eberhard initially attempts to explain how ‘the power to think’ and ‘the power to sense’
reciprocally influence one another.228 This problem is reminiscent of the one Kant attempted to
solve by means of the schematism. Eberhard speculates that an “original primitive power of the
soul” or “a common point of unity for both” must be posited to explain how one power affects
the other.229 If there were no original power but instead a multiplicity of soul powers, how could
one soul modification transition into another? Would one power transfer an effect to another?
How? It is much simpler to suppose one original power.230 Furthermore, Eberhard claims that
there cannot be a multiplicity of powers without there being a multiplicity of substances external
to one another in the soul. If this were the case, the soul would be extended. Eberhard seems to
be implying that this is implausible – as he does not overtly say so.231 Eberhard broadens this
argument in a way that I will return to when discussing the Third Paralogism on the numerical
identity of the soul.
But what is this primitive soul power? In a move reminiscent of the one Wolff made,
Eberhard identifies the human soul’s primitive power as a “striving to have representations.”232
Eberhard attempts to do this by distinguishing the powers of thinking and sensing. Sensing is
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passive while thinking is active.233 The object of thought is perceived as external to the thinker
whereas the object of sensation is somehow perceived to be part of the sensing state of the
affected subject (‘I feel warm’ is a statement about me being in a state of being warm). This is
due to the fact that when I think, I perceive distinctly, which includes distinguishing between me
and the object of thought (as well as the various parts of the object of thought). Such a state of
distinctness does not exist when sensing, so I do not distinguish between myself and the
sensation.234 Furthermore,
Since the number and strength of representations in [the case of sensing] that come together in one
sensation and coalesce into one central point do not permit the time and freedom for dissecting and
distinguishing, I also cannot distinguish myself, as the subjectum inhaesionis [subject of
inherence], from the representations. 235

Eberhard summarizes his principle in the following way:
For a limited being in the precise ratio in which the manifold, the warmth and the strength
increases in a total representation, the intensity of the unity or the distinctness decreases, and vice
versa, or the intensity of the unity is inversely related to the manifoldness and vice versa. 236

It would seem this move is necessary insofar as a continuum of degrees can account for
qualitative distinctions between the derivative powers of thinking and sensing without assuming
substantial distinctions between them.
Eberhard concludes that thinking is characterized by unity and sensing by
manifoldness.237 This is similar to how Kant characterizes the unifying powers of both the
understanding and reason as opposed to the receptive power of the sensibility which can only
receive a disconnected sensory manifold. Eberhard refers to this manifoldness evident in sensing
as characterized by representations being next to each other rather than within each other. 238
“The more distinct, the less [representations are] next to each other; consequently, the more
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external and next to each other, the more confused.”239 Sensibility perceives “a larger sum of
small representations [crowded] together into a total representation,” leading to its obscure,
indistinct nature.240 And similar to Kant, there seems to be a movement from obscure, or at least
disjointed sensations towards clear perceptions and finally distinct cognition.241
In a certain respect, Kant may agree that the mind deals exclusively with representations,
but Kant does not seem to require a primitive power to underlie the faculties of sensibility and
understanding. Instead he appeals to the schematism, produced by the faculty of imagination.
Eberhard implies that the imagination plays a role in mediating between the two powers as well:
“Insofar as the state of both sensing and thinking contain representations, the replacement of the
one state with the other can occur only according to the law of the imagination, or by means of
the association of ideas.”242 Nonetheless, the laws of association (reminiscent of Hume) are not
schemata.
Johann Nicolaus Tetens
Johann Nicolaus Tetens was a German philosopher (1738-1807), contemporary of Kant,
and considerable influence on Kant’s critical work, particularly through one of his central works,
Philosophical Essays on Human Nature (1777). As Eric Watkins notes, “in a letter to Herder in
May of 1779, Hamann claims that Kant always had Tetens’ book open on his desk, and Kant
himself mentions the importance of Tetens in a letter to Marcus Herz in 1778.”243 In this central
text, a question by now very familiar to the reader is asked: “Is there a single faculty or cognitive
power that is responsible for our knowledge of the world, or are there several heterogeneous
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principles at work?”244 Regardless of Teten’s answer to this question, which is predictably in
favor of a unitary power, what is important is that he anticipates much of the first Critique.
Tetens attempts to derive a science of the soul by means of what he calls the
“observational method,” identified with the method of Locke.245
Taking the modifications of the soul as they are cognized through a feeling of the self, becoming
aware of and observing them with careful repetition and under changed conditions, then
comparing and analyzing these observations and seeking out the simplest faculties and the
[various] kinds of effects and their relations to each other. 246

Already, as we have seen, Kant was skeptical of such an empirical science of the soul.
Observation reveals three seemingly distinct expressions of the soul’s power: impressions,
representations, and thoughts,247 or feeling, representing, and thinking.248 It is unclear whether
these faculties cleanly correspond to the Kantian faculties of sensibility, understanding, and
reason, albeit the similarities are notable. Tetens argues that the relations between things (such
as similarity, identity, and sameness) are subjectively imposed upon things by the understanding
and do not exist in things themselves.249 Further reminiscent of Kant, Tetens says that relations
of space, time, causality, as well as the relationship of substances to their accidents are
“something subjective that we attribute to the objects as something objective…that arises from [a
certain act of] thinking.”250 Truth, which for Tetens amounts to a relation of impressions, is
considered objective if all cognitive beings would judge the relation to be necessary. Universal
subjective necessity is equivalent to objective necessity.251
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Tetens challenges Hume’s claim that the self is merely “a bundle of qualities and
changes, which, since they are immediately sensed, actually exist, but that it is one thing, a
complete unity, an actual thing.”252 In response, Tetens says that when we clearly perceive a
feature of the soul, we obscurely perceive the persisting self as a kind of background for it.253
This seems reminiscent of the ‘I think’ which, while a vacuous representation, remains the
persisting form of consciousness that accompanies all representations. I will return to this
response when I discuss the Third Paralogism.
2.5 Discussion of the Specific Paralogisms and Relevant Background Material
Now that we have reviewed the general philosophical and historical context for the
paralogisms, we are prepared to discuss the four paralogisms individually. It should be noted
that Kant’s discussion of the paralogisms was significantly reworked in the second edition. Most
changes seem to reflect an attempt to simplify the previous edition. I will primarily focus on the
first edition, since it is more detailed. I will then discuss those specific philosophers Kant is
critiquing in each paralogism. 254
The First Paralogism
In the A edition, Kant presents the first paralogism in the following syllogism:




That the representation of which is the absolute subject of our judgments, and hence cannot be used as
the determination of another thing, is substance.
I, as a thinking being, am the absolute subject of all my possible judgments, and this representation of
Myself cannot be used as the predicate of any other thing.
Thus I, as thinking being (soul), am substance. 255

The first paralogism is the most fundamental of the four paralogisms, since simplicity,
personality, and distinction from the body assume that the soul is substantial. The rational
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doctrine of substance concludes that the soul is a substance because thoughts are always
determinations of the ‘I’, but the ‘I’ can never be a determination of anything else (i.e. the ‘I’
cannot be a predicate, but is always the subject predicated). Accidents are always accidents of
something which itself is a substance, not a subsequent accident. And to a limited extent, the
paralogism commits no error:
…[O]ne can quite well allow the proposition The soul is substance to be valid, if only one admits
that this concept of ours leads no further, that it cannot teach us any of the usual conclusions of the
rationalistic doctrine of the soul, such as, e.g., the everlasting duration of the soul through all
alterations, even the human being’s death, thus that it signifies a substance only in the idea but not
in reality.256

For Kant, the category of substance, like any category, has “no objective significance at all
unless an intuition is subsumed under [it], to the manifold of which [it] can be applied as [a
function] of synthetic unity.”257 We can recall here the First Analogy of Experience: “In all
change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in
nature.”258 As Kant has reminded us, this is a rule for organizing the sensory manifold into
cognitions, and has no objective use outside of experience. There would have to be an empirical
intuition of the self in order for the category of substance to be applicable. All rational
psychology provides us with is logical necessity: the ‘I think’ must accompany all thoughts.259
Since rational psychology excludes experiential premises, its conclusions can be rejected outright
as baseless.
But can’t such an inner intuition of the self be observed? According to Kant (and Hume),
it cannot. Even after the most meticulous act of introspection, a distinct intuition of the self apart
from any other object of intuition never presents itself.260 Thus, the first paralogism
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…imposes on us an only allegedly new insight when it passes off the constant logical subject of
thinking as the cognition of a real subject of inherence, with which we do not and cannot have the
least acquaintance, because consciousness is the one single thing that makes all representations
into thoughts, and in which, therefore, as in the transcendental subject, our perceptions must be
encountered; and apart from this logical significance of the I, we have no acquaintance with the
subject in itself that grounds this I as a substratum, just as it grounds all thoughts.261

The subject is like the vanishing point in a painting, the gaze that can’t see itself, the condition of
knowledge that can’t itself be known as anything more than a condition.
In the B edition, Kant presents the first paralogism in the following syllogism:




What cannot be thought otherwise than as subject does not exist otherwise than as subject, and is
therefore substance.
Now a thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be thought otherwise than as subject.
Therefore, it also exists only as such a thing, i.e., as substance. 262

All judgments require an ‘I,’ but this subject is too poor an inner representation to ever warrant
the application of the category of substance to it.263 As Kant says of the paralogisms in general,
“Thus through the analysis of the consciousness of myself in thinking in general not the least is
won in regard to the cognition of myself as object. The logical exposition of thinking in general
is falsely held to be a metaphysical determination of the object.”264 What rational psychology
attempts to do is draw a synthetic proposition about the noumenal self from the logical subject
“by adding,” which is impossible.265 In particular, the first paralogism attempts to “[add] the
way of existing to thinking in general,” (i.e. that the ‘I’ is a substance), which exceeds what can
be said.266
Furthermore, in the second edition, Kant is much clearer as to why this syllogism is
guilty of the fallacy of equivocation (i.e. is properly speaking a paralogism) than he ever was in
the first edition. The major premise, “What cannot be thought otherwise than as subject does not
exist otherwise than as subject, and is therefore substance,” uses ‘thinking’ “as it applies to an
261
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object in general (hence as it may be given in intuition).”267 The second premise, “Now a
thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be thought otherwise than as subject,” uses
‘thinking’ “in relation to self-consciousness, where, therefore, no object is thought, but only the
relation to oneself as subject (as the form of thinking) is represented.”268 Thus, “in the
conclusion it cannot follow that I cannot exist otherwise than as subject, but rather only that in
thinking my existence I can use myself only as the subject of judgment, which is an identical
proposition, that discloses absolutely nothing about the manner of my existence.”269 Or put
another way, the thinking referred to in the minor premise is mistaken for an empirical ego, or
object which can be predicated by means of the categories, when it really is merely the unity of
thinking that acts as a prerequisite for cognition. Without a persisting inner intuition, the
category of substance cannot be applied to posit a persisting self.270
Thinkers Addressed by the First Paralogism
According to Eric Watkins in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: Background Source
Materials, Kant’s first paralogism is influenced by the arguments of at least two thinkers:
Christian Wolff and Alexander Baumgarten.271 We have already seen how Wolff argues that the
standard of certainty is equivalent to the certainty we have of our own existence. This argument
bears a striking similarity to Descartes famous, “I think, therefore I am” argument. In this
regard, it seems that Descartes is the explicit target, given that he tries to prove the soul’s
mentally-substantial existence based on a logical assumption (‘thinking implies a thinker’) and
an inner intuition (‘I am thinking right now’). Given that, this argument is immediately refuted
by the first paralogism without much need for in-depth analysis. On the other hand, whether or
267
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not the first paralogism adequately critiques the explicit arguments Wolff and Baumgarten
propose to prove the soul’s substantiality is something we must test, especially if the dogmatism
Kant is targeting is the Wolffian-Leibnizianism of his time.
Christian Wolff presents the following case for why the soul is a substance: If the soul is
simple, it must be self-subsisting, because all simple things are self-subsisting.272 Subsequently,
if the soul is self-subsisting, it must only have one power (that of representing the world), since a
self-subsisting thing can only have one power.273 On the surface, it is unclear how Kant is
critiquing this argument by means of the first paralogism. Certainly Wolff is deriving the
substantiality of the soul from its simplicity, so the first paralogism would seem to apply.
Nonetheless, this argument makes no mention of how the ‘I’ must be a substance because it can
never be an accident of something else. On the other hand, since this argument hinges on the
simplicity of the soul, the argument may be indirectly addressed by undermining the soul’s
alleged simplicity, which Kant does in the second paralogism. As Ameriks notes, the
substantiality of the soul and its simplicity are intimately tied.274
Alexander Baumgarten accepts Wolff’s contention that the soul (or ‘spirit’) is simple:
“Every substance is a monad. Every spirit is a substance. Therefore, every monad is also a
simple thing.”275 The soul is merely posited to be a substance, and on this ground is inferred to
be simple. Souls, or spirits, are intellectual monads, which are simple points. An intellectual
monad is a monad that clearly and distinctly represents the world. 276 Baumgarten offers a proof
for the substantiality of the soul later in his Metaphysics, based on what is required for thinking
to take place. Since thinking is an accident, it can take place only either in a substance or an
272
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aggregate of substances.277 A possible aggregate of substances that make thought possible is
referred to by Baumgarten as thinking matter. Baumgarten rejects the possibility of thinking
matter, leaving only the options that “whatever can think is either a substance, a monad, or a
whole of which a substance that can think is a part. Therefore, every soul is a substance, a
monad…Every spirit is the sufficient ground of the inherence of its accidents.”278 Here we see
the hallmark of the first paralogism: thinking, as an accident, requires a substance to perform the
thinking. Granted how familiar Kant was with Baumgarten’s Metaphysics, it’s likely that he has
this passage in mind when he formulated the minor premise stating the rule.
The Second Paralogism
In the A edition, Kant presents the second paralogism in the following syllogism:




That thing whose action can never be regarded as the concurrence of many acting things, is simple.
Now the soul, or the thinking I, is such a thing.
Thus [the soul is simple].279

The argument goes as follows: there is a difference between those effects produced by an
aggregate of substances, such as interacting bodies, which are external effects, and internal
effects, such as when a thinking being thinks. Composites are made up of simple substances
which have individual actions of their own, which are then added together or canceled out to
produce a total motion. Unlike a body, however, the resulting effect of a thinking being thinking
a thought cannot be additive. The collection of parts of a thought never constitutes a whole
thought, just as the collection of words in a verse cannot be equivalent to the verse itself.
Therefore, only a simple substance thinking can account for the holism of a thought.280
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However, Kant challenges the “proposition that many representations have to be
contained in the absolute unity of the thinking subject in order to constitute one thought.”281 On
what grounds is it claimed that the unity of a thought cannot derive from “the collective unity of
the substances cooperating in it (as the movement of a body is the composite movement of all its
parts)”?282 There is nothing analytically contained in the notion of a unified thought that
precludes this possibility, since on a conceptual level a unity of many representations can be
accomplished in numerous ways. 283 Furthermore, the “necessary unity of the subject…as the
condition of the possibility of every thought” cannot be proven on the basis of experience since
experience can never prove anything with absolute certainty, nor do we ever experience
‘absolute unity,’284 only a series of passing inner intuitions.
It is not difficult to see why refuting this possibility is crucial to the Critical project, as
can be seen in the following passage:
…there can be no insight into the necessity of presupposing a simple substance for a composite
thought according to the rule of identity. But that this same proposition should be cognized
synthetically and fully a priori from sheer concepts – that answer no one will trust himself to give
when he has insight into the ground of the possibility of synthetic propositions a priori as we have
established it above.285

A synthetic proposition known a priori is both a unified proposition and a proposition
constituted from parts. If unity cannot be produced, then cognitions, and with them synthetic
propositions known a priori would be impossible.286
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Each paralogism follows a similar, albeit distinct pattern. In this case, Kant theorizes that
we conclude that the soul is simple based on misunderstanding the ‘I think.’ The ‘I think’ is
indeed simple, but this predicate only describes the simple logical unity of apperception, not a
qualitative description of a spiritual substance.287 The transcendental I can be nothing more than
a ‘Something in general,’ which, lacking particular determinations, can only be simple.288
Furthermore, as we are by now familiar, predication (i.e. synthesis by means of concepts) is only
possible if intuitions are present. Since the soul is not persistently present, it cannot be identified
as a substance, let alone a simple substance.289
Kant claims that even if we concede that the soul is simple, no ground can be gained in
proving that it is distinct enough from perishable matter to persist upon death. On a phenomenal
level, we can grant that mind is different from matter. My mind is not extended. I cannot see
my thoughts and feelings, let alone the thoughts and feelings of others. But nonetheless, on a
noumenal level, mind (or soul) may be composed of the same kind of substrate as matter. Thus,
both spiritual and material substrata may be simple. They may even be identical with each
other.290
Thinkers Addressed by the Second Paralogism
According to Eric Watkins, Christian Wolff, Martin Knutzen, Alexander Baumgarten,
Christian August Crusius, and Marcus Herz were all influences that contributed to Kant’s
formulation of the Second Paralogism. This should not surprise us since Kant says that the
argument for the simplicity of the soul “is the Achilles of all the dialectical inferences of the pure
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doctrine of the soul.”291 We can find similar arguments that attempt to ascribe simplicity to the
soul and subsequently its immortality as early as Plato’s Phaedo.
Christian Wolff
In Wolff’s Rational Thoughts, we discover a somewhat familiar argument, since Wolff’s
argument for the substantiality of the soul is grounded on a proof for the soul’s simplicity. Wolff
assumes that there are only two possible contenders for thinking substance: bodies and souls. He
rules out the possibility that composites, such as bodies, are capable of thinking, which will
indirectly prove that the soul – which obviously does think – cannot be a composite being. The
argument is presented as follows: Changes in bodies can only occur in relation to alterations in
size, shape, and the position of their parts.292 This implies that all bodily changes are
locomotive, “since none of these can occur without a change of place.”293 Granted this, if bodies
thought, they would have to think by means of “a change that occurred in the position of several
parts of a certain size and shape through a determinate motion.”294 To pause over a thought
would then mean that this motion would either be impeded or similar parts would have to
replicate the motion. If one were to then reflect, or become conscious of the similarities and
differences between these two states “according to time as well as with respect to its body,” we
would have an act of thinking that does not derive from the motion of parts. Thus, “a body
cannot be conscious of this change and of the representation that is thereby brought about.
Because thoughts bring consciousness with it, no body can think.”295 Since the soul thinks, it
cannot be composed of matter, nor can it be a composite being.296 Evident in this argument is
the incompatibility between consciousness and a composite substrate. This is similar to how the
291
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unity of thought is argued to be a whole that cannot be a collection of parts, found in the Second
Paralogism.
Martin Knutzen
Martin Knutzen offers two proofs for why the soul must be a single, simple monad, and
never a collection of monads. These proofs bear a striking resemblance to Wolff’s proof,
although they lack any reference to motion.297 The first proof claims that only a simple subject
can have an intuition of the distinction between itself and something else, since only a simple
subject can picture two distinct representations and then connect them. Since matter is always an
aggregate and not simple, this further proves that the soul is not material.298 The second proof
accepts that thinking must involve simple monads, and by process of elimination, determines that
only one monad in an aggregate of monads that make up a body can possibly be responsible for
thinking. Knutzen suggests three possibilities: 1) one monad in an aggregate of monads thinks,
2) all monads in an aggregate think, and 3) thought is the collaborative effort of many monads.
Knutzen says the first option is unproblematic. The second option is absurd, since it implies that
there are many souls within me, even if they all think the same thought. If each monad thinks
something different, “then there will be nothing that compares them all against each other and
distinguishes them…”299 The third option bears the most resemblance to the argument Kant
critiques in the Second Paralogism.
[A] thought cannot be produced by the combined powers of several individual monads, or of the
simplest parts of matter insofar as the task of distinguishing [things] and thus every thought
inevitably requires the unity of the subject in which it occurs, and the unity of the forces by which
it is taken up.300
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Wolff’s influence is also easy to note in the second proof. Thus, because matter is necessarily an
aggregate, the monad (which the soul is) must be distinct from matter, since it must be simple in
order to think at all.
Alexander Baumgarten
We have already discussed Baumgarten’s argument for the simplicity of the soul in the
First Paralogism section: “Every substance is a monad. Every spirit is a substance. Therefore,
every monad is also a simple thing.”301 A soul must be a monad because the conditions of
thinking do not allow it to be an aggregate.302 As a monad, the soul must be simple, since
monads are not extended.303 The soul likewise is ‘physically incorruptible’ because it is not
possible for an indivisible entity lacking quantitative magnitude to break apart.304 Little
innovation is evident in this account.
Christian August Crusius
In Sketch of the Necessary Truths of Reason, Crusius starts his proof for the simplicity of
the soul by making a move similar to ones we have previously covered: by distinguishing motion
(a change of matter) from thinking and willing (changes of the soul). Crusius claims that the
distinction between the two general kinds of change is self-evident.305 Since matter is
characterized by motion and the soul by willing and thinking, the soul cannot be made of matter.
Already implicit in such a conclusion is that the soul cannot be a composite, like matter is, which
Crusius later goes on to explicate. If the soul were a composite, then willing and thinking would
have to be motion, which is contradictory.306 On the other hand, if thinking, willing, and the
soul’s other fundamental powers, are not produced via composition but instead existed in each
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individual part of the soul composite, then each part would essentially be a soul already, and the
soul would in reality be a composite of many self-subsisting souls. Therefore, even if the soul is
composite it still must be simple.307
Marcus Herz
Lastly, in Observations from Speculative Philosophy, Marcus Herz provides a similar
argument to the Comparison arguments referenced above, which lends credence to the Second
Paralogism as the consistent fallacious syllogistic form underlying arguments regarding the
soul’s simplicity. Herz states this argument in at least two places in the Observations: the First
Division and the Appendix. Since the Appendix version is more aesthetically pleasing, I will
quote part of it at length.
Herz asks us to imagine that we and a friend are in a meadow, each of us smelling a
different flower:
Even before I compare to each other the different releases of these two flowers, I had the rose
alone and my friend had the narcissus, and each breathed a special stream of volumptuousness, but
as much as we convinced ourselves of our pleasure, it was still impossible for both of us together
to determine which stream affected our irascible nerves more softly, which one did so more
mildly.308

Only after the flowers are switched and the same subject smells both flowers is a judgment
regarding which flower is more pleasant possible. Analogously, a simple subject is necessary
when any judgment of comparison is made. A relation between two things requires a subject
that constitutes that relation by means of comparison. If the subject is composite and each of its
parts received a part of a representation, then each part would in turn need to be simple in order
to compare the parts of a representation (i.e. for the comparison to be one comparison). If the

307
308

Ibid 177-8 (Paragraph 473).
Herz, Marcus Observations from Speculative Philosophy 310.

92

soul is simple, it cannot be destroyed.309 Once again, the immortality of the soul is concluded
from the soul’s simplicity.
The Third Paralogism
In the A edition, Kant presents the Third Paralogism in the following form:




What is conscious of the numerical identity of its Self in different times, is to that extent a person.
Now the soul is conscious of the numerical identity of its self in different times.
Thus it is a person.310

Initially, it would seem that the persistence of the self through time is analogous to the observed
persistence of an object of outer sense through time. Likewise, I seem to observe with inner
sense a series of inner determinations of a numerically identical self over time.311 And insofar as
“whenever I am conscious of myself, then I am conscious of myself,” there is no controversy,
since this is merely an analytic proposition that says nothing.312 But this does not necessarily
demonstrate the persistence of an identical self over time.313 The Third Paralogism seems to
argue that since time, as inner sense, is in the subject, the subject must be numerically identical
throughout it.314 According to Karl Ameriks,
[this] mistakes the genuine transcendental claim that time is a mere form for us (i.e., only to be
experienced from the human perspective in general) with the quite different and incorrect
empirical claim that it is but the form of the individual. If time were such an individual form, it
would follow that the self is continuous and a person in it. 315

From this Ameriks claims that the real target of critique is once again spiritualism, or the claim
that the self persists separate from the body.316
Furthermore, Kant suggests that just because the ‘I’ always attends our representations
does not mean that the same ‘I’ has persisted throughout. It is conceivable that the contents of
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consciousness at one moment can be transferred to another consciousness, which would result in
the illusion of continuity. This second consciousness would subsequently take itself to be the
first consciousness even though it is distinct. Kant compares it to the force of motion that is
transferred between two elastic balls when one ball strikes another.317 A continuity of force
remains even though the objects are distinct. A more science fiction-based example may be the
transporter technology used in the Star Trek universe, or in similar science fiction. A transporter
operates by means of breaking apart an individual into energy and then reassembling them in a
different location. Technically, one individual is destroyed and another created in another
location. In other words, the pattern of the individual (which presumably would include the
neurological patterns that constitute our consciousness and its states) would be transferred into
another individual. Kant seems to imply that this possibility is more evident to an outside
observer than to the subject as such.318
In the B edition, Kant has significantly simplified the problem. The ‘I think,’ which
accompanies all representations I am conscious of, is analytically identical with itself at any
given point in time. However, the ‘I’ in this case is not an intuition. Thus, the persisting identity
provided by the ‘I think’ does not necessarily refer to the identity of a person at all. As pointed
out by consideration of the First Analogy, nothing in the flow of inner intuitions is sufficient to
be ordered by means of the category of substance.319
Thinkers Addressed by the Third Paralogism
According to Eric Watkins, the development of Kant’s Third Paralogism was shaped by
Alexander Baumgarten, Johann August Eberhard, and Jphann Nicolaus Tetens. Since
Baumgarten’s influence is marginal and comprised primarily by his assertion that personality is a
317

Kant 423 [A363-364].
Ibid 364.
319
Ibid B408-9.
318

94

trait of the soul that cannot be removed without the soul ceasing to be a soul,320 I will focus on
the two latter thinkers.
Johann August Eberhard
In Universal Theory of Thinking and Sensing, Eberhard claims that the soul represents itself
to itself as a subject that persists throughout various determinations. Such a numerically
identical representation is only possible if the underlying subject is in fact numerically one. A
diversity of passing subjects would be as impossible, for Eberhard, as much as a diversity of
powers is.321 It is due to ‘the simplicity of the basic power’ that the soul can think of itself as a
numerically identical personality.322 “For the conservation of the I and of personhood depends
simply on the consciousness of its uninterrupted persistence.”323 Such a line is very similar to
the first premise of the Third Paralogism: “What is conscious of the numerical identity of its Self
in different times, is to that extent a person.”324 Thus, when the soul reflects upon its past, it
thinks itself to be the subject of all previous changes, up until the present time. If it didn’t, if
there was a time in which the soul did not recognize itself as the subject of previous changes,
then for all intents and purposes, there would be a discontinuity of self so radical that the same
person could not be said to have persisted.325 “For this reason one easily sees that it is merely the
consciousness of the continuity in our representations through which our soul recognizes its
numerical identity and assures itself that it still persists as the same I or moral individual.”326
Here we have the two essential components of the syllogism: a definition of personality which
relies on the continuity of consciousness, and a claim that this continuity is experienced.
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Johann Nicolaus Tetens
In Philosophical Essays on Human Nature, Tetens responds to the Humean challenge
that the self is a disjointed flow of impressions, lent convenient unity by the imagination.327
Tetens responds by saying that Hume has not considered all impressions, and that, despite his
observations, a numerically unified subject can be perceived. With awareness of impressions
always comes a further awareness that any feeling of modification is but the most present part of
a greater, although more obscure feeling of a subsisting background to all of my thoughts and
impressions. This background never changes, so it is numerically identical from one moment to
the next.328 “For that reason the concept of the identity of our I [comes] from comparing the
present feeling of our I, as a subject with the features that are present in it, to a similar feeling
that was reproduced from the past.”329 Furthermore, the numerical unity of the representation of
the I “is not a collection of individual representations” that our imagination rhapsodically unifies.
Instead, the unity of the I is evident in the impression itself.330 Tetens identifies the personality
of the self by means of both a fundamental, subsisting feeling, or impression, and a comparison
of that feeling with itself, felt at different times, which is similar to the Third Paralogism.
The Fourth Paralogism
The Fourth Paralogism of the ideality of outer relation in the A edition is the following:
 That whose existence can be inferred only as a cause of given perceptions has only a
doubtful existence.
 Now all outer appearances are of this kind: their existence cannot be immediately
perceived, but can be inferred only as a cause of given perceptions.
 Thus the existence of all objects of outer sense is doubtful. This uncertainty I call the
ideality of outer appearances, and the doctrine of this ideality is called idealism, in
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comparison with which the assertion of a possible certainty of objects of outer sense is
called dualism.331
This paralogism assumes that we only have direct access to objects of inner sense, such as acts of
thought and feeling, and that objects of outer sense can only be indirectly posited as the causes of
inner perceptions. Without direct access, objects of outer sense cannot be known for certain.
Kant refers to this skeptical position as idealism.332 He draws two further distinctions: between
idealism and transcendental idealism, and transcendental idealism and transcendental realism.
Kant’s own position, transcendental idealism, holds that all appearances, inner as well as outer,
(within time as well as space), are representations rather than things in themselves.
Transcendental realism, on the other hand, takes objects of outer sense, including time and space,
as things in themselves rather than as representations, or aspects, of the mind. Transcendental
idealism is also a dualism, since it distinguishes between appearances of outer sense, bound up in
the pure intuitions of space and time, and inner sense, which is only temporal.333
The Fourth Paralogism is ultimately erroneous because all representations are mere
representations of consciousness and when considered apart from their relation to the subject can
be nothing at all. Inner objects and outer objects are differentiated not by the former being
immediate to the subject and the other being mediate to it, but by the former representations
being in time and the latter representations being in both time and space.334 To assume that outer
objects are inferred causes of perceptions is to, in turn, make it logically impossible to determine
whether or not such unknown causes exist outside us or inside us.335 This opens the door to
solipsism, a threat Descartes invites by assuming a difference between perceptions and the
alleged real objects underlying them in space and time. Kant quells this threat by distinguishing
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between objects encountered in space and transcendentally external objects that affect our senses
but are never objects of possible experience.336 The materials for outer intuitions and subsequent
imaginings must always come from sensations produced by a noumenal object affecting the
senses and then subsequently given in space and time.337 At the very least, objects in space and
time cannot be doubted any more than our inner intuitions can be since the only thing
representations can correspond to are themselves.
Kant is ultimately critiquing two extremes that operate by means of the same
transcendental realist assumption: pneumatism and materialism. Pneumatism, adopted by the
spiritualist, prioritizes the mental world of inner sense, while materialism prioritizes the material
world of outer sense.338 However, “the transcendental object that grounds both outer
appearances and inner intuition is neither matter nor a thinking being in itself, but rather an
unknown ground of those appearances that supply us with our empirical concepts of the former
as well as the latter.”339 Neither mental substance nor physical substance is known to exist in
itself, so it is possible that both are underlied by the same kind of thing (if such a distinction still
holds on a noumenal level).
Implicit in Kant’s response to the Fourth Paralogism is a response to the soul-body
interaction debate, which I discussed thoroughly when covering Martin Knutzen.
Transcendental Idealism rejects the notion that objects of inner and outer sense are anything
more than appearances, so a material object can never be the cause of a psychic effect, and vice
versa. Therefore, neither physical influence (or influx), pre-established harmony, or supernatural
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assistance (ocassionalism) are viable, since all three assume a substantial distinction between
mind and matter.340
Kant changes the Fourth Paralogism to make it more about the subject rather than the
object, in the B edition:
That I distinguish my own existence, that of a thinking being, from other things outside of me (to
which my body also belongs) – this is equally an analytic proposition; for other things are those
that I think of as distinguished from me. But I do not thereby know at all whether this
consciousness of myself would even be possible without things outside me through which
representations are given to me, and thus whether I could exist merely as a thinking being (without
being a human being).341

Whereas the A edition was concerned with the metaphysical and epistemological status of
objects of outer sense, the B edition focuses on the distinction of the soul from the body and
surrounding world. But, as Kant points out, the soul is defined in contrast to everything else, so
we can know nothing about whether or not it can be understood distinct from the body or the
outside world. As Kant discusses in the Refutation of Idealism, I can only be conscious of my
existence as determined in time by means of a persistent thing. Since inner sense does not
provide such a persistent thing, self-awareness relies on the persistent objects of outer sense to be
possible at all.342 Thus, it would seem that Kant is skeptical of too drastic a cleaving of soul
from body and world.
Thinkers Addressed by the Fourth Paralogism
According to Eric Watkins, the formulation of the Fourth Paralogism was influenced by
Alexander Baumgarten, but it seems just as likely that it was also influenced by Johann Nicolaus
Tetens, as well as the more obvious Cartesian tradition. Kant explicitly references Descartes
insofar as the Fourth Paralogism produces Cartesian dualism, one of Kant’s targets.343 But
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granted that we have already acknowledged how this kind of dualism is based on the false
assumption that representations of outer sense are fundamentally different from those of inner
sense (or at least that the source of outer appearances is uncertain), it no longer bears repeating. I
will restrict my main discussion to Baumgarten and Tetens.
In the Metaphysics, Baumgarten defines many of the positions that Kant will redefine
using his own transcendental framework, such as idealism and materialism. Working from a
Leibnizian (monadic) framework, Baumgarten defines idealism as the position that only
intellectual monads exist in the world.344 Such a position would represent the pneumatism and
spiritualism that Kant is critiquing in the Fourth Paralogism. Materialism is defined as the
position that monads do not exist in the universe.345
In the Philosophical Essays on Human Nature, Tetens presents an argument regarding
the priority of impressions and the impressional experience as self-evident testimony of the
existence of an outer world similar to the argument Kant provides in the A edition of the Fourth
Paralogism. Tetens first distinguishes between the inner feelings of the soul, the feelings of the
body, and the impressions of external objects. Since we generate the concept of an actual object
from all of them, all three must have the predicate ‘actual object’ assigned to them. Nonetheless,
Tetens seems to give special attention to external impressions. When we are affected by an
external object, the soul is ‘drawn outside of itself,’ so that only the external impression is felt.346
“It must be present in the soul alone, separate from all others, and it must subsist for awhile in
this way, and it must then also be represented in this way alone again as separate.”347 The
emphasis on the persistence of the impression is analogous to Kant’s emphasis on external
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impressions as the only viable intuitions to which the category of substance can be applied,
precisely because they do persist.
2.6 Final Words On The Paralogisms
The paralogisms are an inevitable illusion of reason produced when reason attempts the
synthesis of the conditions of a thought in general.348 Thus is born rational psychology, a
discipline that attempts to understand the nature of the soul without appeal to experience. As a
comprehensive doctrine, rational psychology starts from one proposition – the substantiality of
the soul – then builds onto this proposition with each additional paralogism. The soul is said to
be a simple substance, then a numerically identical simple substance, and finally a numerically
identical simple substance that is distinct from the body and the world. These predicates are
determined by those four categories in each class which “ground the unity of the remaining ones
[of that class] in a possible perception…subsistence, reality, unity, and existence.”349 Rational
psychology attempts to think four kinds of unconditioned unity: unity of relation, unity of
quality, unity in the multiplicity of time (quantity), and unity of existence in space (modality). 350
Rational psychology takes apperception (the ‘I think’) as its ‘sole text,’ but such a text is
barren of all theoretically useful implications. Apperception is the ground of the possibility of
the categories but cannot be grasped by means of them: “I cannot cognize as an object itself that
which I must presuppose in order to cognize an object at all.”351 Instead, all we can say is that
the categories are employed through apperception.352 Each paralogism is a fallacy of
equivocation since the major premise uses a category transcendentally while the minor premise
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and conclusion use the same category empirically.353 We are left with neither empirical
psychology, nor rational psychology as a viable means of conceiving of the soul.
Left unanswerable are three fundamental questions rational psychology attempts to address:354
1. What is the nature of the community of the soul with an organic body? (“i.e., the animality and
the state of the soul in the life of the human being”)
2. What is the nature of the beginning of this community? (“i.e., of the soul in and before the birth
of the human being”)
3. What is the nature of the end of this community? (i.e., “of the soul in and after the death of the
human being” - immortality).

Evident in these questions is a temporal element: a before, a during, and an after. Kant’s own
theoretical framework does not permit us to answer these questions either, and can only
safeguard us from the dangers of materialism and spiritualism.355 They can be addressed,
however, practically. Understanding the subject practically will be the task undertaken in
Chapter Six. Before this can be accomplished though, I must return to the second danger to
freedom: Heteronomy of Choice.
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3.1 Heteronomy of Choice: Introduction to the Task of the Chapter
While empirical psychology and rational psychology concern themselves with the self as
a theoretical object, ethics is concerned with the self as a practical subject. The former
consider the self as both an empirical ego and a rational soul (absolute subject). A similar
division can be made in the latter. Thus, if we assume that there are two general forms of inquiry
(theoretical and practical) and two kinds of material of study (objects and subjects), then an
exploration of ethics would complete this study of the sciences of the self. This chapter will
concern the practical inquiry into the empirical ego, and will explore in-depth the four kinds of
ethical systems that concern that empirical ego. The latter, which concerns the ethical theory
addressing the rational soul, will be explored in Chapter Six. I read Kant as saying the
following: All ethical theories before his time fail to actually address the practical subject qua
subject, and instead, perhaps against their very intentions, address the self as a practical object
instead (a contradiction in terms). Only one ethical theory would thus, in his eyes, consider the
subject qua subject: his own. In other words, as we will see, the will that complies with
principles concerned with what is exterior to itself is not free; it is not acting as an autonomous
subject as much as it is a reactive object conditioned by the phenomenal world (in Kant
scholarship, whether or not we can so neatly parse the self into a free soul and a determined ego
is hotly debated)356. Kant refers to the state in which the self complies with practical principles
concerned with that which is external to itself as ‘heteronomy of choice.’
To do justice to an account of heteronomy of choice and its counterpart, autonomy of the
will, I will need to start where Kant does in the Critique of Practical Reason: with an account of
the faculty of desire. “The faculty of desire is a being’s faculty to be by means of its
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representations the cause of the reality of the objects of these representations…Life is the faculty
of a being to act in accordance with laws of the faculty of desire.”357 The will of a rational being
can be directed by means of two kinds of principles: those that require an object to be attained,
and those that merely tell the will what it ought to will without regard for ends (or objects). The
former is called heteronomy of choice. A practical principle in such a context can only instruct
the will to pursue specific means towards a desired end and amounts to little more than a prudent
guideline. These principles are implicitly hypothetical imperatives that suggest the conditions
necessary for attaining a conditional end (as opposed to a categorical imperative that obligates an
agent to perform it regardless of circumstances). An example of a hypothetical imperative would
be ‘If I want a doctorate, then I will write a high quality dissertation.’ In such cases, the desire
for the object necessarily precedes the practical principle and determines it.358 I may determine
the end but the world determines the means to attain it. Furthermore, whether or not the end is
attained is not fully in my control. Even if the object in question is ostensibly an inner state (for
example, happiness), it is technically external to the will, seeing that the will cannot will even an
inner state of mind such as this the same way it can will to act in a certain way. I may determine
pleasure to be the good and a delicious slice of pizza to be a means towards getting it, but the
pizza shop may be closed. To achieve a hypothetical end depends rather on a concatenation of
conditions outside of the will’s control.
Kant makes the bold claim that all heteronomous principles ultimately seek the same
object, pleasure, or, what amounts to the same thing: happiness.
The determining ground of choice is…the representation of an object and that relation of the
representation to the subject by which the faculty of desire is determined to realize the object.
Such a relation to the subject, however, is called pleasure in the reality of the object. This would
therefore have to be presupposed as a condition of the possibility of the determination of choice.359
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Because an object is necessarily external to the will, when the will seeks to attain it, it seeks to
attain a particular relationship of the faculty of sensibility to it, which produces pleasure.
“Pleasure is the representation of the agreement of an object or of an action with the subjective
conditions of life.”360 Happiness, for Kant, is not qualitatively distinct from pleasure and is but
the extension of this agreeable state over the span of a lifetime361 (Whether or not there are
qualitatively distinct forms of happiness will be addressed in Chapter Six).
Despite the object of desire being affirmed as intrinsically good, Kant seems to imply that
the motivation to acquire the object is fundamentally the subjective state resulting from the
attainment of the object. This requires some explanation, since it seems counter-intuitive.
Because human beings are both rational souls and sensuous egos, there are two concurrent ways
the will can be determined: objectively and subjectively. The objective determining ground is
the ‘appraisal of the action,’ which determines what is right and wrong.362 But the objective
determining ground is not sufficient to move the agent to act. “Since we are not fully rational,
but, rather, partly sensuous, we require a distinct subjective, or motivating, ground that can affect
us sensuously” (a maxim, or “subjective principle of volition”).363 In other words, in order for
embodied, rational beings to comply with obligation, some ‘incentive’ must ‘move’ its sensuous
nature so that we can comply with obligation and act morally. Morally, that incentive would be
respect for the moral law.364 But we are concerned in this chapter with those practical principles
that only appear moral, but are really only precepts of prudence. For Kant, the only non-moral
incentive that can motivate an embodied, rational being is pleasure, or happiness.
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Kant’s point here is that if an end, or object, contained in a maxim determines choice, then this
determination is contingent upon the empirical fact of whether or not the agent associates pleasure
with this end or object. In saying this, Kant implies that it is the anticipation of pleasure that is
associated with an end contained in a maxim that determines choice (according to the maxim).
Thus, for Kant, the end in which we are interested is associated with pleasure, and this association
is not broken when the end is incorporated into a maxim. Maxims are not merely cognitive
principles. Instead, they represent the meeting ground of our rationality and our pathology.365

That being the case, the kind of object desired is irrelevant, since all ‘material practical
principles’ have the same subjective determining ground, pleasure, and with it, the lower faculty
of desire.366
Kant derives an architectonic of material practical principles based on a two-fold
classification of objects that Kant takes to be comprehensive. There are objects of outer sense
and objects of inner sense. These objects, in turn, are either subjective or objective. All
subjective objects are empirical objects, while all objective objects are rational objects.367
Objective objects entail the concept of perfection, either “as a characteristic of the human being”
(such as an individual’s moral character, talent, or skill) or “the supreme perfection in substance”
(God).368 Ultimately though, all material principles are empirical, including objective material
principles conceived in thought, since “perfection in the practical sense is the fitness or adequacy
of a thing” for an end, and ends are objects sought for the subsequent agreeable state they
permit.369 One may criticize this conclusion by pointing out that the object could be pursued for
its own sake and may not be motivated by a pleasurable outcome at all, but even if this were the
case, the circumstantial nature of achieving success would make the moral nature of the act
contingent.
Kant uses this architectonic to categorize all competing kinds of moral theories, typically
including a contemporary exemplar for each sub-variety. Below is the table containing these
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moral theories, which he provides in the Critique of Practical Reason. In the next section, I will
include a detailed exposition of each moral theory indicated and why it is classified as it is.
Practical Material Determining Grounds in the Principle of Morality370

We must understand Kant’s general criticism of these moral theories in context to
freedom. As noted, these theories propose principles that bind us to the caprice of circumstance
rather than self-determination. This parallels a Stoic distinction Epictetus makes in the Manual
of Epictetus:
Of all existing things some are in our power, and others are not in our power. In our power are
thought, impulse, will to get and will to avoid; and, in a word, everything which is our own doing.
Things not in our power include the body, property, reputation, office, and, in a word, everything
which is not our own doing. Things in our power are by nature free, unhindered, untrammeled;
things not in our power are weak, servile, subject to hindrance, dependent on others…There is but
one way to freedom – to despise what is not in our power.” 371

For Kant, we can control the manner in which we will, or put otherwise, the determining grounds
for our practical principles. The proper province of morality is the will rather than the world.
And just like with the Stoics, to determine one’s will in accordance with something out of its
control (in this case, an object) means to become unfree. This occurs in two ways: pragmatically
370
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and metaphysically. Pragmatically, a will that seeks an object is not sufficient unto itself and can
only comply with a heteronomous principle if it has both the power and physical ability to “make
the desired object real.”372 If circumstances do not cooperate with the will’s aspirations, the
principle cannot be satisfied. Thus, success and failure are not completely determined by the
will alone but also by the world. Metaphysically, to pursue an object of desire shackles the self
to the world of sense, and with it, the unbreakable chain of cause and effect. Desires,
inclinations, and all other subjectively determining causes belong to feeling and thus the faculty
of sensibility.373 The faculty of sensibility is in turn a part of the world of sense, which is the
order of appearances.374 As Kant outlines in the Second Analogy of Experience in the First
Critique, “All alterations occur in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and
effect.”375 Therefore, all appearances, of which all sensible desires and inclinations are included,
are bound up in a chain of cause and effect that does not allow for freedom.
And while Kant is not concerned here with ataraxia (to which he gives little moral
regard), nor a fortiori with those lifestyles that can best secure it, he is concerned with those
practical principles that are counterposed to freedom. Morality, if it is indeed to secure freedom
for the self, must secure two kinds of freedom: negative and positive. The former, negative
freedom, is freedom from the natural order of cause and effect; while the latter, positive freedom,
entails the moral principles that explicitly legislate free actions.376
I contend that Kant’s Table of Heteronomy is an architectonic for all manners in which
the will can be controlled, largely because 1) control can be conceived of as the influence of an
object upon a will which undermines its self-determination, and 2) Kant has provided an
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architectonic of all kinds of objects, which, when rendered the determining ground of the will (or
motivating end), undermine its self-determination. I will use this table to organize Foucault’s
analyses of power into a four-fold system in Chapter Four. Such an application is all the more
legitimized by the fact that these four forms of heteronomy are also four kinds of desire, four
kinds of imperative that incite the subject to seek its own subjection, just as power does for
Foucault.
Thus it is crucial to familiarize ourselves with the intricacies of this table, for the sake of
accomplishing three tasks: 1) to provide an account of the practical science of the empirical ego
(heteronomous ethics), 2) to better understand Kant’s position on how the will’s freedom may be
undermined, and 3) to employ this classification more globally to see Foucault’s work in a
different light. In this spirit I will be explicating each moral theory Kant mentions in the Table,
starting with the ‘subjective-external’ moral theories of Michel de Montaigne and Bernard
Mandeville.
3.2 Subjective-External Material Practical Principles
What does Kant mean by a ‘subjective-external’ material practical principle? A
‘subjective’ principle in this case cannot necessarily mean ‘personal’ since then it would not be
external. The only external object that is also subjective, or put otherwise, that lacks objective
necessity, is culture, since culture is relative, yet not relative to each individual’s opinion or
feeling. Mores, as opposed to morals, are cultural artifacts that vary like any other custom. In a
certain respect, the subjective-external register is the sole locus of investigation taken up by the
moral (or cultural) relativist, since the latter conflates morals with mores and looks upon the
moral codes of a given society as nothing but an arbitrary set of cultural practices contingently
selected from a contingent field of possible valuations, neutral and without voice until selected.
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It is in this respect that Kant’s condemnation of heteronomous principles resonates with the critic
of the moral relativist, insofar as moral relativism chains us to the contingencies of our culture’s
social and historical determinations without providing an objective position ‘outside’ the system
to critique its mores and free us.
Kant identifies two kinds of societal principles: education and civil constitution. Before
exploring each individually, it is important to question why Kant distinguishes these two
different subjective-external principles from the general pack of subjective-external principles at
all, since this organizational decision might indicate a comprehensive division inherent in the
nature of subjective-external objects themselves. In fact, this bifurcation can be noted in the
subjective-internal register as well, which may point to a characteristic distinction inherent in all
subjective objects (even if the principle that distinguishes them turns out to be different in each
register). I take it that Kant implicitly emphasizes this in the second Critique, since he presents
here a simplified, perhaps more refined version of the list of subjective-external moral theories
that he provides in his Lectures on Ethics.377 The distinction must be more than a difference of
scale, since moral education need not be one-on-one, such as the tutor-pupil relationship
Montaigne seems to assume in his essay On the Education of Children.378 Theoretically, what is
to stop a much broader moral educational program from being instituted? To solve this mystery,
it seems plausible to look at both practical principles as just the determining grounds they are,
namely as formative of something. It is not insignificant that a moral education traditionally
applies to children while a civil constitution does not. Regardless of the scale of application, a
moral education forms individuals (in this case, cultivating those virtues in a child necessary for
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becoming a responsible adult) while a civil constitution forms societies. We would consider an
education squandered that merely created an orderly classroom, but a civil constitution
successful that created an orderly society.
Furthermore, we should not be too quick to pass over the apparent contradiction between
the subjective axis and the external axis, since it is here, more than anywhere, that Kant
emphasizes de jure universality over de facto universality. In fact, the external-subjective
designation indicates the qualitative limits of subjective judgment, which reinforces a distinction
Kant makes in the Critique of Practical Reason regarding moral necessity and contingency:
But suppose that finite rational beings were thoroughly agreed with respect to what they had to
take as objects of their feelings of pleasure and pain and even with respect to the means they must
use to obtain the first and avoid the other; even then they could by no means pass off the principle
of self-love as a practical law; for, this unanimity itself would still be only contingent. The
determining ground would still be only subjectively valid and merely empirical and would not
have the necessity which is thought in every law, namely objective necessity from a priori
grounds, unless one had to say that this necessity is not practical at all but only physical, namely
that the action is as unavoidably forced from us by our inclination as is yawning when we see
others yawn.379

Despite the content of the passage pertaining to happiness, Kant is making a broader point about
the limitations of heteronomous principles, especially those principles that could potentially
claim that their de facto scope is identical to the scope of a universal and necessary categorical
imperative. Since happiness is assumed to be the aim of all rational beings, Kant can use it to
test the limits of heteronomy. Happiness, like any contingent psychological state, is a matter of
fact. Morality, for Kant, cannot be grounded on matters of fact, since matters of fact are
contingent. As Kant notes in the second Critique, at best such principles can act as ‘general
rules’ but never ‘universal rules.’380 Subjective-external principles, whose domain can
theoretically extend to the boundaries of all human artifice, will never so extend as to outstrip the
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stain of contingency. A set of mores, even if universally assented to by a cosmic and
comprehensive multitude, could always be otherwise.
If the reader may indulge a repackaging of the exposition to follow, Kant outlines not
merely a distinct class of moral principle (the subjective-external), but also a different kind of
subject: the cultural subject. Such a subject is linked either to societal mores or to civil law and
its strictures. Since they are ‘external’ to the pathological immediacy of the individual, we can
consider such principles to be ‘ideal.’ Any practical science that stays without the confines of a
cultural relativist horizon will find nothing but a patient passively shaped by social forces. The
only question such a science may ask is which social force is efficacious. I will now turn to the
two forms of subjective-external material practical principles: those grounded in education
(Montaigne) and those grounded in civil constitution (Mandeville).
Michel de Montaigne’s ‘Education-based’ Moral Theory
In his essay On the Education of Children, Montaigne argues that a proper education is
most of all a moral education. When describing the ideal curriculum, Montaigne notes, “…the
first ideas which [the pupil’s] mind should be made to absorb must be those that regulate his
behavior and morals, that teach him to know himself, and to know how to die well and live
well.”381
Our pupil should be told…what it is to know and not to know, what the aim of his study should
be; what courage, temperance, and justice are; what the difference is between ambition and greed,
servitude and submission, license and liberty; by what signs one may recognize genuine and solid
contentment; to what extent we should fear death, suffering, and shame. 382

Foremost amongst the pupil’s education is the liberal art that “makes us free,” philosophy. 383
Already we can note a sentiment shared by Kant and Montaigne: freedom is in the province of
morality. Before the pupil has encyclopedic knowledge, the pupil must be reared to know the
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proper way to use that knowledge, since, as Plato acknowledges in the Republic, the most
knowledgeable have the greatest potential to abuse the knowledge they have.384
Montaigne opposed theoretical pedagogical agendas that bore no practical fruit, favoring
instead a pruning of speculative investigations:
If we knew how to restrict our life-functions within their just and natural limits, we should find
that most of the branches of knowledge in their current usage are valueless to us; and that even in
those which are valuable, there are quite profitless stretches and depths which we should do better
to avoid.385

Pedagogy should be hands-on rather than based on the excruciating study of texts (Montaigne
sometimes reminds us of how few classics he has actually read from cover to cover).386 In line
with this approach, the tutor necessarily teaches the pupil that the practice of virtue is joyous
rather than burdensome,387 just as all learning should be.388 Montaigne tears down traditional
walls, such as those between happiness and virtue, world and classroom, and mind and body,
since an education divorced from utility is constantly at odds with everyday life and can never
hope to gain traction in the heart of a pupil who must spend the majority of life outside
classroom walls. The world itself becomes the pupil’s classroom,389 a classroom that lends its
pupil a lens that puts his or her own circumstances in global perspective.390 Furthermore, the
reserve of the mind must be shored up by the natural endurance of a properly trained and
hardened body: “When athletes ape the endurance of philosophers, it is rather out of strong

384

Plato, Republic, trans. C.D.C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004) 495a-b.
Montaigne 65.
386
Ibid 49-50. “But as for plunging any deeper, or for biting my nails over the study of Aristotle, the monarch of
modern learning, or stoutly pursuing any particular branch of knowledge, that I have never done…I have never
settled down to any solid book except Plutarch and Seneca, into which I dip like the Danaids, filling and emptying
my cup incessantly. Some part of my reading sticks to this paper, but to myself little or nothing sticks.”
387
Ibid 67-9.
388
Ibid 72-3.
389
Ibid 61. “He must be warned that when in company he should have his eyes everywhere…Let an honest
curiosity be instilled in him, so that he may inquire into everything; if there is anything remarkable in his
neighborhood let him go see it, whether it is a building, a fountain, a man, the site of an ancient battle, or a place
visited by Caesar or Charlemagne.”
390
Ibid 63-4.
385

113

nerves than a steadfast heart.”391 And likewise, all idiosyncrasies of taste must be trained out of
the pupil, so that he or she can adapt to any custom or circumstance no matter how foreign or
unusual; the pupil should always choose the good deliberately rather than merely out of
incapacity.392 “It is not a soul or a body that one is training, but a man; the two must not be
separated.”393
However, a complication in Kant’s account immediately arises: in what way can
education be a motivating end for the will? Perhaps Kant means that education is what shapes
the will, and thus determines it, but what is in question for a practical principle is not the method
by which an ethics is acquired but the content of that ethics; what it instructs us to do. In what
way is education such a content?
It is in Kant’s Lectures on Ethics that a clearer (but not necessarily more accurate)
representation of Montaigne’s position is presented which explains how education can act as a
practical material principle:
The empirical system of the theoretical concept of morality includes…external grounds. Those
who posit morality therein say that all morality rests on two things: on education and on
government. All morality would be a mere custom, and we judge by custom concerning all
actions, by rules of education or by laws of the sovereign authority. So moral judgment arises by
way of example or legal prescription. Montaigne took the first view. He says: In different parts of
the world we also find that men differ in regard to morality; thus in Africa, theft is allowed, in
China parents are permitted to throw their children on the street, the Eskimos strange them, and in
Brazil they are buried alive. 394

Here Kant refers to practical principles based on education as ‘rules’ and ‘examples.’ Further on
the same page, Kant elucidates this further, claiming that Montaigne’s position (one that assumes
education is the determining ground of the will) is that something is moral merely by virtue of
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custom, or by virtue of being taught it is right to perform. Regarding lying, “Were it to rest upon
education…then anyone educated…where lying is permitted, would be at liberty to lie.”395
Is this typology congruent with Montaigne’s own position? What is the possible source
material for this apparent caricature? While it is unclear which Montaigne essays Kant himself
read, there is some textual support for Kant’s reading. Note for example Chapter XXII of
Montaigne’s famous Essays, called ‘Of Custom, and that we should not easily change a law
received:’
The laws of conscience, which we pretend to be derived from nature, proceed from custom; every
one having an inward veneration for the opinions and manners approved and received amongst his
own people, cannot without very great reluctance depart from them, nor apply himself to them
without applause…[W]hatever is off the hinges of custom is believed to be also off the hinges of
reason… 396

By itself, this does not sufficiently demonstrate that Montaigne equates the laws of conscience
with morality as such (Kant certainly did not). Nor is there anything prescriptive indicated about
this passage.
It is later in this essay that Montaigne shifts from a descriptive to a prescriptive approach
to custom, which may give some credence to Kant’s reading:
Let us take another view of the subject: it is a very great doubt whether any so manifest an
advantage can accrue from the alteration of a law or custom received, let it be what it will, as there
is danger and inconvenience in doing it; forasmuch as government is a structure composed of
several parts and members joined and united together, with so strict affinity and union that it is
impossible to stir so much as one brick or stone but the whole body will be sensible of it…For my
own part I have myself a very great aversion for novelty, what face, or what pretence soever it
may carry along with it, and have reason, having been an eye-witness of the great mischiefs
produced.397

He follows this with a curious epistemological position: “[It seems] to me very wrong to wish to
subject public and established customs and institutions to the weakness and instability of a
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private and particular fancy (for private reason is but a private jurisdiction)…”398 This is not to
say that all innovation must be banned outright, as even Montaigne concedes that there are rare
occasions that necessitate it, but that without “the hoary beard and wrinkled face of ancient use,”
namely custom, we would grow dissatisfied with a great many things bolstered by custom alone
which we should nonetheless practice.399 This seems to be a very strange uncritical position for a
philosopher to take. Not only that, but it seems that the grounds Montaigne gives for endorsing
obedience to custom – societal stability – would be the implicit moral motivator, not the
authority of custom as such.
Interestingly enough, as we have seen, Montaigne has given us insight into how he thinks
a child should be educated, in On the Education of Children. If the principles of a moral
education were up to the caprice of the tutor, then anything would go, which is clearly not
Montaigne’s position on the matter. At minimum, that would suggest that the tutor must work
within certain constraints. And while it is likely that those constraints, and thus those virtues, at
least overlap with those venerated by (French) society, Montaigne, perhaps in a moment of
hypocrisy, seems to be advocating a kind of pedagogical reform which is contrary to his hardline
against most innovation. Nonetheless, what is relevant is not the accuracy of Kant’s account, but
instead how it acts as an exemplar for a possible moral position in a grand meta-ethical system:
one of two versions of moral relativism.
Bernard Mandeville’s ‘Civil Government’ based Moral Theory
The other form of subjective-external practical material principle Kant mentions is
political rather than cultural, and includes familiar social contract theories that littered the early
modern philosophical landscape, such as those espoused by Thomas Hobbes and Bernard
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Mandeville. Although Kant mentions both Hobbes and Mandeville in his Ethics lecture, he
specifically singles out Bernard Mandeville in the Critique of Practical Reason. Since the
modern reader is likely familiar with Hobbes but not Mandeville, I will go more in-depth with
Mandeville’s theory, as expressed in his essay An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue rather
than Hobbes’ theory, espoused in the Leviathan.
Before I begin, I need to note a discrepancy between the Lectures and the Second
Critique. In the Lectures, Kant refers to Mandeville’s principle not as a subjective-external
moral principle, but as instead resting on “inner grounds:”400
Those who derive morality from the inner grounds of the empirical principle, postulate a feeling, a
physical and moral feeling. The physical feeling consists in self-love, which takes two forms,
vanity and self-interest. It aims at one’s own advantage, and is a self-seeking principle, whereby
our senses are satisfied. It is a principle of prudence. The authors who uphold the principle of
self-love include, among the…moderns, Helvetius and Mandeville.

Oppose this to his characterization of Hobbes’ theory, which he says is determined on “external
grounds:”
[Hobbes] says: the sovereign can permit all acts, and also forbid them, so actions cannot be judged
morally by reason; we act, rather by example of custom and by order of authority, so that there can
be no moral principle other than what is borrowed from experience. 401

If Kant originally characterizes Mandeville’s position in the Lectures as based on an inner
principle of self-love (as we will see, primarily based on vanity), why should he re-characterize it
as based on an external principle - ‘civil government’ - in the Critique of Practical Reason?
To understand how Mandeville’s moral theory lends itself to this ambiguous reading, I
will need to provide an exposition of the moral account found in An Enquiry into the Origin of
Moral Virtue, an essay found in the larger, popular text The Fable of the Bees. The text starts
with a poem called ‘The Grumbling Hive: Or, Knaves turn’d Honest, which uses a bee hive as an
allegory to explain the necessary role of vice in a thriving society. To demonstrate the
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importance of vice to social prosperity, Mandeville tells the story of how a once vicious but
affluent bee hive dispensed with vice, took up of mantel of virtue, and with it, dispensed with all
greatness.
In the beginning:
…every Part [of the hive] was full of Vice,
Yet the whole Mass a Paradise;
Flatter’d in Peace, and Fear’d in Wars,
They were th’ Esteem of Foreigners,
And lavish of their Wealth and Lives,
The Balance of all other Hives.
Such were the Blessings of that State;
Their Crimes conspir’d to make them Great:
And Virtue, who from Politicks
Had learn’d a Thousand Cunning Tricks,
Was, by their happy Influence,
Made Friends with Vice: And ever since,
The worst of all the Multitude
Did something for the Common Good.402

Even this early in the poem, Mandeville gives away the moral of the story, just as he does in the
alternative title to The Fable of the Bees: ‘Private Vices, Publick Benefits.’ It is in accordance
with human nature to be selfish, since even the most seemingly virtuous, selfless act always has a
selfish underbelly. 403 The hunger pangs of ego can never be sated, and even within the most
devote moralist will merely find ever-more clever, self-deluding, subterranean means of being
appeased. As F.B. Kaye notes of Mandeville’s position, so long as politicians properly regulate
the selfish inclinations of their constituents, society benefits404 since
If all actions were to cease except those due to unselfishness, the pure idea of good, or the love of
God, trade would end, the arts would be unnecessary, and the crafts be almost abandoned. All
these things exist only to supply purely mundane wants, which, according to Mandeville’s
analysis, are all at bottom selfish.405
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Mandeville illustrates this dire consequence of crowned moralism in his poem when he speaks of
what follows when the ‘knaves’ of the hive turning honest:
But all the Rogues cry’d brazenly,
Good Gods, Had we but Honesty!
Merc’ry smil’d at th’ Imprudence,
And others call’d it want of Sense,
Always to rail at what they lov’d:
But Jove with Indignation mov’d,
At last in Anger swore, He’d rid
The bawling Hive of Fraud; and did.
The very Moment it departs,
And Honesty fills all their Hearts…406

With the end of vice, superfluous careers perpetuated by or dependent on vice fall away, industry
is reduced to only bare necessities (since all else is vain luxury), and all traces of affluence and
greatness are removed. The parable ends with the bees, decimated by war, abdicating the hive
and moving into the hollow of a tree, since even to partake of the ease and comfort of the hive is
deemed too vicious.407 From this we are meant to begrudgingly embrace the inefficiencies and
injustices of society (of course within reason), despite our distaste for them, since to eradicate
them means to remove the engine of societal prosperity and growth.
Already we can see why, in the Lectures, Kant insinuates that the thread of self-love runs
throughout Mandeville’s ethical theory. Humans are essentially selfish and even in their virtue
seek to appease their self-interests. But why then does Kant characterize Mandeville’s principle
as a subjective-external principle based on civil government in the Second Critique? A clue can
be found in the Introduction to The Fable of the Bees, wherein Mandeville scholar F.B. Kaye
himself orbits around this ambiguity in Mandeville’s work. Kaye notes that Mandeville both
traditionally esteems selflessness as virtue but secretly affirms personal happiness and net
societal utility - as can only be secured through the pursuit of self-interest - as the true value:
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Mandeville decided upon the public results of private actions according to utilitarian standards.
That which is useful, that which is productive of national prosperity and happiness, he called a
benefit. But he judged the private actions themselves according to an anti-utilitarian scheme,
whereby conduct was evaluated, not by its consequences, but by the motive which gave it
rise…The paradox that private vices are public benefits is merely a statement of the paradoxical
mixing of moral criteria which runs through the book. 408

The distinction lies between the concepts of the Good and Virtue. A state of affairs or a
thing can be good or evil (for example, the experiences of pleasure and pain), but only personal
character can be either virtuous or vicious. Kant’s Lectures focus on Mandeville’s conception of
the Good while the Critique of Practical Reason addresses his conception of Virtue. As
Mandeville himself says, “There is an Ambiguity in the word Good which I would avoid; let us
stick to that of the Virtuous.”409 Thus, what we need to identify is what virtue means for
Mandeville, rather than what Mandeville himself seems to be implicitly advocating. This
question can be answered by turning to An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue, the text in
which Mandeville both defines virtue as selflessness and as the product of political intervention.
It seems as if Kant read the speculative historical account of the origin of the notion of
virtue Mandeville provides as Mandeville’s moral principle itself. According to Mandeville, the
original lawgivers recognized both that Man is inherently selfish and that this selfish nature, left
uncurbed, would always undermine social stability. But this selfishness could also be turned to
the advantage of society. As beings of passion, humans seek praise and avoid contempt. All
lawgivers had to do was draw on humanity’s own vanity by praising those who cultivated any
rational traits that set them apart from other animals, and condemning those irrational appetites
humans and animals share. Similar to Hobbes’ own social contract theory, even the most selfish
recognized the mutual benefit of advocating virtue and discouraging vice:
It being the Interest then of the very worst of them, more than any, to preach up Publickspiritedness, that they might reap the fruits of the Labour and Self-denial of others, and at the same
time indulge their own Appetites with less disturbance, they agreed with the rest, to call every
408
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thing, which, without Regard to the Publick, Man should commit to gratify any of his Appetites,
VICE; if in that Action there cou’d be observed the least prospect, that it might either be injurious
to any of the Society, or ever render himself less serviceable to others: And to give the Name of
VIRTUE to every Performance by which Man, contrary to the impulse of Nature, should endeavor
the Benefit of others, or the Conquest of his own Passions out of a Rational Ambition of being
good.410

Mandeville draws on the example of praising and scolding children to illustrate how this practice
continues on from generation to generation. As soon as a child learns it is a high mark of
distinction to ‘behave,’ they behave.411 In this way, self-love was turned against itself, leading to
the valorization of selflessness. But at its heart, selflessness is merely the pursuit of praise from
others, and at best, the pursuit of self-flattery.
To those who may claim that morality springs from religion rather than politics,
Mandeville has an interesting response. Throughout time and various cultures, there have been
many different religions. Sometimes these religions host a plethora of deities that seem to act
contrary to virtue. The Greek and Roman gods are notable examples, since to emulate the
actions of a Zeus or a Hera would make one a rapist and a murderer. But none could deny that
even in these cultures virtue was praised rather than vice. That is because even in these cultures
we can see the political hand at work, esteeming the courageous and self-sacrificing with
monuments and encomiums.412
Thus, a virtuous character is whatever lawmakers decide to esteem for the sake of
maintaining society. Such a moral principle is determined by social convention, and is thus,
according to Kant, subjective-external, even if it is fundamentally internally grounded by selflove. It should not surprise us that Kant would seem to ignore this more fundamental level, since
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we have previously established that all heteronomous theories are ultimately grounded on a
principle of self-love, including Mandeville’s own position.
3.3 Subjective-Internal Material Practical Principles
Let us now turn to a different kind of material practical principle (the subjective-internal),
with the expectation that a different kind of ethical subject will be revealed that is no more
autonomous than the cultural subject: the sensible subject. While the subjective-external register
could be considered ‘ideal’ (since it concerns ideal precepts) the subjective-internal register
could be considered ‘sensible,’ determined not by external conditions but ‘pathological’
conditions. What this means will become clear as each subjective-internal material practical
principle is explored.
Since all heteronomous theories are fundamentally based on a principle of self-love,413
Kant’s account of subjective-internal principles based on inner states such as happiness, may, in
a certain respect, be the most important general heteronomous position to examine. Kant
identifies two kind of subjective-internal principles: those that affirm a specific physical feeling
– in this case, Epicurus’ valorization of pleasure, and those that affirm a specific moral feeling,
like Francis Hutcheson.’414 If both are distinct from subjective-external principles, they cannot
be ultimately grounded on societal values (although this is not to say that societal values do not
play a role in determining what is pleasurable or conscionable, since it would be patently absurd
to do so). They must in some way be natural.
But why this division? Let us return to the passage in the Lectures on Ethics which
distinguishes the two from each other:
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If a system of ethics is based on empirical grounds, it rests either on inner or outer grounds, drawn
from the objects of inner and outer sense. If morality rests on the inner grounds, then this is the
first part of the empirical system; if it rests on outer grounds, then it is the second part of that
system. Those that derive morality from the inner grounds of the empirical principle, postulate a
feeling, a physical and moral feeling. The physical feeling consists in self-love, which takes two
forms, vanity and self-interest. It aims at one’s own advantage, and is a self-seeking principle,
whereby our senses are satisfied. It is a principle of prudence. The authors who uphold the
principle of self-love include, among the ancients, Epicurus, in that he employed, in general, a
principle of sensuality…The second principle of the inner ground of the empirical system arises if
the ground is posited in the moral feeling whereby we can discriminate what is good or bad. The
leading authors are Shaftsbury and Hutcheson.415

Principles based on physical feeling seem to be ‘principles of prudence.’ Kant does not
explicitly refer to principles of moral feeling in the same way, even though, as we know, all
heteronomous theories are ultimately principles of prudence.416 More importantly, Kant notes
that principles based on physical feeling are ultimately self-serving, while he does not say the
same for moral theories based on what Francis Hutcheson calls a ‘moral sense.’ While most
would equate an internal sense of morality with a conscience, we’d be wrong to do so. A moral
sense is an internal sense which perceives the good, just as external senses perceive external
objects, like eyes perceive light. For Kant, or at the very least the Kant of the Lectures, the
problem with basing ethical decisions on a moral sense is ultimately that such judgments are still
based on taste, which is contingent.417 Later, when Hutcheson’s ‘moral sense’ is discussed more
in-depth, I will show that Kant implicitly suggests in the Critique of Practical Reason, that
Hutcheson’s misrecognizes what is meritorious about his own theory, and that it may actually be
duty-based.418 I will return to that argument after I have outlined both subjective-internal moral
positions.
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What we must recognize is that a subjective-internal principle no more secures our
autonomy than does a subjective-external principle. An imperative obligating us to maximize an
internal state (like pleasure) or to comply with a moral feeling is as heteronomous as one that
obligates us to comply with custom. This may seem paradoxical since the former are ‘internal’
motors. But Kant would have us consider these two different determining grounds – the former
an actual good to be sought, the latter the faculty which determines the good to be sought - as
distinct from the (autonomous) will. Both pleasure and a moral feeling would pertain not to
reason but the faculty of sensibility, since both are feelings. Pleasure is a state that is produced
only when the faculty of sensibility encounters a beneficial object which is nonetheless
contingent, external to us, and thus outside of our control to acquire. A moral feeling, and the
subsequent feeling of pleasure that results from encountering or practicing benevolence
(maximizing societal happiness), while based on a principle, is similarly problematic, since it is
dependent on actualizing a certain state of affairs. And while it might seem like acting from a
principle, such as benevolence, as Hutcheson will describe, is a rational decision, concerned
mostly with motives rather than consequences, and thus a free one, “the interests on which the
reasons for choice are based” are determined by and explicable from a ‘naturalistic causal
explanation.’ Reason, if it is to be genuinely free, cannot be determined by empirical interests,
only rational ones.419 I will start my exposition of subjective-internal material practical principles
with the exemplar Kant provides for physical feeling based moral positions: Epicureanism.
Epicurus’ ‘Physical Feeling’ based Moral Theory
While Epicurus is known to have written over 300 works, all but the Letter to Herodotus,
Letter to Pythocles, Letter to Menoeceus, Principal Doctrines, Vatican Sayings, and a collection
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of fragments have been lost to time.420 The Epicurean position is well-known, and best
summarized in the Letter to Menoeceus. The common characterization of Epicurean doctrine is
that pleasure is good and pain is bad. However, many critics assume that this preliminary
judgment of what is good and bad is sufficient for determining which actions are choiceworthy
to perform and which are not. This uncharitable and shallow reading often leads critics to label
Epicurus a reckless hedonist and libertine who sanctions any act as long as it produces pleasure
in the agent. While it is true that Epicureanism does not consider the pleasures or pains felt by
anyone besides the agent of the act when determining whether or not an act is choiceworthy
(which is admittedly a problem), this does not necessarily translate into the sanctioning of
actions common opinion often regards as immoral (such as libertinage and crime). It is clear that
insofar as Epicurus distinguishes between the good and the choiceworthy, he does not believe
that the rightness of an act is the same as the good psychological state afforded by performing an
act. Although not explicitly framed in such a manner, Epicurus seems to be distinguishing
between the notions of the Good and the Right. As long as a reader of Epicurus keeps this
distinction in mind, neither confusion, nor contradiction will follow from Epicurus’ moral
prescriptions.
The appropriateness of each action is decided by whether or not more pleasure than pain
results in the long-run. Those desires that always lead to more pleasure than pain in the long-run
Epicurus tends to consider ‘natural and necessary,’ those that seem natural but don’t alleviate
pain he refers to as ‘natural and unnecessary,’ and those that cause more pain than pleasure in the

420

Epicurus, The Essential Epicurus: Letters, Principal Doctrines, Vatican Sayings, and Fragment,.ed. and trans.
Eugene O’Connor (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1993), 12.

125

long-run he calls ‘unnatural.’421 This nuance accents a more pertinent feature than the immediate
intensity of a pleasure, and can even allow for short-term pain:
Since pleasure is the first good and natural to us, it is for this reason also that we do not choose
every pleasure; instead, there are times when we pass over many pleasures, whenever greater
difficulty follows from them. Also, we regard many pains as better than pleasures, since a greater
pleasure will attend us after we have endured pain for a long time. Every pleasure, therefore,
because of its natural relationship to us, is good, but not every pleasure is to be chosen. Likewise,
every pain is an evil, but not every pain is of a nature always to be avoided. Yet it is proper to
judge all these things by a comparison and a consideration of both their advantages and
disadvantages. For on certain occasions we treat the good as bad, and, conversely, the bad as
good.422

Perhaps surprising to one who thinks that virtuous behavior requires a selfless attitude, the kinds
of actions, or indulged desires, which pass the Epicurean test are those that align with the
virtuous life:
Prudence teaches us how impossible it is to live pleasantly without living wisely, virtuously, and
justly, just as we cannot live wisely, virtuously, and justly without living pleasantly. For the
virtues arise naturally with the pleasant life; indeed, the pleasant life cannot be separated from
them.423

The claim may at first seem hard to believe, especially since virtue often seems to imply selfsacrifice. Yet it is in the personal self-interest of the Epicurean to live a moderate and just life,
since immoderation leads to insatiable desires and injustice to either swift punishment or an
anxious life full of fear of capture.
In contrast to the moralist who conflates pleasure with excess and indulgence, Epicurus
does not usually define pleasure positively, but rather, more often negatively:
When we say that pleasure is the goal, we are not talking about the pleasure of profligates or that
which lies in sensuality, as some ignorant persons think, or else those who do not agree with us or
have followed our argument badly; rather, it is freedom from bodily pain and mental anguish. For
it is not continuous drinking and revels, nor the enjoyment of women and young boys, nor of fish
and other viands that a luxurious table holds, which make for a pleasant life, but sober reasoning,
which examines the motives for every choice and avoidance, and which drives away those
opinions resulting in the greatest disturbance of the soul. 424 (italics mine)
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Rather than picture intense pleasure ore joy, the appropriate reading of pleasure is closer to peace
of mind or a lack of mental disturbance. Both physical pain and mental pain must be minimized.
Physical pain may result from pursuing the wrong pleasures, but mental anguish (or fear) has a
different source: superstitious thinking.
It is interesting to note the parallel between Epicurean superstition and Kantian dialectical
illusion, since the first Epicurean superstition concerns the soul, the second natural phenomena,
and the third the gods, just as rational psychology concerns the soul, rational cosmology the
universe, and rational theology God. Perhaps this parallel suggests that Kant may be right when
he argues that Reason necessarily invents these Transcendental Ideas and that they are a source
of confusion. While Epicurus does not refute these errors by means of critique, nor cordon
Reason off from engaging with such metaphysical concerns, but instead encourages the
theoretical investigation of these phenomena, it is in the spirit of highlighting the parallel
between superstition and dialectical illusion that I include a brief discussion of these
superstitions below.425
As noted, philosophy’s proper agenda is two-fold and involves both practical and
theoretical aims: it advises us on how best to avoid physical pains (prudence)426 and it
demonstrates why superstitious beliefs should be abandoned. There are three427 superstitions that
grip humanity with fear. The first superstition is that the gods are personally invested in human
affairs and will punish or reward us in accordance with Divine judgment or caprice. The second
superstition is that death is bad, and thus something we ought to fear. According to this
superstition, death either brings with it divine judgment or oblivion, both of which are judged to
425
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be matters of concern. 428 As is obvious, both superstitions implicate each other. Thus when
Epicurus disproves the first superstition, he is already halfway towards dispelling the second.
The third is that celestial phenomena affect human affairs:
…[The] chief disturbance in the minds of humankind arises when they think that…heavenly
bodies are blessed and immortal but have at the same time wills, actions, and motives that are
opposed to these divine attributes; and when they are constantly expecting and fearing some
everlasting pain, as happens in myths.429

As is clear from the language Epicurus uses when describing heavenly bodies, the third
superstition is likewise implicated by the first and second.
According to Epicurus, a careful philosophical investigation of each reveals these fears to
be groundless. The gods, being immortal and blessed, cannot be angered by our actions, since
we cannot harm them. Nor can we please them since they are already happy. Thus, the gods are
indifferent to human affairs, and do not interfere in the course of our lives, nor in any
hypothetical afterlife. Life’s misfortunes and blessings are due to the contingencies of an
atomistic world, not the gods’ intercession. Pleasure and pain are typically the immanent
worldly consequences of one’s actions, not externally imposed. Once this truth is acknowledged,
the sole reason motivating our fear of the gods is removed. Thus, even if the soul survives death
(which Epicurus denies), we ought not to fret about the gods’ judgment.
That would leave us with only one other possible reason to fear death: the possibility of
oblivion. It is not Epicurus’ intention to demonstrate that we ought not to fear death because
everyone is guaranteed a pleasant afterlife. That would make death good, which Epicurus
denies. Instead, Epicurus fully embraces the mortality of the soul but provides a reason as to
why oblivion is not something we should fear. In the Letter to Herodotus, Epicurus establishes
that the soul must be made of atoms to account for why it can influence the body, which is
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definitively known to be made of atoms. If the soul were incorporeal, it would have to be empty
space, since Epicurean metaphysics only allows for the existence of atoms and void. But empty
space cannot affect anything, so by process of elimination, the soul must be made of atoms.430
Since the soul nonetheless does not seem visible or tangible in the same way our bodies and most
other physical bodies are, it must be akin to natural phenomena that also border on intangibility,
like wind and fire, whose atoms are very fine.431 Sensations, such as pleasure and pain, only
manifest when the soul and the body are united. But the soul’s atomic composition implies its
destructibility, since things with parts can be and inevitably are dispersed. We call the
destruction of the soul ‘death.’ Since sensations, such as pleasure and pain, can only be felt by
an entity that exists, and pain is the only thing deemed bad, oblivion is nothing to be feared.432
Death is neither good nor bad. Thus the wise man neither fears it nor chases after it.433
Since not even the soul, the most seemingly intangible of entities, is exempt from
material status and can be explained by means of an atomic theory, a fortiori, every other natural
phenomenon can be explained in this manner as well. Even the immortal gods are made of
atoms.434 Subsequently, the materialist account of the universe reveals that the movements of the
heavenly bodies do not dictate our fate but are just one of many natural phenomena whose
actions are controlled by the collision of atoms.435 While it is pure speculation that Kant’s
derivation of the three forms of dialectical illusion was influenced by the three forms of
superstition highlighted by Epicurus, the three-fold parallel does seem to validate Kant’s claim
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that Reason is necessarily drawn to speculate in these three manners (especially since the
parallels run even further, such as how the Second Antinomy is simultaneously about atoms and
the soul).
Even though these theoretical investigations into the soul, the world, and God are not
practical investigations, like those in the Critique of Practical Reason, they are motivated by
practical ends. As Epicurus reminds Pythocles at the beginning of the Letter to Pythocles: “[We]
must not think that there is any other aim of knowledge about the heavens, whether treated in
connection with other doctrines or separately, than peace of mind and unshakeable confidence,
just as it is our aim in all other pursuits.”436 This brings us back into the orbit of prudence and
the role it plays in determining the right course of action. Prudence may not have the capacity to
dispel superstition but it does encourage us to pursue philosophy for the sake of dispelling
superstitious anguish. Here we see Kant’s criticism of the Epicurean ethic in its most transparent
light: As Epicurus implies, the Epicurean ethical principle is no different than prudence, and
prudence is no more than the rational pursuit of pleasure, which is Kant rejects it.
Free of these superstitions, the Epicurean indulges only those desires that correspond
with necessary needs, which in turn, are easy to satisfy. Thus, the prudent life mimics the
virtuous life because the simple life of the ascetic is the most self-sufficient. While an Epicurean
may be compassionate towards others and appear to privilege intellectual pleasures over bodily
pleasures, both tendencies are due to a hedonic calculus that determines that a life that embraces
friendship and intellectual pursuits is more pleasant than a life that is egocentric and sensuous.
For Kant, it is a given that the prudent life aims at personal happiness, and that, in non-moral
matters, a principle of self-love has its place. But prudence is not the same as morality, and any
overlap between prescribed acts is merely contingent and coincidental: “The maxim of self-love
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(prudence) merely advises; the law of morality commands. But there is a great difference
between that which we are advised to do and that to which we are obligated.”437
Francis Hutcheson’s ‘Moral Feeling’ based Moral Theory
Kant identifies another way the faculty of sensibility could conceivably be used to posit a
heteronomous moral principle. While Epicurus assumes that the faculty of pleasure is the only
faculty relevant for cognizing the good, Francis Hutcheson’s theory relies on something he refers
to as ‘moral sense.’ Moral sense is not the same as moral conscience, even though both can
please or displease the agent in accordance with personal conduct. Hutcheson dedicates the first
portion of An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, to establishing an
‘aesthetic’ sense, which is meant to lead into the more controversial claim that a similar, moral
sense, exists as well.438 Often aesthetic connotations of beauty seep into Hutcheson’s moral
exposition. This is not necessarily surprising since both aesthetics and ethics are in some way
dependent on the perception of some non-subjective quality in an object, be it in a thing, or those
actions that express a virtuous character, in contrast to previously discussed theories Because
Kant would view aesthetics as a bridge between the theoretical and the moral, Hutcheson’s
position is all the more relevant to better understanding the Kantian architectonic. As I will later
explore, Hutcheson will go to extreme lengths to distance himself from all subjective-external
moral principles, particularly Bernard Mandeville’s position. For Hutcheson, morality and
personal advantage do not overlap.
Hutcheson starts off by defining moral good and moral evil based on the affect an act or
person elicits in a third-party observer or disinterested patient: ‘Moral good’ denotes “our Idea of
some Quality apprehended in Actions, which procures Approbation and Love toward the Actor,
437
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from those who receive no Advantage by Action.”439 ‘Moral evil’ “denotes our Idea of a contrary
Quality, which excites Aversion, and Dislike toward the Actor, even from Persons unconcern’d
in its natural Tendency.” (sic)440 Hutcheson distinguishes the moral good from natural good,
since the latter only concerns those actions that bring us either immediate or mediate pleasure.
Hutcheson often refers to natural goods under the umbrella term ‘Advantage,’ since we are
motivated to secure them from the vantage point of self-love alone.441 The naturally good and
the morally evil can often blur, insofar as acts of evil are typically precipitated by a selfish
pursuit of natural goods.
It is important for the prospective Kantian reader to note how Hutcheson frames morality
in the affective register. Already we can rightly predict that any principle Hutcheson proposes
on this basis will be much too subjective to satisfy Kant’s moral criteria since affect is based on
an act of perception. Likewise, the moral sense is characterized as an inner sense. It is on the
basis of this moral sense that we can judge the goodness or badness of our own potential actions
and judge them accordingly. The moral sense ‘sees’ the good, just as any other sense sees its
object, and reacts with the appropriate emotion. Any moral principle based on such a subjectiveinternal sense will thus be a subjective-internal principle.
There are two morally-relevant motivating emotions: Love and Hate.442 Love has two
general forms: ‘Esteem and Complacence’443 and ‘Benevolence.’ Esteem is the feeling that
arises within us when we observe a good act or encounter a virtuous character. Esteem is
disinterested, because upon reflection, it does not seem possible for us to esteem the character of
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a bad man, no matter how much we may benefit from his mischief.444 While esteem seems to be
mostly a passive response to the character of others, benevolence seems to motivate the actions
of the agent. It is also disinterested, since we would never call an action benevolent if it is
motivated by self-gain rather than genuine concern for another.445
Hate also has two general forms: ‘Contempt and Displicence’ and ‘Malice.’446 We
naturally hold those in contempt that we judge to be vicious. Contempt seems to be the negative
analogue to esteem. Contempt is also disinterested, since we cannot have contempt for a good
person regardless of the advantage that could result from doing so. To harm a good man may not
necessarily elicit guilt, but it does elicit the awareness that guilt is appropriately felt.447

While

this may seem to imply that it is impossible to resent another for their virtue – which is patently
false – it is not possible to hold a good person with contempt. Hutcheson does not foreclose the
possibility of resentment, jealousy, or the kind of negative feelings that accompany opposing a
virtuous foe, only contempt, since it is a moral feeling.
But does benevolence have a negative analogue, such as malice? Can we be actively
motivated to harm another if we perceive no advantage in inflicting harm? Since the answer is
controversial, it is worth quoting Hutcheson’s response in full to do his position justice:
As to Malice, Human Nature seems scarce capable of malicious disinterested Hatred, or a sedate
Delight in the Misery of others, when we imagine them no way pernicious to us, or opposite to our
Interest: And for that Hatred which makes us oppose those whose Interests are opposite to ours, it
is only the Effect of Self-Love, and not of disinterested Malice. A sudden Passion may give us
wrong Representations of our Fellow-Creatures, and for a little time represent them as absolutely
Evil; and during this Imagination perhaps we may give some Evidences of disinterested Malice:
but as soon as we reflect upon human Nature, and form just Conceptions, this unnatural Passion is
allay'd, and only Self-Love remains, which may make us, from Self-Interest, oppose our
Adversarys.448
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According to Hutcheson, malice seems to be either rare or outright non-existent. Malice only
seems to exist when a foe is perceived to be a threat, and dissipates once that perceived threat is
resolved. Since nothing perceived to be a threat can be viewed disinterestedly, it’s not really
malice that’s felt. We can no sooner maintain animosity towards another than the necessity
arises within us to view that other as a villain (or lesser thing) deserving poor treatment. In other
words, we must rationalize our hatred of the targeted other. We must convince ourselves that our
negative actions towards him are in some way justified. Otherwise, we are generally welldisposed towards outside parties and wish them well. It seems only the pursuit of personal
advantage pits man against man, not disinterested malice.449
Hutcheson entertains an interesting hypothetical scenario to prove this point. Imagine a
crew of pirates who plague the seas, upset commerce, and take lives. We would be justified in
despising these criminals. But suppose that these men eventually became forever shipwrecked
on an island, away from civilization, where they could no longer do any harm. Would not even
the most self-righteous man’s heart turn warm in such an instance? Would not even he, now
freed of resentment from past injuries and fears of future ones, hope that such barbarous men
would embrace benevolence rather than Justice’s sword, and live out their days in peace? Who,
asks Hutcheson, would still wish misery upon such men?450
Ultimately, Hutcheson acknowledges three hypothetical kinds of moral evil: disinterested
malice (which, as we have shown, remains for Hutcheson a likely flight of fancy), aggressive
acts based on self-love, and self-neglect. Even the most infamous of tyrants, such as Nero, were
less guilty of malice than of holding their actions to be in some way justified or motivated by
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personal advantage.451 A Grand Inquisitor thinks himself justified in torturing a potential heretic
and would quickly loosen the straps if such justification were suddenly to be annulled by
compelling evidence. More commonplace aggressive acts are motivated mostly by self-love.
An opponent is considered to have contrary interests to the agent. For example, two people
competing for the same office may do evil to one another.452 Finally, self-neglect, although not
as bad as aggression, is still an evil, since a wholly selfless being would so compromise himself
as to become completely ineffectual as a moral agent. While absolute selflessness displays a
virtuous character, it ultimately does more harm than good and in general should be avoided.453
Up until now, I have spoken of benevolence without fully explaining the term.
Benevolence is Hutcheson’s shorthand term for what is likely to be for the reader a very familiar
utilitarian formula for the calculation of the moral good: “That action is best, which procures the
greatest Happiness for the greatest Numbers; and that, worst, which, in like manner, occasions
Misery.”454 An agent acts benevolently when choosing that action which best suits the whole of
society. Our moral sense ‘sees’ those actions and characters that are in harmony with this
principle and naturally esteems them as admirable and lovable. Even God’s judgments are
determined by this principle.455 Hutcheson develops an elaborate formula456 to illustrate this
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simple principle: a virtue is proportional to the degree of internal and external adversity that the
agent must overcome in order to accomplish the selfless act (i.e. any act which aims to maximize
happiness for the whole of society). For example, someone wealthy who donates $100 to charity
is not as virtuous as a poor man who donates the same amount (or even less of an amount).
Likewise, someone who is normally a villain who works against his nature to do a selfless act
has acted more virtuously than the kind-hearted man who has never felt temptation.
Intention plays a fundamental role in moral assessment. The intended social benefit is
more relevant than the actual social benefit, at least when it comes to assessing the virtue of the
agent. Any degree of selfish intent diminishes the virtue, or benevolence, inherent in the
action.457 For example, if that same wealthy man donated money, in part to gain a tax write-off
or to gain good press, but also in part out of disinterested benevolence, the virtue of the act
would equal the latter minus the former (presuming, of course, that these tendencies can in some
way be quantified). Since Hutcheson contends that we are naturally inclined towards the public
good, even apathy towards the public good is evidence of evil, since some negative tendency
must be overriding that natural moral tendency.458 Little of this moral account would, at first
glance, appear to be out of the ordinary or in some way at odds with commonly-held moral
5.
6.
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positions, and, as Wolfgang Leidhold notes, much of it informed the political agendas of the
Founding Fathers.459
This is not to say that all acts motivated by perceived personal gain are evil. In a rare
moment of agreement, both Hutcheson and Mandeville say that the whole of society would be
harmed if everyone, or even a significant number, of its members were completely selfless.
Where this momentarily shared path diverges hinges on the question of whether selfless acts are
even possible. Hutcheson sees little problem with selfish acts, as long as they also benefit the
whole, or at minimum, do no harm to it.460 As previously stated, self-love diminishes the
benevolence of the act, but it does not necessarily negate it completely. Assumed in this
conclusion is the obvious position that genuine selfless, benevolent acts are possible, even
commonplace, and not merely self-interest in disguise.
Much of Hutcheson’s moral treatise is dedicated to refuting Mandeville’s position that
what passes for virtue is really some kind of social convention that masks and codifies selfinterest. Therefore, his refutations are quite extensive.461 Hutcheson’s first response
distinguishes moral goods from natural goods, which already anticipates his direct critique of
Mandeville’s position. The very fact that we do not value a selfless gesture the same way as a
useful happenstance already implies that they are distinct goods.462 Let me take as an example
the acquisition of money. If I were poor, purchased a lottery ticket, and won, I would judge the
circumstance to be advantageous, but in no way a matter of virtue. However, if someone gave
me the same amount with good intentions, I would judge that person to be acting virtuously. In
the case of what is naturally evil and morally evil, no one judges a natural disaster, like a
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hurricane, to be morally evil. 463 There are no courts of justice that hold Nature accountable for
the harm it inflicts. This indicates another way in which the natural good is distinct from the
moral good: only rational agents can be morally good, while any kind of object or entity could,
in theory, be naturally good.464 We can even withdraw ourselves from a situation entirely and
witness a benevolent act without receiving any benefit whatsoever, and yet still esteem the act to
be morally good. Likewise we do not need to be harmed by an evil act to judge its perpetrator to
be contemptible. 465 And even in those cases in which we benefit from someone’s actions, we
would judge them differently if they were doing so with benevolent intentions rather than selfserving ones.466 The former would garner our esteem, the latter our suspicions.
Hutcheson’s explicit critiques of Mandeville’s (and Hobbes’) positions are even more
extensive, most of them highlighting circumstances of moral judgment in which advantage is not
gained. I will sample but a few. For example, why should we admire those from bygone eras
known for their virtue if the only things we esteem to be good are things that benefit us? What
has the remote past to do with my particular present?467 Secondly, if a corrupt man were to bribe
me or otherwise benefit me in the pursuit of bettering himself, would that miraculously convince
me of his virtue?468 Thirdly, noting the personal benefits that result from a selfish action might
incite me to perform it, but never to approve of it as I would a virtuous act.469 Fourthly, in a
similar vein, someone could never convince me of their virtue by pointing out how much they
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benefitted from performing an act.470 Kant himself mentions this counter-argument in the
Critique of Practical Reason:
Suppose that an acquaintance whom you otherwise liked tried to justify to you his having given
false testimony by first pleading what he asserts to be the sacred duty of his own happiness and
then by recounting all the advantages he had acquired by doing so, pointing out the prudence he
had observed in order to be secure from discovery even by yourself, to whom he reveals the secret
only because he can deny it at any time; and suppose he were then to affirm, in all seriousness,
that he had fulfilled a true human duty: you would either laugh in his face or shrink back from him
with disgust, even though, if someone has directed his principles solely to his advantage, you
would not have the least objection to bring against these measures. 471

Fifthly, why should persuasion, or even torture, be necessary to convince another, if the moral
good lay squarely on the side of personal benefit? How could someone resist from the vantage
point of virtue if the principle of self-love avidly pleaded for the staying of the blade?472 Sixthly,
why should the perpetrators of crimes feel guilt, even in those cases in which they escaped
punishment and reaped only rewards? 473
In the previous section, I provided Mandeville’s origin story for virtue: politicians of the
past recognized that certain traits and actions were more useful to the State than others. The
former were praised and esteemed in order to appeal to the vanity of citizens who themselves
would then be inclined to adopt such traits and perform those actions which garnered praise and
esteem from their peers. Such praise and esteem rendered these traits and actions into what we
would call ‘virtue.’474 Thus, virtue as a concept is merely the product of political puppetry.
Hutcheson first responds to this charge by providing a military counter-scenario: If a foreign
citizen were to decide to become a turncoat and betray his country for the benefit of our own,
would we still not consider him a contemptible villain, despite the benefit we received from the
traitorous act? Admittedly, the results would be lauded but the traitor would receive no
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celebratory parades in our town squares. Contrarily, we may face an unassailable yet honorable
adversary on the battlefield and still, despite ourselves, esteem him. In both cases, our esteem
runs counter to advantage.475 Furthermore, assuming that virtue aligns with the self-interest of
the state, we have but to consider cases of those who have sacrificed for the state – Hutcheson
names Marcus Atilius Regulus, Cato, and Decius Mus – who could never actually recognize that
benefit, and thus, according to this definition of virtue, are thus incapable of recognizing the
virtue of their own actions.476 Hutcheson continues, “Regulus and Cato could not possibly praise
or love another Hero for a virtuous Action; for this would not gain them the Advantage of
Honour; and their own Actions they must have look’d upon as the hard Terms on which Honour
was to be purchas’d, without any thing amiable in them, which they could contemplate or reflect
upon with Pleasure.”477
Hutcheson is incredulous that Mandeville’s origin account is even possible, since by what
means could a person who only knows self-interest as his guiding moral principle be convinced
that the good lie squarely in everything counter to his self-interest? How could such a man even
conceive the selfless actions of others to be good if he had never known such acts to be good in
the past? Instead, it seems more plausible to Hutcheson that the perception of the goodness of
public-minded acts comes first and the assessment of the benefit of such actions comes second.
How else could a criminal recognize the justness of a sentence passed against him?478
Hutcheson’s ethical prioritization of maximal happiness, being already of a social nature,
is explicitly applied to politics at the end of the Inquiry. Hutcheson defines a ‘right’ in the
following manner: If “a Faculty of doing, demanding, or possessing any thing, universally
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allow’d in certain Circumstances, would in the whole tend to the general Good” we say someone
has a right to “do, possess, or demand” it.479 Hutcheson marks something as a right if social
happiness results when it is universally performed or possessed. But technically, this definition
is much too narrow and more accurately defines only what Hutcheson calls ‘perfect’ rights. As a
whole, there are three different kinds of rights: perfect, imperfect, and external. Hutcheson
defines perfect and imperfect rights in negative terms, or rather, in the context of the
consequences of their violation, to give us a means of clarifying the distinction without falling
into the positively-phrased definition of rights as such.
Perfect rights are defined as “of such necessity to the publick Good, that the universal
Violation of them would make human Life intolerable; and it actually makes those miserable,
whose Rights are thus violated.”480 Most of these rights are so basic that we take them for
granted. For example, we have the right to self-preservation, but also to the fruits of our labor
(presumably guaranteeing property rights) and contractual arrangements.481 If everyone lived
under the real and constant threat of murder of self and loved ones, theft of property, or dishonest
contracts, no one would be happy. We could go one step further than Hutcheson and even
conclude that it is unlikely that any society could be possible at all without these rights being
guaranteed in some manner by a state structure. Presumably such a social arrangement would be
analogous to the infamous state of nature. Hutcheson refers to any violation of perfect rights as
‘evil.’482 All violations of perfect rights are punishable by the state, since they circumvent the
general good of society.
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Imperfect rights are defined as those rights which “when universally violated, would not
necessarily make Men miserable” but that nonetheless benefit society.483 Charity,484 for
example, benefits society, but it is neither necessary for the happiness of the whole nor would it
be reasonable to legislate and enforce it. Not only is compulsory charity a contradiction in terms,
but the joy of giving comes from choosing to give. Generally good people respect most imperfect
rights, although it is likely impossible for all imperfect rights to be respected, since that would
likely call for a perfect moral character. Violations of imperfect rights are not properly
punishable by the state, since making such violations illegal would lead to more general misery
than happiness.485 Hutcheson refers to these violations as ‘weak benevolence.’486
Finally, there are external rights, which are things we technically have right to, but that
are not particularly positive. Hutcheson defines external rights,
…as when doing, possessing, or demanding of any thing is really detrimental to the Publick in any
particular Instance, as being contrary to the imperfect Right of another; but yet the universally
denying Men this Faculty of doing, possessing, or demanding that Thing, or of using Force in
pursuance of it, would do more mischief than all the Evils to be fear’d from the Use of this
Faculty.487

External rights are rights only insofar as more harm would come from outlawing them than
overlooking them. For example, it is the right of a lender to call in a debt even if the debtor is
poor and would be put at a severe disadvantage by paying it.
At minimum, we can preliminarily note two similarities between Hutcheson’s moral
formulation of rights and Kant’s formulation of duties in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of
Morals (the latter to be discussed more in-depth in a later chapter). First, Hutcheson subjects a
possible action to a principle of universality and then considers the material consequences: Does
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the action make more people happy or sad? While Kant would reject the second part, he
embraces the first as the primary test: Can the action be universalized at all? The form of
lawfulness is universality; therefore, our actions should be universalizable, or rendered into laws.
Upon some readings, only cognitive consequences that follow a priori from assumed premises,
like logical consistency, are of concern. Material consequences drop out of the equation entirely.
Second, Kant does not repudiate a notion of moral feeling, only Hutcheson’s conception
of it. For Hutcheson, we love what is beneficent and hate what is selfish. Thus, we feel
disinterested pleasure from the good and disinterested pain from the evil. But for Kant, the only
feeling that is moral, and moreover, a priori, is respect for the law. Kant turns Hutcheson’s
intentions on their head and suggests that the pleasure gained from perceiving the good is in
some way the determining ground or motivating end of the action because a principle based on a
moral feeling must be heteronomous and thus only empirically motivated. In a later chapter, I
will return to the question of love’s role in a potential science of the subject and how it is
necessary if others are to be encountered in their full personhood rather than as mere rational,
ethical beings.
Third, Hutcheson delineates between perfect and imperfect rights based on what produces
happiness if universalized, and what does not. While not identical, Kant distinguishes between
perfect duties (those which, if universalized, do not produce a logical contradiction) and
imperfect duties (those which, if universalized, do not produce a contradiction of the will).488
The so-called imperfect duty of beneficence does obligate us to help others pursue goals that lead
“We must be able to will that a maxim of our action become a universal law: this is the canon of moral appraisal
of action in general. Some actions are so constituted that their maxim cannot even be thought without a
contradiction as a universal law of nature, far less could one will that it should become such. In the cases of others
that inner impossibility is indeed not to be found, but it is still impossible to will that their maxim be raised to the
universality of a law of nature because such a will would contradict itself. It is easy to see that the first is opposed to
strict or narrower (unremitting) duty, the second only to wide (meritorious) duty…” Kant, Immanuel, ‘Groundwork
of the Metaphysics of Morals’ in Practical Philosophy, ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 75, [4:424].
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to their own personal happiness, since to live in a world where people do otherwise would
contradict the will’s own pursuits.489 This may be Kant’s partial vindication of Hutcheson’s
moral theory of benevolence. So while Kant did not adopt Hutcheson’s moral theory of
benevolence in toto, he did augment and integrate those parts which could be formalized.
Interesting enough, Hutcheson, whose theory goes to such lengths to formalize a foundational
moral principle as a mathematical equation, in a certain respect, fails to go far enough.
Now that we understand Hutcheson’s moral theory of benevolence in general, we can see
that it appears to be the implicit target of the Second Critique. Consider the following passage:
The principle of happiness can indeed furnish maxims, but never such as would be fit for laws of
the will, even if universal happiness were made the object. For, because cognition of this rests on
sheer data of experience, each judgment about it depending very much upon the opinion of each
which is itself very changeable, it can indeed give general rules but never universal rules, that is, it
can give rules on the average are most often correct but not rules that must hold always and
necessarily; hence no practical laws can be based on it. Just because an object of choice is here is
put at the basis of its rule and must therefore precede it, the rule can be referred to and can be
based upon nothing other than what one approves, and so it refers to and is based upon experience,
and then the variety of judgment must be endless. This principle, therefore, does not prescribe the
very same practical rules to all rational beings, even though the rules come under a common
heading, namely that of happiness. The moral law, however, is thought as objectively necessary
only because it is to hold for everyone having reason and will. 490

Since what makes one person happy differs from another and can only be determined
empirically, universal happiness as an end cannot furnish the basis for a categorical moral
principle that binds with one unambiguous voice without exception. Furthermore, the faculty of
sensibility itself is contingent and could potentially vary from person to person, as Kant notes in
Lectures on Ethics: “If [the principle of morality] rested on a moral feeling, then anyone not
possessed of a moral feeling so fine as to produce in him an aversion to lie would be permitted to
lie.”491 Hutcheson would no doubt claim that, since malice seems, at worst, to be rare, his moral
principle of benevolence based on moral sense would hold in general. For Kant, what is general
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is still, nonetheless, not necessary and universal, so Hutcheson’s principle would remain tainted
by the contingency of a faculty’s makeup.
We might be tempted to fall back on the principle of maximal happiness (or benevolence)
to vindicate Hutcheson’s theory. But Kant seems to anticipate this response. Kant furthers this
critique by demonstrating that its moral value lies outside of its matter and instead in its form. It
is worth quoting at length:
…the matter of the maxim can indeed remain, but it must not be the condition of the maxim since
the maxim would then not be fit for a law. Hence the mere form of a law, which limits the matter,
must at the same time be a ground for adding this matter to the will but not for presupposing it.
Let the matter be, for example, my own happiness. This, if I attribute it to each (as, in the case of
finite beings, I may in fact do) can become an objective practical law only if I include in it the
happiness of others. Thus the law to promote the happiness of others arises not from the
presupposition that this is an object of everyone’s choice but merely from this: that the form of
universality, which reason requires as a condition of giving a maxim of self-love the objective
validity of a law, becomes the determining ground of the will… 492

In other words, a principle of benevolence is only properly moral on the basis that it possesses a
universal form that makes it an objective law. Thus, Kant seems to allow for Hutcheson’s
‘object’(general happiness) but only after the true moral content (universal form) is
acknowledged.
It’s interesting to note that Kant’s further critiques of moral sense theories continue this
line of reasoning. The feelings of esteem we have for our own benevolence or the contempt we
have for our own selfishness cannot themselves be the means by which right and wrong are
revealed, since we must already be virtuous by some measure in order to feel them in the first
place. One must already feel the weight of obligation in order to feel the sting of noncompliance or the pleasure of acquiescence. Thus, if these moral feelings of esteem or contempt
are right, then they presuppose knowledge of the moral law and duty, as well as respect for that
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moral law.493 That said, is Kant not begging the question? Why must an affect be a reaction to a
judgment? Perhaps the more material point is that such a feeling cannot be universalized, nor
necessary because it is grounded in the faculty of sensibility. But is not mathematics also
grounded in sensibility, yet its calculations are both universal and necessary? What would an
ethical theory look like that was grounded in pure intuition? Is it even possible to talk of pure
intuitions that aren’t the forms of time and space?
3.4 Intermezzo: From the Subjective to the Objective
The transition from subjective material determining grounds to objective material
determining grounds marks a shift in Kant’s sympathies, since on the surface there is a
movement away from the sensible to the rational.
Those in the first group are without exception empirical and obviously not at all qualified for the
universal principle of morality. But those in the second group are based on reason (for, perfection
as a characteristic of things, and the supreme perfection represented in substance, i.e. God, are
both to be thought only be means of rational concepts). 494

Nonetheless, perfection, from a practical rather than a theoretical perspective, can only be a
talent and skill for achieving an end. Since these ends are objects exterior and thus
heteronomous to the will, all material practical principles based upon them, such as all objective
material principles, are still empirical. This makes intuitive sense, since we not only must
empirically verify whether or not an end has been achieved by means of the faculty of
“More refined, though equally untrue, is the pretense of those who assume a certain moral sense which, instead of
reason, determines the moral law and in accordance with which consciousness of virtue is immediately connected
with satisfaction and pleasure, and consciousness of vice with mental unease and pain, so that everything is still
reduced to desire for one’s own happiness…I want only to note the deception going on here. In order to represent
someone vicious as tormented with mental unease by consciousness of his offenses they must first represent him as
morally good, at least to some degree, in what is most basic to his character, just as they must represent someone
who is delighted by consciousness of his dutiful actions as already virtuous. The concept of morality and duty
would therefore have to precede any regard for this satisfaction and cannot be derived from it. Now, one must first
value the importance of what we call duty, the authority of the moral law, and the immediate worth that compliance
with it gives a person in his own eyes, in order to feel that satisfaction in consciousness of one’s conformity with it
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sensibility, but also can only fully attain it if circumstances properly align. As discussed, the
affective state produced by the subject’s acquisition of an object is pleasure, so to want the
acquisition of that object is no different than to want that state of pleasure. Thus, these principles
“can become motives of the will only by means of the happiness we expect from them.”495
Kant’s discussion of objective ‘reason-based’ principles is curiously more complicated in
the Lectures on Ethics than it is in the Critique of Practical Reason, and includes not just
perfection as potential bases for a moral principle, but also unity and truth:
The rational grounds are also (1) internal, and (2) external. The former have been derived from
metaphysical grounds, namely, from the concepts of unity, truth, and perfection. Almost all
writers have derived them from unity, because reason likes to have a rule. But we disapprove a
thing on moral grounds, even though there is a rule. Cumberland has a principle of truth. A
wicked man, he says, never tells the truth, because he cannot disclose his evil dispositions, without
being at variance with himself. The principle of perfection, or of the harmonizing of the manifold
into one comes from Wolff.496

The conscientious reader of Kant’s Critical works will recognize the three-fold list - unity, truth,
and perfection – as a scholastic inheritance mentioned by Kant in Section III of the
Transcendental Analytic in the Critique of Pure Reason: “Quodlibet ens est unum, verum,
bonum” (“Every being is one, true, and good”).497 In the first Critique, Kant demonstrates how
each of these three concepts is not a fundamental category to be added to the list of twelve, like
some metaphysician critics might contend, but instead derives from one of the three categories of
quantity (unity, plurality, and totality). Kant’s critique is familiar: “These supposedly
transcendental predicates of things are nothing other than logical requisites and criteria of all
cognition of things in general…”498
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 “In every cognition of an object there is, namely, unity of the concept, which one can call qualitative unity
insofar as by that only the unity of the comprehension of the manifold of cognition is thought, as, say, the
unity of the theme in a play, a speech, or a fable.
 Second, truth in respect of the consequences. The more true consequences from a given concept, the more
indication of its objective reality. One could call this the qualitative plurality of the marks that belong to a
concept as a common ground (not thought of in it as a magnitude).
 Third, finally, perfection, which consists in this plurality conversely being traced back to the unity of the
concept, and agreeing completely with this one and no other one, which one can call qualitative
completeness (totality).”499

In other words, not only are unity, truth, and perfection not anything more than necessary
preconditions for cognition, but they are also derivative, qualitative interpretations of the
categories of Quantity.
The Critique of Pure Reason is not concerned here with assessing the moral value of
these three concepts, and could potentially preserve their use in a practical sense while rejecting
their theoretical use. This would be consistent with how Kant broached at least three Ideas (the
soul, freedom, and God), which were critiqued on theoretical grounds, only to be spirited away
to their proper practical sphere. However, it becomes clear by the time the categorical
imperative is drafted, that one of these moral concepts takes precedence: unity, or ‘universality.’
Interestingly enough, this is the only scholastic category that seems identical with the Kantian
category associated with it. However, as we will see when I explicate Kantian ethics in a later
chapter, the duty of truth will reveal itself to be the quintessential example of duty as such, as it
provides one of the only clear demonstrations of how the categorical imperative can determine a
clear, unambiguous, obligatory maxim.
3.5 Objective-Internal Material Practical Principles
While, as Kant indicated in his Lectures on Ethics, rational principles could conceivably
be based on either unity, truth, or perfection, Kant only attacks objective-internal material
practical principles based on perfection in the second Critique. Since the table of heteronomy is
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meant to be a comprehensive system of possible ethical theories based on material grounds, this
omission is perplexing. However, if the objective-internal/objective-external divide is looked at
symmetrically, then the omission makes more sense. Let us return to the passage in question in
the Critique of Practical Reason: “But those in the second group are based on reason (for,
perfection as a characteristic of things, and the supreme perfection represented in substance, i.e.
God, are both to be thought only be means of rational concepts).”500 Presumably, if 1) there is
only one objective-external material practical principle – Divine Command theory – and it is
predicated on perfection, and 2) both objective-internal and objective-external run parallel and
are based on the same concept (perfection), then there is no systemic place for objective-internal
material practical principles based on unity and truth. Or, perhaps in some way, unity and truth
fold into either the aforementioned theories, or in some way can be attributed to a formal
practical principle, like the one Kant formulates. Therefore, either Kant’s table of heteronomy is
1) complete, and truth and unity are either 1a) ‘formal’ practical principles, or 1b) morally
irrelevant, or 2) the table of heteronomy is incomplete, unity and truth actually provide the
ground for material practical principles, and Kant has either 2a) forgotten to add them, or 2b)
deliberately omitted them to maintain the symmetry of his system.
The Stoic Perfection-based Moral Theory
Stoicism
In the Critique of Practical Reason, we can recall that Kant describes perfection “as a
characteristic of the human being” that is “nothing other than talent and what strengthens or
completes this, skill.”501 Talent and skill is determined and thus proportionate to how efficiently
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a rational being achieves a particular end. Since any end is prior to and external to the will as a
standard that it must empirically measure itself up against, the principle itself is empirical.502
Nonetheless, it is still unclear which specific form this objective internal object
(‘perfection as a characteristic of the human being’) takes in Stoicism. In the Lectures on Ethics,
we are provided with this suggestive fragment: “[The Stoic] sage [was] ranked above the gods,
for not much pertained to their gods, since divinity had no temptations or obstacles to overcome;
but a sage of that kind would have attained to such perfection by his strength in overcoming
obstacles.”503 By no means is Kant suggesting that a sage thinks he has surpassed the gods in
physical skill or breadth of knowledge (nor is Epicurus suggesting something like this when he
claims that the prudent man lives like a god504). A sage is not physically or intellectually
superior to the gods, but superior in another manner. Is Stoic perfection a certain standard of
character then? If so, how would a principle that legislates the will (i.e. determines a will to be
of a certain character) be any different from a formal practical principle that passes Kant’s moral
test, which is only concerned with the will? Is not the will an internal object? By turning to the
primary texts of Stoicism, I hope to fill in this nebulous type with something more concrete.
Early Stoicism: Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus
Stoicism was founded by Zeno of Citium in the 4th century B.C., and was further
developed by his successors Cleanthes of Assos (c. 300-232 B.C.) and Chrysippus of Soli (c.
282-201 B.C.)505 Since few early Stoic texts have survived, most accounts of their respective
positions are found in secondary sources, such as Diogenes Laertius’ Lives, the works of critics,
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like Cicero and Sextus Empiricus, and the works of later Stoics, like Seneca.506 We have already
observed that Kant subsumes the Stoic tradition under the moniker of its founder, ‘Zeno.’
Unfortunately he is not particular as to which Stoic thinkers he has read or has in mind when he
provides his account of objective-internal material practical principles. Since Zeno’s works are
largely missing, it seems unlikely that he is the primary source from which Kant is drawing. It is
unlikely that a more nuanced analysis of Stoicism would suit Kant’s purposes, since what seems
to matter most for Kant is the meta-system of ethical theories rather than the component theories
themselves. Nonetheless, if we are to better understand what an objective-internal material
practical principle (or object) is and how it specifically undermines freedom, such a nuanced
analysis seems necessary.
The moral principle that Zeno adopts which fundamentally defines Stoicism as a moral
philosophy is the command to live a “life in agreement with nature.”507 But such a principle,
appearing on the surface to be no different that its Cynic progenitor, has in Zeno’s formulation
mutated in connotation to mean something other than the subtraction of social conventions.
Unlike the Cynic, the Stoic does not take for granted an originary momentum of human nature
overcome and corrupted by the artificial counterforce of society. Instead, the Stoic seeks to
realize humanity’s full potential within society, since society is not at odds with human nature;
rather it is humanity’s proper niche.
But what exactly is human nature according to the Stoics? What is humanity’s specific
natural potential? For one who has read Plato and Aristotle, the answer should come as no
surprise:
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The peculiar potentiality of man as distinct from the rest of natural creation is reason, which
subsumes all the traditional virtues; a man can be brave and continent and just only if he
understands the folly of their opposites. Man’s goal is therefore the achievement of perfect
reason, but nothing less than perfection will do…508

Already we can see in this passage an emphasis on the very imperative towards perfection that
Kant highlights under the objective-internal register. That perfection is, in turn, tied to both
human nature and virtue. For Zeno, the natural life is no different than the virtuous life.509 This
claim might at first seem counter-intuitive since typically most people today take it as a given
that nature is amoral. Without Reason acting as a mediating term, the Stoic inference between
nature and virtue seems baseless.
But the notion of ‘nature’ as a standard-bearer was not born fully-formed. As Diogenes
Laertius recounts, Cleanthes assumes only a common nature while Chrysippus develops this
notion further to include not only common nature but also the nature of man.510 Ultimately,
humanity is but a part of a larger Universal whole, and each of us is slated a part to play in that
dynamic whole. Vice results when one goes against what we are naturally predisposed to do.
This is not to say that we are naturally virtuous, but that we must work to fall in line with human
nature. Interestingly enough, it seems that Man’s very nature, rationality, can only be revealed
and thus made a standard for actions by means of Reason itself.511 Those points aside, we can see
how Stoicism is trying to reconcile the two connotations of nature, since ‘human nature’ is
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concluded to be a part of ‘Nature as such,’ just as a hand is part of the body.512 To act in
accordance with human nature (reason) is thus to act in accordance with Nature.513
In nature, we find three kinds of things: good things, bad things, and things that are
neither, namely, indifferent. Stoics would disagree on the status of indifferent things, some
arguing that many of the things commonly thought to be good, such as health and wealth,
although technically indifferent, are nonetheless preferred indifferents. Unlike virtue, such
indifferents can be used for both good or ill, so they cannot be specifically either.514 This
delineation mirrors Kant’s own discussion of what is “considered good without limitation” in the
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.515
According to the Stoics, virtue is both a means to an end and an end in itself: “On the one
hand, insofar as [virtues] cause happiness, they are means, and on the other hand, insofar as they
make it complete, and so are themselves part of it, they are ends.”516 The Stoic attempts a
precarious balancing act between happiness and virtue. He calls happiness (or peace of mind)
the highest good while simultaneously attributing the same status to virtue. The Kantian
depiction of Stoicism, as we will see in the next section, will suppose that virtue and happiness
are the same while Diogenes Laertius’ account underscores virtue’s dual role as both means and
end.
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Later Stoicism: Seneca and Epictetus
Seneca
Seneca developed the Stoic position even further. The works of his history has preserved
(which are many) are often letters specifically addressing the concerns of a struggling Stoic,
friend, or relative. For example, in On Providence, Seneca addresses the classic problem of
theodicy: Why do the gods let bad things happen to good people? Seneca responds by
challenging the presuppositions of the very question. Bad things never happen to good people.
Herein lies a subtle ethical doctrine that fleshes out what is good and what is bad. If we
presume, like Seneca does, that the universe is governed by a just providence, then all the
negative afflictions that good people often bear, such as poverty, persecution, violence, and
death, can’t actually be bad but instead in some way must benefit the virtuous and society as a
whole.
Seneca most vividly illustrates how what appears to be bad in actuality benefits the
afflicted in a letter he wrote to his mother during his temporary exile, called The Consolation of
Helvia. In it, he attempts to convince her that his exile, which appears bad, is really for his
benefit, which should allay her grief. To a modern reader, the claim that poverty could be
preferable to affluence seems like an act of rationalization in the face of misfortune rather than
an honest assessment. However, this notion was already implicit in Epicureanism when it
distinguished between natural and necessary desires and unnatural desires (aspects of affluence
aligning more with the latter than the former). Similar to Epicurus, affluence, according to
Seneca, can lead to vice, since it creates unnatural desires which cannot be sated. Vice leads to
misery since it places us squarely in Fate’s province: What has been given by Fate will inevitably
be taken away, like an immaculate rug pulled out from under us. It is better to not stand on such
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a rug at all. That is why the poor man is actually more likely to be content than the wealthy man
since he is neither burdened with these bottomless desires, distracted by the acquisition of
luxuries, nor worried about their imminent loss.517
A man who keeps himself within the bounds of nature, therefore, will not feel poverty; but one
who exceeds those bounds will be pursued by poverty; but one who exceeds those bounds will be
pursued by poverty even in the greatest opulence. For necessities even exile is sufficient, for
superfluities not even kingdoms are. It is the mind that which makes men rich; the mind
accompanies us into exile, and when it has found adequate sustenance for the body even in the
most desolate wilderness its own resources provide an abundance which it can enjoy. 518

Poverty is akin to a medicine hard to swallow, since it cures by removing the very luxuries that
lead to vice.519 Once again, the Stoic emphasis on the affective costs of vice (misery) seems to
highlight Kant’s own characterization of this moral imperative as ultimately aiming at pleasure.
At minimum, the benefits proffered by apparent evils can be reduced to one: we can only
grow stronger if we are tested. The gods do not show disapproval but stern love for those they
test through hardship. ‘Strength’ in this context is two-fold. Physically, our bodies grow
stronger when they are put to work.520 But physical strength is secondary to what may be called
either mental strength, or virtue. “By suffering misfortune the mind grows able to belittle
suffering.”521 Mental endurance is but one aspect of virtue as such. Only through hardship can
we determine the caliber of our virtue, or lack thereof. “You do not shine outwardly because all
your goods are turned inward.”522 Those who live an easy life only attain a superficial happiness
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that wavers at the slightest misfortune.523 To these people Seneca says, “I account you
unfortunate because you have never been unfortunate. You have passed through life without an
adversary; no one can know your potentiality, not even you.”524 With prosperity comes
temptation to vice: “Death by starvation comes gently, gluttony makes men explode.”525
For Seneca, the duty of a good man ultimately amounts to “offer[ing] himself to Fate,”526
since “nothing can be wrested from a man if he does not cling to it.”527 In a sense, this is nothing
more than a reframing of Zeno’s position that we ought to act in accordance with Nature.
Seneca, pre-empting Epictetus’ own words, seems to suggest that what is properly mine cannot
be taken from me, but what can be taken from me belongs to the gods and can fairly be
repossessed at any time.528 The measure of our virtue is proportional to how little the loss of
externals bothers us, or even occasions joy in us. Another way of saying this is that proper virtue
immunizes the Stoic against the whims of Fortune, leaving the state of mind of the Stoic
unaffected by externals.
Epictetus
The Enchiridion may be one of the most concise and yet comprehensive of Stoic ethical
texts. The text itself is more of a collection of adages meant to guide the Stoic initiate than a
streamlined essay. Epictetus grounds his interpretation of ‘living in harmony with nature’
through delineating between what is in our power and what is not. The list of things in our
power include thought, impulse, will to get (desire), and will to avoid (aversion); while things
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such as the body, property, reputation, office, and loved ones are not in our control.529 It is
undeniable that the former are ‘internal’ objects, so Kant’s categorization seems so far apt.
Remaining ‘in harmony with nature’ means to focus on what we can control and to accept that it
is in the nature of things outside of our control to inevitably be taken from us. For example, it is
in the nature of mortal beings to perish, so we would be at odds with nature if we expected them
to transcend death. To dread the passing of the mortal is to invite discontent since it will
inevitably happen, while to accept it as inevitable is to remain unfazed regardless of
circumstances.530 Many critics may read this as a cold reaction to the passing of someone dear.
The modern assumption is that emotional distress should be proportional to the love felt for the
departed. But to a Stoic, things not in our control should be thought of as on loan to us from the
Divine. Likewise, it makes little sense to feel indignant rather than grateful when something is
reclaimed by its proper owner, since one was never owed use of the reclaimed item to begin
with.531
Epictetus uses a theatrical example to illustrate what our duty is:
Remember that you are an actor in a play, and the Playwright chooses the manner of it: if he wants
it short, it is short; if long, it is long. If he wants you to act a poor man you must act the part with
all your powers; and so if your part be a cripple or a magistrate or a plain man. For your business
is to act the character that is given you and act it well; the choice of the cast is Another’s. 532

Of course this analogy spawns several provocative questions. Does this mean that the so-called
cripple should decline opportunities to improve his condition? Furthermore, while we may be
born into some roles, such as Marcus Aurelius was, neither career, talent, health, nor social
standing are static from birth. Each is determined by our choices. Aptitudes may manifest, but
only after significant practice determined by an initial decision that may have been arbitrary.
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And even granted that there are innate aptitudes, an aptitude could dispose someone towards a
myriad of roles. And what of conflicting roles? A man may be born into an imperial lineage,
but what if he has a once-in-a-generation ear for music? Which role does he take up?
Ultimately, Epictetus concludes that the only quality about oneself that carries value (and
presumably, moral weight) is one’s response to impressions.533 This is due to the reduction of
the sphere of what one truly is to the realm of what is in our control, namely, the will. This can
be inferred from the following passage: “Sickness is a hindrance to the body, but not to the will,
unless the will consent. Lameness is a hindrance to the leg, but not the will. Say this to yourself
at each event that happens, for you shall find that though it hinders something else it will not
hinder you.”534 The path dedicated to what is in one’s control is at odds with the path dedicated
to things outside of our control, insofar as one frees us from the contingencies of things out of
our control while the other one shackles us more firmly to them. True contentment only lies on
the former path, momentary pleasure and persistent disappointment on the latter path.535 That is
not to say that the path of true contentment is the one that will gain the accolades and attention of
others, since such things can usually only be ‘earned’ by following the slavish path.536
What makes something pleasant or distressing is ultimately the judgment we have about
the events rather than something intrinsic to the events themselves.537 Otherwise, why would the
same circumstance that causes me pain be viewed by others with indifference? If it were
otherwise, would not everyone view it the same way? 538 Things happen as they must, leading
Epictetus to conclude that “there is nothing intrinsically evil in the world.”539
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Kant’s Account “of the Ethical Systems of Antiquity”540
Now that we have examined various Stoic texts, it is worth noting how Kant critiques
Stoicism and compares it to the other ancient ethical theories, particularly Epicureanism.
Notably, it is in his criticism of the Stoic ideal that we encounter an unfamiliar Kant, one critical
of any ethics predicated solely upon a disembodied, passionless duty. Kant identifies three
approaches in Antiquity which took a different object to be the ideal of the highest good: The
Cynic ideal, the Epicurean ideal, and the Stoic ideal.541 Each, in its own way, seems to be the
inversion of one of the others.
The Cynic ideal is unique for several reasons. Traditionally, Cynicism is considered a
precursor to Stoicism, yet Kant claims that neither shares a common ideal: the Cynic ideal is
simplicity (or innocence), the Stoic ideal wisdom.542 Furthermore, Kant finds a place for both the
Epicurean and Stoic ideals in the table of heteronomy but the Cynic ideal is strangely omitted
from the second Critique, perhaps for the sake of systemic symmetry. What makes the omission
more perplexing is how he identifies Cynicism with the position of one of his contemporaries:
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (In the Lectures on Ethics Kant refers to Rousseau as ‘that subtle
Diogenes’).543 Apocryphal stories involving late-day walks aside, Rousseau’s influence on Kant
is difficult to overestimate. Paul Guyer and Allen W, Wood say the following about Rousseau’s
impact on Kant’s ethical work:
…Kant’s philosophy can be thought of as an attempt to synthesize Leibniz’s vision of the
preestablished harmony of the principles of nature and the principles of grace with the substance
of Newtonian science and the moral and political insights of Jean-Jacques Rousseau…Kant
[transformed] Leibniz’s vision of a harmonious world of monads under the rule of God and
Rousseau’s vision of a social contract expressing a general will into ideals of human reason,
neither of which can simply be asserted to exist in well-founded cognitive judgments made within
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the limits of human sensibility and understanding, but both of which can and must represent the
ultimate even if never completely attainable goals of human theoretical and practical thought and
conduct.544

Is Kant’s pairing of the Cynic ideal and Rousseau’s position, as well as the glaring absence of
both in the table of heteronomy, in some way an implicit agreement with this position? This
answer, as well as how Kant distinguishes Cynicism from Stoicism, can only be discovered by
further probing the Cynic ideal of simplicity.
The ideal or archetypal Idea of Diogenes and the Cynics was ‘the man of nature.’545 By
esteeming the natural over the conventional, morality consists of preserving the natural state: not
only nature but morality itself is put at odds with society. Maintain only natural needs rather
than supplementing those needs with conventional ones, and the happiness that results from the
appeasement of needs will be assured. Natural man wants for nothing and in this way
technically has no needs. He is naturally good: “for if one has no needs, one also has no desires,
and then our actions coincide with morality; for such a man, it costs nothing extra to be honest,
and so virtue would be only an Idea.”546 For Kant, however, such an individual could be moral
but never virtuous, since there is no natural adversity to overcome in order to act morally.547
In contrast to the seemingly-extraneous role played by the Cynic ideal, the Epicurean and
Stoic ideals are two sides of a virtue and happiness debate that Kant sees as founded on false
grounds. For Kant, the highest good is ‘highest’ only by virtue of two criteria: that it is
‘supreme’ over all other goods, and that it is complete, lacking nothing.548 Virtue fulfills the first
criterion, but the happiness of agents must be proportionate to their virtue for the second criterion
to be met. A virtuous man lacking in happiness could never be said to possess the highest good,
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such as Aristotle notes of King Priam after the loss of his sons at the hands of the Greeks. Even
an impartial observer would judge such a virtuous yet tragically sad man’s plight to be unjust.
While the world gives no guarantees that good people will live happy lives, we nonetheless judge
good people to deserve happiness, and are saddened when they are plagued by misery and
misfortune. Furthermore, nothing stirs ire and disgust like the awareness that a wicked man is
beset with lavish blessings and enjoys the greatest happiness despite what punishments he is
owed.549
Kant differentiates ancient ethical theories based on the varieties of possible logical
relationships that can hold between virtue and happiness: either the pursuit of one is identical
with the other (they are the same), or the pursuit of one causes the other to occur (they are
distinct).550 Epicureanism and Stoicism assert a relationship of identity between virtue and
happiness, which, for Kant, is the source of their error. Given that we have two terms – virtue
and happiness – there are two ways that relationship of identity can be expressed:
The Epicurean said: to be conscious of one’s maxim leading to happiness is virtue; the Stoic said:
to be conscious of one’s virtue is happiness. For the first, prudence was equivalent to morality;
for the second, who chose a higher designation for virtue, morality alone was true wisdom.551

The Epicurean archetypal Idea – ‘the man of the world’552 – judges all actions that lead to
pleasure (ataraxia, or peace of mind) to be virtuous. The first term defined is happiness, and
virtue is only defined in reference to it, as identical with the proper means towards achieving
ataraxia. “Epicurus wanted to give virtue motives and no value; the motive was happiness, and
the value worthiness…So he took away the value from virtue, in that he made morality into a
means of happiness.”553 The prudence required to achieve ataraxia does not come naturally, but
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instead is an art:554 Philosophy as such. On this point, Epicureanism and Stoicism agree: People
are not born virtuous but instead have an inclination towards vice. Naturally, people are plagued
by irrational beliefs and values. They discount long-term consequences and pursue immediate
pleasures accompanied by long-term pains.555 They pursue unnatural, or vain, pleasures instead
of natural and necessary ones, even though a life spent pursuing them leads to pain and anguish.
Most people naturally succumb to superstitious thinking that makes them fear baseless threats.
Philosophy thus had to be invented to correct this innate tendency.
A contrast with Epicureanism illuminates Kant’s interpretation of Stoicism and its
failings. Kant identifies the Stoic ideal with the Sage.556 While the Epicurean tries to change
circumstances to those that accord the agent peace of mind, the Stoic tries to change himself so
that he is immune to the contingencies of circumstances. The sage, by mastering himself,
masters fate, since he controls how he responds to the whims of fortune. He never becomes
distraught by events because he aligns his will with these events: “He is a king, in that he rules
over himself, and cannot be constrained, in that he constrains himself.”
It is easy to see how Zeno reverses Epicurus’ position: “Zeno extolled the inner value of
virtue, and located the highest good in it, and took away the motives to virtue…Zeno did the
opposite [of Epicurus], locating happiness in value, and assigning no motive to virtue.”557
Stoicism inverts Epicureanism, privileging the logical over the sensible558 (In a way, Kant and
Foucault are but the avatars of this ancient debate). “According to the Epicurean the concept of
virtue was already present in the maxim of promoting one’s own happiness; according to the
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Stoic, on the other hand, the feeling of happiness was already contained in consciousness of
one’s virtue.”559
Neither the Epicureans, nor the Stoics, acknowledged the fundamental difference
between happiness and virtue, because they “sought the unity of the principle [of the highest
good] in accordance with the rule of identity.”560 An innovation of Kant’s critiques, evident here
as it was in the first Critique (when he criticized Leibniz’s conflation of intuition and concept in
the Amphiboly561) is to divide what must be distinguished. Both ethics and metaphysics have
been plagued by improper conflations between things of different natures. For ethics, that
conflation was not between intuitions and concepts (like it was for the Amphiboly) so much as
between happiness and virtue. This irreconcilable difference ultimately undermines the Stoic
project (as well as the Epicurean project). Happiness cannot come merely from the esteem we
hold for our own virtuous actions like the Stoic thinks, since we are not mere minds but
embodied beings with all-too-human sensuous desires and needs. Happiness arises from the
satisfaction of these desires and needs. It may be noted that virtue, while not at odds with
happiness, does not concern itself with the personal happiness of agents, only prudence does.
Yet when it comes to the matter of what is fair, happiness and virtue are related. A worthy man
is warranted a greater share of happiness, a moral fact all the more evident when a bad man is
unjustly blessed with it. Therefore, consciousness of this injustice is not allayed by a virtuous
character but is contrarily exacerbated by it. Thus, the unfortunate Stoic may reflect upon his
actions favorably and hold himself with the highest esteem, but be all the more pained that he

559

Ibid 230 [5:112]
Ibid 229 [5:111]
561
Kant Critique of Pure Reason 366-383 [A260/B316 – A292/B349]
560

163

deserves happiness and yet lacks it. The pain of righteous indignation only increases the more
worthy the Stoic feels himself to be.562
For Kant, both the Epicurean and the Stoic fail to recognize that this discordance cannot
be resolved by anything other than divine assistance, such as Christianity promises.563 While
Epicureanism esteems the Man of the World, and Stoicism the Sage, Christianity endorses the
Holy Man and holiness as its ideal, the latter of which is a kind of moral perfection unattainable
by man’s own efforts. The ultimate incentive to attain this ideal is blessedness, or perfect
happiness, attainable only by means of grace and dispensed only after the fetters to this life and
world have been severed. Unlike those ethical theories that conflate virtue and happiness by
means of a principle of identity, Christianity correctly posits a causal relationship between virtue
and happiness that acknowledges the difference of kind between them. This causal relationship
respects this difference in kind insofar as virtue does not produce happiness in the sensible world
so much as give God grounds for offering it as a reward for virtue..564 By making happiness a
reward, happiness and virtue are fundamentally divorced from each other. Ancient ethical
positions, such as Epicureanism and Stoicism “had no greater [concept of] moral perfection than
that which could come from the nature of man,’ and subsequently “accommodated virtue to
human weakness.”565 Because Christianity assumes ‘divine assistance’ (by which Kant likely
means both grace and salvation simultaneously) its standards can be unflinchingly perfect and
pure.566 While this statement only sheds a dim light on Kant’s own ethical positions (to be
covered in Chapter Six), it does allow us to see how Kant sees both positions as brothers of the
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same bifurcated branch grounded on at least two fundamental errors: namely, heteronomy of
choice and a misrecognition of the relationship between virtue and happiness.
General Reflections on Stoicism as Heteronomy
Despite the Stoic emphasis on freedom, Kant nonetheless judges Stoicism to be
heteronomous rather than leading to true autonomy. That is because the Stoic is concerned with
moral perfection, which according to Kant, can only be determined empirically by how well one
achieves an end. Although Kant is not explicit about what this end is, it’s likely to be two-fold:
1) whether or not the will wills that things should be as they already are in the world, and 2)
whether the inner intuition of ataraxia is observed. Both criteria are clearly empirical.
Furthermore, for Kant, it is unavoidable that the subjective determining grounds of the will must
be that very sensible state of agreeableness (ataraxia). And while, as we will see, Kant will turn
to nature as a model for his moral principle, he turns towards the form of nature (lawfulness)
while the Stoic appeals to its content (natural states of affairs).
The Wolffian Perfection-based Moral Theory
Kant classifies the Leibniz-inspired ‘rationalist (or cognitivist)567 perfectionism’ tradition
in the same objective-internal category as Stoicism, and does not distinguish the two positions as
subtypes, as was common in the ‘subjective’ moral theories previously covered. Nonetheless,
rationalist perfectionism, albeit similar, is distinct from Stoicism rather than a mere modern
reiteration of it.
The substance of the view was that the primary duty of human beings is to admire or even imitate
the perfection of God, and that from that derive the duties to perfect their own minds and bodies in
order to facilitate that and to assist each other in achieving such perfection. 568
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What this position ultimately means is that we as human beings are obligated to perfect our
cognitive capacities, since only then do we fully grasp God’s perfections. Since humans are not
purely spiritual entities, this requires us to perfect those bodily and external conditions that act as
necessary conditions for achieving that cognitive perfection.569 To know God’s perfections is to
necessarily love God, which in turn makes us happy.570 Striving towards self-perfection is thus
just a means towards understanding God, and all duties towards benefitting others are also just
means towards facilitating their understanding of God.571
However, the position could be restated in a manner without reference to God that sounds
more in line with Stoicism, as Lewis White Beck does in Early German Philosophy: Kant and
His Predecessors.572As Beck notes, according to Wolff, “No revelation of God is needed to teach
men their duty; an intelligent atheist can know and fulfill his duty.”573 To know a perfection is to
necessarily desire it. But one cannot want one sole perfection, since all perfections are bound
together as reciprocally reinforcing, and a given perfection is grounded by the other perfections:
To know a perfection is to will an interconnection of every act so that each one supports and gives
a ground for the others; it is to be independent of the accidental and obscure features of our
circumstance, and when we act so as to actualize our own nature we are living “according to
nature.”574

Thus a variant of natural law theory emerges that suggests that, as previously discussed, we have
a duty to help others to perfect themselves as well as to perfect ourselves, which when attained
leads to happiness.575
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Conclusions regarding Objective-Internal Material Practical Principles
The duty to comply with nature as well as the subsequent happiness that results from
doing so has much in common with Stoicism, albeit Wolff is much more explicit about the
standard of perfection towards which we should strive. It’s clear by now that Kant is not going
out on a limb when he suggests that moral perfectionism, be it Stoic or Wolffian, is
heteronomous and eudaimonistic. Both Stoicism and rationalist perfectionism explicitly express
a necessary relationship between moral perfection and happiness. As we have covered, this
connection is the naïve one Kant identifies with the Ancient perspective, a connection he
attempts to thoroughly sever. Wolff does admit that the body must be perfected as well, which
may comply with Kant’s requirement that sensuous nature also be appeased, so Kant’s critique
on this point may in fact miss the mark. Nonetheless, both positions also depend on satisfying
criteria external to the will. Even though a seemingly unempirical a notion such as ‘the
perfections of God’ may be derived rationally, whether or not we measure up to those standards
can only be confirmed empirically.
3.6 Objective-External Material Practical Principles
Finally, Kant identifies moral theories based on objective-external criteria. Kant divides
objective practical principles into two kinds of perfection: perfection as a ‘characteristic of the
human being’ (objective-internal material practical principles) and perfection as ‘the supreme
perfection in substance.’576 The latter is God and His “adequacy…to all ends in general.”577 For
Kant, the latter acts as a practical principle insofar as the will of God can act as a standard to
which our will must conform. It still remains a eudaimonistic principle insofar as the only
subjective motive for complying with it remains the happiness expected from complying with it.
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It is also empirical not because God Himself is empirical but because compliance with an
external standard must be determined empirically. 578 Another way of expressing this moral
position is to say that what is right and wrong is determined solely by God’s will. Kant cites one
near-contemporary who holds this position: Christian August Crusius.
Crusius’ Divine Command Moral Theory
In Chapter Two we encountered Crusius as a critic of the Wolffian-Leibnizian
metaphysical and epistemological tradition. However, he was also a critic of the WolffianLeibnizian ethical tradition.579 Contrary to Leibniz and Wolff, Crusius sees right and wrong as
determined solely by the will of God. Crusius opposed Wolff’s cognitive perfection with an
emphasis on ‘conscientious feeling.’580 Contrary to Wolff, who claimed that to know the good
means to desire it, Crusius divides the understanding and the will, cleaving the presumed
necessary connection between knowing and willing. In a move that parallels Kant’s own
subservience of the theoretical to the practical, Crusius concludes that “thought and
understanding exist only for the sake of action and the will.”581 The understanding helps us to
understand the natural ends, or ‘perfections’ which we must strive to attain while the will
implements the means the understanding has reasoned out to achieve those ends. These means
are referred to as goods. 582 God, however, designed us with not only an understanding that
grasps the good and a will that desires it, but also with fundamental impulses or desires for
specific natural ends. These fundamental desires include the desires for truth, self-perfection,
happiness, and to love God, but also a desire to obey God’s commands. Happiness is found by
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obeying these divine commands, or, in other words, with complying with the ‘impulse of
conscience’ God has given us.583 Therefore, humans possess innate feelings that grasp the
Divine will. Since one of the natural ends of humans is to comply with divine commands, ethics
is grounded on God’s will.584 The will, being free, can choose to assent to the commands of the
Divine will or to act contrary to them. We are free to comply or not regardless of our desires or
concerns for our own happiness.585 Once again, it becomes clear why Kant thinks that the
subjective determining ground of the will, even in this case, is happiness.
Beck suggests that this is not technically the same position as Divine Command theory
per se, since what is good is ultimately determined not by God’s arbitrary whim but instead by
those natural ends God originally chose. Nonetheless would not this position still be an indirect
or roundabout version of Divine Command theory (or even Natural Law theory), since
presumably God arbitrarily chose humanity’s natural ends when He designed human nature? 586
3.7 Final Remarks on Heteronomy and Its Threat to Freedom
From this concluding vantage point, an interesting pattern seems evident in the Table of
Heteronomy. Granted a left-to-right reading of the Table itself (which I have presented), we can
see a (dialectical) movement from the most groundless moral theories to those that
asymptotically approach a universal grounding. Subjective-external material practical principles
are anarchic, since they seem to be arbitrarily determined by the tastes of a given culture. They
bear the force of law without being the moral law. They are in a sense the simulacra of the moral
law, since they give the appearance of law without bearing the substance of law (universality).
Subjective-internal principles, being internal, are at minimum planted on a purely subjective
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ground and, having returned into their purely subjective essence, can find a less arbitrary object
to affirm: a real subjective state (pleasure) which can be determined by means of what can at best
be described as a theoretical analogue to practical reason (prudence). By conceiving of the agent
as a theoretical object (namely, a body, or at best, an empirical ego) actual, specific
circumstances that will elicit that internal state can be calculated. It is thus an advancement from
the previous moral relativist position since it is mediated by reason, albeit prudential reason
rather than practical reason. Nonetheless, taste can never be the basis for universal and
necessary moral principles, as what pleases one patient may displease another. Objectiveinternal principles, in some ways similar to Kant’s own practical principle, seem to aim at
autonomy. Seneca, for example, seems to articulate the Stoic position as one in which the agent
frees himself from the whims of Fortune by withdrawing the boundaries of the self to the sphere
of the rational. Nonetheless, this is not absolute autonomy, since practical perfection amounts to
mere skill and compliance with external (human) nature. With objective-external principles we
are provided with an example of absolute autonomy (God), but such autonomy, in principle,
must be arbitrary without a rational grounding, since any ethical criterion other than the will of
God would mitigate the power of that will. Divine Command theory is the purest material
practical principle since from a limited human perspective it presents itself as if it were rationally
determined from a position of absolute freedom (divine decree). But such a conception proves
self-contradictory, since this very Logos seems arbitrarily grounded. Rational beings aside from
God can only attain autonomy by means of rationality. Rational autonomy and its concomitant
formal practical principle will be explored later when we return to Kantian askesis.
The following chapter has highlighted the four kinds of heteronomy, primarily by
providing more in-depth expositions of those ethical theories Kant places under the headings of
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each kind of heteronomy. Even after doing so, it is not necessarily clear which texts Kant read to
familiarize himself with each position. Interestingly, our investigations of each ethical theorist’s
position did not always confirm a clean correspondence between each theorist and his respective
heteronomous variant. There even seemed to be moral theorists that were strangely omitted
granted not only their impact on Kant’s own moral development, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
but also because of Kant’s claim that his was a comprehensive architectonic of moral theories
outside of his own. One wonders what is more important: Kant’s conception of each
heteronomous variant or the actual theories. In this chapter I attempted to find a middle ground.
At minimum, Kant does succeed at providing a framework for not only organizing but
predicting possible theories that identify a particular kind of contingent object as good. It is
arguable that there may be valued objects that are neither subjective or objective, nor external or
internal, but at present, what those objects could be remain merely a logical possibility devoid of
actual content. And in those cases when it is clear that a theory does conform to the
heteronomous rubric, it is not always clear where it properly belongs. This analysis has shown
that to some degree what Kant considers the privileged object of a moral theory is arbitrarily
chosen on his part, or at minimum that convincing arguments could be made to the contrary. For
example, why should a metaethical analysis of Mandeville’s theory privilege custom when he
also seems utilitarian (i.e. to privilege pleasure)?
These complications aside, Kant’s strongest point remains how any practical principle
that judges a state of affairs to be either good or bad based on an object, necessarily exterior to
the will, leaves an agent at the caprice of factors outside of his control. The agent’s decisions
become reactive instead of active, ensnared to the phenomenal realm of determined cause and
effect, rather than self-determining. And even if Kant’s typologies are not faithful renditions,
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they still articulate ways in which external conditions can replace the conditions the will sets for
itself.
The table of heteronomy is thus a crucial architectonic of domination whose usefulness
can be exported from the realm of metaethics. It is from this perspective that I will approach
Michel Foucault’s investigations into power-knowledge in the next chapter.
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4.1 The Table of Heteronomy as Architectonic for Foucaultian Forms of Control
In Chapter Three, we explored the four primary manners in which Kant claimed the
will’s autonomy could be subverted. This, paradoxically, was represented in a table of possible
goods the will could pursue:

Because each good and the means towards acquiring it are external to the will and thus in some
respect contingently bound to the faculty of sensibility and its situational relationship to the
phenomenal realm of cause and effect, the will founders and is no longer autonomous if the
success of its strivings is measured by their acquisition. Put otherwise, insofar as we are merely
concerned with a being that seeks goods, we do not encounter a rational self-determining agent
but a sensuous patient that is bound up in the causal web of natural forces, reacting to stimuli
much as the metal ball impacted by another in a Newton’s Cradle communicates its kinetic force
to the others mindlessly, prompting a reflexive back-and-forth no more autonomous for being so.
Rather than eschew the label of possible ‘goods’ and look only at the structural aspects of
the Table, we must recognize that the form of domination a theorist such as Michel Foucault is
concerned with always persists and perpetuates itself through a nexus of posited human goods:
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the ‘normal,’ after all is supposed to be the human good and the ‘abnormal’ the human bad.
Such a reading would remain in the spirit of Kant’s own engagement with these heteronomous
imperatives insofar as he deprives these imperatives of their moral pretentions while
acknowledging that they are indeed pretentions. We can thus re-read the Table of Heteronomy
as illustrating two interdependent forms of domination: metaphysical domination that determines
the actions of subjects and social domination that determines the norms to which subjects must
conform. The Table itself would thus provide us with a comprehensive grid of the forms of
domination. Ironically, a table meant to illustrate objects necessarily illustrates forms. Put
another way, granted that the norms at issue that constitute normalcy are human norms, each
quadrant of the table could thus represent a kind of norm meant to standardize a specific facet of
human nature. Each quadrant would represent a problematic field of human nature which is
consistently re-investigated, reconceived, and regulated.
Michel Foucault’s corpus is, by design, meant to be asystematic. However, I take issue
with Foucault’s claim that his work need be so, and can be more effective when systematized. I
will argue that if Foucault’s work is categorized in line with Kant’s Table of Heteronomy, the
rhapsodic array of his investigations will suddenly appear consistent and that methodological
differences between each text will be shown to indicate less a rejection of previous methods than
they do a change of problematic field. I argue genealogy does not replace archaeology but rather
is a distinct, albeit related, manner of interrogating different objects.
What is really at stake in both Kant and Foucault’s work on domination is the object of
the human sciences: Man. As both Foucault’s Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology and The
Order of Things indicate, Modern thought is inherently anthropological and embroiled in the
‘analytic of finitude.’ Kant signals the beginning of Modernity (and Man himself) because he is
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the first to make man’s finitude the basis for knowledge (which is an implicit contradiction borne
out over time).587 It is by means of the Critical project and its empirical-transcendental
distinction that Man, as an ‘empirico-transcendental doublet’ became possible.588 More
accurately, Man and Anthropological thought are constituted by three doubles: the
transcendental/empirical, the cogitio/unthought, and the retreat/return of origins. These doubles
are the “three ways in which man’s factual limitations (the positivities) are both distinguished
from and equated with those conditions which make knowledge possible (the fundamental).”589
Kant is the first to distinguish the form of knowing (the transcendental conditions for knowing),
from the contents of what is known (the empirical object). Kant also argues that ‘the form of
thought and action’ may be clear while the content of knowledge, in principle, is inexhaustible
and inevitably unthought in its totality. Finally, we always seek an origin when we seek to
ground what we know, but that origin consistently retreats. Those after Kant attempted to
overcome each double by means of making finitude the condition of knowing, and, according to
Foucault, consistently fail.590 Man is the persisting product of that failure.
In claiming that man has existed only since the eighteenth century, Foucault is asserting that there
was no “epistemological consciousness of man as such,” no domain that was specifically proper to
man before the modern period. “Renaissance ‘humanism’ and Classical ‘rationalism’ were indeed
able to allot human beings a privileged position in the order of the world but they were not able to
conceive of man.”591
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By means of three emerging disciplines (economics, biology, and philology: production, life, and
language, respectively) that underpin the human sciences (sociology, psychology, and language
analysis),592 Man as an epistemological ‘figure of finitude’ emerged as a being…
…condemned to exist by the sweat of his brow, an organism living under the sentence of death,
[and] a process of thinking forced to lodge its thought in the density of language. His essentially
finite identity is proclaimed through these domains of knowledge in which he has sought
enlightenment. The experience of human reality as “man” is as a living body, an appetite in
relation to which value emerges, and as a user of language. 593

On Deleuze’s reading, the Man-form, as a figure of finitude, emerges “when the forces within
man enter into a relation with forces of finitude from outside” (namely, the forces of Life, Labor,
and Language).594 According to Foucault, these three disciplines “cover the entire domain of
what can be known about man.”595
Foucault’s over-arching task is to analyze Man, reveal the ways in which the figure of
Man restrains us, and to overcome him (indeed, he already thinks the dissolution of Man is
underway596). He does this in his works by analyzing the emergence of discourses on the Mad,
the Crackpot, the Delinquent, and the Pervert, discourses embedded in practices of domination.
The Table can thus be interpreted, upon my reading, as Foucault’s four-fold interrogation of Man
that reveals the manners in which Man as a figure of finitude constrains us.
Since I am attempting to prove that Foucault’s work can be mapped onto the Table of
Heteronomy, it may help to know before that analysis what I mean by each of the four
designations in context to Foucault’s theoretical system and domination: objective-internal,
objective-external, subjective-external, and subjective-internal. Let us start with what could be
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meant by the Objective-Subjective distinction. To preliminarily substantiate this approach, I will
take as a guide Gilles Deleuze’s categorization of Foucault’s work, provided in his work
Foucault. Deleuze’s reading of Foucault is not particularly unconventional, and on the surface
seems to model the archaeological/genealogical divide common in Foucault studies. “The study
of stratified relations of knowledge culminated in The Archaeology of Knowledge. The study of
strategic power relations begins with Discipline and Punish and culminates paradoxically in The
History of Sexuality.”597 Deleuze identifies The History of Madness (Madness and Civilization),
The Birth of the Clinic, The Order of Things, and The Archaeology of Knowledge, with ‘stratified
relations of knowledge’ and Discipline and Punish and History of Sexuality: Volume I, with
‘strategic power relations.’ Foucault himself divides his work between focuses on knowledge,
power, and the subject. I will argue that insofar as Foucault addresses ‘stratified relations of
knowledge’ he is concerned with objective forms of domination, and on the other hand, when he
broaches ‘strategic power relations’ the subjective forms of domination. Prima facie this makes
sense insofar as knowledge concerns objective claims while power is necessarily subjective
assertion. Domination characterized by the former would thus consider epistemological
limitations of discourse while those of the former immanent social forces in agonistic tension.
Or, to put it otherwise, claims of knowledge, if they are to at least be pretenders to the crown of
knowledge rather than mere beliefs, must claim to be objective. On the other hand, as we saw
with Kant, ‘Subjective’ does not necessarily mean a ‘personal’ epistemological designation,
since society and its cultural practices fell under the ‘Subjective-External’ register. Thus, powerrelations permeating society concern the Subjective registers.
It is important to note an important distinction between ‘domination’ and ‘power’ before
moving onto the ‘Internal-External’ axis. Technically, domination refers to a totalized control
597
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without freedom, akin to the control of an inert object: “When an individual or social group
succeeds in blocking a field of power relations, immobilizing them and preventing any
reversibility of movement by economic, political, or military means, one is faced with what may
be called a state of domination.”598 But power can only exist where there is freedom and thus
resistance. As we will see, Foucault allows for the possibility that a power relation can be
reversed so that domination, properly speaking, rarely happens. But Foucault uses ‘domination’
in another way as well, in The Subject and Power, when he discusses the difference between
forms of domination (ethnic, social, and religious), forms of exploitation that separate
individuals from what they produce, and forms of subjection (what ties the individual to himself
and submits him to others by means of it).599 I do not intend the word ‘domination’ to be limited
to repression, as it will become clear as we proceed that these forms of control are always
operative in a given historical period.
Granted that the Objective-Subjective axis is adequate, a second axis must be considered
to complete the Table: the Internal-External axis. Whereas in the first classification the
difference was epistemological (subjective vs objective), the second seems to involve the
domain: Is the form of domination concerned with the internal domain of the self or the external
domain outside of it? Traditionally, we pair the subjective with the internal domain and the
objective with the external. Kant, however, has provided us with two other kinds of objects: the
objective-internal and the subjective-external.
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A preliminary attempt at mapping Foucault’s major works (or at least the ones I will
discuss) onto these axes might produce the following:
 The History of Madness (Madness and Civilization) concerns the mental state of
the mad, which is Internal.600
 Both The Order of Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge concern the
discourse within which the human sciences are framed, which is External.
 Discipline and Punish concerns the manner in which power disciplines and
regulates by means of institutions, like prisons. The social practices of control are
External.
 The History of Sexuality: Volume I considers how Western discourse conceives of
a hidden inner truth: the truth of our Sex and the incitement to confess it. ‘Sex’,
in turn, acts as a means of self-control. This seems ultimately Internal.
This seems to map onto Kant’s Table of Heteronomy nicely, granted that the Objective-Internal
theories Kant cites are concerned with virtuous character (an ideal mental state), the ObjectiveExternal exemplar with the Will of God (the Logos), the Subjective-External exemplars with
education and government (discipline), and the Subjective-Internal exemplars with physical and
moral feelings (pleasure and desire).

600

Madness and Civilization is the abridged version of The History of Madness. The Birth of the Clinic is a difficult
book to place, insofar as it does concern something internal, namely the anatomy of the body, while also being a
structuralist analysis of the field of medicine that articulates that anatomy and its maladies. Dreyfus, Hubert L., and
Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (2e), (Chicago: University of Chicago
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Thus, we are left with the following table, which is a map of the course of discussion in
this chapter:

The following exposition will fall in line with the chronological sequence of Foucault’s
works, from The History of Madness, to The Order of Things, The Archaeology of Knowledge,
Discipline and Punish, and then The History of Sexuality: Volume I. As Herman Nilson notes,
the first three characterize ‘negative domination-forms’ while the last a more ‘positive’ form.601
Much of this categorization aligns with Foucault’s own division of his project into examinations
of three modes of objectification that “transform human beings into subjects”: the mode of
inquiries that try to give themselves the status of sciences,” (such as The Order of Things and
The Archaeology of Knowledge) the mode concerned with ‘dividing practices’ that divide the
subject either from himself or others (such as the History of Madness and Discipline and
Punish), and the mode concerning how humans turn themselves into subjects (The History of
Nilson, Herman, Michel Foucault and the Games of Truth, trans. Rachel Clark (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1998), 74.
601
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Sexuality).602 After documenting the four kinds of domination, I will then proceed onto
Foucault’s ethical writings, such as The History of Sexuality: Volume Two in Chapter Five. I will
start with The History of Madness and the Objective-Internal quadrant.
4.2 Objective-Internal Forms of Domination: The History of Madness
Criteria for the Objective-Internal Form of Domination
We may recall that Kant describes the Objective-Internal material practical principle as
pertaining to the perfection of a human ‘characteristic,’ ‘talent,’ or ‘skill’ in accordance with
reason. Because the principle pertains to the human being it is internal and because the standard
of perfection is rational rather than empirical it is objective.603 Therefore, any physiological or
psychological standard or norm can serve as the basis for such a principle, since physiological
and psychological states are characteristics of the human being. Deviations from a physiological
norm are referred to as illness while from a psychological norm as madness. Both norms carry
the potential for nonconsensual intervention, since a doctor can intervene when a patient is
incapacitated in either body or mind. In such instances, intervening authorities (medical or
otherwise) may have carte blanche control over their patients. In the forthcoming section, I will
explore how this license to intervene and silence what Foucault calls ‘the experience of madness’
has changed forms: from the exclusionary practices of the Renaissance which sought to exile
Unreason, to the Houses of Confinement which sought to contain and hide it, to the asylums that
sought to cure it, but not as Unreason but as mental illness. By doing so, we will gain a better
understanding of the forms of objective-internal domination to which we are subjected.
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Foucaultian Epistemology in The History of Madness
Foucault’s History of Madness is an extensive chronicle of how madness was
experienced in the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Classical Age, and the Modern Age, with a
particular focus on the Classical Age (or ‘Age of Reason’). But before getting a sense of how
each epistemological era (or episteme) experienced madness distinctly, it is crucial to point out
that Foucault is not charting an inevitable progression from religious superstitions about madness
to the more enlightened scientifically-informed medical model of madness of today:
The point here is not to establish a hierarchy, nor to demonstrate that the classical age was a step
backwards in comparison to the sixteenth century and the knowledge it had developed on
madness. We shall see that medical texts from the seventeenth and eighteenth century are enough
to prove the contrary. What matters here is to remove all chronology and historical succession
from the perspective of a ‘progress’, to reveal in the history of an experience, a movement in its
own right, uncluttered by a teleology of knowledge or the orthogenesis of learning. The aim here
is to uncover the design and structures of the experience of madness produced by the classical age.
That experience is neither progress nor a step backward in relation to any other. It is possible to
talk of a loss of the power of discrimination in the perception of madness, and to say that the face
of the mad began to be erased, but this is neither a value judgment nor even a negative statement
about a deficit of knowledge. It is a manner, sill very exterior, of approaching the experience of
madness in its positive reality, an experience which stripped the madman of the precise
individuality [and] status that the Renaissance had given him, which prepared him, beyond the
field of our customary experience, a new face, where the naivety of our positivism believed that it
could recognize the nature of madness. 604

Here we can see an object of inquiry that appears to belong to the Objective-Internal field: ‘The
design and structures of the experience of madness.’ As Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow note,
the relationship between reason and madness
…changes radically from period to period…[What] seems to be a series of approximations to an
unseizable ontological condition of pure otherness…[lies] at the center of Foucault’s analysis.
Foucault seems to have thought that there was “something” like pure madness which all these
different cultural forms were groping after and covering up… 605

But we would be wrong to not notice a pattern, or culmination resulting from this historical
series of epistemic shifts. As we will see, these approximations, which have culminated in
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present-day psychiatry and psychology, are ultimately but the means of mastering madness
rather than understanding it:
Having mastered his madness, and having freed it by capturing it in the gaols of his gaze and his
morality, having disarmed it by pushing it into a corner of himself finally allowed man to establish
that sort of relation to the self that is known as ‘psychology.’606

What Foucault discovered was the “history of the conditions of possibility of psychology.” 607
While Foucault at this point is taking madness to be self-subsistent and historically
persistent, his neutrality regarding inevitable historical progress already foreshadows a form of
phenomenology that Dreyfus and Rabinow consider more radical than previous
phenomenological methods:
Not only must the investigator bracket the truth claims of the serious speech acts he is
investigating – Husserl’s phenomenological reduction – he must also bracket the meaning claims
of the speech acts he studies; that is, he not only must remain neutral as to whether what a
statement asserts as true is in fact true, he must remain neutral as to whether each specific truth
claim even makes sense, and more generally, whether the notion of a context-free truth claim is
coherent...Going Husserl one better, Foucault treats both reference and sense merely as
phenomena.608

Later, in The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault will seem to suggest that he didn’t go far
enough in The History of Madness, and that the text was wrongheaded:
We are not trying to reconstitute what madness itself might be, in the form in which it first
presented itself to some primitive, fundamental, deaf, scarcely articulated experience, and in the
form in which it was later organized (translated, deformed, travestied, perhaps even repressed) by
discourses, and the oblique, often twisted play of their operations….This is written against an
explicit theme of my book Madness and Civilization…[Nonetheless], such a history of the referent
is no doubt possible….609

This passage seems at odds with my thesis that Foucault’s methods vary depending on their
object, until we note the last sentence: “[Nonetheless], such a history of the referent is no doubt
possible…” The referent (the experience of madness) is not being denied. Foucault is merely
acknowledging that he is not concerned about it in The Archaeology of Knowledge.
606
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A History of the Experiences of Madness
The History of Madness chronicles a progressive objectification of Man.610 I will
explicate this process through three historical eras: the Renaissance, the Classical age, and the
Modern age. Along the way, I will highlight how this history is an exposition of an objectiveinternal form of domination. If the thesis is in fact true, then we should see changing
engagements with the same problematic objective-internal field, as well as efforts taken to
control it. Therefore, the expression ‘objective-internal form of domination’ implies an
ambiguity I would like to preserve between an objective-internal ‘problematic site’ (the objective
state of the ‘inner’ man where both virtue and mental health blur) as well as a form that
characterizes a kind of domination.
The Renaissance
What was the Renaissance experience of madness and in what way did those in this period
attempt to control it? Foucault notes that the Renaissance signaled an apparent cultural shift in
anxieties away from the ever-looming presence of Death towards Madness. However, in reality,
this was not a decisive break but instead “a new twist within the same preoccupation” with the
“nothingness of existence.” Madness is nothingness, like death, but a nothingness interior to life
rather than its “absolute limit,” a nothingness that could be “disarmed” through mockery,
allaying existential fears: “From the knowledge of that fatal necessity that reduces man to dust
we pass to a contemptuous contemplation of the nothingness that is life itself. The fear before
the absolute limit of death becomes interiorized in a continual process of ironization.”611
Therefore, Madness was viewed both as symbolic of an existential threat and as a means of
disempowering that threat through mockery. There was something about madness that, to the
I use ‘Man’ loosely, as Foucault has a specific use for the term in his later work, such as The Order of Things.
Foucault, The History of Madness 14.Italics mine.
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Renaissance mind of the Fifteenth century, foreshadowed the End Times, in which madness
would overrun the world.612
Of importance to our task is the objective dimension revealed by this interiorization. In other
words, Madness initially symbolizes not a subjective truth about an individual psyche but an
objective existential truth: the truth of Death that haunts all men, an immanent nothingness.
Furthermore, madness, as a facet of a greater Unreason, is conceived of as an internal threat
insofar as it threatens the very foundations of subjectivity: “Unreason, like death, is the
unsettling force that puts the subject into question.”613 This subjective threat is not in itself
subjective, given that it is not concerned with a subjective truth but the objective truth of
subjectivity: the very conditions of subjectivity are put into jeopardy. Therefore, identifying it
with the objective-internal locus seems appropriate.
But this experience of madness was not monolithically interpreted by Renaissance artists and
writers alike, but instead fractured along the fault lines of different forms of representation: the
Image and the Word. The former revealed a perverse fascination with madness while the latter
assumed a necessary connection and dialogue between Reason and Unreason (to which madness
belonged). In the Middle Ages, the Image transparently communicated moral and religious
lessons. But as time went on, such symbolism became more and more overburdened with
significations. For the Renaissance painters, such as Bosch, Brueghel, and Durer, the Image,
overburdened with these significations, no longer communicated clear moral or religious lessons,
but instead “began to gravitate around its own insanity.”614 The image, populated by grotesque
bestial forms, communicated both a perverse inversion of the natural order, where Animal
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triumphed over Man, as well as a secret, forbidden knowledge of man’s true nature, the world,
and its end, knowledge only the madman possessed.615 Foucault refers to this experience of
madness as ‘tragic.’
Often when Foucault talks about the process of domination that silenced madness, or when
he refers to how mental illness “is simply alienated madness, alienated in psychology,”616 it
sounds like he is referring to the occlusion of the tragic experience of madness. For example,
Foucault speaks of Sade, Goya, (and later, Nietzsche and Artaud) as if they are a long-forgotten
eruption of the tragic experience of madness once again surging forth after centuries of neglect,
something hidden but nonetheless always lurking:
In Sade, as in Goya, unreason still watches in its night; but through that watchfulness it connects with
younger powers. The non-being that it was becomes the power to destroy. Through Sade and Goya,
the Western world rediscovered the possibility of going beyond its reason with violence, and of
rediscovering tragic experience beyond the promises of dialectics. 617

Therefore, if madness is presented as an objective-internal ‘problem,’ then understanding how
this tragic experience was silenced is an important component to understanding objectiveinternal forms of domination.
How then was the tragic experience of madness silenced? As we will see, this process began
when the tragic experience was separated from the critical experience of madness, as was found
in the humanism of Erasmus.
Renaissance Literature: Erasmus and the Humanists
On the side of the Word, madness was conceived of in another way. There was already a
tradition dating at least as far back as the Thirteenth century that conceived of madness as Folly,
as merely one member of a family of vices. The Renaissance modified this tradition by elevating
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folly above the other vices: “Madness now has absolute privilege, and reigns over all the
negative aspects of the human character.”618 It is important to note how the Western tradition
pairs madness and vice together, since this theme will recur for centuries in different forms.
But for the Renaissance humanists, such as Erasmus, folly did not bear a resemblance to
the monstrous visage of madness populating Renaissance paintings: Rather, folly “controls
indirectly all the possible aspirations to good, the ambition that creates wise politicians, the greed
that causes wealth to grow, and the indiscreet curiosity that fires the research of philosophers and
men of science.”619 Nor did this light-hearted madness speak a forbidden knowledge, since,
rather than being a bearer of truth, madness was often the natural punishment plaguing those
intellectuals that sacrificed experience for abstruse theoretical speculations.620 For thinkers like
Erasmus, madness “was not about truth or the world, but rather about man and the truth about
himself that he can perceive.”621 The madness characteristic of folly was more likely to manifest
as delusions of grandeur, incited by self-love, since such delusions prompt us to mistake
ourselves for the opposite of what we are (a fool believes himself wise, an ugly man handsome,
etc).622 As long as folly was controlled and mastered and did not descend into such errors, it
could be a necessary, playful and carefree distraction in a difficult world.623
Tragic Experience vs Critical Consciousness
These two conceptions of madness, the tragic experience of the world and the critical
consciousness of man’s folly (‘moral reflection’) no longer constituted a unitary experience and
would only further diverge from one another as time passed, notably by the Sixteenth century:
“In short, the critical consciousness of madness was increasingly brought out into the light, while
618
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its more tragic components retreated ever further into the shadows, soon to almost vanish
entirely.”624 This antagonism persisted in many guises throughout the centuries, the tragic
experience only rupturing forth intermittently, its pitch like a maddening scream, reverberating in
its violence like a struck tuning fork or raw nerve, before fading back into silence and retreating
back into the darkness.
Foucault claims the submission of the tragic to the critical happened in a particular
sequence: First, madness and reason entered into a
…perpetually reversible relationship which implies that all madness has its own reason by which
it is judged and mastered, and all reason has its madness in which it finds its own derisory truth
Each was the measure of the other, and in this movement of reciprocal reference, each rejcts the
other but is logically dependent on it.”625

The reason of men, when compared to the reason of God, was like madness, since things in their
essence were always the opposite of how they appeared; life was really death, death life, beauty
ugliness, wealth poverty.626 Nonetheless, to discard earthly reason to approach God meant to
exchange one form of madness for another. As Nicholas of Cusa wrote, “When man abandons
the realm of the senses, his soul falls prey to a kind of dementia.”627 Furthermore, “if madness
can only exist in reference to some sort of reason, the whole truth of reason is to allow a form of
unreason to appear and to oppose it, only to disappear in turn in a madness that engulfs all.”628
But ultimately this reversible relationship became one-sided, as “Madness then became a
form of reason,”629 as is evident in the works of Montaigne and Pascal. A new division arises
between ‘mad madness’ (which “turns its back on the madness that properly belongs to reason”)
and ‘’wise madness’ (which acknowledges the rightful place of madness in reason).630 By
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accepting that madness was an inevitable part of the pursuit of reason, as is demonstrable from
how easily wise men can slip into it, madness was placated and disarmed.631 The stage was set
for a silencing of madness, an oppressive concealment that would last about 150 years.
The Ship of Fools
This experience of madness worked in tandem with a form of social control:
embarkment. During the Renaissance, it was common practice for the mad to be banished from
the city walls. Sometimes the Mad were left to wander the countryside, but on other occasions
they were passed off onto seafarers, who would transport them aboard their ships, sometimes to
possible holy sites of pilgrimage and miracles, sometimes to wherever was most convenient.
These ships were referred to as the Ships of Fools. Feminist scholar Lynne Huffer describes the
ship of fools as “neither an image of absolute freedom nor of absolute containment, the ship is a
figure of an agonistic struggle whose stakes are defined by reason’s grappling with its own limits
as unreason.”632 Insofar as Madness was recognized as an immanent nothingness within life, the
mode of domination that held it at bay was likely to reflect a similar ambiguous tension.
The Mad were prisoners of the outside, the watery beyond to which he was banished,
dwelled, and returned.633 Freedom became the very means of captivity that held immanent
nothingness at bay. In the Renaissance imagination, madness and water were intimately linked.
Thus while it is clear that there was a very concrete purpose served by banishing potential
troublemakers, there was also a likely spiritual element in play in which the forced embarking of
the mad acted as a gesture of purification. Perhaps in some way this watery banishment was
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meant to cure.634 By any means, a precedent of forced internment was set that would mutate into
a new kind of domination in the Classical age: Confinement.
The Classical Age (The Enlightenment Period)
The Renaissance had an ambivalent relationship with madness. As Foucault prefaces, “After
defusing its violence, the Renaissance had liberated the voice of madness. The Age of Reason,
in a strange takeover, was then to reduce it to silence.” The Classical age will, like Descartes
famously accomplishes in the Meditations on First Philosophy, make reason and madness
mutually exclusive. Descartes illustrates this clearly: Madness will no longer haunt reason
because “madness is precisely a condition of impossibility for thought…While man can still go
mad, thought, as the sovereign exercise carried out by a subject seeking the truth, can no longer
be devoid of reason.”635 For Foucault, Descartes’ exclusionary gesture is but the theoretical
manifestation of a radical shift taking place in the West’s experience of madness during the
Classical age. This shift will silence madness both by exiling it into the isolated cells of
confinement and by erasing its conceptual boundaries, blurring it with other forms of Unreason.
In this section, I will summarize what the practice of Confinement meant as well as the Classical
medical interpretation of madness. By doing so, I will demonstrate a mutation both in the
experience of madness and the objective-internal modes of domination that control it.
As we will see, these two distinct approaches to madness comprise two distinct domains of
madness unique to the Classical age. Foucault divides the possible domains of madness in
accordance with the permutations that can derive from combining four kinds of ‘consciousnesses
of madness’- the critical, the practical, the enunciatory, and the analytical. In the Classical age,
Confinement represented but one possible domain of madness (the unity of critical and practical
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forms of consciousness) while the enunciatory and analytical forms of consciousness of madness
were united in another domain more in line with what we today might be tempted to consider a
medical approach to madness.636 Confinement frames madness in opposition to “all that is
reasonable, ordered, and morally wise” (the critical) and then ceremonially partitions and
silences it by means of internment (the practical).637 The remaining domain of madness
attempted to recognize it (the enunciatory) and know it (the analytical).638 What essentially
characterizes the Classical age is the lack of dialogue between those practices which sought to
master “all that went against nature and [reduce] it to silence” (Confinement), “and a form of
knowledge that tried to decipher the truths of nature”639 (Theoretical knowledge). I will
explicate both, starting with Confinement and then moving onto Confinement’s medical brother.
The Domain of Confinement
Confinement in France originally started in Paris in 1656, with the establishing of the
first Hôpital Général,640 followed by the founding of Hôpital Générals in every city of France in
accordance with a royal edict issued on July 16th, 1676.641 Held in these houses of confinement
weren’t just criminals, but also the poor, the unemployed, the irreligious, the promiscuous,
libertines, and the insane.642 These inmates were provided for, but only at the expense of their
freedom. Despite housing the mad, these houses were not medical establishments, but rather, as
‘semi-judicial structures,’ were ‘administrative entities’ “granted powers to deliberate, judge and
pass sentence independently of other pre-existing authorities and court.” They were “an
instrument of order, of the new bourgeois and monarchical order that was beginning to take
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shape in the France of that time.”643 Similar institutions spread throughout Europe
contemporaneously,644 suggesting that a shared sensibility created them to solve a universal
problem menacing the West.
The moral regimen of the General Hospitals as well as all houses of confinement were
endemic of a new mode of objective-internal domination that worked in tandem with a new
experience of madness: What is virtuous character if not the objective, rational standard for the
inner man? And how else does the Age of Reason characterize Madness at this time than as
Unreason within? As vice? As falling short of the standards characteristic of Bourgeois society?
Of homo faber? Given that bourgeois society is founded upon two institutions – Industry and
Family – we might expect that the new objective-internal mode of domination would force the
conformity of character to these norms, or at minimum, confine those who cannot do so. That is
in fact what history reveals to have happened in the West at this time.
Madness and Bourgeois Standards of Industry
Houses of Confinement, as was noted, confined a myriad of social types that, to us, seem
unrelated. Part of understanding the organizing principle that effected this unity concerns a
change in attitude towards poverty:
This complex unity brings together a new sensibility to poverty and the duty to relieve it, new forms of
reaction to the economic problems of unemployment and idleness, a new work ethic, and the dream of
a city where moral obligations go hand in hand with civic duties, all held together by the authoritarian
forms of constraint.645

This move was only possible due to a shift from the Medieval attitude, which afforded poverty a
spiritual significance, to a Classical attitude, that viewed it as a social ill the State was
commissioned to addressed. Since the mad, in Medieval times, were considered sacred only in
conjunction with the valorization of poverty and the obligatory charity owed to the poor, a
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change in attitude towards poverty was ultimately mirrored in the change of attitude towards
madness.646 The duty of charity once levied on the individual, wary that the neglected beggar
was Christ in disguise, was now placed on the shoulders of the state, since as of “the creation of
the General Hospital and the charitable bureau, God no longer appeared in a poor man’s rags.”647
Instead, the mad, like the poor, were considered instigators of social disorder due to their
idleness,648 a festering population of beggars that congested the streets in times of economic
decline that needed to be hidden away, provided for, and put to work.
Within the newfound work ethic that characterized the Classical age lies one of the vital
functions houses of confinement were meant to serve: “In times of high wages and full
employment, they provided a low-cost workforce, while in a slump they absorbed the
unemployed, and protected society against unrest and riots.”649 Ultimately though, houses of
confinement failed to be the instruments of economic correction they were meant to be and were
abandoned in the early nineteenth century, since the cheap labor they employed merely created
unemployment elsewhere and “any effect on prices was at best artificial, the cost of the products
manufactured being out of proportion to that of production when the cost of confinement was
included.”650
But houses of confinement were not merely institutions of socio-economic utility since work
itself was valorized as a kind of moral cure for laziness. The obligation to work was “a moral
ascesis, a punishment, and the sign of a certain disposition of the heart.”651 To lack it and fall idle
was an act of rebellion against God, since the Fall of man condemned man to labor and toil for
his subsistence. An idle man foolishly presumed himself exempt from this inherited curse and
646

Ibid 61.
Ibid 60.
648
Ibid 62.
649
Ibid 66.
650
Ibid 68-67.
651
Ibid 73.
647

193

instead expected God to provide for him. For those in the Seventeenth century, sloth was the
worst of sins, spurring on all other vices, and causing general social discord.652 It was in this
respect that the General Hospital was “a moral institution destined to punish and castigate a
certain ‘void’ of conscience, which was not serious enough to be brought before a human court,
but which the severity of penance alone was insufficient to correct.”653 The constraints and
repressions of Confinement, viewed as moral treatments, would carry over into the Modern age,
shaping the therapeutic care the mad would receive once isolated into asylums.654 The
Reformers would time and again return to the curative powers of labor.
Madness and Bourgeois Standards of Family
Nonetheless, Confinement did more than banish those who could not contribute
economically. Confinement meant to banish Unreason in its various forms, forms that took on
the status of character types defined by their deviance from a social norm,655 in order to mitigate
scandal in bourgeois society. Scandal possessed a dangerous power to dishonor entire families,
to inspire imitation,656 so those social types of unreason that provoked it had to be excluded from
society. These social types…
…can be summed up by saying that they all touch either on sexuality and its organization of the
bourgeois family, or on profanation in relation to the new conception of the sacred and of religious
rituals, or on libertinage, i.e. the new relations that were beginning to emerge between free thinking
and the system of the passions. Together with madness, these three domains of experience form a
homogenous world in the space of confinement where the meaning of mental alienation as we know it
today was born.657

The net cast by Confinement was wide, including the venereal, the debauched, the dissolute,
blasphemers, homosexuals, alchemists, libertines, suicides, the poor, and the mad.658 Although
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distinct to our eyes, Foucault suggests that, to the Classical eye, they may have been united by ‘a
common experience of unreason’ lost to us once the practice of Confinement ceased and only the
mad were left.659 Here, in confinement, there were only the ‘frenzied,’ those who led a
disordered life that may have bordered on but never crossed the juridical line into criminality. 660
It is important to note how Confinement conflated madness and sexuality, since it was this
association that carried over into psychoanalytic interpretations of mental illness.661 Sexuality
acts as a third term between Madness and Family.
In an important sense, confinement and the whole police structure that surrounded it served to control a
certain order in family structures, which was at once a social regulator and a norm of reason. Family
and its requirements became one of the essential criteria of reason, and it was above all in its name that
confinement was demanded and obtained. The whole era bears witness to the great confiscation of
sexual ethics by family morality…The institution of the family traced a circle of reason, and outside it
lurked all the perils of insanity, where man might fall prey to unreason in all its fury.662

Confinement “banded together a whole group of blameworthy behaviors, creating a halo of guilt
around madness.”663 Through this conflation of madness, morally-condemned forms of
sexuality, and family crises, the stage was later set for psychoanalysis to assume madness to be
underpinned by guilt, libido, and family dysfunction. But everything it was to discover had been
placed there by the practice of Confinement in the Classical age.664
In the same vein, the contours of modern day madness were defined by the other
disparate ‘unreasonable’ social types consigned to exile as well. For example, the rituals of
today’s obsessional echo the rituals of the condemned magician; the ‘morbid desire to profane’
(also evident in obsessional behavior) echoes the profanities of the condemned heretic and
libertine.665 The asylums of the Modern age that house the mad still ring with the echoes of their
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former non-mad inhabitants. For Foucault, such historical echoes or repetitions indicate “the
dark memory that accompanies madness.”666 Confinement acted as a synthesizer of these
disparate elements, producing a novel experience of madness. It accomplished this, in large part,
by divesting those elements of sacred significations (some significations of which would have
led many of these social types to burn at the stake) and instead reinvesting them with moral
significations that warranted exclusion and civil correction in houses of confinement.
Madness as we experience it today thus still bears the traces of Confinement’s hidden
alchemy, transmuting disparate elements into a unified experience taken to be natural. But rather
than being a mere historical accident, is it not more plausible to conclude that objective-internal
forms of domination operate in this way: that they synthesize disparate elements into a unity and
then conceal their very synthetic operation behind the façade of nature? And is not ‘nature’ in
this case an oblique moral judgment? Does this process not attempt to legitimize domination?
Certainly history seems to corroborate such a suspicion, and in the realm of sexuality, Foucault
later explores quite a few examples (normative natural sexual identities to be shaped vs abnormal
unnatural sexual identities to be regulated). Paradoxically, it is by means of naturalizing this
composite that it could be marked as deviant.
As a point of criticism, one has to wonder if symptoms of various mental illnesses really
did emerge in such a manner. Did the religious and sexual obsessions and compulsions of
Freud’s Rat Man really present themselves as they did in a symptomatic unity (Obsessional
neurosis) because a century or so beforehand Houses of Confinement grouped together
magicians, heretics, and libertines? Why not a synthesis of heresy and poverty? Without
explaining why one collection of condemned practices was synthesized into a symptom complex
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(or disorder) rather than others, Foucault can only suggest a possible connection. Rather than
prove a connection, Foucault merely tempts us with the intriguing possibility of one.
Madness, Animality, and Absolute Freedom
Confinement, as a form of civil correction had one aim: moral conversion.667 In order to
understand this treatment, we must understand how the mad were perceived, a manner divorced
from the medical models we are accustomed to now. Foucault contrasts two experiences of
madness that characterize the Classical age: madness according to the law and madness
according to the world of confinement. “For men of the law, madness essentially attacked the
faculty of reason, and altered the will, thus making it innocent…By contrast, in the world of
confinement, it mattered little if the faculty of reason had been affected or not.”668 Of primary
importance for the confinement experience was the quality of the will itself.669
The experience of madness found in Confinement, on the surface, seems to lack
definition, but nonetheless there is a coherent perception and understanding that underpins it. At
its worst, Confinement presented the mad not as humans but as animals, which accounted for
why they were often bound and chained to the walls and bed, or kept in small quarters.670
Foucault recounts how in even one hospital at Bethnal Green, one woman was “kept in a pigsty,
her legs and arms bound, whenever she began to rave.”671
The violence of these practices demonstrates quite clearly that they were not governed by a
consciousness of the need to punish, or by the duty to correct behavior. The notion of
resipiscence672 is quite foreign to the whole system. What haunts the hospices is an image of
bestiality. Madness here took its face from the mask of the beast. The men chained to the walls of
the cells were not seen as people who had lost their reason, but as beasts filled with snarling,
natural rage, as though madness at its furthest point was liberated from the moral unreason where
its milder forms languished, and was revealed in all its immediate, animal violence. That model of
667
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animality slowly came to dominate the asylums, and explained their cage-like, menagerie
aspects.673

The paradox of this condition that chaffs the most with modern sensibilities of mental illness is
that within the Classical imagination not only was madness not considered an illness, it was
readily evident that a madman was immune to sickness. “The mad were protected by their
animality from all that was fragile, precarious and delicate in man.”674 It was accepted as fact
based on observation that the mad seemed indifferent to the elements and could endure
horrendous living conditions (which was convenient, granted how atrocious their living
conditions actually were). “It was common currency until the late eighteenth century that the
mad could put up indefinitely with the miseries of existence. Hence there was no need to protect
them, cover them or even provide warmth for them.”675
Because the mad were not ill, there was no reason to medically treat or correct them
when they were most captivated and swept up in the maelstrom of madness.676 Instead,
“unchained bestiality could only be tamed or trained.”677 Madness was a form of radical,
unpredictable liberty, a “counter-natural violence of the animal world,” or ‘negativity’ that
threatened the natural order.678 “Madness was not a mechanism, but a freedom to roam among
the monstrous forms of animality.”679 Unreason, of which madness was but one manifestation,
was the ever-present danger of absolute liberty and error, and had to be kept in check.680
Madness was accorded a unique status in the realm of Unreason since it synthesized its two
extremes. Madness stood…
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…between moral failing, the relative choice, the faltering will, and animal rage, freedom chained
to frenzy and the initial, absolute fall; the bank of clear, liberty and the opposite bank of dark,
freedom. Madness summed up the whole of unreason in a single point – the guilt of day and the
innocence of the night.681

And while the treatment of confinement removed the stain of scandal from madness by
acknowledging that all humanity had been lost to bestiality,682 freedom from its confines would
never be granted to such unfortunate souls, whose collective fates for 150 years would be as dark
as the cells they were forced to inhabit. Thus Classical objective-internal forms of domination
‘tamed’ the mad for the sake of controlling the absolute freedom they embodied.
The Medical Experience of Madness
Nonetheless, there was another way in which madness was conceived in the Classical
Age: medically. As noted, houses of confinement were institutions of exclusion, rather than
providers of medical treatment. Foucault characterizes the Classical Age as fundamentally
divided between critical and practical consciousness’ of madness, which found unity in the
practice of Confinement, and enunciatory and analytical consciousness’ of madness, which
found unity in the medical practices of taxonomy.683 This division must be considered
constitutive of the Classical mode of objective-internal domination. A unity of disparate
elements, such as the venereal, the debauched, the dissolute, blasphemers, homosexuals,
alchemists, libertines, suicides, the poor, and the mad could not be effected on the basis of a
medical engagement with madness. Only after this unity had been effected could such medical
disciplines as psychoanalysis ‘discover’ it. As Paolo Savoia notes, “Secret kinships between the
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mad and all kinds of social, moral, political, and sexual deviants percolated, and these will
become the object of the positive style of thinking about madness in the nineteenth century.”684
Classical medicine did not discover such a hodgepodge entity under its microscope, but
instead sought to derive “abstract classifications, trying to mold itself according to the
taxonomies of natural history”685 (classifications that fit into the so-called ‘Garden of Species’).
These classifications were not deployed in the houses of confinement, which instead classified
the denizens of Unreason in accordance with their own experiences of it. Medical engagement
with madness at this time seems minimal and certainly did not resemble the aggressive
psychiatric treatments of the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries. Despite this, I will mention
this perspective to highlight both continuities and discontinuities between the Classical
experience of madness, which conceived of treatment as inducing changes in both body and soul,
and the Modern experience of madness, which often employed similar techniques employed by
Classical physicians but for different purposes (a moral conversion of the patient through
psychological procedures, such as punishment and reward).686 In other words, I will highlight
the Classical medical perspective on Madness in order to elucidate the medical tenor of the
Modern objective-internal form of domination, a tenor that seems to inherit the moral undertones
of Confinement.
Some Classical thinkers, such as Bayle and Fontenelle, seemed to maintain a continuity
with Renaissance thought and understood madness to be a natural instrument in the service of
reason: “The madness of love is necessary for the preservation of the species, the delirium of
ambition is required for the good order of political bodies, and insane greed is necessary for
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wealth to be created.”687 Nonetheless, Foucault notes that even amongst such thinkers, a shift
had taken place. No longer were the signs of madness readily known, even though who qualified
as mad and who didn’t was immediately perceptible to the reasonable. The essence of madness
went out of focus just as the madman came into focus thanks to the implicit rationality of
perception which immediately recognized the madman not in his positivity but merely as nonrational, as Other.688 One can see how this shift lent itself to an explosion of types
conceptualized and then organized in relation to one another.
The unity of the enunciatory and analytical consciousness’ of madness produced a
classification system (‘the Garden of Species’) that both demarcated the immediately perceived
difference between madness and reason (the enunciatory) as well as attempted to differentiate
each form of madness in accordance with its positivity and structural placement on a table (the
analytical).689 Such taxonomical projects were initiated by such thinkers as Plater (1609),
Johnston (1644), Sauvages (1763), Linnaeus (1763), and Weickhard (1790). In this, Foucault
anticipates his later characterization of the Classical episteme as one of Representation and the
Table.
Ultimately, however, these classifications merely recapitulated “a gallery of ‘moral
portraits.’”690 Any attempt by the Classical thinkers to classify the most specific forms of
madness inevitably described specific vices instead. For example, when Thomas Arnold
attempted to derive all the species of ‘pathetic madness’, he invariably included in his
classifications such vices as ‘avaricious’ and ‘arrogant.’691 This curious development highlights
Foucault’s point that despite the lack of direct communication between the discourse of
687
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Confinement and the discourse of Theory, parallels consistently cropped up because both were
confronting a ‘moral experience of unreason.’692
Despite our Cartesian temptations to assume that mind-body dualism is insurmountable,
or at least problematic, the Classical physician assumed the unity of body and soul. In this spirit,
madness was often referred to as a “disease of the organs of the brain” or head.693 Only after we
acknowledge the blurring of mind and body in the Classical imagination will their theories
involving the remote and immediate causes of madness make sense. And, as noted, it is upon
this basis that treatments were prescribed that were later adopted by Nineteenth century
psychiatrists for differing purposes.
An immediate cause is the internal dynamic of ‘neural’ parts that produce visible
symptoms. The parallel between visible qualities attributed to a given mental disorder and the
actual internal cause easily translate into each other. For example, mania’s “lively, unpredictable
and ardent qualities” may be paralleled by underlying vigorous animal spirits that, due to their
force and acidity, produce the wild associations of ideas and hyperactivity.694 Remote causes
were considered external (or ‘environmental’) influences, often perceived as antecedent to
madness, such as a sudden draft, unrequited love, or an over-stimulating theatrical
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performance.695 Here we see a developing conception of the human organism’s vulnerability to
a surrounding milieu,696 which in the Nineteenth would figure so importantly not only in a
conception of madness but also criminality, as we will see when we discuss criminality in
Discipline and Punish.
For many Classical physicians, the essential cause of madness was passion. Passion was
privileged, in part, because “passion was always the interface between the body and soul, the
point of contact between their activity and their passivity.”697 Passion’s conceived role in
madness changed over the course of the Classical age. Early theories based on the humors
considered the reciprocal relationship certain passions had with specific humors. A passion,
such as anger could agitate bile, which in turn would upset the body. Bile would then proliferate,
inciting more anger. A positive feedback loop would result.698 Eventually humor theories were
replaced by theories based on how passions incited not humors but ‘animal spirits’ whose
movements within the body and influences upon the soul were supposed to produce a parallel
transcription in both, resulting in a mental fixation upon the object of passion transcribed in the
soul.699 Once again, passions create an internal state that reinforces its own expression until
those passions can no longer be controlled. But ultimately, Eighteenth century medicine will
conceive of passion not as a mere remote cause at all, but instead as the ‘general condition of
possibility’ for madness itself.700
Tension and relaxation, hardness and softness, rigidity and rest, and swelling and desiccation are
all qualitative states of the mind as well as of the body, and ultimately refer to an indistinct and
mixed situation regarding the passions, imposing its common forms on the flow of ideas and
feelings, the state of the nerve fibers and the circulation of the fluids.701
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It is not a question of a physical state prompting a mental illness, for example, since this would
neglect the unity between body and soul that passion presupposes.702 As Whytt contends, a
strong emotion can simultaneously do physical violence to nervous fibers as well as ‘shock the
soul,’ leading to madness and sometimes even death. In this case, madness does not properly
start until the system is overloaded by its own excesses and becomes immobilized.703
Madness partakes of the necessity of passion and at the same time of the anarchy that passion
brings, which although triggered by passion moves far beyond it, and goes so far as to challenge
all that passion supposes. It culminates by being a movement of the nerves and muscles of such
violence that nothing in the course of images, ideas, or will seems to correspond to it any
longer.704

Mental illnesses are simultaneously disturbances of the brain and disturbances of the soul. 705
Nonetheless, the very unity that gives passion its lease on the body and the soul enables its
dissolution in a fit of madness.
But what exactly is this rupture effected by the passions? It is the dissolution of the
totality of the body and soul, but not a severing of one from the other. If one were to imagine a
pie, with the crust representing the body and the filling the soul, and one were then to imagine a
slice of it cut from the rest, we would see that the unity of the pie has been compromised but the
unity of crust and filling remains intact in both the removed slice and the remaining pie.
Likewise when the unity of the self is shattered into fragments, the unity of body and soul
remains intact. The self, now divided from itself, is alienated it not only from itself but from
reality.
Amidst this fragmentation and alienation occasioned by the passions, the imagination
now plays its essential role in madness’s gestation. Madness was conceived of as “a
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derangement of the imagination.”706 Madness is essentially bound to the image, although it is not
solely contained within it. Dreams and misperceptions are experienced by even the most
reasonable of people and insofar as they are considered as mere images (or appearances), no
error is contained within them. Madness begins when a truth-value is assigned to a unreal image,
which is, in effect, an error. Taking the unreal image to be real, the madman then reasons based
on that belief. 707 Thus madness is reason in the service of error.
A man who imagines that he is made of glass is not mad, for any sleeper might have that image in a
dream. But he is mad if, thinking that he is made of glass, he concludes that he is fragile and in
danger of breaking, and that therefore he should avoid contact with hard surfaces, remain immobile,
and so forth.708

Beneath the surface phenomena of madness exists a logically consistent discourse masquerading
as reason: a delirious discourse.709 “Madness, in the classical sense, does not designate a certain
change in the mind or the body, but the existence of a delirious discourse that underlies the
alternations of the body and the strangeness in behavior and speech.”710 In the end, madness and
all the passions and images associated with its eruption all orbit around this delirious discourse.
Discourse is what “liberated passion from its limits, and clung to the liberated image with the
constraining weight of its affirmation.”711 We can thus see how Reason is inserted into the heart
of Unreason and how dreams were similar but not identical to the experience of madness.712
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As we have seen, madness requires more than an anarchical freedom of the image; it also
requires error.713 As Sauvages says, “…it is that constant error of the soul that is manifested in
its imagination, in its judgments and desires that constitutes the character of this class.”714 The
kind of error, or ‘access to the truth’ that is problematized, is often viewed as the principle that
differentiates the various categories of madness.715 The ‘void of error’ is then filled with
fantastical images which are then logically connected and affirmed as real.716 Madness is the
nothingness that manifests its nothingness through the mask of reason.717 It is a manifestation of
non-being itself.718 “Blindness is perhaps one of the words that get closest to the essence of
classical madness…reason dazzled.”719
The Classical imagination experienced madness as unreason, which was nothing more
than the ‘negativity of reason,’ which was ‘nothing at all.’720 Ultimately, all mental disorders
existed on a continuum, with Unreason on one end and Reason on the other: dementia,
melancholy and mania, and finally hysteria and hypochondria, respectively (just as there are
degrees between non-being and full being).721 Foucault notes, quite startlingly, how the purpose
of Confinement was ultimately an acknowledgement of the very conclusions Classical medicine
independently derived: “return nothingness to nothingness.”722 Guards who noted in
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Confinement registers the desire for the madman’s death were not cruel per se but merely
responding as one would who conceived of madness as nothingness.723 This characterization
should be considered a condition for the Classical mode of objective-internal domination
(Confinement), its justification.
But by the second half of the Eighteenth century, the experience of madness was about to
change. Partly due to the eventual incorporation of hysteria and hypochondria under the
classification of madness, a new moral interpretation of madness began to arise which conceived
of madness as a consequence of civilized lifestyles at odds with nature.724
This incorporation…
…gave this madness a whole content of guilt, moral sanction, and just punishment that was in no way
part of the classical experience. It weighed down unreason with all these new values, and instead of
making blindness the condition of possibility of all these manifestations of madness, it described them
as the psychological effect of a moral fault. And it thereby compromised all that was essential in the
experience of unreason. What had been blindness was to become unconsciousness, what had been
error became fault, and all that which pointed in madness to the paradoxical manifestation of nonbeing became the natural punishment of a moral wrong. In short, the vertical hierarchy that constituted
the structure of classical madness, from the cycle of material causes to the transcendence of delirium,
was toppled over and spread on the surface of a domain first simply occupied and soon disputed by
psychology and morality. The ‘scientific psychiatry’ of the nineteenth century had become possible. 725

We must consider the ‘moral’ mutation that led to psychology one of Foucault’s most important
insights into how the Modern mode of objective-internal domination operates. But before the
moral dimension of psychological treatment can be understood, we must contrast it with the
medical treatment of the Classical age.
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Medical Treatments
The story of the transition from the Classical age to the Modern age is largely one of how
Confinement in general hospitals was transformed into controlled medical treatment in asylums.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon us to trace out both how the moral ‘treatment’ of Confinement
became explicitly medical as well as how psychiatric and psychological therapies have a hidden
moral underbelly inherited from the Classical era. Treatments at this time did not distinguish
between mind and body, so they are not psychological treatments. Cures for madness
developing around the time shared several themes. The last two techniques – immersion and
mobility - were to be reinterpreted and reused during the Modern age. The focus will lie mostly
on them.
First, there was a presumption that madness was due to a secret weakness of some sort in
the animal spirits or the fibers. A proper cure would strengthen these weakened spirits or fibers,
restoring them to a natural vitality and stability.726 Iron, for example, was often administered,
since it possessed the paradoxical, yet therapeutically reinforcing qualities of strength and
pliability. Proper administration of iron could transfer those qualities onto the animal spirits or
fibers. The crudest form of iron treatment involved the consumption of iron filings.727
Second, a cure should purify the body of those harmful elements, such as humors,
responsible for illness. Some cures attempted to make openings in the body as an exit for
congesting elements, like black vapors. Infecting patients with scabies was also thought to draw
the maddening corruption out from within the body and towards its surface.728 Other cures tried
to dissolve the problem from within the body. It was thought that various fermentations of
vapors propagated madness and needed to be dissolved. Bitter liquids, like coffee, were believed
726

Ibid 307-308.
Ibid 308-309.
728
Ibid 310-311.
727

208

to help purge these harmful fermentations.729 Administering soap was also believed to aid in
purification since its normal hygienic function was already a form of purification.730
Third, immersion was also a technique used to cure madness, since contained in this
notion is one of both cleansing and ‘impregnation.’731 “From the end of the seventeenth century
onwards, the cure by baths was, or was once more, the most common form of treatment for
insanity.”732 Naturally, immersion in water was the most common form of this treatment since
water itself possessed qualities of purity and purification.733 Here the reader would not be
mistaken to read connotations of baptism into this practice, as such ritualistic practices involving
water further cemented in the Classical mind water’s purifying qualities. Water of various
temperatures was said to effect different changes in the body. Typically disorders thought to be
caused by excessive heat in the body, like mania and frenzy, were treated with cold baths.734
Cold baths were also thought to constrict the body, fortifying it against an internal softening
characteristic of too much moisture (which would lead to feminization).735 Nonetheless, water
had such an over-abundance of supposed qualities, sometimes so much at odds as to suggest
contrary treatments, that its use in this manner waned by the end of the Eighteenth century.736 In
its place, immersion in cold water by shower or bath would be used by modern doctors, such as
Pinel, but whereas such immersions in the Classical mind aimed at effecting a physiological
change based on trying to reestablish a connection between the patient and the truth of the world,
the Nineteenth century was more interested in how the violence of sudden water exposure could
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purify737 and correct by means of punishment. “The cure no longer revolved around a core idea
of truth, but was dominated by the idea of a behavioral norm instead,” a realigning of the
organism with ‘its own nature.’738
Finally, mobility was considered a treatment for madness, since madness was thought of
as caused by the immobility and weakness of various animal spirits, fibers, and humors.739 “The
idea behind this particular therapeutic theme was the restoration of a movement of harmony with
the well-ordered mobility of the outside world.”740 Travel was privileged. Travel by sea
provided the patient with exposure to natural motion (a theme that hearkens back to the
Renaissance Ship of Fools), while travel by land could stimulate the mad in a healthy way by
engaging their attentions in the immediate world and away from their own internal delusions or
obsessions.741 “The subject is to be restored to his initial purity, torn away from his pure
subjectivity, and reinserted in the world; the non-being that alienates him from himself is to be
destroyed, that he might be opened again to the plenitude of the world and the solid truth of
being.”742 Later, modern techniques would employ the use of motion, such as by strapping
patients into rotatory machines, with the intended purpose of bringing “about a number of
internal changes of a purely mechanical and psychological variety.”743 With the notion of
reconnecting the patient with the truth of the world lost, there would no longer be any need for
the motion to be situated in a beautiful landscape, on the water, or anywhere in nature.
The transition between Classical and Modern experiences of madness would require the
disintegration of the unity of body and soul that Classical medicine assumed, as well as a
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recognition of the differences between physical medicine and ‘moral’ treatments.744 Few places
illustrate these contrasts better than the way Classical and Modern physicians employed the
passions to effect change in the patient. Fear, for the Classical physician, was thought to both
overcome the anger of the frenzied and to reduce the erratic movements of overly-energetic
fibers.745 But for the modern, fear was a punishment whose usefulness was borne by its
psychological or moral significance. This conversion of affects only occurred after the patient
was reconceived of as a morally responsible subject who must accept his guilt, which took place
in the Nineteenth century.746 “A purely psychological medicine was only made possible when
madness was alienated into guilt.”747
Transition to the Modern Age
Milieus
The mid-Eighteenth century signaled the beginning of the end for the Classical age.
Almost overnight the houses of confinement, once thought to adequately contain and silence
Unreason, became viewed as ground zero for a spreading contagion in Paris in 1780, spurring on
a public outcry and a medical investigation of the Hospital.748 Foucault refers to this moment as
“the first agent of synthesis between the world of unreason and the medical universe.”749
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soon to spread throughout the cities.” Ibid 355. In the Classical imagination, the evil harbored within the walls of the
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In 1780, an epidemic spread through Paris, and its origin was attributed to an infection at the Hôpital Général, and there
was even talk of going to burn the buildings at Bicetre. Faced with panic among the populace, the Lieutenant of Police
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And while a ‘putrid fever’ was found to be there because of poor air quality and poor sanitary conditions,
authorities assured the public that the Hospital was not the source of the epidemic. And while the original
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‘The Great Fear’ indicated that the experiences of unreason and madness were changing.
Perhaps inspired by Rousseau and a new focus on ‘nervous disorders,’ a new historical
awareness began to flower: with the passage of generations and the flourishing of civilization,
we were growing ever-more alienated from nature and, as a just consequence, were now more
and more frequently afflicted with madness.750 Unreason and madness were starting to separate,
the former taking on the status of the untimely and the latter the status of the timely historical
degeneration of humanity.751
Slowly the great cosmic forces responsible for madness started to become broken down
into what the Nineteenth century would call ‘milieus.’752 Non-natural milieus produced madness
in their inhabitants. Milieus characterized by excess of political freedom and economic
prosperity, as well as religious milieus were notable environments for stoking the fires of
madness.753 In a move reminiscent of Rousseau as well as the Renaissance position on the
connection between abstract study and madness, even civilization itself was considered a milieu
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wrought with potential dangers. For example, erudition could slip into manic study, ‘abstract
speculations,’ ‘perpetual agitation of the spirit,’ and inactivity of the body.754 Sciences that deal
with the immediate perceptual world are less likely to compromise the brain in a way that could
lead to madness.755 Complex, abstract thinking presents “the soul with a form of exercise that
fatigues the inner sense on account of the over-lengthy strain placed upon the brain.”756 Thus,
the argument is not necessarily that erudite studies, characteristic of civilization, deal with unreal
things as much as they overtax the brain. Civilization also removed us from the sphere of natural
influences since it also produced numerous ‘milieus for the perversion of sensibility.’757 For
example, people no longer had to go to bed with the onset of night, nor awaken with the rising
sun, but instead obeyed the timetables set by society. The theater and novels also stirred the
passions, while the latter did so ever more intensely by conjuring fantastical worlds detached
from the immediate and sensible.758
A great change was taking place. Madness and Unreason, which had once been blurred
together, were now to separate.759
In the landscape of unreason where it had been placed by the seventeenth century, madness
concealed a meaning and origin that were obscurely moral; its secret likened it to sin, and the
imminent animality perceived in it paradoxically did nothing to make it more innocent. In the
second half of the eighteenth century, it was no longer recognized in all that brought men close to
their timeless fall, or to their indefinitely present animality. It was situated instead in the distance
that men took from themselves, from their world, and from all that was offered to them in the
immediacy of nature.760

The milieu, conceived of as the negativity of nature’s withdrawal, was an artificial environment
filled with artificial values and practices that induced madness.761 By the end of the Eighteenth
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century, the madman was seen as one who lost his truth rather than the Truth.762 Moreover, an
inversion took place that no longer saw animality as the counter-natural source of madness
hidden within, but instead saw animality as “the tranquility and happiness to be found in
nature.”763 Furthermore, “the animal could not be mad, or at least it was not in its animality that
its madness could originate.”764 Now that the historical process of civilization rather than an
untimely animality was considered the cause of madness, the stage was set for the Nineteenth
century’s obsession with ‘degeneration.’765
Nonetheless, over the course of the Nineteenth century, madness’ connection with history
would be severed: “Madness was no longer conceived of as the counterpart of history, but as the
hidden face of society.”766 Morel, for example, reversed the relationship between affluence and
madness, and argued that madness was a possible effect of poverty. For him, madness was an
‘obstacle’ to the ‘normal flow’ of human history, not necessarily a product of its development.767
Madness “became the stigma of a class that had abandoned the forms of bourgeois ethics…The
medical and psychological concept of insanity was severed from history to become instead a
moral criticism in the name of the compromised salvation of the species.”768
Institutional Transitions
By the mid-Eighteenth century, asylums exclusively designed for the insane began to
appear.769 These initial movements towards separating the mad from the other inmates of
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unreason had nothing to do with humanitarian efforts770 but would eventually lay the
groundwork for those humanitarian efforts.
Over the course of the Eighteenth century, Unreason began to lose its nuances.
Eventually only two categories remained: the mad and the libertine.771 “Unreason, increasingly,
was just a power of fascination, while madness became an established object of perception”
becoming increasingly differentiated in the registries in houses of confinement.772 The most
essential division made within the community of the mad involved danger: was the madman a
danger to others, to himself, or benign?773 Subsequent to this, another distinction was drawn
between ‘the alienated’ and ‘the insane.’ The alienated was someone most lost to madness; he
was “a man who had entirely lost truth” and had surrendered to his illusions.774 The insane man,
on the other hand, “was not entirely a stranger to the world of reason, but demonstrated instead
something like reason perverted.”775 The alienated and the insane were distinguished on an axis
of nonsense and sense.776 Foucault refers to the new perception that produced these new
categories as ‘the asylum perception of madness.’777 As we previously noted, the categories
derived from this new perception and the more theoretical ‘analytics’ of physicians, for a time,
belonged to their own worlds and resisted one another.778 For Foucault, it was in the former
perception that madness found its own voice. He describes this as a ‘tear’ in the experience of
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madness, “a rent between madness considered by our science as mental illness, and all that it can
give of itself in the space in which it has been alienated by our culture.”779
But what initially enabled the mad to become seen, the separation of the mad from the
rest of the inmates of unreason, was unexpectedly instigated not by calls on behalf of the mad,
but for those housed beside them, originally from the non-mad confined themselves.780 Houses
of confinement, haunted by madness, came to be seen as symbols of despotism, as places where
the establishment sent those it sought to silence.781 A call arose to remove all but the criminal
and the insane,782 cementing the presumption that confinement and madness mutually implied
each other.783
After 1770, Confinement was on the decline.784 Already Confinement had been
challenged, which made various external social and economic complications all the more
devastating. A series of economic disasters, notably in France and England, demonstrated that
Confinement could not curb massive unemployment and out of control prices.785 Unemployment
in the countryside, largely due to the confiscation of common lands, undermined the common
opinion that unemployment was an urban problem caused by indolence.786 Furthermore, the
shift from a mercantilist economy to an industrial capitalist economy caused a shift in how
poverty was interpreted and valued, dispelling the motives for confining the poor.787 The poor
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were viewed as a necessary part of a healthy economy and needed to be reincorporated into the
workforce.788 That was but one of many reforms that started to empty the houses of
confinement; unreason (libertines), poverty, and eventually criminality were expunged from the
orbit of confinement, leaving only the mad to occupy its space.789
What disappeared in the course of the eighteenth century was not the inhumane rigor with which
the mad were treated, but the obviousness of confinement, the global unity into which the mad had
been unquestioningly subsumed, and he countless threads that locked them into the unbroken
weave of unreason.790

In the transitional period around the time of the Revolution, the mad began to become
objects of pity requiring assistance.791 Medical treatment, which had previously been conducted
in an external structure before confinement was deemed necessary, now became incorporated
into the same structure, although the process was slow.792 Asylums could not be considered
medical (or modern) until the act of confinement was considered a medical measure, a process
begun in a nascent form by Tenon and Cabanis. Tenons, for example, argued that confinement,
while still a form of imprisonment, could still be a setting that allowed the mad to express their
madness in a harmless way.
What now appeared was the idea that there could be in a madman a more gentle form of animality,
which did not destroy its human truth in violence, but allowed instead one of nature’s secrets to
emerge: the rediscovery of the familiar but forgotten resemblance with tame animals and
children.793

To Tenons, the animal rage associated with the mad was largely due to ‘constant oppression,’ so
an attenuated form of liberty could be therapeutic.794 Constraint pushed the mad further within
their own imaginary worlds, while freedom allowed them to constantly confront reality.795
bolster national wealth. It was therefore a mistake to confine the poor, especially since there was a fear that
supporting them only increased the rate of poverty. Ibid 405-407.
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Confined freedom cured of its own accord, just as liberated language was soon to do for
psychoanalysis, but in a movement that was its exact opposite: not by allowing fantasy to take
shape in language and use it as a medium of exchange, but by forcing it instead to disappear when
confronted with the insistent and heavily real silence of things. 796

Thus, through a paradox, the mad could be most free only when confined and best cured when
left to their own devices. Society, in turn, was still protected from them.797
Where once the mad were viewed as guilty of indulging in the most absolute bestial
liberty, now they were seen as fundamentally unfree and unresponsible for their actions. “The
disappearance of liberty, once a consequence of madness, now became its foundation, secret and
essence.”798 The madness within each individual was to be investigated and adjustments to his
liberty and treatment were to be made accordingly.799 Those who watched over the mad and
made these observations were free of the influences of either families or even the prejudices of
medicine. It was in the spirit of this kind of observation that the ‘asylum journal’ was
invented.800 “Madness was no longer to be inscribed in the negativity of existence, as one of its
most brutal figures, but now progressively took its place in the positivity of known things.”801
This fall into objectivity was a far more effective means of mastering madness than its previous
enslavement to the forms of unreason. Confinement, in the light of these developments, could
offer madness the luxury of liberty – as it was now enslaved, and stripped of its deepest powers. If
this evolution was to be summed up in one sentence, we might say that the kernel of the
experience of Unreason was that madness was there its own subject, but that in the experience that
came into being in the late eighteenth century, madness was alienated from itself through its
promotion to a new status as object.802

By becoming an object of investigation, madness had become an object.803
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The Beginnings of Psychology
At the same time, a reversal of Classical justice and its relationship to scandal produced
by the French Revolutionary imagination was setting the groundwork for psychology. Scandal,
which was once hidden, was now considered a proportional punishment for vice. Those guilty of
vice (would-be criminals) would not be confined, nor their sins kept secret, but were instead
dragged out into the public light to suffer the shame of exposure, to deter criminal behavior.804
As a consequence, psychology and the knowledge of all that was most interior to men were born
from the fact that public conscience had been elected to the status of universal judge, as an
immediately valid form of reason and morality for judging men. Psychological interiority was
constituted on the basis of the exteriority of scandalized conscience. All that which had
previously made up the content of the old classical unreason could now be taken up in these new
forms of psychological knowledge.805

Note how psychological interiority was allegedly created: ‘on the basis of the exteriority of
scandalized conscience.’ Here we have the hallmarks of objective-internal domination: the
internal domain – the psychological man - is itself created as not only the product of but also the
means for enacting a self-perpetuating mode of domination.
Psychology arose from this moral foundation, and on these grounds must be considered
the Modern objective-internal mode of domination par excellence:
Psychology is not rooted in a study of man but in a certain “homo psychologicus,” whose alliance
with certain historical developments situated man within two fundamental axes: “an external
dimension of exclusion and punishment” and “an internal dimension of moral assignation and
guilt.” This alliance reduced madness to mental illness. 806

This new psychology is best introduced in its most forceful expression: criminal evaluation. It is
worth quoting Foucault at length:
The psychology of individuals would not have been possible without [the] reorganization of
scandal in the public conscience. Knowledge about the concatenations of heredity, the past and
motivations only became possible when fault and crime ceased having intrinsic value and were no
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longer seen purely in relation to themselves, but took their meaning instead from the universal
gaze of the bourgeois conscience.807

The psychology of individuals was now considered pertinent in a court of law. The public
consciousness of crime and the concomitant public conscience were embodied in juries.808
This new psychology was not value-neutral but instead reinforced bourgeois values since
guilt could be attenuated if criminal behavior was motivated by bourgeois values.809 Here we
have the notions of the ‘insanity defense’ and ‘crimes of passion’ in their beginning stages.810
For example, in 1792, a 52-year-old laborer named Gras was charged with murdering an
unfaithful mistress. The murder itself was not questioned. But the jealousy that incited his
violent act, motivated by a sense of outrage at infidelity, was argued to provide grounds for an
attenuated sentence because fidelity, although not a legal issue, was a moral issue.811 On the
other hand, at this period of time, if no such moral ground motivated the action, the accused was
considered guilty, even if it was motivated by a ‘perverse nature’ or ‘a vicious education.’812
Thus, madness was divided between ‘good’ and ‘bad’813 based on the degree of
bourgeoisification of the accused.
The Modern Age and the Great Reformers: Tuke and Pinel
The rise of psychology, for Foucault, in the modern age, as we have seen, is rooted in a
simultaneous movement that liberates madness only because it has been rendered an inert
object:814 “Psychology became possible in our world only when madness had already been
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mastered.”815 Madness was the starting point for the objectification of Man, and became its
“first objectifying form” and the “means by which man could have an objective hold on
himself.”816 Madness was “the first great figure of the objectification of man.”817 This inner
psychological Man is the ‘objective-internal’ object this investigation has been looking for.
Traditionally the great reforms that led to the liberation of the mad are attributed to
Samuel Tuke, in England, and Philippe Pinel, in France. Tuke, a member of the York Quakers,
founded the Retreat, a place for the treatment of the mad, in 1796, in response to “old legislation
regarding the poor and sick” judged to be unfair.818 Pinel was the head physician at Bicêtre
during Revolutionary France, an institution required at the time to assume the medical
responsibilities previously had by the Hôtel-Dieu,.819 In this role, for reasons that may have been
politically motivated, Pinel ‘liberated the mad.’820 But for Foucault, we must be skeptical of
these humanitarian efforts: “Pinel and Tuke, in those simple gestures that were to provide its
paradoxical origin to positive psychiatry, interiorized alienation, and installed it inside
confinement, delimiting it as the distance from a madman to himself, and thereby invented the
myth of alienation.”821 But what were these gestures? Let us look to both Tuke and Pinel and
observe both their similar forms of treatment and the moral underpinnings Foucault saw to be so
suspicious.
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Tuke
Tuke founded the Retreat in the countryside, where the mad could live simple lives tied
to the regularities of nature. Granted that madness was the consequence of a social lifestyle that
deviated from a natural lifestyle, the former had to be replaced by the latter if madness was to be
cured.822 Reason was not believed to be totally effaced but instead dormant, needing to be
reawakened through natural living.823 “…A new myth was beginning to take shape, which was
to become one of the great organizing forms of the psychiatry of the nineteenth century – the
myth of the three natures: Nature as Truth, Nature as Reason, and Nature as Health.”824 The
truth of nature could restore reason, which could restore health.825 Furthermore, the community
was to act as a surrogate family, with the authorities being the parents and the patients the
children, a social arrangement believed to be the most originary.826
But a further look reveals the Retreat was anything but. Adopted in what was essentially
a Quaker institution, the patient was to be regulated and placed into a moral milieu of ‘Law and
Guilt’ in which fear was used to restore the mad to reason.827
Fear here was directed straight at the patient, not through any instrument but purely by means of
discourse. There was no question of limiting a raging liberty, but of defining and exalting a region
of simple responsibility, where any manifestation of madness would be linked to a punishment. 828

Patients were made to feel guilt for their madness, and by means of an instilled conscience,
would regulate themselves.
Through this guilt, the madman became an object of punishment always offered to himself and the
other; and from that recognition of his status as object, and his consciousness of his own guilt, the
madman was to return to his consciousness as a free, responsible subject, thereby regaining
reason.829
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Presumably, liberty could only be secured for the mad after an effective means of neutralizing
them had been devised.
Tuke accomplished this self-regulation by means of Work and the Gaze.830 Work as a
practice introduced discipline insofar as it bound the patient to the strictures of a schedule and
focused attentions towards accomplishing a task. Work, in this manner, kept the patient rooted
in reality (by grounding them to a real task that yielded real fruits) and morality (since it
encouraged responsibility).831 A patient, once responsible, would then curtail their liberty
deliberately, accomplishing internally what physical constraint only appeared to do.832
Few practices reveal the irony of liberation as that of the Gaze. In the age of
Confinement, the gaze was reciprocal, since not only were the mad watched, but the mad, like
Nietzsche’s infamous abyss, looked back at the watcher, a reminder of the hidden madness that
could creep into even the most reasonable of men. Now the gaze was one-way, critical,
objectifying, and disarming.833 For example, tea parties would be orchestrated so that patients
could be observed in the most technical and unforgiving ways, so that they could be scrutinized
for behaviors both deliberate and accidental that revealed a hidden madness at work.834 A
reward and punishment system was established that did not enter into dialogue with the object
but instead only considered its visible aspects.835 Two words capture the new regime setting in:
Surveillance and Judgment.836 But these would come to nothing if not for ‘The Doctor’: ‘the
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incarnation of Reason,’ “bearing the full force of the authority invested in him by the fact of his
not being mad:”837
Tuke organized the Retreat in accordance with the model of the Bourgeois family unit,
since this Family ideal was both the antithesis of the societal milieu that caused madness and the
“truth and norm for all the relations that could be struck up between madmen and men of
reason.”838 From this soil would eventually sprout the psychoanalytic elevation of the Family as
the locus of psychological development and madness. Where once there had been the endless
battle between Reason and Unreason there would now be the oedipal battle of instincts against
the institution of the Family and the Father.839
Pinel
Much is made of Pinel’s ‘liberation of the mad of Bicêtre.840 But the liberation offered
by Pinel was conditional: “the madman, freed from the animality to which his chains confined
him, could only rejoin humanity as a recognized social type.”841 This social type was one that
both incorporated the madman into a moral world and reinforced a master-servant power
dynamic.842 For example, one patient, a soldier taken with delusions of grandeur, referred to as
Chevingé, was rendered ‘sane’ when Pinel released him from his bonds and took him on as his
servant. “The miracle happened, and the virtues of a faithful valet were awoken in that troubled
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soul.”843 Here we can see both the assumption of a social type – the servant – which, in turn,
instantiated both a moral integration and a relationship of servitude.
Although similar to Tuke, Pinel did not appropriate the imaginary themes of religion into
medical treatment, only its moral content.844 Such imaginary themes tended to instigate madness
and had to be removed from the asylum. Religious fervor was one of the only practices amongst
the mad that would not be tolerated.845 But once these alienating images were removed,
“religion had a power of ‘disalienation’, dissipating images, calming passions, and restoring to
man all that was immediate and essential in his being: it could help him approach his moral
truth.”846 Pinel, like Tuke, wanted to minimize the use of the imagination since it was through its
derangement that madness arose. But, unlike Tuke, the social theme of a religious community
was abandoned, while the “moral power of consolation, confidence, and docile faithfulness to
nature” found in religion was retained.847 Once again, madness was treated by focusing on
family values, ‘virtue, work, and social life.’848
This kind of moral treatment was effective because morality wasn’t lacking in the mad,
only hidden and subtle in its operations.849 Vice was often the cause of madness, so virtue would
be its cure: “The asylum’s aim was the homogenous reign of morality, and its rigorous extension
to all those who attempted to escape it.”850 Since the source of this vice was “the lower depths of
society,” Pinel’s asylum was situated within a social discourse concerned with eliminating “the
nascent alienation” characteristic of the dredges of society by means of ‘moral syntheses.’851
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There were at least three means by which Pinel effected these moral syntheses: silence,
mirroring, and perpetual judgment:852
Silence was a technique that was used when speech and reaction in some way fed into the
delusions of the mad. By isolating a patient with silence, the delusion starved itself, and the
patient was forced to face himself rather than stay insulated within a delusional persona. “From
this moment on, more genuinely confined than he could be in a dungeon or in chains, a prisoner
of nothing but himself, the patient was trapped in a relation to the self that was of the order of
guilt, and in a non-relation to others that was of the order of shame.”853 Despite Confinement’s
attempt to silence madness, its very oppression produced a silence dialogue of struggle. This
final, subtle dialogue was silenced, leaving the patient no choice but to acknowledge his own
guilt. Once that guilt was faced, it could be acknowledged, and with that acknowledgement the
delusion would dissipate.854
The second technique was a forced recognition through mirroring. First, there was a
stage of exaltation, in which a patient was made to see another patient who had his same delusion
as a madman. At this stage, the guard or doctor does not attempt to contradict the presumptions
of the initial patient but instead contradicts the presumptions of other patients. The patient was
then incensed to denounce the madness of others, objectifying them as mad. But this moment,
which was the consolidation and affirmation of the patient’s contentions was ultimately the
delusion’s undoing, since it led to a second stage of abasement. Faced with the awareness that
those others who had similar presumptions were insane, now the patient would have to consider
the possibility that he too was mad like his fellow madmen, which led him to eventually accept
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his own madness.855 “The solidity of his sovereign subjectivity crumbled in the object that he
had demystified by taking it as his own identity. He found himself the unpitied object of his own
gaze…”856 Rather than attack the error of madness, Pinel attacked its arrogance, leaving the
patient to suffer at his own hands the same humiliation he leveled at others.857
The third means Foucault refers to as ‘perpetual judgment.’858 Patients were to be
constantly aware that they were being observed and scrutinized for behaviors that warranted
punishment. Many of the practices considered by Classical physicians to be treatments, like cold
baths and showers, were now used as punishments meant to prompt remorse in the patient.
Punishments would continue until it was clear that the seeds of conscience had been planted.859
Faults, no matter how small, were punished until the patient acknowledged his guilt.860
That said, some behaviors could not be punished in this manner and called for
incarceration. Those who would not work, those who tormented other patients and incited
insurrection, thieves, and religious fanatics were all to be locked away, separated from the other
patients.861 Thus, we find in Pinel’s asylum and its descendants “a sort of endless trial…where
any error in life, by a virtue proper to life in the asylum, became a social crime, observed,
sentenced, and punished.”862 Ultimately the aim of such measures was the acceptance of guilt
and moral conversion to bourgeois norms.
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A fourth aspect, like a crown upon the asylum itself, facilitated all of this: namely, ‘the
apotheosis of the medical character.’863 It was the doctor that rendered what was once a house of
confinement into a medical institution: an asylum. Yet what originally gave the doctor his
legitimacy and authority was not the possession of medical knowledge but recognition that he
was a ‘wise man’ of virtue.864 “If the medical character could circumscribe madness, it was not
because he knew it but because he mastered it; and what positivism came to consider as
objectivity was nothing but the converse, the effects of this domination.”865 It was less the ply of
a medical skill that gave the doctor his power to cure: it was his persona as ‘Father and Judge,
Family and Law.’866
Whereas both Pinel and Tuke underlined quite clearly that their moral actions were not necessarily
linked to any scientific competence, it was generally believed, above all by patients, that it was
some esoteric, almost demoniacal secret in his knowledge that gave him the power to undo
alienation.867

A doctor had as much power as the patient’s faith in his competence as a ‘miracle worker’
bestowed.868 Subsequent generations forgot this fundamental therapeutic truth, succumbing to
the same ‘myth of the doctor’ that patients did. Perhaps even today, when it is acknowledged
that one of the most crucial factors leading to successful therapy is a good ‘therapeutic alliance,’
all that is being articulated is this position: that therapy is only as efficacious as the faith the
patient has in his doctor. It is this very medical persona Freud amplified to its limits869 when he
sat silently out of sight of the analysand as he offered his secrets up for analysis.
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Summary of Objective-Internal Domination
The History of Madness presents us with a series of dominating forms: the Embarkment
of the Renaissance, the Confinement of the Classical age, and the Commitment of the Modern
age. The fruit borne by this series of mutations is psychology itself and its attendant: the
Psychological Man. The mad were the first to be objectified, paving the way for the
objectification inherent in the human sciences. With the construction of the ‘inner man’ of
psychology, we see the emergence of a moral entity expected to adhere to bourgeois virtues and
to acknowledge its guilt. After centuries of gestation, we are that guilt-ridden moral entity.
‘Mental Health’ stands as the seemingly innocuous objective-internal norm which we have all
internalized, attuned not just to guilt but error. The Madman is both the figure of moral deviance
and the negative image of one who has ‘sense.’ This figure is the alibi for the application of
objective-internal control that constitutes normality and silences Madness.
4.3 The Objective-External Forms of Domination: The Archaeology of Knowledge
Criteria for the Objective-External Form of Domination
We may recall that Kant describes the objective-external practical material principle as
‘the supreme perfection represented in substance’ (God) as conceived by means of rational
concepts. Subsequently, this principle refers to any moral theory that determines the Good based
on the will of God.870 But, as Nietzsche reminds us, the notion of Truth can be tied to God. By
any means, the notion of Truth, be it eternal and universal or historical and relative, has criteria
which distinguish between what makes sense and what does not. These criteria are not
psychological rules, so they are not internal. And given that they concern knowledge, these are
objective, and comprise what Foucault calls ‘discourse.’ Discourse is something that cannot be
870
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reduced to its speaker. It is not a subjective expression, but is rather autonomous and operates in
such a way as to delimit the speaker. What makes sense can be spoken and what does not is
consigned to ridicule. It is to this form of domination we now turn.
Transitions and Introductions: Relating the Earlier Archaeological Works to the Archaeology of
Knowledge
In the previous section, we acknowledged that only a selective reading of The
Archaeology of Knowledge would suggest that it repudiated The History of Madness. Instead,
Foucault has shifted his investigation from a referent (the experience of madness) to the rules of
discourse:
…What we are concerned with here is not to neutralize discourse, to make it the sign of something
else, and to pierce through its density in order to reach what remains silently anterior to it, but on
the contrary to maintain it in its consistency, to make it emerge in its own complexity. What, in
short, we wish to do is to dispense with ‘things’. To ‘depresentify’ them. 871

Rather than provide a history of how experiences are distorted by discourse (which assumes that
words index things), Foucault wants to focus on that sea of words: discourse itself.
The Archaeology, in its way, is the culmination of his earlier works, the History of
Madness, Birth of the Clinic, and The Order of Things, since the former attempts to articulate the
method that was still gestating as he worked through the themes of psychiatry, medicine,
biology, economics, and grammar found in those earlier books.872 That said, there are
differences between these texts. The project of The Order of Things is bolder in its language
than its accompanying sequel, which may help highlight what the Archaeology is trying to
accomplish. The Order of Things aims at rediscovering:
…on what basis knowledge and theory became possible; within what space of order knowledge
was constituted; on the basis of what historical a priori, and in the element of what positivity,
ideas could appear, sciences be established, experience be reflected in philosophies, rationalities
be formed…[in other words], the epistemological field, the episteme in which
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knowledge…grounds its positivity and thereby manifests a history…of its conditions of
possibility.873

While the actual possibility of an a priori that is contingent upon the vicissitudes of history is
questionable, we can still recognize what Foucault is getting at: the conditions of intelligibility
for a given era. In this vein, Foucault does not seem to shirk the bold claim that there have been
at least two shifts in epistemes, or epistemological fields, over the last four hundred years in
which ‘the mode of being’ of “the order on the basis of which we think” has radically changed:
the Classical age and the Modern age.874 We are by now quite familiar with both. However, the
Archaeology is more cautious. Foucault dismisses the systematic tone of The Order of Things in
the Archaeology as nothing more than an oversight on his part, “the absence of methodological
signposting” that merely gave the false impression of ‘cultural totality.’875 Ultimately, however,
Foucault’s aside seems less like clarification and more like historical revisionism.
An interrogation into the objective-internal locus (what could be called psychic structure)
revealed Psychological Man to be the form and product of objective-internal domination, and the
Madman to be both what resisted it but also most fell under its authorized sway. Now we shift to
the objective-external locus, to the field of discourse devoid of founding subjects. I argue that
insofar as Foucault interrogates discourse as an autonomous domain, he means to highlight the
ways in which discourse determines the array of subject positions a speaker must occupy to be
taken seriously. These systemic limitations act not only as a form of domination due to their
very nature as restrictions, but inevitably act in concert with other forces in order to legitimize
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the marginalization of certain voices. Those that deviate from these permitted subject positions
are labeled Crackpots, a term Foucault uses in the History of Madness.876
Discursive Analysis
To understand what a discourse is and how its rules ultimately set the parameters for
what we say, we must know what statements are, since discourses are composed of statements.877
Foucault distinguishes between sentences, propositions, and statements.878 Sentences are
grammatical and must comply with grammatical rules, while propositions are logical and must
comply with logical rules. Statements, on the other hands, must comply with what Foucault calls
‘rules of formation.’ While sentences and propositions can be statements, statements are neither
grammatical nor logical in nature, and are in fact, more fundamental than either. Many
statements (such as items organized on lists, tables, and graphs) are not sentences, while two
distinct statements can actually be found in the same proposition (for example, ‘No one heard’
and ‘It is true that no one heard’ are the same logical proposition but different statements).879
The statement is not therefore a structure (that is, a group of relations between variable elements,
thus authorizing a possibly infinite number of concrete models); it is a function of existence that
properly belongs to signs and on the basis of which one may then decide, through analysis or
intuition, whether or not they ‘make sense’, according to what rule they follow one another or are
juxtaposed, of what they are the sign, and what sort of act is carried out by their formulation (oral
or written).880
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Foucault is directing our attentions not towards “mere possibilities” but towards “the dimension
of existence, of grasping a series of signs, as actually operating,” which is why he is concerned
with uncovering those rules which made such an operating series of signs actual.881 While
admitting that the field of statements is broader, Dreyfus and Rabinow contend that most of
Foucault’s attention is really directed towards a specific kind of statement – the truth claim –
which they designate by the Speech Act-inspired term ‘serious speech act’ (namely, those speech
acts validated by various procedures, communities of experts, etc).882
Foucault refers to this ‘function of existence’ signs exhibit as an ‘enunciative function,’
or ‘modality of existence’ proper to a group of signs. Fully explicated, a statement is…
A modality that allows [a group of signs] to be something more than a series of traces, something
more than a succession of marks on a substance, something more than a mere object made by a
human being; a modality that allows [a group of signs] to be in relation with a domain of objects,
to prescribe a definite position to any possible subject, to be situated among other verbal
performances, and to be endowed with a repeatable materiality. 883

Discourse is that “constituted by a group of sequences of signs, in so far as they are statements,
that is, in so far as they can be assigned certain modalities of existence.”884 From this definition
it now seems that statements are both the modality of a group of signs and that very grouping of
signs exhibiting that mode which make up discourses. Ultimately, the grouping of statements is
not arbitrary but instead the result of a law (or ‘single system of formation’), which Foucault
calls a discursive formation.
A discursive formation is defined as “the principle of dispersion and redistribution…of
statements.”885 Thus, to understand what discourse is, we must understand the rules that
determine which statements belong to it and which do not, which in turn make up a discursive
881
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formation. It is by these rules of formation (the discursive formation) that Foucault hopes to
explain “How it is that one particular statement appeared rather than another?”886 Foucault
restricts himself, for the most part, to a finite collection of actual statements, which can only be
found in a previous episteme (Archaeology does not analyze the possible, only the actual887).
Arguably the appeal of looking to past statements from an episteme that no longer produces
statements lies in the possibility that such a finite collection of actual statements could be
considered by an archaeologist as an aggregate with regularities while still being complete.
Without recourse to the past, such completeness could only be attained by attempting to derive
an underlying system that determines what statements are possible, which in turn would be
totalizing and deterministic. Archaeology is not an ahistorical analytic tool, but is itself part of
the current episteme that is either emerging at the end of the Modern episteme, or (perhaps not
previously considered) a collection of statements some of which the Modern episteme actually
rejects as nonsensical (In other words, we cannot necessarily conclude from the appearance of
Foucault’s work that the Modern episteme has ended, unless the regularities of the Modern
period no longer seem to be present). Such a determination may still be premature.
We start by asking what it means to define a discursive formation as a principle of
dispersion and redistribution of statements. Foucault attempts to answer this even before
providing us with a definition of the statement:
Wherever one can describe, between a number of statements,…a system of dispersion, whenever,
between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an
order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations), we will say, for the sake of
convenience, that we are dealing with a discursive formation.888
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Thus we are introduced to “four new descriptive categories for the analysis of discursive
formations:”889 the formations of discursive objects, enunciative modalities, concepts, and
strategies (also called theories, themes, or strategic choices).890 We should not expect these
elements to always be in harmony, since coexistence does not preclude conflict. Nonetheless,
while contradictory statements may be permitted within the same discursive formation, there is
still a principle of exclusion in play that is in no way dependent on what Foucault would call a
totalitarian periodization891: “We are studying statements at the limit that separates them from
what is not said, in the occurrence that allows them to emerge to the exclusion of all others.”892
It is in this respect that it could be argued that an objective-external constraint is in effect: the
rules of formation limit the field of statements subjects can make or the forms discourse can take.
Or, stronger put, the rules of formation seem to determine what can be said (‘what can be taken
seriously as a truth claim’) and what cannot (‘what won’t be taken seriously as a truth claim’).
As we have seen, rules of formation regulate objects, enunciative modalities, concepts,
and strategic choices – but we have as yet to define them. Foucault concludes that individually
none of these is substantial enough to lend unity to a discourse, but together they do. However,
each element must be viewed not as somehow consistent in form throughout history but as in
constant variation. Such variations, however, are still contained within the bounds of a
discursive formation. Foucault explores each element chronologically in context to each work:
the object in History of Madness, the enunciative modality in Birth of the Clinic, etc.
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It is thought that a discourse is consistent insofar as it interrogates the same object. For
example, psychopathology would seem to be united around the study of an object: madness.893
But Foucault observed as early as History of Madness that the object under interrogation does
not remain an identical object of study over time. Thus, hopes of unifying a discourse around
unchanging, persisting objects are doomed to fail.894 Rather,
…The unity of the discourses on madness would be the interplay of the rules that define the
transformations of these different objects, their non-identity through time, the break that produced
them, the internal discontinuity that suspends their permanence. Paradoxically, to define a group
of statements in terms of its individuality would be to define the dispersion of these objects, to
grasp all the interstices that separate them, to measure the distances that reign between them – in
other words, to formulate their law of division. 895

What is discovered is not a discourse that revolves around an independent referent but a
discourse-object historically determined in its variations by rules of formation.896
The next candidate for anchoring a discourse Foucault calls ‘enunciative modalities.’
Enunciative modalities seem to be comprised of “the various statuses, the various sites, [and] the
various positions” a subject can occupy “when making a discourse.”897 A subject can speak as a
doctor, situated in a hospital, occupying various relations to its object (such as an observer, a
questioner, etc.).898 This gesture is an attempt to shift the emphasis from an intentional subject
who constructs discourse to the field of enunciation that precedes the subject and determines the
locus from which it can speak. “Instead of referring back to the synthesis or the unifying
function of a subject, the various enunciative modalities manifest his dispersion.”899 We can see
in this language an implicit bypassing of Kant and Husserl’s transcendental ego.
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Thirdly, one could try to organize a discourse around a ‘family of concepts.’900 For
example, the Grammar of the Classical age deployed a rich system of concepts, such as
judgments, subjects, predicates, nouns, verbs, words, etc.901 Here again Foucault notes a lack of
stability where the only consistency seems to lie in variation rather than a consistent network of
concepts deployed throughout the history of the disciplines. Foucault asks, “Could a law not be
found that would account for the successive and simultaneous emergence of disparate
concepts?”902 In response, Foucault conjectures the existence of a ‘preconceptual field’ which is
neither a ‘horizon of ideality’ nor ‘an empirical genesis of abstractions.’903
The preconceptual field allows the emergence of the discursive regularities and constraints that
have made possible the heterogeneous multiplicity of concepts, and, beyond these the profusion of
the themes, beliefs, and representations with which one usually deals when one is writing the
history of ideas.904

The law in question, once again, is the discursive formation, which generates both the diversity
and the parameters for families of concepts.
Finally, there are strategies, theories, or themes. Foucault notes that in biology evolution
seems to be an example of such a persistent theme. Nonetheless, the eighteenth century and
nineteenth century theories of evolution, while sharing a theme, are two distinct discourses with
“two sets of concepts, two types on analysis, two perfectly different fields of objects.”905 By
now Foucault’s proposed alternative should be no surprise:
Rather than seeking the permanence of themes, images, and opinions through time, rather than
retracing the dialectic of their conflicts in order to individualize groups of statements, could one
not rather mark out the dispersion of the points of choice, and define prior to any option, to any
thematic preference, a field of strategic possibilities?906

Thus there is a tension between the diversity of strategies and the unity of the discourse.
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A discursive formation will be individualized if one can define the system of formation of the
different strategies that are deployed in it; in other words, if one can show how they all derive (in
spite of their sometimes extreme diversity, and in spite of their dispersion in time), from the same
set of relations.907

The same rules of formation determine which strategic choices are available and which are not.
But objects, enunciative modalities, systems of concepts, and strategic choices are not
isolated elements produced parallel to one another by rules of formation, like spokes of a wheel.
Only by relating to one another do they form ‘a single system of formation.’908 Each element
acts as a level which determines what can and cannot manifest on another level, a relation which
Foucault calls a ‘vertical system of dependences.’909
[The very possibility of strategic choices] is determined by points of divergence in the group of
concepts;…Concepts [are formed] on the basis of forms of coexistence between
statements;…and…the modalities of enunciation [are] described on the basis of the position
occupied by the subject in relation to the domain of objects of which he’s speaking. 910

It is also possible for this process to occur in the reverse direction. What each level permits is
based on the rules of formation of the discourse, which, in turn, are not immune to change.
There are even higher levels of complexity, such as the episteme. Epistemes are not
limited to one discourse or one discursive practice but instead “the total set of relations that
unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures,
sciences, and possibly formalized systems…”911 Epistemes do not denote a limitation on
knowledge due to inadequate means of investigation, “mental attitudes, or the limitations
imposed by tradition; it is what, in the positivity of discursive practices, makes possible the
existence of epistemological figures and sciences.”912 Epistemes mark the boundaries between
what can be said and what cannot, between who can be taken seriously and who cannot.
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Summary of the Objective-External Form of Domination
Foucault primarily confines archaeology to the history of the human sciences. The
Archaeology is thus not concerned with subjectivity per se but the field of discourse that situates
the subject and gives him a place to speak. Since the structures that underpin discourse are
anonymous (not constituted by a transcendental ego) and pre-subjective (they situate subjects
and are not determined by psychological processes), it is fair to consider the constraints these
structures place upon what can and cannot be said as external. Insofar as they concern
knowledge (particularly of the sciences), these constraints are objective.
At this new level of analysis, we are not considering the psychological straightjacket,
which may concern itself with the internal objective error constitutive of madness (the Mad do
not see things as they ‘really are’) but not the external field of accepted knowledges that
prefigure it (How things ‘really are’ is derived from what can and cannot be seriously said).
Discourse acts as the nexus that determines both primary relations (such as economic and social
causes) and secondary relations (such as psychological reflection). The two forms of domination
interact but are not the same. Psychology can pass judgment on an internal structure but not an
external one. What determines what can and cannot be said is an episteme, not a psychological
norm. One who speaks what cannot be taken seriously is not necessarily the Madman. The
Madman and the Crackpot are distinct marginal subjects.
Arguably, the distinction lies with what can be seen and what can be said (the Visible and
the Articulable). Deleuze says that while both the Visible and the Articulable are fundamentally
different in nature (words and things do no overlap), the two are in mutual presupposition with
one another,913 and even mix together in the same way that soldiers mix in the midst of battle.914
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The Madman is often cast in context to visibility, such as the different ways the Mad were
displayed in different eras (Embarkation, Confinement and exhibition in the Asylum, the gaze of
the Doctor),915 in policed spaces, while the disjointed Articulable aspect of madness was rooted
elsewhere (medicine).916 In retrospect, Foucault thought he gave undue priority to the Visible
(like the phenomenologists he critiqued tended to do) by focusing on the pure experience of
madness in the History of Madness. 917 It is arguable that each form of domination is
intrinsically tied to either of the two: objective-internal domination to the Visible (to the one
subjected to the gaze: the Normal and the Madman) and objective-external domination to the
Articulable (to the one subjected to the rules of knowledge: the Scientist and the Crackpot). 918
That is not to deny that History of Madness does not provide an account of discourse, since
‘reciprocal presupposition’ implies where one is the other must be as well,919 but rather to
illustrate Visibility’s priority in this text and its penchant for trying to reveal a pure experience of
Madness that escapes words which the methods of the other texts cannot bring into focus.
After The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault will adjust his method, and with it, its
correlative object will change. No longer focused exclusively on the role of knowledge in
discourse, he will now look to power and the non-discursive practices that not only repress us but
also incite us and create us as subjects. Foucault will call Discipline and Punish a ‘genealogy of
915
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the modern soul.’920 Along its path we will see just what he means by this tantalizing task and
how the disciplinary society of the Modern age acts as a Subjective-External form of domination
that creates this ‘prison for the body.’921
Yet an initial comparison between two forms of domination – the Objective-Internal
(History of Madness) and the Subjective-External (Discipline and Punish) is necessary since they
seem, on the surface, to be so similar as to challenge the division I am drawing. Discipline and
Punish concerns criminality and how society punishes it. Its concern is the Delinquent.
Certainly, from a Classical perspective, the Mad were already considered guilty in some manner,
like lesser criminals, and their confinement seems much like a prison. Yet, the criminal was not
typically thrown into prison during the Classical age, like those agents of Unreason who found
themselves in houses of confinement. While at the end of the Eighteenth century there was a
blurring of the spaces for the Mad and the Criminal, it was quickly noted and judged an injustice
among reformers, and the two divided. No sooner had madness been divorced from unreason
and left amongst the criminal than it was polarized in the Modern imagination, like oil separating
from water. The Asylum and the Prison are not the same institution.
Foucault may describe Discipline and Punish as a history of the soul, its novel discovery
is disciplinary society: something that is both subjective (since it is cultural) and external (since
it is imposed from without). Each book highlighted introduces a new object, a new aspect of
domination; it’s on this basis that I have assigned each book to a quadrant. So while Foucault
may emphasize the soul as a disciplinary construct in Discipline and Punish, that soul had
already been nascently outlined in History of Madness. The disciplinary society (and later bio-
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power) had not, since neither power nor genealogy had been utilized in that text. Foucault is
painting a complete picture of anthropological Man throughout his corpus.
4.4 The Subjective-External Forms of Domination: Discipline and Punish
Criteria for the Subjective-External Form of Domination
As we recall, Kant refers to cultural practices, such as education and civil constitutions,
as subjective-external material practical principles. Here we see highlighted neither a
characteristic of the human being (like madness), nor the operative rules of an autonomous
discourse (like rules of formation), but the operations of power through various disciplinary
institutions. Because of its culture-bound and localized nature, any form of domination effected
by means of such institutions must be subjective rather than objective. Likewise, given that such
institutional practices are not characteristics of individual human beings, although they do act on
and through them, they are external. It’s to these disciplinary power relations that we now turn.
An Analysis of Power
Given that a shift in method seems to alter the object of inquiry, it is best to highlight the
new method and the explicit rules that Foucault outlines for its application before exploring
Discipline and Punish itself. These rules, it will be seen, integrate non-discursive practices (like
‘punitive mechanisms’) as well as power into the former archaeological method:
In Foucault’s later works, practice, on all levels, is considered more fundamental than theory.
Again the intelligibility of the human sciences is not to be found in their own theories. It is not to
be found in some system of formation rules either; this level of rules is simply dropped. Nor is it
to be found in the horizon of meaning shared by the participants. Rather, Foucault now finds the
human sciences intelligible as part of a larger set of organized and organizing practices in whose
spread the human sciences play a crucial role…Foucault introduces genealogy as a method of
diagnosing and grasping the significance of social practices from within them…archaeology,
while it still plays an important role, is subordinated to genealogy. 922
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The four general rules Foucault will follow in Discipline and Punish are as follows:
1. Both the negative and positive effects of punitive mechanisms should be examined.
Punitive mechanisms do more than just punish.923
2. Punitive measures should be viewed as techniques or tactics for exercising power rather
than as mere “consequences of legislation or as indicators of social structures.”924
3. “Make the technology of power the very principle both of the humanization of the penal
system and of the knowledge of man.”925
4. “Try to discover whether this entry of the soul on the scene of penal justice, and with it
the insertion in legal practice of a whole corpus of ‘scientific’ knowledge, is not the effect
of a transformation of the way in which the body itself is invested by power relations.”926
The body is always is always in the grip of power. “Power relations “invest it, mark it,
train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs.”927
These rules challenge how we conceive of power and its relation to knowledge. Foucault seeks
to subvert the traditional Top-Down account of power and replace it with a ‘micro-physics of
power.’928 Power should not be viewed as something the privileged possess, as if it were a
property. Power “exerts pressure” on the dominated, “invests them,” and “is transmitted by them
and through them.” It n turn is resisted by them.929 Strategic sites of confrontation pervade
society. For this reason, power cannot be reduced to a grand monolithic process, such as a social
contract or a Marxist class struggle. Instead power is more localized.930
Foucault also challenges the notion that power and knowledge are inversely related.
Knowledge is not found in the vacuum left by power’s absence, as if it were only possible to be
objective once its “injunctions, its demands, and its interests” have been subtracted; nor does
power ‘make mad.’931 “We should admit rather that power produces knowledge…that there is
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no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any
knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.”932 When it
comes to the human sciences, the consequences of this theory of power-knowledge are
significant. Various ‘techniques and material elements’ (which Foucault calls a ‘body politic’)
are set into motion that bolster “power and knowledge relations that invest human bodies and
subjugate them by turning them into objects of knowledge.”933
The correlate of these ‘technologies of power over the body’ that have developed since
the Classical age and into our own is what Foucault regards as a ‘soul.’934 “This real, noncorporal soul is not a substance; it is the element in which are articulated the effects of a certain
type of power and the reference of a certain type of knowledge…”935 Upon it are grounded all
the concepts essential to humanism and its scientific investigations: psyche, subjectivity,
personality, consciousness, etc.936
The man described from us, whom we are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a
subjection much more profound than himself. A ‘soul’ inhabits him and brings him to existence,
which is itself a factor in the mastery that power exercises over the body. The soul is the effect
and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body.937

Here we see the other side of the Psychological Man discussed in History of Madness: a created
interior where the drama of conscience and discipline play out (much like the interior world of
self-flagellation Nietzsche describes in the Second Treatise of On The Genealogy of Morality).
But let there be no mistake: the History of Madness describes a moral-psychological form of
domination which tries to tame a wild liberty within (pure, prediscursive madness) rather than a
juridical-political form. What we find in Discipline and Punish is an apparatus of technologies
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of power (a disciplinary society) that disciplines the body, making it receptive to the influences
of power (such techniques being adaptable to innumerable political systems). The former
provides us with a field of objects such as ‘the experience of madness’ and Unreason. The latter
provides us with a field of objects such as bodies, discipline, strategies, and power. We should
not dismiss this discrepancy of description as a nascent theory that was later developed but
instead as the formulation of distinct, albeit overlapping domains, each characterized by a form
of domination that varies depending on the method used to investigate the human sciences.
Introduction to the Immediate Task
In this section, I will explicate Foucault’s notion of ‘discipline’ and argue that it
comprises a subjective-external form of domination that has mutated from the Classical to the
Modern age.
As Foucault notes:
The division between the permitted and the forbidden has preserved a certain constancy from one
century to another. One the other hand, ‘crime’ the object with which penal practice is concerned,
has profoundly altered: the quality, the nature, in a sense the substance of which the punishable
element is made, rather than its formal definition. 938

Most crimes in the Classical age will still be considered crimes in the Modern age, but how that
crime is conceived, how it is punished, and for what reason it is punished will drastically change.
Classical Punishment as Terror
In History of Madness, Foucault already alluded to how during the early Classical period,
the poor (be they beggars or vagabonds) were executed until it became common practice to exile
them to houses of confinement. Discipline and Punish picks up where this narrative left off, this
time highlighting a more definitive criminal population. Foucault starts off his investigation with
the most infamous of his historical anecdotes: the public torture and execution of Damiens the
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regicide (on March 2nd, 1757).939 In it, various parts of Damiens’ body were torn off with redhot pincers and his limbs cut with a knife so as to allow them to be more easily ripped from his
body as he was quartered by horses pulling from opposing directions.940 This particular
execution is notable for its excessive violence since “the ideal punishment of the regicide had to
constitute the summum of all possible tortures. It would be an expression of infinite
vengeance.”941 Such a purpose for violence is foreign to the Modern sensibility, which sees
punishment as a balanced restitution proportionate to the crime rendered not directly onto the
body of the condemned but upon his liberty and property (imprisonment and leveled fines).942
The Classical judicial process had at least two stages: a secret investigation (that utilized
torture) and conviction, then a public punishment comprised of further torture and, in some
cases, execution: Private investigation and Public spectacle. Torture played a different role in
each. In neither circumstance was torture a supplemental, uncontrolled expression of power but
was instead an instrumental part of the judicial process that obeyed certain rules.943 The pain
produced by various techniques was measured and dealt out in proportion to various factors,
such as “the gravity of the crime, the person of the criminal,” and “the rank of his victims.”944
To be suspected of a crime was already a measure of guilt, which gave the inquisitor license to
inflict torture in calculated ways in order to secure a confession. The rules for its application
were intricate,945 and the confession, once secured, played a crucial part in the theater of public
punishment.946
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But one must not be mistaken into thinking that pain was dealt in a manner meant to
equally cancel out the crime, since the spectacle of punishment was measured excess meant to
terrorize.947 The spectacle was both a judicial and political ritual948 meant to mark the body of
the condemned in such a way to represent the truth of the crime.949 Its purpose was not merely to
rectify a wrong committed but also to exact vengeance upon the transgressor who either
symbolically or literally attacked the sovereign, his laws, and his kingdom as well as demonstrate
the power of the sovereign in the most excessive forms possible.950
Nonetheless, this sovereign act of terror sometimes inspired rebellion contrary to its
intentions. Sometimes the condemned were judged to be innocent victims, or at least victims of a
double standard that punished one class of people harsher than another. The people would then
identify with the criminal rather than the sovereign who sought to punish him.951 Sometimes the
degree of torture inflicted was deemed too harsh, inciting the merciful crowd to turn on the
executioner. In such cases, the people would temporarily overthrow the system and the

only permitted certain levels of punishment. Full proofs (such as two trustworthy eyewitnesses seeing the defendant
leave the scene of the crime with the murder weapon) were sufficient to condemn a defendant to death. Semi-full
proofs (such as a known death threat) were held to be true as long as the defendant could not refute them, carrying
heavy punishments that were nonetheless not lethal. Finally, there was evidence composed of distant clues (such as
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condemned would be pardoned.952 Furthermore, there was something about the site of execution
that had the spirit of a carnival that inverted the political order,953 valorizing rather than
demonizing the criminal. The penitent criminal almost carried himself as a saint, while the
defiant criminal was a symbol of resistance against an unjust use of power.954 While it must be
admitted that courts often tried to minimize such bloody excesses of justice,955 this system of
political control over the power of death was never efficient and could much too easily be
reversed by a sympathetic, defiant audience. These sites of excessive power could quickly turn
into sites of resistance.
The Great Reformers
By the second half of the Eighteenth century, various groups began to protest the
excesses of sovereign power and call for the end of public executions and torture. By the end of
the Eighteenth century these challenges were institutionalized. No longer was the penalty to
exceed the scope of the offense, the death penalty to be dealt out to any but the convicted
murderer, or torture to be a viable part of punishment.956 We are often told of the great reformers
(Beccaria, Servan, Dupaty, Lacretelle, Duport, Pastoet, Target, Bergasse, etc) who worked to
reform the prison system out of a sense of compassion and respect for the prisoners’ humanity,
but Foucault calls this humanitarian gesture into question, looking instead to a ‘single strategy’
much less benevolent that motivated these reforms.957
Rather, what they seem to have been challenged were the irregularities within the penal
system: “The criticism of the reformers of the reformers was directed not so much at the
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weakness or cruelty of those in authority, as at a bad economy of power.”958 Their reforms were
intended to erect “a more finely tuned justice,” or “a closer penal mapping of the social body.”959
Many of these irregularities were due to overlapping and often conflicting jurisdictions of
various courts and authorities which permitted loopholes and abuses of authority.960 Much of
this disorganization and inefficiency stemmed from the power of the sovereign, who often
appointed the wrong people for the wrong reasons to various offices or recklessly created new
offices: “It was because he was constantly creating new offices that he multiplied the conflicts of
power and authority.”961 The results of sovereign intervention rendered normal justice
“sometimes lenient and inconsistent, but sometimes over-hasty and severe.”962 It was this
mixture of “weaknesses and excesses” and the “super-power of the monarch” largely responsible
for it that was the target of criticism.963
The true objective of the reform movement, even in its most general formulations, was not so
much to establish a new right to punish based on more equitable principles, as to set up a new
‘economy’ of the power to punish, to assure its better distribution, so that it should be neither too
concentrated at certain privileged points, nor too divided between opposing authorities; so that it
should be distributed in homogenous circuits capable of operating everywhere, in a continuous
way, down to the finest grain of the social body. 964

The reformers wanted a more efficient use of power, not a merciful diminution of its effects,
leading to a myriad of alliances with parties with different interests.965
The reforms in question targeted an old ‘economy of illegalities’ that largely stemmed
from an arbitrary and unregulated use of sovereign power,966 both of which were not compatible
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with emerging industrial capitalist society.967 Before the reforms, many illegalities were
tolerated. Certain illegalities tended to fall along class lines, both opposing and bolstering the
interests of all social classes involved: “The reciprocal interplay of illegalities formed part of the
political and economic life of society.” But by the second half of the Eighteenth century a shift
was occurring:
With the new forms of capitalist accumulation, new relations of production, and the new legal
status of property, all the popular practices that belonged, either in a silent, everyday, tolerated
form or in a violent form, to the illegality of rights were reduced by force to an illegality of
property.968

A bifurcation between illegalities of rights and illegalities of property took place along class
lines.969 The bourgeoisie, more prone to commit illegalities of rights (like fraud, tax evasion, and
irregular commercial operations), received leniency, while the lower classes, more prone to
commit illegalities of property (like theft) were prosecuted in ordinary courts and more heavily
policed.970 Thus penal reform must be understood as a strategic bolstering of those parties who
spurred on capitalist growth and punishment of those that stunted it.
The reformers viewed crime as a violation of the social contract that introduced chaos
into society971 which needed to be reduced. Recidivism concerns aside, punishment was to deter
others from committing crimes without falling into the excesses of the ‘Ancien Régime.’972
Reform was to obey six rules if it was to apply power more efficiently. First, the disadvantages
associated with punishment should slightly outweigh any possible advantages associated with
criminal activity. If people perform those actions which they consider to be to their advantage,
then it was always the best course of action to obey the law.973 Second, focus should be on
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cultivating within the minds of citizens the representation of pain associated with a crime rather
than techniques meant to actually inflict pain.974 Third, punishment should deter would-be
criminals rather than as attempt to rectify a wrong through pain. The best punishments
minimized the amount of suffering endured by the criminal yet maximized the negative public
perception of the punishment.975 Fourth, the association in the minds of citizens between the
crime and its punishment must be perfect. No citizen should be given hope of pardon, nor even
conceive it possible to evade judicial detection. Surveillance and judicial transparency would be
crucial. Citizens should be aware of what the law is, that it was omnipresent, how prosecutions
were handled, and that the law provided no exceptions.976 Fifth, all defendants were assumed
innocent until proven guilty. This was an outright rejection of the notion that someone could be
semi-guilty and warrant torture. A defendant should only be punished after guilt had been
adequately demonstrated.977 Finally, all possible crimes should be thoroughly classified and
paired with appropriate punishments. In order to thoroughly do this, such individual factors as
social status and personal wickedness needed to be taken into account. For example, a wealthy
man would not feel the same degree of disadvantage from a given fine than a poor man would.
Nor would a poor man without means be as wicked for stealing as a rich man would be. All of
these factors were relevant when determining the appropriate punishment for a criminal.978
At this time of reform many options for new penal systems were considered. Many
reformers supported a system that circulated the tight, automatic associations between particular
crimes and their appropriate punishment (so-called ‘obstacle-signs’) as a means of deterring
crime. To see a criminal endure an appropriate punishment automatically yielded to the
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observer’s mind, like a text, the crime committed to warrant it, because the punishment was
similar to the crime by some manner of resemblance, analogy, or proximity.979 For example,
someone who stole might lose their property in return.980 If these associations between crimes
and punishments were transparent enough, only the disadvantages of committing a crime would
come to mind when that crime was considered. The ideal system for such reformers would be a
‘punitive city’ in which criminals would both publicly serve the community and also act as
visible, living signs (sometimes by wearing actual symbols) that communicated the
consequences of committing certain crimes.981
Prisons
Nonetheless, the punitive city did not replace the traditional system of punishment.
Instead, the practice of Confinement, what we call today imprisonment, would now be applied to
the general criminal population, its duration determined by the severity of the crime. The
criticisms of this form of punishment were numerous. For example, a generalized punishment
not specifically tailored to the crime could never act as a morally educative sign that
transparently communicated to the criminal and the observer that a specific crime necessarily led
to a specific punishment.982 The prisoner, spirited away behind private walls, would provide no
benefit to society and instead, through his very hiddenness, would undermine the very
transparency of the penal process, adding grist to the mill of public rumors of injustice.983
Because there was no ‘natural’ association between the crime and the punishment, imprisonment
could easily be seen as an arbitrary and abusive use of sovereign power.984 This was by no
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means a flight of fancy since, as we have seen in the History of Madness confinement was often
imposed and sanctioned by royal decree.985
Prisons existed as early as 1596, in Amsterdam and Ghent.986 Yet it was America that
offered the most influential prison models. The Philadelphia model, based on the Walnut Street
Prison (opened in 1790), was founded by Quakers inspired by the previous models. Prisoners
were put to work and their daily lives obeyed a strict schedule with constant supervision.
Punishment was no longer to be a public affair and instead stayed between the prisoner and his
supervisors.987 The Philadelphia model’s objective was both to instill the positive habits of labor
and a spiritual conversion. The latter task required not merely special moral direction given to
each prisoner,988 but also knowledge of each individual prisoner. Each prisoner arrived at the
prison with a report that documented the crime committed, its circumstances, “a summary of the
examinations of the defendant,” and observations pertaining to his behavior before and after
sentencing.989 Subsequent to arrival, the prisoner would be regularly observed and his
disposition towards committing further crimes noted, in part for the sake of determining whether
a reduction of sentence would be warranted.990 Solitary confinement was used only for those
would either have received the death penalty or who were unruly in prison.991
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The points of divergence between the punitive city of the reformers and the apparatus of
corrective penality are telling: “The point of application of the penalty is not the representation,
but the body, time, everyday gestures and activities; the soul, too, but in so far as it is the seat of
habits.”992 By means of coercion and consistently reapplied constraints, which take the forms of
exercises, “time-tables, compulsory movements, regular activities, solitary meditation, work in
common, silence, application, respect, [and] good habits,” an obedient subject is created rather
than a juridical subject restored.993 The prison system trades a transparent circulating system of
signs for a secret autonomy that allows those who correct prisoners to exercise ‘total power.’994
Disciplinary Power, the Panopticon, and the Disciplinary Society
A new modality of power and a new kind of body were starting to develop in the
Classical age: discipline and the docile body. By applying a constant coercion concerned with
maximizing the utility of the minutest of bodily movements, a body could be rendered docile.995
Such calculated coercion was a curious paradox: the more useful it rendered the body, the more
obedient it became: “Disciplinary coercion establishes in the body the constricting link between
an increased aptitude and an increased domination.”996 Discipline as a practice intersected and
pervaded numerous institutions: “They were at work in secondary at a very early date, later in
primary schools; they slowly invested the space of the hospital; and, in a few decades, they
restructured the military organization,” typically in response to some need (like “an industrial
innovation, a renewed outbreak of certain epidemic diseases, the invention of the rifle or the
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victories of Prussia”).997 Once a concern of religious asceticism a new obsession with detail
would pervade the school, the barracks, the hospital, the workshop, and eventually the prison. 998
Discipline was deployed by means of reorganizing space and time. Space was cordoned
off, divided, and specialized in order to better manage the circulation of bodies and the behaviors
of those who inhabited it. Now everyone within it could be assigned a position and function.999
Time was to be divided and filled in accordance with a time-table so that every moment was
maximally utilized.1000 Furthermore, the same duration of time could be used for training
different groups at varied levels of competency (e.g. different classes held at the same time).1001
“Power is articulated directly onto time; it assures its control and guarantees its use.”1002 Finally,
discipline was concerned with how best to organize an aggregate of individuals with individual
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potentials into an efficient machine.1003 For example, individual bodies were now considered
fragments of ‘mobile space,’ or as parts “of a multisegmentary machine.”1004 Yet, temporal
series were also parts of a composite time that made up that machine.1005 Use could be extracted
from every period of life, from beginning to end. Directions would not so much be spoken as
signaled, as the docile body is an obedient body that is conditioned to do an action without
thinking.1006 That is not to say that the body was perfectly compliant with these disciplinary
forces, but that the assumed ‘mechanical body’ would eventually yield in the minds of
disciplinarians to a ‘natural body’ whose limitations and capacities needed to be known and
exploited by the disciplines.1007 The site of power and any possible resistance is the body.
To sum up, it might be said that discipline creates out of the bodies it controls four types of
individuality, or rather an individuality that is endowed with four characteristics: it is cellular (by
the play of spatial distribution), it is organic (by the coding of activities), it is genetic (by the
accumulation of time), it is combinatory (by the composition of forces). And, in doing so, it
operates four great techniques: it draws up tables; it prescribes movements; it imposes exercises;
lastly, in order to obtain the combination of forces, it arranges ‘tactics.’ 1008

All of these processes comprise the form of subjective-external domination found in the
Classical Age. Disciplinary power does not merely wear down the resolve of individuals; it
‘makes’ them. Discipline “is the specific technique of a power that regards individuals both as
objects and as instruments of its exercise.”1009
Disciplinary power uses three instruments: hierarchical observation, normalizing
judgment, and the examination.1010 Each is worth examining in-depth.
Hierarchical observation (or surveillance) employs those architectural designs that
promote constant, maximal visibility, but only for those meant to observe (like supervisors), not
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between those being observed. With all individuals exposed, all fell under the disciplinary power
of either a single gaze (the ideal) or several and were compelled to comply with the conditions of
training.1011 “By means of such surveillance, disciplinary power became an ‘integrated’ system,
linked from the inside to the economy and to the aims of the mechanism in which it was
practiced.”1012 This disciplinary power operates through a network that runs not merely topdown but also the reverse, casting all in light, rendering all the objects of surveillance.
“At the heart of all disciplinary systems functions a small penal mechanism.”1013
Foucault refers to this as ‘normalizing judgment.’ Within a disciplinary space lies a juridical
power that regulates those behaviors that would otherwise fall within the bounds of legality.
Things potentially punished included mismanaging time (latenesses, absences, interruptions of
tasks), activity, (inatention, negligence, lack of zeal), behavior (impoliteness, disobedience),
speech (idle chatter, insolence), the body (‘incorrect’ attitude, irregular gestures, lack of
cleanliness), and sexuality (impurity, indecency).1014 What is ultimately punished is deviation
from a norm or set of rules. The aim of discipline is conformity with specific norms, norms that
may be staggered depending on the rank of the individual. 1015 Punishments usually are
comprised of an intensification and repetition of the very kinds of exercises the individual failed
to comply with. In this manner, punishment further disciplines.1016 Nonetheless, rewards for
compliance should be more commonly appealed to than punishments for deviance. By
considering compliance as a continuum which one traverses by means of good or bad marks,
individuals organize themselves by rank.1017 “Through this micro-economy of a perpetual
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penality operates a differentiation that is not one of acts, but of individuals themselves, of their
nature, their potentialities, their level, or their value.”1018 Finally, change in rank becomes
recognized as either a reward or punishment. Higher ranks, in turn, are accorded privileges and
lowers ranks disadvantages. The pressure to attain higher ranks was a pressure to conform, to
normalize.1019
Finally, disciplinary power uses the examination, which “combines the techniques of an
observing hierarchy and those of a normalizing judgment.”1020
It is a normalizing gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to qualify, to classify, and to
punish…In it are combined the ceremony of power and the form of the experiment, the
deployment of force and the establishment of truth. At the heart of the procedures of discipline, it
manifests the subjection of those who are perceived as objects and the objectification of those who
are subjected.”1021

There are at least three ways in which the examination linked power and knowledge. First, it
constituted a shift from a sovereign’s excessive power that was visible rendered against a mostly
invisible populace, to an invisible deployment of power that required the object of its
examination to be visible.1022 “It is the fact of being constantly seen, of being able always to be
seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection.”1023 By this means (‘the
review’) subjects were constantly objectified.1024 With the examination of each individual came
the need for a network of documentation that tracked each individual and its relationship to
others: data collection (for example, military records of the living and the dead, or the medical
tracking of the course of a disease, or the aptitude of students and their improvements, or the
determination of categories or averages). This allowed both for the individual to become a
‘describable, analyzable object’ and the development of a ‘comparative system’ that allowed for
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more global analysis.1025 Documents pertaining to one individual comprised a ‘case.’ What was
once a sign of power (having one’s life committed to paper, like biographies of powerful men of
old) became a sign of subjection and objectification.1026 “In a system of discipline, the child is
more individualized than the adult, the patient more than the healthy man, the madman and the
delinquent more than the normal and the non-delinquent,” and the latter ‘normal’ members of the
pairs are only individualized based on comparison with the former ‘abnormal’ members.1027
Disciplinary power is best diffused in Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon. All cells form a
ring around a central tower, allowing for every inmate to be visible to a hypothetical observer
while the observer himself would never be seen. Subjects, such as inmates, students, and
workers, would be isolated, with no means of communication.1028 Because the prisoner never
knows if he is seen, but knows that he could be watched at any time, he will always regulate his
own behavior to avoid punishment.1029 This holds true for the supervisors as well, whose
performance can always be evaluated by inspectors just as easily.1030
The Panopticon must not be understood as a dream building: it is the diagram of a mechanism of
power reduced to its idea form; its functioning, abstracted from any obstacle, resistance, or
friction, must be represented as a pure architectural and optical system: it is in fact a figure of
political technology that may and must be detached from any specific use. 1031

The panoptic schema is applicable to any multiplicity of individuals assigned a task or a certain
form of behavior.1032 In this generalized form, it amplifies: “its aim is to strengthen the social
forces – to increase production, to develop the economy, spread education, raise the level of
public morality; to increase and multiply.”1033 Foucault summarizes it as follows:
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There are two images…of discipline. At one extreme, the discipline-blockade, the enclosed
institution, established on the edges of society, turned inwards towards negative functions:
arresting evil, breaking communications, suspending time. At the other extreme, with
panopticism, is the discipline-mechanism: a functional mechanism that must improve the exercise
of power by making it lighter, more rapid, more effective, a design of subtle coercion for a society
to come. The movement from one project to the other, from a schema of exceptional discipline to
one of a generalized surveillance, rests on a historical transformation: the gradual extension of the
mechanisms of discipline throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, their spread
throughout the whole social body, the formation of what might be called in general the
disciplinary society.1034

Panopticism is less a mutation of Classical forms of disciplinary power than its wholesale
victory. From its victory emerged the disciplinary society. Both it and its very disciplinary
mechanisms can be considered subjective, yet external, a ‘rendering docile’ through surveillance,
normalizing judgment, and examination.
This victory required disciplines to not merely serve a negative, preventative function,
but to also a positive, productive function (to make ‘useful’ individuals). The number of
disciplines that could not only repress but cultivate different kinds of individuals in different
ways ballooned.1035 Disciplinary mechanisms eventually detached from their specific
institutions and freely circulated throughout the social body.1036 The police apparatus, whose
surveillance and influence was all-pervasive yet invisible by design, emerged around this time,
becoming a vehicle for disciplinary power.1037 “In short, the eighteenth century police added a
disciplinary function to its role as the auxiliary of justice in the pursuit of criminals and as an
instrument for the political supervision of plots, opposition movements, or revolts.”1038 The
police could discipline where various enclosed institutions (like workshops, armies, and schools)
could not: “The organization of the police apparatus in the eighteenth century sanctioned a
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generalization of the disciplines that became co-extensive with the state itself.”1039 A reversal
had taken place: the spectacle, which made the few the object of the many, was replaced by a
surveillance that made the many the object of the few.1040
This power has less repressed us than it has invested us, ‘fabricated’ us,1041 and reduced
our bodies as ‘political’ forces ‘at the least cost’ and maximized their usefulness.1042 It was this
disciplinary power, in reciprocal relationship with knowledge, that produced clinical medicine,
psychiatry, child psychology, educational psychology, and the ‘rationalization of labor:’1043
“What [the] politico-juridical, administrative, and criminal, religious, and lay, investigation was
to the sciences of nature, disciplinary analysis has been to the sciences of man.”1044 The
fundamental difference Foucault sees between the investigation and the examination (and by
extension, between the natural sciences and the human sciences) is that the former, once bound
to a politico-juridical model, was able to free itself from it in its investigations of nature, while
the examination, in its investigations of man, has yet to emancipate itself from disciplinary
technology.1045
Disciplinary Power and Prisons
The prison plays a unique role in discipline1046. As an ‘exhaustive disciplinary
apparatus,’ all aspects of the individual, be it physical training, physical training, aptitude for
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work, everyday conduct, moral attitude, and state of mind, are managed by the prison.1047 Prison
seems to be the institution that combines the disciplinary practices of many non-penal
institutions and to have the sanction to thoroughly apply them: “It carries to their greatest
intensity all the procedures to be found in the other disciplinary mechanisms.”1048 While a
workshop may only be concerned with the aptitude for work, for example, such a concern
formed only part of a comprehensive rehabilitation.1049 Prisons seem to be the site of subjectiveexternal domination at its most extreme since they both restraint and ‘rehabilitate.’ Their
disciplinary task is overtly negative and positive. Prison forced the criminal to face his own
conscience: be that through silence or isolation.1050 It trained him to be a viable worker and
instilled within him a work ethic. It attempted to rehabilitate him. It was simultaneously cell,
workshop, and hospital.
One model, the Auburn model, by means of a policy of silence, isolated prisoners in their
moral existence but still placed them together in a collective work environment. While under
constant surveillance, prisoners, through work and training, simulated an ideal society whose
citizens submitted to the law. The other major model, the Philadelphia model, kept prisoners in
isolation in order to force the prisoner to confront his own conscience and through the remorse it
stirred, reform himself.1051 Second, work, as we have seen, was also considered to have
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rehabilitative powers, as well as providing a wage for the prisoner.1052 The purpose of penal
labor is “the constitution of a power relation, an empty economic form, a schema of individual
submission and of adjustment to a production apparatus.”1053 Third, imprisonment itself could
vary depending on the progress made by the convict. For example, the duration of imprisonment
could be abridged when the convict was considered reformed, or rewards could be given to
acknowledge and reinforce moral progress. It had been noted that bad character was not always
proportional to the crime committed; thus the offense alone was not a sufficient factor when
considering altering a sentence.1054 In short,
The carceral apparatus has recourse to three great schemata: the politico-moral schema of
individual isolation and hierarchy; the economic model of force applied to compulsory work; the
technico-medical model of cure and normalization. The cell, the workshop, the hospital. 1055

Discipline began where mere detention left off.1056
The Delinquent as Disciplinary Object of Knowledge
Gauging the improvement of individual prisoners required an apparatus of observation
that could accumulate data (so-called ‘clinical knowledge’) on each prisoner. But this prisoner
was now transfigured by power-knowledge into a new figure, a new object of knowledge: the
Delinquent.1057 The delinquent is not the offender but the typology that lies behind the actual
offense and all other possible offenses: “It is not so much his act as his life that is relevant in
characterizing him.”1058 It is this figure, and not the offender, who was susceptible to a kind of
disciplinary power that attempted to reform the propensities of those judged likely to commit
crime; thus, the crime was incidental since punishing it was no longer the aim of
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imprisonment.1059 To understand the delinquent means to understand not merely the
circumstances of the crime, but the cause of it as it is situated in the life of the delinquent, in his
psychology, social position, and upbringing. Only these three loci could uncover his dangerous
psychological proclivities, the harmful predispositions of his social position, and the bad
antecedents of his upbringing.1060 The delinquent precedes his crime and is its cause, being
comprised of deviant instincts, drives, tendencies, and character. Attempts were made to classify
types of delinquents, each type warranting a different treatment (intelligent delinquents requiring
solitude, stupid delinquents requiring education, inept delinquents requiring living in
common).1061 If the Madman is the correlate of subjective-internal forms of domination, the
Delinquent is the correlate of subjective-external forms of domination.
It is important to note in context to the delinquent the constant criticisms of the prison
system right from its inception, if only to suggest, as Foucault does, that the real purpose of
prisons is not to deter crime or rehabilitate criminals, since the prisoner is more likely to fall into
an incessant cycle of recidivism. Imprisonment incites the prisoner to rage against justice, cavort
with other criminals, fall into destitution, and, upon release, return to a life of crime to
survive.1062 After leaving prison, it is said that the ex-convict is subjected to such conditions of
surveillance and control, forced to live in certain residences that limited migration, and left so
publicly exposed concerning his penal past, that attaining work becomes difficult, derailing re1059
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integration into society. The ex-con inevitably becomes a recidivist due to these obstacles.
Finally, it was said that prisons left the families of criminals destitute, which led its members into
lives of crime.1063
Right from its birth, the prison was judged a failure that could be reformed only if it
reintroduced “the invariable principles of penitentiary techniques,” if it fully realized “the
corrective project as the only method of overcoming the impossibility of implementing it.”1064
Right from the start, prison reform called for a more personalized, hands-on engagement with
each prisoner: more rehabilitation, more documentation, classification, and tailored segregation
and treatment of prisoners by type, more vocational training, more surveillance and assistance
upon release.1065 In effect, the proposed answer to discipline’s alleged failure was more efficient
discipline. The failure and the perennially recurring call to reform the prison by reasserting its
fundamental principles is an intrinsic part of the prison and facilitate its longevity.1066
So if prisons fail to curb crime, what is their function? What purpose is served by
preserving delinquency, bolstering recidivism, transforming occasional offenders into habitual
delinquents, and created a ‘closed milieu of delinquency’?1067 The response is provocative:
One would be forced to suppose that the prison, and no doubt punishment in general, is not
intended to eliminate offenses, but rather to distinguish them, to distribute them, to use them; that
it is not so much that they render docile those who are liable to transgress the law, but that they
1063
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tend to assimilate the transgression of the laws in a general tactics of subjection. Penality would
then appear to be a way of handling illegalities…It provides them with a general ‘economy.’ And,
if one can speak of justice, it is not only because the law itself or the way of applying it serves the
interests of a class, it is also because the differential administration of illegalities through the
mediation of penality forms part of those mechanisms of domination. Legal punishments are to be
resituated in an overall strategy of illegalities. The ‘failure’ of the prison may be understood on
this basis.1068

By looking at the problem of prisons strategically, it becomes clear that reducing crime is not so
much its aim but rather that this aim gives license to practice a form of domination.
Foucault situates the prison, the toleration of some illegalities, and the rejection of others
historically (starting around the 1780s), as new laws that tended to exploit peasants and laborers
produced new illegalities, or resistances.1069 “A whole series of illegal practices, which during
the previous century had tended to remain isolated from one another, now seemed to come
together to form a new threat.”1070 The lower classes were now viewed as an outlaw class. This
was the social class to appear time and time again in front of the judge in a court of law. It was
no coincidence that this was the social class of delinquents.1071 Rather than seeing prison as
failing to eliminate crime, we should observe what it actually produces: “delinquency, a specific
type, a politically or economically less dangerous – and, on occasion, usable – form of illegality;
in producing delinquents, in an apparently marginal, but in fact centrally supervised milieu; in
producing the delinquent as a pathologized subject,”1072
Foucault argues that there are several motives for creating delinquency. In the Eighteenth
century there was a notion of a nebulous group of wrongdoers. With the introduction of the
carceral system and delinquency, a small definable group capable of being constantly surveilled
emerges. From an exploited lower class group that had the potential to cause significant political
and economic upheaval (rioting, looting) was forged a relatively impotent class of delinquents
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cut off from the lower class sympathy necessary to promote change. These delinquents, destitute
due to the limitations placed upon them after release, were now only capable of ‘localized
criminality’ (petty thefts, minor acts of violence, routine acts of law-breaking). Delinquency is
like a mark upon the oppressed that neutralizes them as threats; it is a fundamental element in a
strategy deployed by the upper class in its war against the lower class.1073 Furthermore,
discipline created an economy of illegalities the state and the police could integrate for their own
profit.1074 Just as insidious, the class of delinquents provided the state with a pool of possible
insiders and informants released from prison that could be used to infiltrate political parties and
workers’ associations or break up riots and strikes: “a clandestine police force and standby army
at the disposal of the state.”1075
What Foucault reveals is a circuit:
Prison and police form a twin mechanism; together they assure in the whole field of illegalities the
differentiation, isolation, and use of delinquency…Police surveillance provides the prison with
offenders, which the prison transforms into delinquents, the targets and auxiliaries of police
supervisions, which regularly send back a certain number of them to prison. 1076

This circuit was fueled by perpetuating the public narrative that the delinquent was dangerous
and everywhere and that only constant police surveillance could curtail it. That, supplemented
by the emergence of crime novels, characterized the delinquent as someone belonging to a
different world, someone that did not share in the common struggle with the oppressed. As
opposed to other forms of punishment in the past that left the door open for the public to identify
with the anti-authoritarian revolt of the offender, the delinquent was a danger the police were
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entitled to use as they wished.1077 This emphasis on the delinquency of the lower class often but
not completely obscured the legal sanction granted to the illegalities of the upper classes. 1078
Summary of the Subjective-External Form of Domination
In Discipline and Punish, we discovered a historical series of mutations in the way power
was deployed and the knowledge that was co-extensive with its operations. In the Ancien
Regime, there was the sovereign form of subjective-external domination, or sovereign power
over death. Its correlative object was the Condemned, basked in the light of the spectacle, and
the observing masses meant to be intimidated by the sovereign’s vengeance. In parts of the
Classical, as well as the Modern age, a new kind of power-knowledge mutation took effect.
Now a new form of subjective-external domination emerged: disciplinary power. Its correlative
object was two-fold: the docile body conditioned by discipline and panopticism, and the
Delinquent, whose rebellious potency was co-opted by the carceral system and the police-prisondelinquent circuit. Given that Kant considers social forces (like educational and civil institutions)
to be subjective-external objects, the identification of disciplinary power with subjective-external
domination is intuitive.
4.5 The Subjective-Internal Forms of Domination: The History of Sexuality – Volume I
Criteria for the Subjective-Internal Form of Domination
The first volume of The History of Sexuality concerns the Subjecive-Internal form of
domination since it concerns the hidden personal secret of one’s own sex. Once again, we are
discussing a characteristic of the human being (sexuality), so it is internal, and because this is
presented as a personal secret to be confessed, it is subjective. Foucault is skeptical that there is
such an inner truth, but instead sees the incessant imperative to discover and speak the personal
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truth of one’s sex(uality) as but a tactic playing out on a larger strategic stage. It is in this book
that Foucault discovers a new kind of power: Biopower – The power over life. What I am
concerned with exploring is how this ‘inner personal truth’, a construct of biopower, acts as a
means of control, especially insofar as it is characterized as a subjective truth. Biopower both
targets the subjective-internal domain of desire, and uses the ‘truth’ of this domain (the truth of
our sexuality) as a means of subjective-internal domination, a form of domination that
masquerades as personal liberation of repressed desires.
The Repressive Hypothesis and Confession
Foucault starts off The History of Sexuality by providing a summation of his foil – the
repressive hypothesis: It is commonly believed that sometime during the Seventeenth century,
sexual expression and talk about sex began to be repressed, in large part due to the rise of a
capitalist work ethic that found all but familial sexual reproduction wasteful.1079 Furthermore, as
the contemporary discourse on sex would have it, power, being merely negative in nature,
consistently represses sex, prompting the need to talk more and more about it to overcome that
repression.1080 If sex is but one victim of a repressive capitalist regime, it not only becomes a
necessary part of revolution to overturn sexual prohibition, but speaking about sex itself
transgresses this repressive power structure and becomes a positive act of rebellion.1081
What sustains our eagerness to speak of sex in terms of repression is doubtless this opportunity to
speak out against the powers that be, to utter truths and promise bliss, to link together
enlightenment, liberation, and manifold pleasures; to pronounce a discourse that combines the
fervor for knowledge, the determination to change the laws, and the longing for the garden of
earthly delights.1082
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Foucault wants to problematize this optimism and try to understand what role the discourse on
sex really plays in the grander scheme of power-knowledge. It is in this spirit that he asks,
Is it not with the aim of inciting people to speak of sex that it is made to mirror, at the outer limit
of every actual discourse, something akin to a secret whose discovery is imperative, a thing
abusively reduced to silence, and at the same time difficult and necessary, dangerous and precious
to divulge?1083

Foucault notes a curious paradox beginning in the Classical age: the age in which talk of
sex seemed to be constricted into innuendo and metaphor in the private sphere was the same age
in which the discourse on sex exploded, notably a
…multiplication of discourses concerning sex in the field of exercise of power itself: an
institutional incitement to speak about it, and to do so more and more; a determination on the part
of the agencies of power to hear it spoken about, and to cause it to speak through explicit
articulation and endlessly accumulated detail. 1084

But this development seems continuous with a tendency that had taken place in the Catholic
pastoral and the sacrament of penance since the Middle Ages. What once was compelled to be
articulated in excruciating detail during confession (the sexual act itself), started, after the
Counter-Reformation to be veiled and replaced by a focus on disclosing details of one’s sexual
desires: “Sex must not be named imprudently, but its aspects, its correlations, and its effects must
be pursued down to their slenderest ramifications…”1085 The ‘flesh’ was considered to be ‘the
root of all evil’ and thus had to be traced and rooted out of the deepest recesses of the soul. Such
a tracing required absolute disclosure of desire, for a confessor’s mind to be laid bare for
examination. At minimum, this was the ideal set for one to be a good Christian: all desire,
especially sexual desire, must be converted into discourse.1086 By converting desire into
discourse, one was to both master desire and detach from it but also experience a spiritual
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conversion. This role attributed to confession was to detach from the monastic nursery where it
exhaled its first breaths and circulate in secular society as the Classical age progressed. 1087
Sexual Regulation
Reason, as well as morality, was now to take stock of sex as something to be “managed,
inserted into systems of utility, regulated for the greater good of all, made to function according
to an optimum”.1088 What was beginning to take place was not distinct from what had taken
place in confessionals. Sex was no longer something to be minimized or censored but something
to be regulated and ‘policed’ to maximize its potential.1089 For example, the notion of
‘population’ became politically and economically relevant at this time, which rendered its source
– sex – of the utmost importance: “This was the first time that a society had affirmed, in a
constant way, that its future and fortune were tied not only to the number and the uprightness of
its citizens, to their marriage rules and family organization, but to the manner in which each
individual made use of his sex,” and then sought to analysis it and intervene.1090 Institutions (or
‘centers’) began to incorporate and produce discourses on sex, such as medicine, which looked to
it as the cause of ‘nervous disorders,’ psychiatry, that eyed certain sexual practices (like excess
and onanism) as possible sources for mental illnesses, criminal justice, and pedagogy.1091
Up until the Eighteenth century, the marital couple was the primary focus of those ‘major
explicit codes’ that ‘governed’ sexual practices (canonical law, the Christian pastoral, and civil
law), not necessarily sexual practices outside the bounds of marital obligation.1092 That is not to
say that the courts were not concerned with ‘deviant’ sexual practices, but that civil and religious
jurisdictions were concerned with a ‘general unlawfulness’ that was just as likely to condemn
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adultery as sodomy.1093 With the onset of the Eighteenth century, a shift occurred in which the
heterosexual marital couple, albeit set as the norm, came out of focus and was replaced with all
those forms of sexuality that deviated from it (children, the mad, criminals, homosexuals,
etc.).1094 Furthermore, deviations within that norm and deviations from that norm now were
struck, the latter being designated as ‘unnatural’: “To marry a close relative or practice sodomy,
to seduce a nun or engage in sadism, to deceive one’s wife or violate cadavers, became things
that were essentially different.”1095 The latter terms now belonged to a wide ‘family’ of
perversions, or ‘peripheral sexualities.’1096
‘The function of power exerted’ on peripheral sexualities in the Classical and Modern
ages operated in four ways. First, this new operation of power only claimed to eliminate certain
practices or vices it knew it could not eliminate. Instead power relied on what it claimed to
subdue as a prop to support its further encroachment, multiplying “its relays and its effects, while
its target expanded, subdivided, and branched out, penetrating further into reality at the same
pace” (Foucault refers to this as ‘lines of penetration’).1097 Its very failure was the condition for
its perpetual spread. This should be reminiscent of how prisons claimed their purpose was to
eliminate crime while in reality they had incorporated it as delinquency and relied upon in order
to function. Second, perversions were incorporated and perverted individuals were divided into
types or ‘species.’ For example, before the Nineteenth century, sodomy was considered a
forbidden act and its perpetrator a mere ‘juridical subject,’ like a thief or adulterer.1098 That all
changed in the Nineteenth century when the perpetrator of the act was characterized as
possessing a certain ‘sexual sensibility’: “The nineteenth-century homosexual became a
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personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form,
and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology...The
homosexual was now a species.”1099 Numerous species of perverts were coined.1100 “The
machinery of power that focused on this whole alien strain did not aim to suppress it, but rather
to give it an analytical, visible, and permanent reality.”1101 Third, power now traced the signs
and causes of dysfunctions to the body, probing it medically, or coaxing out confessions through
psychiatric investigation, a process which not only produced pleasure (at minimum the
excitement of curiosity and voyeurism), but also a positive feedback loop in which the pleasure
produced excited power to probe further. These investigations became a game of seduction and
evasion between examiner and patient, what Foucault calls ‘perpetual spirals of power and
pleasure.’1102 Finally, spaces and relationships were not simply bifurcated into those that
permitted sexuality and those that forbade it.1103 Sexuality circulated through a complicated
“network of pleasures and powers linked together at multiple points and according to
transformable relationships.”1104 Foucault’s thesis is provocative:
“The growth of perversions is not a moralizing theme that obsessed the scrupulous minds of the
Victorians. It is the real product of the encroachment of a type of power on bodies and their
pleasures…And accompanying this encroachment of powers, scattered sexualities rigidified,
became stuck to an age [(like infantile sexuality)], a place [(like the school or the home)], a type of
practice [(like homosexuality)].”1105

Perversions were not so much discovered as they were produced.
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The Confessional Imperative plays a crucial role in the subjective-internal form of
domination. The very notion that speaking one’s desires is in some way liberating what has been
censored is a ‘ruse’ that ignores centuries of practices that have demanded that people tell what
they are, what they do, what they remember, what they think, all in the most minute details.1106
We moderns only believe speaking our truth is liberating because that power has succeeded in
fooling us in the most insidious way possible: By convincing us that compliance with its
injunction is transgressing it. Confession plays a crucial role in a two-fold ‘subjection’: one is
dominated (like a king’s subject) and one is constituted as an ‘I’ (a subject).1107 In a move that
pre-empts his later work, Foucault contrasts the way the ancient Greeks related truth to sex
verses how the Moderns do (scientia sexualis):
In Greece, truth and sex were linked, in the form of pedagogy, by the transmission of a precious
knowledge from one body to another; sex served as a medium for initiations into learning. For us,
it is in the confession that truth and sex are joined, through the obligatory and exhaustive
expression of an individual secret. But this time it is truth that serves as a medium for sex and its
manifestations.1108

Only for the Moderns does Sex bear the secret to self-knowledge.1109
When a ‘science of the subject’ emerged, it was based on two often conflicting truth
procedures: the procedures of confession, based on ‘the old juridico-religious model’, and
scientific discursivity, stemming from “the extortion of confidential evidence according to the
rules of scientific discourse”.1110 Due to the conjectured nature of sex, which was pervasive and
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yet hidden, a particular kind of therapeutic engagement and hermeneutic transcription was
authorized that compelled confession.1111 Put otherwise…
…sexuality was defined as being “by nature”: a domain susceptible to pathological processes, and
hence one calling for therapeutic or normalizing interventions; a field of meanings to decipher; the
site of processes concealed by specific mechanisms; a focus of indefinite causal relations; and an
obscure speech that had to be ferreted out and listened to. 1112

From a centuries’ long interplay, beginning with Christian confession and ending on the
analyst’s couch, a knowledge of the subject evolved: “the project of a science of the subject has
gravitated, in ever narrowing circles, around the question of sex.”1113
The Modern does not merely demand that sex speak the truth; it demands that it speak
our personal truth. It is on the basis of this coaxed confession that the Pervert readily steps
forward to speak his truth and take his punishment, being both the product of the discourse on
sex and its most legitimized target. He now joins the ranks of the Madman, the Crackpot, and
the Delinquent, those abnormal figures of which Man is but the despotic negative image.
Sex and Power
But what is this injunction, this ‘will to knowledge’ regarding the truth of sex? Why
have we been so persistent “to constitute it as a secret, the omnipotent cause, the hidden
meaning, the unremitting fear”?1114 The answer requires a new conception of power.
Just as the traditional ‘juridico-discursive’ function of power cannot account for
discipline (subjective-external domination), this same repressive function cannot explain how the
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discourse of Sex produces and controls us (subjective-internal domination). Modern power is
not merely something negative that represses, nor does it merely operate by means of
prohibitions, censorship, and law. Modern power has displaced the Sovereign, and no longer
operates only from on-high, but is instead diffused throughout society.1115 We must reconceive
of power locally, as something that starts as a situational relation of forces (a ‘microphysics of
power’). From these local relations emerge the more familiar larger state apparatuses of
oppression. Power is diffuse and omnipresent in society because unequal relations of force (be
these economic relations, knowledge relationships, sexual relationships, etc.) exist throughout
society at every level. Power relations can resonate with each other, forming, on a macro-level,
consistent strategies and tactics that are intelligible, with a clear objective or aim, but that lack a
centralized rational agent deliberating on those objectives and pulling the strings. 1116 Modern
power does not so much operate due to right but by technique, nor law but normalization, nor
punishment but control, all measures less concerned with repression that discipline.1117 We only
give priority to the juridico-discursive function of power because power can only be tolerated if
it conceals its own mechanisms. As long as we conceive of power as a ‘No’, an outside to power
is presumed to which we can escape.1118 But there is no such outside to power.
Power and Resistance
The absolute diffusion of power relations has at least one positive outcome: Each point of
power is also, by necessity a point of resistance that could reverse the relation. In ‘The Subject
and Power’ Foucault encourages us to take “the forms of resistance against different forms of
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power as a starting point.”1119 The imposition of force always meets with a reaction, and we
should observe, upon reflection, that such resistance was evident as early as History of Madness
and is in no way limited to The History of Sexuality. Insofar as Foucault merely means
‘opposition’ then his claim does not seem controversial, as history seems to consistently bear this
claim out. Discourses are ‘tactically polyvalent,’ which means that the same discourse deployed
to dominate can be reversed and utilized for the sake of resistance. For example, homosexuals
originally used “the same categories by which [they were] medically disqualified.”1120
Foucault’s position on resistance, as Paul Veyne notes, lies in the position that even in conquest
the conquered is always free. A subject may be constituted but nonetheless remains free to take
a step back and by means of thought struggle with those constitutive limitations.1121 Upon
Veyne’s reading, “The set-up is not so much a determinism that produces us; rather, it is an
obstacle against which our thoughts and liberty either do or do not react.”1122 Foucault’s project
can be taken as evidence that this opposition is possible, which is the central thesis of
McGushin’s book Foucault’s Askesis. And insofar as this claim is compelling, Foucualt
provides us with an example in his own person of how an engagement with the self through
thought acts as a means of resistance.
Some may challenge whether or not change is possible if there is no outside to power.
And given that change may be possible would not a resisting power merely become the new
dominating power? If the only ethical value is freedom, then a resisting cause is merely
tentatively good, unless such a cause never fully succeeds in gaining the upper hand. In ‘Lives
of Infamous Men,’ Foucault sometimes seems to revel in accounts of criminals for the sheer fact
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that they resisted.1123 Yet Foucault’s evaluations typically assume many Western moral values,
freedom being but the most obvious. He later tries to build an ethics from the invention of new
pleasures, new relationships, and new modes of existence, but one gets the sense that what
Foucault needs to underpin all of this is an explicit moral theory, a project he shows no interest
in developing (As Foucault once said, “The search for a form of morality acceptable to everyone
strikes me as catastrophic”1124). Contrary to such a conclusion, Oksala concludes that
…although Foucault’s ethics can never be completely salvaged from the point of view of
normative ethics…it is possible that as a style, a manner of writing, it does express ethical values.
These values are not communicated as linguistic propositions providing a normative ground or
framework; they must be understood as part of Foucault’s philosophy as lived. 1125

Given Foucault’s claim that power is local, even if total without an outside, it may follow that
ethics can only be decided locally, in the midst of struggle. In this way it’s possible that
resistance could itself resist becoming its opposite. But can local victories be enough?
Power and Knowledge
If there is no ‘outside’ of power, then knowledge is always situated within the network of
power.
If sexuality was constituted as an area of investigation, this is only because relations of power had
established it as a possible object; and conversely, if power was able to take it as a target, this was
because techniques of knowledge and procedures of discourse were capable of investing it.1126

As scholar Beatrice Han describes it, “it is not the discourse that is adequate to reality but
“reality” that is adequate to the discourse – the “scientifically acceptable discourse” being in fact
the mere description of the symptoms that it itself has induced.”1127 Sexuality is no longer
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understood as a ‘natural given’ that power tries to suppress or something hidden that knowledge
tries to uncover but instead as something produced:
It is the name that can be given to a historical construct…a great surface network in which the
stimulation of bodies, the intensification of pleasures, the incitement to discourse, the formation of
special knowledges, the strengthening of controls and resistances, are linked to one another, in
accordance with a few major strategies of knowledge and power. 1128

This may seem like an unwarranted, overly strong claim to make, as surely something must exist
to be regulated. What ultimately seem to precede this historical construct are bodies and the
various forms of pleasure that can be produced by specific forms of stimulation and
manipulation.
However, Judith Butler has an interesting response to such a criticism. Upon her reading,
Foucault both seems to argue that a pre-existing body is inscribed by means of power1129 and is
constituted by power, the latter perspective being her own.
We can understand Foucault’s references to the “soul” as an implicit reworking of the Aristotelian
formulation. Foucault argues in Discipline and Punish that the “soul” becomes a normative and
normalizing ideal according to which the body is trained, shaped, cultivated, and invested; it is an
historically specific imaginary ideal…under which the body is effectively materialized. 1130

In other words, there is no neutral body because the body has always been historically shaped by
power. From this perspective, Foucault’s notion that sexuality is a historical construct becomes
more plausible.
We already saw in History of Madness that the connection between madness and
sexuality psychoanalysis discovers was less an essential connection than a historical synthesis
effected by the preceding techniques of Confinement. Now Foucault goes further in
demonstrating the role of power in knowledge, noting at least ‘four great strategic unities’ that,
having operated since the Eighteenth century, “formed specific mechanisms of knowledge and
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power centering on sex:”1131 a hysterization of women’s bodies, a pedagogization of childen’s
sex, a socialization of procreative behavior, and a psychiatrization of perverse behavior. Each
strategy has a privileged object of knowledge: the hysterical woman, the masturbating child, the
Malthusian couple, and the perverse adult. Combined, the field of all possible human members
(women, children, and men) was invested and its sex appropriated.1132 We are once again
reminded of the hysterical woman and her symptoms that threatened to upset the social order, the
familial order, and the health of the child; we’re reminded of the obsessive surveillance of
children, whose developmental state was so precarious that the slightest introduction of sex could
derail it; we see the familiar concern with the reproductive potential of couples;1133 finally, we
how ‘the sexual instinct’ was “isolated as a separate biological and psychical instinct,” was
scrutinized for deviations, norms constructed, and deviations ‘corrected.’1134 Much of this
psychodrama played out in the Family, making it the privileged target of therapeutic
intervention.1135
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If for more than a century the West has displayed such a strong interest in the prohibition of incest, if more or less by
common accord it has been seen as a social universal and one of the points through which every society is obliged to pass
on the way to becoming a culture, perhaps this is because it was found to be a means of self-defense, not against an
incestuous desire, but against the expansion and the implications of this deployment of sexuality which had been set up, but
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The incest taboo narrative would seem to be a mechanism for riveting this new deployment of sexuality to the
ancient laws of alliance (rules concerning the family, marriage, etc.) Ibid 109.
Our society both produces an abundance of techniques of power that bypass the law and tries to ‘recode’ this power
in the confines of law. Amidst this, ‘the family’ has one foot in alliances and the other in sexuality, making it an
ambivalent site of contestation that produced an array of new ‘personages.’ Ibid 109-110.
The nervous woman, the frigid wife, the indifferent mother – or worse, the mother beset by murderous
obsessions – the impotent, sadistic, perverse husband, the hysterical or neurasthenic girl, the precocious and
already exhausted child, and the young homosexual who rejects marriage or neglects his wife. These were
the combined figures of an alliance gone bad and an abnormal sexuality; they were the means by which the
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But if sexuality is a historical construct, what purpose does it serve? Surprisingly, the
deployment of sexuality was originally an attempt by the ruling class to perfect itself by finding
techniques that ‘maximized life;’ it was not a collection of repressive techniques aimed at
controlling the lower classes: “The primary concern was not repression of the sex of the classes
to be exploited, but rather the body, vigor, longevity, progeniture, and descent of [those] classes
[that] ruled…It has to be seen as the self-affirmation of one class rather than the enslavement of
another.”1136 What the bourgeoisie aimed to create was a ‘class body’ and a sexuality. 1137 Sex
became the soul’s “most secret and determinant part,” in whose hands the health and vitality of
future bourgeois generations depended.1138 It was only later, when such things as outbreaks,
heavy industry, and the administrative and technical means of controlling the lower classes by
means of it arose in the Nineteenth century that they were unwillingly included in this
deployment.1139 After this (at the end of the Nineteenth century), the discourse of repression
took over, as bourgeois sexuality was simultaneously re-inscribed within the bounds of the law
and illness was posited as caused by repression. In this way, the bourgeoisie distinguished itself
from the lower class (in a manner paralleled in Discipline and Punish): the lower class was not

disturbing factors of the latter were brought into the former; and yet they also provided an opportunity for the
alliance system to assert its prerogatives in the order of sexuality. Ibid 110-111.

Now taxed by the struggle between alliance and sexuality, the bourgeois family of the mid-nineteenth century turned
to various experts to examine it, track down its dysfunction, and correct it. Ibid 111. From this context arose both
psychiatry and later psychoanalysis. Often doctors would remove children from their families (the milieu of
alliances) to best focus on the child’s sexuality in order to cure them. But while psychiatry used a neurological
model when diagnosing and treating, psychoanalysis dispensed with this model and framed sexuality and psychic
problems in context to dysfunctional family dynamics, the incest taboo, and a revitalized ‘law of alliance.’ Ibid 112113. “The guarantee that one would find the parents-children relationship at the root of everyone’s sexuality made it
possible – even when everything seemed to point to the reverse process – to keep the deployment of sexuality
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repressed while the bourgeoisie was precisely because only the latter was obedient to the law.
Psychoanalysis both re-inscribed sexuality within the bounds of the law and attempted to relieve
repression, allowing the bourgeoisie to voice its unsavory desires safely while the lower classes
were punished for them by the state.1140
Power since the Classical age does not merely suppress or seize but also administers life.
Foucault refers to this new power as bio-power: “A power bent on generating forces, making
them grow, and ordering them…”1141 In those cases when violence, such as warfare, is
committed by the state, it is in committed for the sake of everyone, for the sake of life and the
benefit of populations and races, rather than the defense of the sovereign. This is even true in the
most barbaric of instances that seem to run counter to the administration of life: genocide.
If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the
ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species,
the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population…One had the right to kill those who
represented a kind of biological danger to others”1142

Bio-power has at least two forms: disciplines that targeted the body and regulatory controls that
targeted populations (the anatomic and the biological, respectively). The former, anatomopolitics of the human body, we are already familiar: discipline sought to both maximize the
potentials of the body as well as render it docile.1143 The latter, bio-politics of the population,
targeted the ‘species body,’ “the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis
of the biological processes; propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy
and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary.”1144 A ‘normalizing society’
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was the result of this confluence.1145 Without bio-power and this calculated regulation of bodies
and populations, capitalism could not have developed and flourished.1146
Foucault has now laid the necessary foundations for us to understand why Sex was such a
crucial deployment: Sex lies at the intersection of both the disciplining of bodies and the
regulation of populations since it pertains to both the mastery of the body’s potential and the
health of this generation and the cultivation of future generations.1147 “Sex was a means of
access both to the life of the body and the life of the species. It was employed as the standard for
the disciplines and as a basis for regulations.”1148 Each of the four great strategies “was a way of
combining disciplinary techniques with regulative methods.”1149 The hysterization of women’s
bodies and the pedagogization of children’s sex appeal to population benefits to justify
discipline, and the socialization of procreative behavior along with the psychiatrization of
perverse pleasure appeal to individual disciplinary benefits to justify regulation.1150
The notion of sex, which we see now as the fundamental means by which two kinds of
bio-power found unity, is like a principle of unity in other ways as well:
The notion of “sex” made it possible to group together, an artificial unity, anatomical elements,
biological functions, conducts, sensations, and pleasures, and it enabled one to make use of this
fictitious unity as a causal principle, an omnipresent meaning, a secret to be discovered
everywhere: sex was thus able to function as a unique signifier and as a universal signified.1151

Therefore, sex is less a prediscursive anchorage point for sexuality than it is an ‘ideal element’
deployed when power seizes the body and incites its capacities.1152 Knowledge of sex also
gained the halo of quasi-scientificity by means of its proximity to biology (reproductive science),
and was able at times to determine its norms by appeal to biology and physiology.
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Sex acts as

an ‘imaginary point’ that mediates all access we can have to our own bodies, identity, and
‘intelligibility.’1153
We have arrived at a point where we expect our intelligibility to come from what was for many
centuries thought of as madness; the plenitude of our body from what was long considered its
stigma and likened to a wound; our identity from what was perceived as an obscure and nameless
urge.1154

Finally, the notion of sex conceals the nature of power by means of the repressive hypothesis,
which in turn commands that we track down the secret of our sex and confess it to free ourselves,
making it desirable to do so, blinding us to the reality that we are further affirming power.1155
Summary of the Subjective-Internal Form of Domination
In sum, bio-power controls us by inciting us to speak and examine the truth of our sex.
Those who deviate from the norm are deemed Perverts. Institutions, in turn, are then given
license to normalize them. We can resist power and the deployment of sexuality by deprioritizing the ceaseless examination of sexual desire, replacing it with a focus on bodies and
pleasure,1156 perhaps by rediscovering an erotic art the West seems to have mostly lost. Every
site of power is also a site of resistance, just as every discourse bears within itself the potential of
reversal. For example, the same language used to stigmatize homosexuality can be appropriated
to defend it.1157 Subjective-internal domination, like any form of domination, is reversible.
4.6 Conclusions Concerning the Four Kinds of Domination
I argued that if the four kinds of heteronomous principles Kant categorized were a
comprehensive list of the ways in which the will could be dominated, then Foucault’s work,
which primarily focuses on forms of domination, would necessarily conform to that Table’s
categorization. I argued that at least four of his books could be mapped onto each quadrant of
1153
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the Table, implying that Foucault’s work also attempted a comprehensive mapping of the general
ways the social sciences objectify us (The archaeological period corresponding with the
Objective axis and the genealogical period with this Subjective axis).
I started with the History of Madness, and “the first great figure of the objectification of
man”: Madness.1158 I argued that madness, which to the Classical mind suffered from too much
liberty, was silenced in the Modern period by means of an objective-internal form of domination,
namely, the moral character internalized by means of psychiatric treatment that sat as a constant
judge of the patient’s thoughts and behaviors. The asylum was, as Foucault argues, a moral
institution which treated illness like a vice that had to be confessed and taken responsibility for,
and by means of this, a moral character was internalized. The doctor’s…
…presence and his language possessed that power of disalienation, which at a stroke revealed
faults and restored the moral order…If the medical character could circumscribe madness, it was
not because he knew it but because he mastered it; and what positivism came to consider as
objectivity was nothing but the converse, the effects of this domination. 1159

The power to cure embodied by the doctor was less medical than it was moral.1160 Granted this, I
argued that this form of domination separated the Madman from the Sane. Arguably, many of
the other agents of Unreason could be placed here as well, such as the libertine and the pauper,
since what they were said to lack was a moral character that embodied a respect for work.
I then explored the Archaeology of Knowledge, and argued that the rules of formation
that characterize a given episteme delineate the rules of intelligibility that divide those who
‘make sense’ from those that do not. It seemed appropriate to characterize this form of
domination that divided the Reasonable from the Crackpot as objective-external, since
epistemological rules are neither subjective, nor internal.
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I then examined Discipline and Punish and argued that the disciplines constituted a form
of subjective-external domination that fell in line with Kant’s own characterization of subjectiveexternal material practical principles as concerning social institutions (like government and
education). This form of domination ranks everyone on a continuum from Delinquency to
Docility. Ultimately, the aim of discipline, as we saw, was both to render the body most
effective and also the most docile and susceptible to power.
Finally, I examined The History of Sexuality, and argued that bio-power, at least in
context to the deployment of sexuality, was a form of subjective-internal domination insofar as it
insinuates itself into our lives by means of the notion of sex, of a personal inner truth that hides
like a secret and must be painstakingly tracked down and confessed. While there were four
sexual deviations - the hysterical woman, the masturbating child, the non-procreative couple, and
the pervert – I simplified this to the Pervert and the Healthy Adult.
We can thus derive the four principles (if I may indulge legalistic language) that comprise
Modern Man and his domination based on the four ways that Foucault analyzes madness,
science, criminality, and sexuality, respectively. Each explores a process of objectification
insofar as each of the four material practical principles concerns a specific kind of object. Taken
together as four object-determinations of the same object (Man), they together form a total
objectification, since there are only these four kinds of objects. From History of Madness we see
the influences of psychology, from The Archaeology of Knowledge the influences of epistemes,
from Discipline and Punish the influences of disciplinary power, and from The History of
Sexuality: Volume I the influences of biopower. These influences can be summarized as
anthropological imperatives:
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1.
2.

The Objective-Internal Principle: Internalize the voice of responsibility.
The Objective-External Principle: Comply with the rules of formation of your given
episteme.
3. The Subjective-External Principle: Comply with those disciplines that aim to render your
body docile and receptive to power.
4. The Subjective-Internal Principle: “To exchange life in its entirety for sex itself, for the
truth and sovereignty of sex.”1161

4.7 Anticipated Concern: Is Kantian Morality Complicit with Psychology?
It will be my ultimate contention that contemporary therapeutic psychology loses
freedom because it is not moral (rather it is heteronomous), and that Kantian ethics, in its critique
of heteronomy and it valorization of autonomy, reveals this impasse between freedom and
happiness as well as a possible way it can be overcome. This move is analogous to Foucault’s
own, insofar as he explores the way that the Ancients moderated their pleasures as a way to
stylize their own freedom (to be explored in the next chapter). Yet Foucault criticizes
psychology (the modern objective-internal principle), the institution of the asylum in which it
emerged, and ultimately psychoanalysis itself, on the grounds that psychological treatment is
inherently moral rather than medical. To be sure, Kantian ethics is normative and the Critical
project, so concerned with drawing limits, may reinforce normalization and discipline:
In Kant, the problem of the spiritual condition of knowledge is taken up in the question of
discipline – the body, as the source of heteronomy must be submitted to the discipline of reason –
and in the question of the relationship between the epistemological subject and the ethical
subject…In each action one must take up a relationship to oneself as a universal legislator of
moral law.1162

So how can I suggest a sympathy between Kant and Foucault? Upon McGushin’s reading,
discipline is the precondition for Kantian freedom and the epistemological limitations of Critique
make self-transformation and askesis ‘absurd’ since the self cannot be known or perceived. 1163
However, contrary to McGushin’s claims, such a limitation forces the subject to create itself as
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an ethical subject, not by appeal to a normative body of knowledge but by means of his own
reason. Foucault (or McGushin) cannot accuse Kant of both submitting the self to discipline
while simultaneously cutting the legs out from under power’s means of doing so: the human
sciences. While Kant may consign the body to the sway of discipline, he does mark out a space
free of external determinations and discipline’s normative reach: the soul.
But the rebuttal is even stronger. Even if the moral law were grounded by discipline (a
claim Foucault once again can only suggest rather than prove), it is disingenuous to Kant to
suggest that he thinks all actions fall under the jurisdiction of moral judgment. They don’t.
Those actions that are non-moral fall under the domain of prudential reason, which is concerned
with happiness. Furthermore, if Kant thought that happiness were anything but subjective, he
would not have rejected it as the basis for a moral principle. Happiness by its very subjective
nature resists the normative standards of universal laws because what pleases one does not please
another.
It is not necessary for Kant and Foucault to hold the same metaphysical positions on
freedom, merely that they are compossible. There may be many kinds of freedom, one type
grounded in rational self-legislation and another on resistance. Or put another way, resistance
could be phenomenal. The same problem nonetheless emerges for both: how are happiness (or
pleasure) and freedom to be reconciled? And both turn to ethics to answer that question. The
categorical imperative is not a principle of domination but a principle of self-stylization, a
stylization of one’s freedom at the same time that it is that freedom’s condition. To be sure, that
stylization carries normative weight, but at least when it comes to imperfect duties, a personal
style is also possible (Nor should we so easily accept Foucault’s two-fold claims that ‘normative
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ethics’ and the human sciences necessarily act as threats to freedom). It is to Foucault’s account
of how ethics can stylize freedom that I now turn.
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5.1 Foucault’s Response to Power-Knowledge: Askesis and the Ethical Turn
Introduction
Given that the human sciences, such as psychology, are complicit with power-knowledge
domination, what alternatives exist for engaging the subject that bypass this domination?
Foucault’s response to modern domination, I argue, will parallel Kant’s response to psychology
and heteronomy: resistance is most effectively mounted from the locus of ethics rather than
theoretical knowledge. Ethics, for Foucault, is “the conscious practice of freedom,”1164 which is
commensurate with the task at hand to think the subject qua subject (as an agent). An ethical
engagement with the subject does not mean expounding universal moral precepts, or
recapitulating the implicit moral norms of psychiatry and psychology, but rather, enables “one to
get free of oneself.”1165 The ethical subject differs from the psychological subject insofar as it
acts as a locus of resistance against power rather than enabling it, as the latter, modern
disciplinary subject does. Foucault, as we have seen, does not explicitly concern himself with
morality, so we must bear in mind that discussions of ethics in this chapter do not necessarily
bear the weight of moral injunctions (albeit Kantian ascesis does).
What Foucault’s late work turns to is askesis, an ancient approach to philosophy
concerned with the care of the self, or with remaking oneself. Foucault turns to the past, not in
order to return to some lost way of life (be it Greek or otherwise), but to shake free of the present
and “to give one’s individual life a form which, because it is reflexive, necessarily includes one’s
own transformation.”1166 In Foucault’s Askesis: An Introduction to the Philosophical Life,
Edward McGushin notes of Foucault’s late work that it reflects a form of ‘philosophical
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problemization’ that acts as “a mode of resistance to power-knowledge that takes the form of
new practices of subjectivity: care of the self (epimeleia heautou) and ethical truth-telling
(parrhesia).”1167 After I have discussed ancient Greek ascesis (Volume II of The History of
Sexuality: The Use of Pleasure), I will note modern applications of this means of resistance. All
of this is meant to anticipate Kant’s own turn to ethics as a means of thinking the subject qua
subject.
However, it is neither my nor Foucault’s contention that ancient Greek ascesis is a model
whose content must be emulated. Many of these practices are immoral, such as how free men
could use women and young boys as mere means for the sake of their own self-cultivation (in the
domains of economics and erotics, respectively). Insofar as an alleged ethical practice is at odds
with morality (rather than just adjacent), one may even question whether or not it is even proper
self-care. Therefore Foucaultian ethics should not replace morality but rather supplement it,
which is possible given that both are concerned with cultivating freedom. Where ethics
(understood as self-care) conflicts with morality ethics must yield.
Ethical Practice
At the beginning of The Use of Pleasure, Foucault summarizes his previous work and the
work that lies ahead of him:
After first studying the games of truth in their interplay with one another, as exemplified by
certain empirical sciences in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and then studying their
interaction with power relations, as exemplified by punitive practices – I felt obliged to study the
games of truth in the relationship of self with self and the forming of oneself as a subject, taking as
my domain of reference and field of investigation what might be called “the history of desiring
man.”1168
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This history is inseparable from a certain ‘art of existence,’ or ‘technology of the self,’ that
sought not merely to determine conduct but also to transform the self and make its “life into an
oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria.”1169 Volumes II
and III of The History of Sexuality attempt to write “a history of ethical problematizations based
on practices of the self,” an archaeological investigation that intersects with “a genealogy of
practices of the self” at the point when ‘desiring man’ is analyzed.1170
Self-cultivation, for the ancients, should not be understood as the imposition of a set of
universal prohibitions, but instead as a manner of stylizing one’s life, of transforming the self
into a being capable of accessing the truth (what Foucault calls spirituality1171). Rather than
restricting one’s freedom, ascesis was practiced by free men as an expression of their freedom.
Such efforts attempted to master those domains of life, such as sexual practice, not prohibited by
moral codes, law, or custom but still deemed from a different perspective to be problematic sites
requiring austerity.1172 It’s important to note that for the Greeks ethics was mostly the province
of free men, so it is not morality, which obligates regardless of sex or social standing. Foucault
is not concerned with exploring morality since “moral codes are relatively stable;” but rather the
variations that occur historically in man’s ethical relation to himself.1173 Thus it would be a
mistake to assume when Foucault talks about Greek ethics that he is talking about Greek morals
per se, but presumably one who is ethical would also obey the interdictions of their given culture
(not to kill, not to steal, etc.). There are thus two kinds of morality: ‘code-oriented’ morality
(which emphasizes compliance with standards of conduct) and ‘ethics-oriented’ morality (which
is concerned with the type of person one is trying to become more than what one does). Ancient
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morality was typically of the ethics-oriented variety, or askesis.1174 Code-based morality, with its
various interdictions, has been relatively stable for millennia (but in modern times may be on the
decline), while ethics-based morality has changed over time (and may now be needed).1175
Given that sexual behavior is one of those domains not necessarily legislated by law or custom
that ethics (as self-care) can stylize, Foucault outlines at least four themes, or ‘locuses of
problematization of sexual practice’: one’s relationship to one’s own body, to one’s wife, to
boys, and to truth.1176 These are referred to as dietetics, economics, erotics, and philosophy,
respectively.1177
In order to analyze ethics-oriented morality, demonstrate the role ethics plays in subjectconstitution, and to articulate new manners of resistance by means of it, a new conceptual
apparatus is necessary. Foucault employs four concepts to accomplish this task: ethical
substance, mode of subjection, elaboration of ethical work, and the telos of the ethical subject.
Ethical substance refers to that which ethics is meant to mold, such as desires, pleasures, actions,
and virtues, in the case of sexual ethics.1178 A mode of subjection is “the way in which the
individual establishes his relation to the rule and recognizes himself as obliged to put it into
practice.” 1179 For example, a Stoic may say, “I have to be faithful to my wife because I am a
human and rational being” while a king, such as Nicocles, king of Cyprus may obligate himself
“Because I am a king, and because as somebody who commands others, who rules others, I have
to show that I am able to rule myself.”1180 There is also the form of elaboration of ethical work,
which is the work performed by the subject in order not only to comply with the rules but also to
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“transform oneself into the ethical subject of one’s behavior” (for example, Foucault cites that
sexual austerity could be adapted based on a rigorous education requiring memorization of
precepts and a thorough, regular examination of one’s conduct).1181 Finally, there is the telos of
the ethical subject, which is “the kind of being to which we aspire when we behave in a moral
way” (for example, being free, or pure, or master over oneself). 1182
Ethical Analysis: How an Ethical Subject Emerges
Foucault focuses on ancient Greek art of existence in order to showcase an alternative to
the domination-complicit human sciences. For the Greeks, their ethical substance was
aphrodisia (“desires, acts, and pleasures”1183), their mode of subjection chresis (“the careful use
of pleasures”1184), their elaboration of ethical work enkrateia (self-mastery by means of asketic
training1185), and their ethical telos sophrosyne (moderation).1186
Aphrodisia are “the acts, gestures, and contacts that produce a certain form of
pleasure.”1187 The ethical question that was raised concerning them was not: Which desires?
Which acts? Which pleasures? But rather: With what force is one transported “by the pleasures
and desires”?”1188 How intensely does the ethical subject experience the practice? (Is it moderate
or excessive?) Condemnations we may be tempted to see as precursors to sexual injunctions (socalled ‘relations against nature,’ such as against same-sex relations) were in actuality judged
based on immoderation and excess rather than on a determination that an act, nature, or desire is
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in some way abnormal.1189 That said, the Greeks recognized that there were two roles in sexual
activity: the masculine ‘agent’ who performs the act (the subject) and the feminine ‘patient’ that
is acted upon (the object). The former were supposed to be adult free men (citizens) and the
latter women, boys, and slaves. As free men and administrators of political power, mature men
were expected to be active yet moderate rather than passive and excessive sexual partners.1190
While not bad, sex was still judged to be problematic. It was often judged to be an
inferior pleasure, largely because it was not a distinctly human activity, was “mixed with
privation and suffering,” was prompted by a bodily need, and was intense.1191 The intensity of
pleasure and desire’s pull made it susceptible to excess, since people might prioritize aphrodisia
over other practices as well as continue to indulge it past the need necessitated by the body. In
this respect it was similar to the acts of eating and drinking, which also admitted of easy
excess.1192 “The moral question was how to confront this force, how to control it and regulate its
economy in a suitable way.”1193
But what is the mode of subjection that allows us to moderate these behaviors? Foucault
identifies three elements or ‘strategies’ in the reflection on the use of pleasures: need, timeliness,
and the individual’s status.1194 Use of aphrodisia should be limited to satisfying needs, not
appeasing indulgences. Needs were natural, so exceeding their bounds or deriving pleasure from
something that wasn’t a natural need constituted immoderation.1195 Second, the art of making
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use of pleasures required knowing the right time to act. One could be too young or too old to
practice it: “In general, the latter was limited to a period characterized not only as the span
during which procreation was possible, but also that in which the offspring would be healthy,
well formed, and robust.”1196 Furthermore, other temporal factors, like the season of the year and
the time of day had to be considered (traditionally, the evening was preferred for the latter).
Finally, the status of the individual could either imply higher standards or lower standards. Rank
of power was a relevant status, since those in power should display strict standards. ‘Natural
gifts’ and education entailed others.1197
Here everything was a matter of adjustment, circumstance, and personal position. The few great
common laws – of the city, religion, nature – remained present, but it was as if they traced a very
wide circle in the distance, inside of which practical thought had to define what could rightfully be
done. And for this there was no need of anything resembling a text that would have the force of
law, but rather, of a techne, or ‘practice’…that by taking general principles into account would
guide action in its time, according to its context, and in view of its ends.1198

An art of existence was not concerned with universality but individuality, with achieving a
personal style.1199 None of these elements seem morally relevant, only relevant to caring for the
self.
The form of relationship or attitude one has towards oneself regarding aphrodisia is
called enkrateia.1200 Specifically, enkrateia is an “active form of self-mastery, which enables one
to resist or struggle, and to achieve domination in the area of desires and pleasures.”1201 In order
to be moderate (sophrosyne), one must first practice self-mastery. The intensity of this internal
battle and conquest indicates how admirable that self-mastery is. To lose to such warring
appetites was to succumb to a form of slavery.1202 Nonetheless, mastering pleasures
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(synonymous with virtue), does not mean dissipating them, but instead moderating them.1203
According to Plato in the Alcibiades, before all else, one must know one’s soul, because one was
properly speaking, one’s soul, not one’s body. Only then was self-mastery possible. After the
true self has been mastered can the body be properly mastered, as well as the household properly
managed, and ultimately the city properly governed.1204 Properly trained, the soul possesses not
merely an abstract knowledge of moderation but the capacity to be moderate, which allows one
to both master others1205 and to govern by teaching moderation.1206 If self-mastery is akin to
virtue, then the proper moral dimension to such non-moral practices as proper eating or hygiene
become clear: self-mastery leads to moderation.
Sophrosyne (moderation) was a kind of freedom possessed by the moderate subject
(Askesis as a practice aiming at freedom is a theme I will return to in Kant in Chapter Six). For
the Greeks, the freedom of the city paralleled the freedom of the citizen. A citizen mastered his
desires and pleasures in the same way the masses were ruled democratically by free citizens.
Those that were ruled were ruled by those capable of mastering themselves. In this manner,
those with little reason had but to obey to be ruled by reason, since the rulers governed
themselves and others by means of reason. On the other hand, rulers that caved to the
temptations of their desires became tyrants, since they no longer ruled themselves but were ruled
by their most unruly parts. 1207 The male leader capable of abusing his power by satisfying his
desires but refraining, rather than the virginal woman, was considered the sexual ideal for the
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ancient Greeks.1208 In this freedom there is an expression of a male virility meant to dominate
that which by nature should be passive.1209
In this ethics of men made for men, the development of the self as an ethical subject consisted in
setting up a structure of virility that related oneself to oneself. It was by being a man with respect
to oneself that one would be able to control and master the manly activity that one directed toward
others in sexual practice…It was this prior condition of “ethical virility” that provided one with
the right sense of proportion for the exercise of “sexual virility,” according to a model of “social
virility.”1210

It was the active-passive distinction which was important to the Greeks, not necessarily the
choice of sex partner. Those who could not control their desires and pleasures were passive to
their sway, and thus effeminate. But those that were active and moderate (i.e. mastered
themselves) were considered masculine, regardless of sexual partner or sexual role.1211 Evident
in this ethos is something Foucault admits is problematic: a sexist valorization of male
virility.1212 An ethics that esteems male virility invariably condones those that are judged by
nature to be passive (women, young boys, slaves). This aspect of Greek ethics does not align
with morality, and luckily is not essential to ethics as self-care as such. As Foucault says, “The
Greek ethics of pleasure is linked to a virile society, to dissymmetry, exclusion of the other, an
obsession with penetration, and a kind of threat of being dispossessed of your own energy, and
so on. All that is quite disgusting!”1213 However, without a normative ethical standard, all
Foucault can do is assess this practice on aesthetic grounds: personal disgust. One suspects,
however, that such a judgment must be implicitly based on a moral judgment.
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But to be active also meant to bear a particular relationship to truth: “To rule one’s
pleasures and to bring them under the authority of the logos formed one and the same
enterprise.”1214 In other words, the rational life is the moderate life. An ethical subject was
necessarily a subject of knowledge, which in turn was a subject that knew itself, and was
governed by the reason within.1215 This reason was also a ‘practical reason’ capable of
determining “the things he ought, as he ought, and when he ought.”1216
Contrasts and Possible Criticisms
But in what manner was this self-knowledge, so necessary for self-care, any different
from the hermeneutics of desire so instrumental to biopower? Do not both enquire into whom
one is in an attempt to master oneself, the former by means of askesis and the other by means of
therapeutic intervention? And even given its differing nature, can an ‘aesthetics of existence’
actually resist power or does it recapitulate it? After all, Foucault’s emblematic example of ‘care
of the self’ (the Greeks) clearly affirms domination: man over woman, active over passive, free
man over slave. Must freedom be exacted at the expense of others? And if it must be, how
much moral value does that freedom possess?
At best, Foucault must advocate the potential these practices bear rather than a return to
its previous incarnations. In contrast to a hermeneutics of desire, an aesthetics of existence does
not take the subject to be an object to be known, with essential desires that need to be extracted,
examined, and obeyed. If biopower actively constructs such ‘inner truths of desire,’ any
‘authentic’ life that aligns with them recapitulates that power, not any authentic self worth
affirming. An aesthetics of existence does not assume such an obligated allegiance to such a
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self, but rather encourages the subject to make itself and take responsibility for its own freedom
and the inevitable power relations that result from its practice.
While it is inevitable that the subject cannot bear the weight of self-creation on its own,
its relationship to knowledge and its bearers is different. The ‘non-hermeneutical’ practices that
characterize an aesthetics of existence “were not so much a means of subjecting individuals to
the interpretation of an expert (doctor, psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, priest) as they were ways of
subjectivizing individuals by guiding them in their own process of becoming capable of
governing themselves and others.”1217 Ultimately, even when consulting experts, the free man
did not cede his freedom. So while the free man (the moderate subject) may still consult doctors,
a life characterized by ‘stylizing one’s freedom’ would call for a dialogue with one’s doctor to be
convinced of a given recommendation.1218 By ‘stylizing one’s freedom,’ “one would be able to
give one’s conduct the form that would assure one of a name meriting remembrance.”1219 In
contrast to a hermeneutics of desire, an aesthetics of existence does not normalize; it renders
one’s life beautiful.1220
But how does the enslavement an aesthetics of existence is meant to combat compare
with Kantian heteronomy? Both recognize that desires and pleasures, if not mastered, endanger
freedom, even if their notions of freedom are distinct. Much of what Foucault describes as a
‘style’ (‘giving one’s conduct a form’) could be interpreted as the product of a synthesis, or
application of a principle to one’s manifold of desires, which is how Kant describes the
application of the categorical imperative. While freedom for Kant is noumenal, the application
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of the categorical imperative is to a self that is phenomenal, and therefore stylizes that
phenomenal life, giving it the form of a universal subject1221 free from uncontrollable passions.
Greek Practices
Foucault divides up his asketic analysis into the three domains of Greek life previously
mentioned: dietetics (“an art of the everyday relationship of the individual with his body”),
economics (how a man ran his household), and erotics (“an art of the reciprocal conduct of a man
and a boy in a love relationship”).1222
Dietetics: Man’s Relation to His Body
Dietetics was concerned with the best possible use of pleasures for the sake of caring for
the body. Implied in this is the recognition that aphrodisia were essential to human flourishing
and needed to be properly integrated.1223
The aphrodisia were considered in the aggregate, as an activity whose significance was not
determined by the various forms it could take; one needed to ask oneself only whether the activity
ought to take place, how frequently, and in what context. The problematization was carried out
primarily in terms of quantity and circumstance. 1224

A proper regimen concerned itself with exercise, foods, drinks, sleep, and sexual relations.1225
Regarding exercise, certain kinds had to be performed with a certain intensity, at the right time,
and were to be individually calibrated based on age and food consumed. Similar considerations
also had to be made for the ingestion of food and drink, based on what was to be consumed, the
body’s condition, the climate, and daily activities. Proper sleeping also depended upon allocated
time, when sleep was to begin, and the qualities of the bed.1226 These regimens could be
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rigorous, and largely depended on the elemental associations of things (dry, wet, hot, cold).1227
Interestingly enough, concerns over dietary habits took precedence over sexual habits.
Regimens were concerned with both the health of the body as well as the purity and
harmony of the soul. The Pythagoreans even recommended certain kinds of music to benefit the
body as well as the soul.1228 Not merely did the health of one imply the health of the other, but
the very lengths required to maintain a regimen implied moral fortitude on the part of the
practitioner. Ultimately, however, one cultivates the body for the sake of the soul.1229 If one
trains the body too much, the soul becomes sluggish. On the other hand, if one is too focused on
caring for the self, one will lead the obsessive, over-refined life of a convalescent rather than the
life of a productive free citizen. Such a life could only be decadent.1230 Rather, regimens should
not push someone beyond the boundaries nature has set; one should be prepared for numerous
life circumstances but ultimately not expect to live beyond the age nature has set for man. 1231
While sexual activity, or aphrodisia, was sometimes encouraged among those with too
much phlegm, bad digestion, or a cold and dry stomach, it was typically regarded with suspicion.
This was not due to shame but the medical judgment that sexual activity, if practiced wrong,
could damage the body (Some, such as Pythagoras, took the extreme view that abstention was
the best way to avoid these effects). The brain, for example, was alleged by Aristotle to suffer
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from the negative effects of a ‘general cooling effect’ caused by the emission of semen. 1232 Too
much intercourse, according to Hippocrates, could cause potentially fatal diseases, like ‘dorsal
phthsis.’1233 Appropriate sexual activity also had to be tailored to sex, since women were
believed to require regular sexual relations while men did not.1234 As Foucault notes, this was a
paradox: nature compelled men to inseminate, yet the act of discharge was disempowering. To
retain that virile substance was to retain the ‘intense energy’ it contained, and to use it for other
purposes.1235 That said, the dangers of aphrodisia go even further:
Medical and philosophical reflection describes it as posing a threat, through its violence, to the
control and mastery that one ought to exercise over oneself; as sapping the strength the individual
should conserve and maintain, through the exhaustion it caused; and as prefiguring the death of
the individual while assuring the survival of the species. 1236

Man-female intercourse was assumed to be a violent process whereby the blood was so agitated
that it foamed, producing the sperm that would douse the heated female element upon achieving
a violent ejaculation.1237 The sexual urge not merely clouded men’s reason, but sex itself,
particularly the orgasm, was akin to an epileptic seizure.1238 Semen, be it from the head, the
entire body, or the marrow that bridged soul and body (theories differed), was considered a
fragment of the man’s vitality. To the Ancients, only a loss of one’s vital force could explain
how a new life could be conceived.1239 Even for Aristotle, whose position is close to our own
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(He believed that ingested nutrients were either committed to the growth and maintenance of the
body or to seminal fluids), ejaculation constituted the loss of a precious, vital substance that
could have just as easily been committed to the growth of the body.1240 Finally, there is a link
between sexual activity, death, and immortality, insofar as progeny are an attempt to attain a
form of immortality in the face of certain death.1241
Thus it is evident that an aesthetics of existence did not aim so much at curbing a sinful
behavior or impulse, or to cultivate an erotic art to maximize pleasure, but rather attempted to
constitute a healthy relation to oneself that mastered the use of pleasures, put one in a
relationship with truth, and made one free.1242
One may further ask, besides cultivating moderation (a virtue Kant affirms), are there
grounds for interpreting dietetic practices as moral behaviors? Kant, as we will see, will argue
that we have a duty (albeit imperfect) to cultivate our personal talents. Insofar as the body is a
vehicle for such talents, a duty to cultivate one’s body is implied. The same duty to cultivate
one’s body can likely be extended to the economic realm as well, since to cultivate one’s estate is
to cultivate an extension of oneself.
Economics: Man’s Relation to His Wife and Household
Economics concerned how a husband and father managed his household (once again, the
primary focus is on the free male citizen). On the surface, this seemed to be a grossly
unbalanced arrangement: there was a ‘lawful wife’ in such a household, but, some might argue,
the marital relationship was not primarily a pleasure-based one: “In it, marriage would encounter
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the sexual relation only in its reproductive function, while the sexual relation would raise the
question of pleasure only outside of marriage.”1243 Wives were to be sexually-exclusive to their
husbands (likely or maintaining a proper line of succession) and to “keep to their household
tasks,” or be punished severely.1244 Husbands, on the other hand, could pursue extra-marital
relations with anyone, as long as the lover, be it a mistress, concubine, prostitute, young boy, or
slave, wasn’t married (since this would be a slight to the other married man).1245
But things weren’t so simple. For example, there was a social expectation that a married
man would not be as licentious, even if no laws existed to reinforce it. Some moralists, such as
Aristotle, even suggested it was dishonorable to seek sexual fulfillment outside of marriage.1246
Furthermore, we would be in error to assume that the wife’s sole purpose was to secure
descendants for her husband: “There exists a good deal of evidence testifying to the value that
was attached to the wife’s beauty, to the importance of the sexual relations that one might have
with her, and to the existence of mutual love.”1247 Besides possible affection, the wife was
recognized as a partner in running the estate, one that typically included land and servants that
tended it. It was the husband’s responsibility to educate and train her to both assist but also stand
in for him when he was away.1248 Their roles tended to complement each other: “Generally
speaking, it is the husband’s activity that brings provisions into the house, but it is the wife’s
management that regulates their expenditure. The two roles are exactly complementary and the
absence of one would make the other useless.”1249 These roles were said to match the qualities
imbued by the gods upon each sex: men were stronger and braver to handle outdoor work, and
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women were weaker and more afraid, which aided them in keeping a careful eye on provisions
and their use: “Hence each of the two marriage partners has a nature, a form of activity, and a
place, which are defined in relation to the necessities of the oikos.”1250 Of course today we are
skeptical of such natural gender roles and can see how such artificial roles, while giving women
some autonomy, nevertheless constrain them into an unnecessary subservience to men.
Foucault is adamant that we not see this as a foreshadowing of Christian ethics but
instead a continuation of an art of existence. A husband’s fidelity to his wife was not an
indication of a marital duty as much as it was indicative of the self-mastery of one properly
governing his household: “This was not nearly so much a prefiguration of a symmetry that was
to appear in the subsequent ethics, as it was the stylization of an actual dissymmetry.”1251
Presumably, self-mastery (enkrateia), or control over one’s appetites, is a precondition for
managing a household. Both spouses may possess it, as it should not be assumed that the
husband always bears the most virtue.1252 Likewise, spouses should always present themselves
as they naturally appear, since to present oneself otherwise was to falsify the terms of the
marriage. Instead, true beauty develops from performing one’s appointed role. Quite literally, it
was supposed that attending to one’s household tasks was the appropriate exercise to cultivate
the body and the mind in such a way as to remain attractive with age.1253 “The condition of
mastery has its physical version, which is beauty.”1254 Furthermore, the wife’s willingness to
please her husband sets her apart from those beneath her who must be compelled to serve.
Ultimately, the wife was owed preference rather than fidelity, a guarantee that she governed the
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household and would bear the descendants of her husband.1255 “The husband’s self-restraint
pertains to an art of governing – governing in general, governing oneself, and governing a wife
who must be kept under control and respected at the same time, since in relation to her husband
she is the obedient mistress of the household.”1256
The previous account of the marital relation largely follows from Xenophon’s
Oeconomicus. But at least three other thinkers (Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle)1257 suggested
other principles, notably of which Foucault calls ‘the principle of double sexual monopoly,’ or
sexual exclusivity. Nonetheless, Foucault once again reminds us that this is by no means
motivated by a romantic consideration of what is owed the wife. Instead, it is either a form of
‘political regulation’ meant to benefit the State (in the case of Plato’s Laws) or a form of
deliberate self-limitation on the part of the husband (in the case of both Isocrates and
Aristotle).1258 For Plato, the behaviors of both husband and wife could be kept equally in line by
means of the law as well as by extra-juridical means, such as public opinion about what is
acceptable, which was always underpinned by desires for glory, honor (showing oneself capable
of attaining the monogamous coupling found amongst even animals), and avoiding the shame
felt when transgressing sexual mores.1259 As for Aristotle (or at least the Economics, which is
attributed to him, as well as the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics), the focus is brought back
1255

Ibid 163-164.
Ibid 165.
1257
Isocrates and Aristotle were not so juridical in their recommendations. Isocrates drafts his recommendations
based on the virtuous character a proper monarch should possess, notably justice (dikaiosyne) and moderation
(sophrosyne). Moderation in one’s relations with one’s wife was encouraged based both on maintaining the purity
and legitimacy of a lineage traced back to Zeus as well as maintaining “a kind of isomorphism between the good
order that should reign in the monarch’s house and the order that should prevail in his government.” Ibid 170-171
Thus, moderation was encouraged based on political reasons, albeit not juridical ones. The ruler should govern
himself like he governs his subjects and set an example for them, even when he is trying to distinguish himself from
all others at the same time. The moderate use of power is an outward expression of one’s admirable self-mastery.
Ibid 172-173. “The prince’s relationship with himself and the manner in which he forms himself as an ethical
subject are an important component of the political structure; his austerity is part of it, contributing to its solidity.
The prince, too, must practice an ascesis and exercise himself.” Ibid 174.
1258
Ibid 167-168.
1259
Ibid 168-169.
1256

307

to the ‘natural’ roles of each sex, how they complement each other in the household, how each
contributes to the ‘well-being’ rather than just the ‘being’ of the other, and how Nature has
designed the rearing of children in such a way that the advantage the child received is returned to
the parents once they get older.1260 Aristotle compared the relationship of husband and wife to
an aristocracy, an unequal relationship to be sure, but nonetheless allegedly based on justice,
acknowledgment of merit, and friendship.1261 Despite their differences, all four accounts see the
essential obligation lying in the married man’s duties to cultivate and refine himself1262 although
the wife could cultivate herself as well:
For the Greek moralistis of the classical epoch, moderation was prescribed to both partners in
matrimony; but it depended on two distinct modes of relation to self, corresponding to the two
individuals. The wife’s virtue constituted the correlative and the proof of a submissive behavior;
the man’s austerity was part of an ethics of self-delimiting domination.1263

Thus, ascetic practice in line with moderation was determined by one’s sex. Foucault certainly
does not advocate a return to essentialist gender-based askesis, but nonetheless would likely
condone consensual reinventions of relationships that may fall along the lines of gender.
Erotics: Man’s Relation to Boys
Likely the most controversial ‘ethical’ practice Foucault explores in The Use of Pleasure
is pederasty. Given that pederasty was practiced by free men and sexual behavior has a tendency
towards excess, it was considered a potential threat to one’s freedom, requiring measures to
master. It goes without saying that the Greeks, while recognizing the practice to be problematic,
did not recognize the full moral dimensions of the practice. As we will see, the Greeks
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recognized there was a problem not merely for the older free man but also for the courted youth,
since such relationships represented an imbalance of power that endangered the honor of the boy.
Nonetheless, the onus was unfairly placed upon the young man to mitigate this danger, although
many families attempted to shield their children from such advances as well. In no way do I or
Foucault advocate a return to such a practice, only to demonstrate that love has a place in ascetic
practice.
We would be mistaken in assigning too much weight to the sex of the courted Beloved.
While, as we will see, the sex of the Beloved is relevant, the desire for men was not perceived as
any less natural than the desire for women:
So it seemed to people that of these two inclinations [towards boys or towards women] one was
not more likely than the other, and the two could easily coexist in the same individual…To their
way of thinking, what made it possible to desire a man or a woman was simply the appetite that
nature had implanted in man’s heart for “beautiful” human beings, whatever their sex might be. 1264

If an aesthetics of existence aimed to render one’s life beautiful, and if, for the Greeks, young
men were idealized as the most beautiful, then the former must concern itself with the latter. To
live right was to love right. Noble love was often characterized (like in the Symposium) as the
love for young men not because of something intrinsically superior to same-sex attraction but
rather because young men bore within themselves more admirable traits, like budding
intelligence, virtue, and power, unlike women who were usually ignorant and weak. ‘Baser’
love, characteristic of an immoderate man enslaved to his desires, is not drawn to the virtues of a
lover’s soul like noble love is but instead to beautiful bodies, regardless of sex.1265
The Greeks could not imagine that a man might need a different nature – an “other” nature – in
order to love a man; but they were inclined to think that the pleasures one enjoyed in such a
relationship ought to be given an ethical form different from the one that was required when it
came to loving a woman.1266
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While a reader of Aristophanes’ speech in the Symposium may find this hard to swallow, given
that three types of sexual desire are explicitly noted as at odds with each other (male-male,
female-female, and male-female), charitably granting Foucault this point however, it becomes
evident why the distinction between economics and erotics is so crucial. Erotics at its best,
unlike economics, served romantic, pedagogical, and ultimately civic functions involving free
men, not subservient women.
A proper love affair should educate a young man in the ways of moderation until he is
old enough to educate another young man in the same manner, in which case the old erotic
relationship would turn into friendship between equals (philia).1267 Here we see an interesting
configuration of Eros and Philia, a relationship returned to in Chapter Six. Traditionally it was
up to the young man (eromenos) to separate the wheat from the chaff, only accepting those
suitors (erastes) who could educate him in the ways of virtue and wisdom. Paradoxically, the
Beloved needed to already possess in some way the very moderation the ideal erotic relationship
was meant to instill, in order not to succumb to lust or greed and choose poorly. The Lover, in
turn, was to demonstrate both passion and moderation in his pursuits. 1268 Courtship was a
competition of persuasion, a game, an expression of the Beloved’s freedom, since the adolescent
boy made the ultimate decision between possible suitors. Only the love and affection that was
freely returned was valued.1269 Thus there was a reciprocal sorting process, with only those
young men with the potential towards the moderate life choosing those suitors best at drawing it
out of them. This ‘dance’ gave courtship a “beautiful form” that was “aesthetically and morally
valuable.”1270 Certainly any kind of ‘dance’ between a mature man and an underaged boy strikes
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us as manipulative at best and coercive at worst. Nonetheless, there are merits to conceiving of a
romantic relationship as a dance that can be given a beautiful form.
Pederastic relationships were problematic for the Greeks not because homosexual love
was problematic (no anxiety lay with a free man having sex with a male slave, for example) but
because of the contradictory status of the young receptive male. The Beloved was meant to be a
passive partner because of his youth, but that youth would inevitably fade with the passage of
time and with it any natural suitability he may have for adopting the passive role.1271 Presumably
a beard was a mark that the adolescent was too old, but age parameters were less a matter of a
codified universal standard than they were a question for debate.1272 This is evident in Plato’s
Symposium since two mature men at the drinking party delivering speeches were in a relationship
with each other (Pausanias and Agathon).
It is on the basis of being a ‘loved object’ and navigating these ambiguities that the boy
becomes a ‘subject of ethical behavior’ for the Greeks.1273 If not done properly, a boy could
forever damage his reputation and future status as a man in public life.1274 Because the
active/passive distinction was assumed to directly parallel the conquerer/conquered distinction,
the passive penetrated partner was inherently shameful. This was a source of anxiety because,
when considering whether someone is worthy of ruling others, it seems problematic for that
person to have had a history of willfully presenting himself to other men as a passive object of
pleasure for their satisfaction. Such behavior is at odds with a position of civic and political
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authority.1275 What was important to the Greek was not that men had sex with other men; it’s
that free men had sex with other free men.1276 Freedom, authority, and passivity were judged to
be at odds. Thus a tension seems to exist within and between sexual ethics and politics: the boy
was the most acceptable object of pleasure for older men but if he identified with this role, and if
he enjoyed it, he would be condemned (the boy was only supposed to yield as a gesture of
gratitude, affection, and admiration for the suitor). Foucault refers to this as ‘the antinomy of the
boy.’1277
The distinction between ‘dietetics and economics’ and erotics is notable and highlights
not merely the differing status relationships at play with others but also the free man’s
relationship with himself:
In economics and dietetics, the voluntary moderation of the man was based mainly on his relation
to himself; in erotics, the game was more complicated; it implied self-mastery on the part of the
lover; it also implied an ability on the part of the beloved to establish a relation of dominion over
himself; and lastly, it implied a relationship between their two moderations, expressed in their
deliberate choice of one another.1278

What is always at stake in these self-relations, and in the case of erotics, with another, is always
freedom: how to secure it in all arenas of one’s life and how best to practice it to distinguish
oneself from others and become one of such virtuous character as to never be forgotten.
Arguably the psychological well-being of the boy could be threatened by pederasty, which would
likely endanger their ability to enact their virtue and freedom. Nonetheless, a proper romance
between equals should conceivably accentuate that freedom.
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Philosophy: Man’s Relation to Truth
We have already seen that the pederastic relationship was also a pedagogical one, the
Lover serving as a mentor to the Beloved. But such a relation would be one-sided if it weren’t
acknowledged that Love, by its nature, is a Lover rather than a Beloved. At first, Plato’s
conception of Love in the Symposium seems to come at a high cost: Since Eros is a subject
desiring rather than the object desired, none of the attributes of the object can be attributed to it.
However, such inherent ontological destitution comes with great reward, since only a subject can
be free (With plenitude would come the inertia of objecthood). Only by recognizing that love
seeks what it lacks do we see how Eros himself is a philosopher (a lover of wisdom), and that
love is intrinsically tied to the pursuit of truth. The pursuit of what is lacked sets the lover on the
path towards beholding the Form of Beauty and attaining Truth.1279 The lover will go from the
love of one beautiful body, to the love of many beautiful bodies, to the love of a beautiful soul, to
the love of beautiful customs, to the love of knowledge, until he climbs above all beautiful things
to behold the Form of Beauty itself. This is often referred to as The Ladder of Love. If Love
aims to be in the presence of Beauty, then it will inevitably draw closer to what is more beautiful.
Such a process is one of further abstraction, from one particular eventually to the Form that
encapsulates all particulars. This is similar to the education of the philosopher-king in the
Republic insofar as it too is a process of abstraction moving from knowledge of particulars to
knowledge of the Forms those particulars participate in, and ultimately the Form of the Good.
Furthermore, the lover and the beloved enter into a relationship based on the desire for
immortality only provided by some form of procreation occasioned by the presence of Beauty: a
man who desires physical immortality seeks women and begets physical children, while a man
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who desires intellectual immortality seeks boys and begets spiritual children.1280 “For Plato, it is
not exclusion of the body that characterizes true love in a fundamental way; it is rather that,
beyond the appearances of the object, love is a relation to truth.”1281 There is no need for such a
relationship to truth to be mediated by a pederastic relationship, only by means of a relationship
between those who can further their mutual ascent up the Ladder.
But if love is a relation to truth both the man and the boy (or whoever) experienced, then
both of them had to feel the same Eros; The boy could not merely be a passive recipient of love
but must also desire the lover if he was to attain to the truth: “The “dialectic of love” in this case
calls for two movements exactly alike on the part of the two lovers; the love is the same for both
of them, since it is the motion that carries them toward truth.”1282 This can be facilitated by the
lover. If the lover, aided by the virtue and resistance of the boy, is able to master his desires, he
will become both a master of truth and an object of love for the boy who desires the truth.1283
“Henceforth the master’s wisdom (and no longer the boy’s honor) would mark both the object of
true love and the principle that kept one from “yielding.””1284
Plato thus has attempted to resolve the disparity between man-lover and boy-beloved by
transforming the love relationship into a truth relationship and then reversing the positions of the
lover and the beloved so that the boy loves the man for his wisdom rather than his body1285 (So
it’s notable that the ancient Greeks attempted to resolve the imbalance between man and young
man, even if by modern standards we see that such efforts were insufficient). To be sure, this
cannot be a definitive solution that quells what makes erotics problematic. Rather it is Plato’s
attempt to address it and contribute an attempted solution to a pool of other potential solutions.
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“In this sense, one can say that it meets the challenge that was issued by Aristophanes’
fable: it gives the latter true content.”1286 But rather than love being the reunion of one with their
other half love is the ‘medium’ that occasions access to truth.1287 Plato attempts “to determine
the self-movement, the kind of effort and work upon oneself, which will enable the lover to elicit
and establish his relation to true being.”1288 What Plato describes is “an erotics centered on an
ascesis of the subject and a common access to truth,1289 a way of stylizing the love of men into its
highest form.1290
Reflections on Greek Askesis
The Greeks invented a novel way of stitching together pleasure, freedom, and subjectivity
by means of an aesthetics of existence and its end-result: the moderate subject. That subject was
not one discovered but made, thus bypassing the dangers inherent in a hermeneutics of desire.
But can the moderate subject, concerned merely with its own singularity, act as a sufficient point
of resistance against power? Must a vibrant universal be the necessary foe of freedom, as
Foucault sometimes seems to suppose? I will argue in Chapter Six that Kant provides us with a
viable way of both employing the universal to stitch together pleasure, freedom, and subjectivity.
For now, let us suppose, as Foucault does, a microphysics of power that must be resisted locally.
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5.2 Askesis as Resistance
Introduction
Given both how the human sciences are complicit in our subjugation and how ethics may
provide us with an alternative way of thinking the subject without succumbing to the pitfalls of
power, what would a Foucaultian askesis look like? In Saint Foucault, David Halperin sees in
Foucault’s later work the modern possibility of a ‘homosexual ascesis,’ comprised not so much
by a kind of homosexual desire or nature as much as by an ideal marginal position for creative
resistance to normativity.1291 Quoting Foucault’s interview Friendship as a Way of Life,
Halperin highlights the following passage:
Homosexuality is a historic occasion to reopen affective and relational virtualities, not so much
through the intrinsic qualities of the homosexual but because of the “slantwise” position of the
latter, as it were, the diagonal lines he can lay out in the social fabric allow these virtualities to
come to light.1292

By describing homosexuality as a ‘historical occasion’ Foucault highlights not the psychological
essence of homosexuality but rather how homosexual communities have, given their marginal
status, begun to invent new ways of life. Foucault calls on homosexuals not to grow complacent
with a readymade identity but instead to work on and invent themselves: to invent a homosexual
ascesis.1293 To invent is a mark of freedom and resistance, not recourse to a body of knowledge
implicated in the sway of a dominant normalizing power bent on regulating individuals and
populations.1294 What is necessary is for men who love men to ‘become’ homosexuals, to avail
themselves of the opportunity to invent a way of life that makes us “infinitely more susceptible
to pleasure. We must escape and help others to escape the two readymade formulas of the pure
1291
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sexual encounter and the lovers’ fusion of identities”1295 (Interestingly, Foucault is challenging
the Aristophanes-inspired notion of ‘The Other Half,’ and in so doing finding an unlikely ally in
Alain Badiou, who also challenges the notion of love as a Fusion into One). Homosexuals are
tasked not to segregate themselves but to invent ways of life non-homosexuals can also adopt.
Foucaultian askesis continues where ancient Greek askesis left off: with pleasure. The
shift towards exploring pleasures rather than desires is a strategic act of resistance. By deessentializing identity, and making it a game or “procedure to have relations, social and sexual –
pleasure relationships that create new friendships,” something new can emerge that struggles
against normalizing power characteristic of the modern age. Essences too easily become a kind
of “law, the principle, the code of [one’s] existence.” A homosexual ethics centered around a
homosexual essence would likely slip back into a traditional form of ‘heterosexual virility.’1296
Furthermore, pleasure seems to escape
the medical and naturalistic connotations inherent in the notion of desire. That notion has been
used as a tool, as a grid of intelligibility, a calibration in terms of normativity…Desire is not an
event but a permanent feature of the subject: it provides a basis onto which all that psychologicomedical armature can attach itself.1297

The first task is to create new pleasures, since they evade the ‘grid of intelligibility’ deployed by
normalizing power. From that desire may eventually follow.1298
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Criticisms of Ethics-Only Morality
According to Halperin, Foucault’s later ethical turn was spurred on by the observation
that codified morality was ‘disappearing’ and ethics (or the art of existence) either was or could
replace it. It could be said that, as Badiou himself does, that the resulting modern crisis parallels
that of the times of Plato and should be answered similarly. In this spirit, Edward McGushin
notes that the philosophical life began as a “practice of resistance” against “false ways of
life.”1299 It makes sense that Foucault would turn to philosophy’s origins to retrieve that
forgotten practice of ‘care of the self’ that first opened us up to a potent form of resistance and
self-invention but which, since the rise of modernity, has been slowly forgotten.1300
But is morality disappearing? If by ‘codified morality’ Foucault means Christian
morality, he may be right. And if he means to note the lack of any explicit place for morality in
today’s form of self-care, therapeutic psychology, he would likely also be right. But we must
earnestly ask ourselves whether such an ethics should replace morality rather than supplement it
instead. Could even those societies Foucault turns to as inherently ethics-based have been
possible without the moral injunctions that maintain order? It’s hard to see how any society
based purely on self-care ethics is possible, since social integrity requires general rules. But
even bracketing this fundamental problem, as Kant notes, freedom and morality may be
inseparably bound to one another. If Kant is right, only the moral law as a determining ground
of the will can secure us freedom. Without morality, any practice of self-care would thus be
merely eudaimonistic. Perhaps such a consequence would be no objection to Foucault, since he
is concerned with cultivating pleasures.
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But there may be other consequences as well. It is relevant to note that the homosexual
ascesis Foucault and Halperin describe attempts to reinvent friendship, to eroticize Philia. But
must a homosexual ascesis take this form? In the next chapter, I will address how, from a
Kantian-perspective, it may not be possible to eroticize Philia without losing both Eros and
Philia. Love may be desire-based. If so, then Foucault, despite his claims to friendship, is not
articulating a philial or erotic ascesis at all, but something new: an ascesis guided not by love but
pleasure. Eros and Philia may not be something people are willing to lose.
5.3 Foucault’s Kant: Enlightenment and Askesis
Certainly Foucault had a lot to say about Kant, not all of it positive, given that Kant was a
formative part of modern power’s development.1301 Nonetheless, Kant is of fundamental
importance for Foucault and his project, as long as he is read in a certain way. In What is
Enlightenment?, which references Kant’s own essay Answering the Question: What is the
Enlightenment? (1784), Foucault comes to terms with Kant’s answer. Of significance to
Foucault is how Kant sees Enlightenment as a process leading out of immaturity, which for Kant
means a state of the will in which we no longer blindly accept the authority of others in the place
of using our own reason: No longer will books “take the place of our understanding,” or a
religious figure take “the place of our conscience,” or a doctor decide “for us what our diet is to
be.”1302 Enlightenment is both a cultural development and an imperative to eschew immaturity
in all its forms. Just as the moderate man of old let not even the doctor unilaterally treat him, so
Kant marks enlightenment by the same prescription.
Many times, one must always obey, but one who is mature can freely reason about the
matter at hand while doing so (such as debating the tax system while still paying one’s taxes).
1301
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These instances refer to a ‘private use of reason,’ those instances when one must play a particular
role in society and tailor reason’s rational ends to the ends established by those authorities one
must obey. But a ‘public use of reason’ entails reasoning for its own sake; this use of reason,
used when man reasons as a reasonable being rather than as a part of a social order, must always
be free.1303 The universal use of reason “is the business of the subject himself as an
individual.”1304 In order to ensure the protection of the free use of public reason, Kant proposes
what Foucault calls ‘the contract of rational despotism with free reason’: “the public and free use
of autonomous reason will be the best guarantee of obedience, on condition, however, that the
political principle which must be obeyed itself be in conformity with universal reason.”1305
In this text, an ‘attitude of modernity,’ or “mode of relating to contemporary reality”
arises.1306 Foucault calls this modern attitude an ‘ethos,’ a way of thinking, feeling, and acting
that “marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task.”1307 The Enlightenment attitude
is a problematizing of our relationship to the present, “a permanent critique of our historical era,”
and a critique than confines reason to those legitimate uses that guarantee its autonomy.1308 It is
the persisting critique of the present that Foucault seems interested in.
Foucault wants to turn the Critical impulse on its head without necessarily going beyond
its established limits, asking not what the limits of knowledge are, but “In what is given to us as
universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and
the product of arbitrary constraints?” What this ‘practical critique’ will uncover (by means of
archaeological and genealogical methods) is not “formal structures with universal value” but
Foucault, Michel, ‘What is Enlightenment?’ in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. Trans. John Johnson, ed. Paul
Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997), 305-307.
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instead a historical account of how we came to constitute ourselves as specific kinds of subjects
that think, do, and say in a particular way, and how we can become otherwise.1309 Foucault
characterizes this as a “historico-practical test of the limits we may go beyond” that we can
individually explore as “free beings.”1310 Foucault thus, ultimately wants “to give new impetus,
as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom.”1311
As Foucault reminds us, the very tools deployed by normalizing power to invest us can
be the same tools we turn against it, what he calls ‘the rule of the tactical polyvalence of
discourses.’1312 It is true that Kant is a systematizer (of whom he is one of the best) that draws
theoretical limits not to be crossed. But as Badiou notes:
The greatness of Kant is not at all to be found in his having proposed a theory of the limits of
reason, a theory of the human limits of reason…The greatness of Kant is to have combined the
idea of a limit of reason with its opposite, the idea of an excess of humanity with regard to itself ,
which is given in particular in the infinite character of practical reason. 1313

Kant draws boundaries, to be sure, but also a means of crossing them that is necessarily annexed
to the sphere of life: the realm of ethics and freedom. He forecloses a certain knowledge of the
self (the noumenal self, or soul), critiques attempts at empirical psychology, and shows previous
attempts from times past to draft an ethics that both binds and frees to be inadequate to the task.
In the vacuum of what is unknowable he erects a principle that both necessarily binds us and
frees us: the categorical imperative. And while many may accuse the categorical imperative of a
certain impotence to draft coherent, commonsense laws, we can see in this perhaps the
misapplication of a principle that even Kant did not see. Perhaps the categorical imperative is
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the groundwork for an ascetic practice of freedom. It is in the service of this task and contrary to
Foucault’s own suspicions towards the power of the universal that the next chapter is dedicated.
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6.1 Introduction to Practical Psychology
Outline of the Task
In the preceding portion of this dissertation, I explored how both Immanuel Kant and
Michel Foucault challenged the notion of a science of the subject. I mapped Foucault’s corpus
onto Kant’s Table of Heteronomy in order to draw out the four forms of domination, and then
showed how Foucault proposed an ethical alternative to the human sciences: askesis. Rather
than ask what the self is, we ought to ask how to make one, a free agent (a subject qua subject)
rather than a passive object. Here I will follow Foucault’s lead and show how Kant also turns to
ethics as a means towards thinking the subject qua subject rather than psychology or the other
human sciences. From here on out, the task will be a positive one rather than a negative one:
What would the outlines of a proper science of the subject qua subject look like? How does Kant
attempt to approach the subject in light of the critiques of psychology?
In this introduction I posit two non-exclusive possibilities, both indebted to Kant’s Table
of Categories as well as his insightful analysis into the differences between theoretical, practical,
aesthetical, and anthropological disciplines:
Possibility One: Practical Psychology as Architectonic of Modes of Self-Constitution
I will argue that the Paralogisms, errors of judgment dogmatic philosophies of the past
have used to devise a theory of the subject, fall into error only insofar as those categories are
used to derive metaphysical (theoretical) predicates of the soul. If those same categories were
used practically rather than speculatively,1314 or in other words, if they indicated what the self
should aim to become rather than what it is, the shortcomings endemic of a metaphysical
doctrine of the soul would be circumvented. These categories (substance, reality, unity, and
existence/non-existence), when recast in practical terms, give us ‘Categories of Self1314

To some degree, theoretical and speculative are interchangeable words when discussing an interest of reason.
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Constitution’ never before identified in the Critical philosophy. I will demonstrate, however,
how Kant’s own reworking of the Categories of the Understanding into Categories of Freedom
both anticipates and provides a clue as to how those new Categories of Self-Constitution can be
derived. These four Categories, once derived, will act as an Architectonic of Self-Constitution,
or Ascesis. Ascesis, as we have previously seen, means a practice of self-discipline that aims at
freedom. We have already explored another ascetic regimen: Foucaultian askesis. This practice
of self-care aims at maximizing pleasure by means of an encounter with historical contingency
(The Outside), a contingency revealed in his work on Kant’s ‘What is Enlightenment?’ I will
argue that Kant’s ethical theory as well as its founding ascesis, is but another of four modes, or
regimens, of self-constitution which, when practiced, lead to freedom. Ultimately, my choice of
Kant and Foucault for this project has always been implicitly undergirded by this architectonic,
although this architectonic can only be sketched out in this dissertation.
Possibility Two: The Science of the Subject as a Critical Anthropology of Intersubjectivity
I will argue that Kant’s Critical apparatus is incomplete and that the question of how
someone can be a subject of possible experience remains to be answered. Nonetheless I argue
that this shortcoming can be addressed within the confines of the Critical philosophy alone since
Kant never develops a Critical anthropology which would provide an a priori basis for how we
encounter others as subjects. This section shifts from the personal locus to the interpersonal
locus, no longer conjecturing about the self as subject and instead focusing on how we can
encounter the Other as a proper subject. In this manner an outline of a science of the subject
becomes complete and any accusation of Kantian solipsism is overcome. This work focuses
primarily on Kant, since Foucault’s work, cut short by his premature death, does not seem to
provide a means of executing this task.
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Preliminary Criticisms
These two possibilities are admittedly speculative, so I will rein back most of my
speculations. Nonetheless, two criticisms could be made from the start: 1) How can practical
reason think the subject qua subject if theoretical reason cannot? Does theoretical reason’s
failure not suggest that the subject of investigation either doesn’t exist or at least is always
inaccessible to reason of any kind, practical or not? 2) Are not the four modes of ascesis I will
outline (Kantian, Deleuzian, Badiouian, and Foucaultian) mutually exclusive?
To the first question I answer that the objects that can be thought depend upon
epistemological parameters that can vary. Knowledge and rational belief are epistemologically
distinct. The latter is not dialectical because it admits its own epistemological limitations.
Furthermore, let us grant that we ought to be as charitable to the Second Critique as we were to
the First. I remind the reader of the humble beginnings of the Critique of Pure Reason:
I should think that the examples of mathematics and natural science, which have become what
they are now are through a revolution brought about all at once, were remarkable enough that we
might reflect on the essential element in the change in the ways of thinking that has been so
advantageous to them, and, at least as an experiment, imitate it insofar as their analogy with
metaphysics, as rational cognition, might permit. 1315 (italics mine)

The Copernican Revolution was initially an experiment, a hypothesis: If experience is possible,
what are its conditions? Likewise, we may ask with no less arrogance: If morality is possible,
what are its conditions? If in considering morality’s conditions we draw closer to the subject qua
subject, let that be no more of a crime than deducing the transcendental unity of apperception.
To the second question I may answer that there may be many forms of freedom reached
by distinct ethical practices. Kant provides us with a system that may be able to grasp these
different modes of self-constitution. In fact, the same project, approached through the lens of
other thinkers, may appear neither systematic nor comparable.
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Practical Psychology as Architectonic of Self-Constitution
Why the Practical Interest?
Before providing the architectonic of self-constitution, it must be shown why the
practical interest can get us any further than the theoretical interest of Reason does. In other
words, before we can explore a moral question, I must clarify the epistemological principles that
ground it. But to understand what the ‘practical interest of reason’ is and how its difference from
the ‘speculative’ interest gives it an epistemological range beyond the latter, what an interest of
reason actually is needs to be explained. But what is an ‘interest of Reason’? Up until now, the
meaning of interest has been implicit whenever I have made mention of a theoretical or practical
approach to the subject, and to a large extent has acted as a synonym for an ‘end’ or ‘objective.’
At this point, however, a full account of interests and their role in the Critical project is
necessary.
The question of Interest is an intricate one which ultimately frames the entire Critical
project, delineating its parameters and specializations along theoretical, practical, aesthetical, and
anthropological lines (the Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of Practical Reason, the
Critique of the Power of Judgment, and Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View,
respectively). As Deleuze notes in Kant’s Critical Philosophy, “An immanent Critique – reason
as the judge of reason – is the essential principle of the so-called transcendental method. This
method sets out to determine: 1. the true nature of reason’s interests or ends; 2. the means of
realizing these interests.”1316 Kant defines an interest of Reason in two ways: as “the dependence
of a contingently determinable will on principles of reason”1317 and as “a principle that contains
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the condition under which alone [a faculty’s] exercise is promoted.”1318

These definitions are

not at odds with one another, however, since Reason, “being a faculty of principles, determines
the interest of all the powers of mind.”1319
There are at least two ways of talking about interests in the first respect. Either we can
talk about the kind of relation had with an interest or about different interests. Kant uses the
former to distinguish between moral and non-moral acts. An interest can be concerned with
human action in one of two ways: The will can either depend on the principles of reason in
themselves, what Kant calls taking an interest (which is practical), or it can rely on principles of
reason for the sake of satisfying inclinations, what Kant calls acting from interest (which is
pathological, or heteronomous). In the former case, the agent is motivated to perform a
particular action for its own sake1320. In the latter case, the patient “regards the principles of
reason as means to achieving the ends set by inclination.”1321 The latter I have already detailed,
the former I will describe in the next section of this chapter.
But interests of reason do not merely ground the distinction between practical and
prudential acts, as is clear from the second, much broader definition of an interest. As early as
the ‘A edition’ of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant famously outlines these interests in the form
of three questions. “All interest of my reason (the speculative as well as the practical) is united
in the following three questions: 1. What can I know? 2. What should I do? 3. What may I
hope?”1322 The first question is to what the speculative interest of reason is directed (the
theoretical), the second the practical interest (the moral), and the third both the speculative and
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practical interests.1323 The third question may even be regarded as a pragmatic interest insofar as
it is concerned with the acquisition of happiness. The aesthetic is distinct from these three by
virtue of lacking an interest entirely (aesthetics is ‘disinterested’). “These interests form an
organic and hierarchical system, which is that of the ends of a rational being.”1324 Interests thus
determine a unitary rank-and-file of the mind’s capacities, or faculties. There are two ways in
which the faculties of the mind are ranked: by means of the nature of its cognition (which is
rooted in the specific interest of reason in question), and by the ultimate end of a rational being.
In the ‘Introduction’ of the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant explains that each faculty of
the mind (faculties of cognition, feeling of pleasure and pain, and desire) has a higher form
whose a priori principles are realized in a specific faculty of cognition (the understanding, the
power of judgment, and reason, respectively).1325
Kant’s classifications, ‘faculties of the mind’ and ‘faculties of cognition,’ reveal an
ambiguous use of the term ‘faculty’ that should be cleared up before proceeding. The first use of
‘faculty’ indicates the type of relationship between a representation and a subject and object.
The faculty of knowledge proper (or cognition) refers to the relationship between the
representation and the object insofar as it can be said to correspond to it. The faculty of desire
refers to a causal relationship in which the representation causes the subject to bring about the
object of the representation. Finally, the feeling of pleasure and pain represents the relationship
of a representation to a subject.1326 The second use of the term ‘faculty’ provides us with the
faculty names most readers of Kant are best familiar with and is defined by the source of a
specific kind of representation. The faculty of sensibility is the source of intuitions, the faculty
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of the understanding is the source of concepts, and the faculty of reason the source of ideas.1327
Arguably the list could be extended, such as by including the faculty of imagination as the source
of the schemata.
As Deleuze puts it, “…a faculty in the first sense of the word has been defined so that an
interest of reason corresponds to it” and faculty in the second sense refers to the faculty “capable
of realizing this interest” by providing its legislative a priori principles.1328 The speculative
interest is realized by the understanding’s higher form and the practical interest by reason. The
power of judgment does have a priori principles of its own, despite judgments of taste being
disinterested.1329 A faculty is given priority over the others based on the interest being satisfied,
since the other faculties are enlisted in its service. For example, the theoretical (i..e speculative)
interest requires that sensibility and imagination prepare intuitions for the understanding. The
cognitions it forms are then organized by reason, but only to enable the understanding to further
its own ends, since the understanding is only concerned with possible experience.
The other way in which faculties are ranked is less ambiguous: the practical interest
always takes priority over the theoretical interest. Kant posits that reason cannot conflict with
itself, so its two uses (speculative and practical) have to be in harmony. If both faculties must be
in harmony and practical reason goes beyond the speculative, then practical reason is
supreme.1330 Furthermore, “the interest of [Reason’s] speculative use consists in the cognition of
the object up to the highest a priori principles; that of its practical use consists in the
determination of the will with respect to the final and complete end.”1331 Interests always relate
to an end, ends are always for the sake of a final end, and a ‘final end’ can only be realized
Ibid 7 – 8.
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practically. The world, beheld by reason in its theoretical mode, is populated by patients, not
agents. Only from a moral perspective does the world realize its final end, since only practical
reason can conceive of something as an end-in-itself (rational beings) as well as of a
suprasensible world in which the Highest Good (happiness proportionate to moral worth) is
achieved.1332 Thus, the ultimate priority of practical reason already sets it apart from theoretical
cognition.
Kant is quite explicit: There is a “warrant of pure reason in its practical use to an
extension which is not possible in its speculative use.”1333 Kant continues:
In order now to discover this condition of the application of the concept in question to noumena,
we need only recall why we are not satisfied with its application to objects of experience but
would like to use it of things in themselves as well. For then it soon becomes apparent that it is
not a theoretical but a practical purpose that makes this a necessity for us. 1334

The understanding cannot satisfy the practical interest since it is insufficient to determine the
will. Instead it is reason1335 which must stand in relation to the faculty of desire (or will).1336 If
we consider that the understanding is only concerned with nature, it makes sense that reason,
which is not bound to experience, is the only faculty capable of legislating an ‘ought’ rather than
an ‘is.’ Likewise, it makes sense that such an ‘ought’ may rely on postulates concerning a
noumenal realm that may undergird it.
The faculty of desire is considered pure, and is even called pure practical reason itself,
only insofar as it is moral, determined by ‘the mere representation of a law,’ or the form of
universality.1337 Since the moral law is not concerned with content but rather form, it is not
empirical but rather the product of reason alone. Given that the moral law can still determine the
Deleuze Kant’s Critical Philosophy 44 – 45.
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actions of the will without considering appearances, it becomes evident that there exists a
determining ground for the will that escapes the deterministic chain of cause and effect of the
phenomenal world.1338 Once one’s actions are determined by rational principles rather than
inclinations, one is free. Here we see a characteristically Kantian move: What in the Critique of
Pure Reason produced dialectical illusion - Reason’s detachment from experience - becomes the
basis for the will’s freedom. A disadvantage becomes an advantage.
But since “the concept of a being that has free will is the concept of a causa
noumenon”1339 practical reason has exceeded the bounds of what speculative reason can
accomplish. Kant already granted that freedom was logically possible since presupposing it and
determinism does not necessarily result in a contradiction so long as one was noumenal and the
other phenomenal. Now this possibility is conceptually determined as a practical necessity, but
without this necessity comprising a theoretical cognition.
…I do not now claim to know theoretically by this concept the constitution of a being insofar as it
has a pure will; it is enough for me to thereby only designate it as such a being and hence only to
connect the concept of causality with that of freedom (and with what is inseparable from it, the
moral law as its determining ground); and I am certainly authorized to do so by virtue of the pure,
not empirical origin of the concept of cause, inasmuch as I consider myself authorized to make no
other use of it than with regard to the moral law which determines its reality, that is, only a
practical use.1340

In other words, practical reason does not provide a doctrine of the soul, only an ethics
commensurate to one. A skeptic may say that this is at odds with the most fundamental tenet of
practical philosophy: to determine one’s actions always in accordance with what one knows. But
one has but to see how modest Kant is with such claims to see that this criticism misses the point.
Practical reason provides us with only as much as is necessary to compel moral action. A
metaphysical system cannot be developed from its principles.
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Thus, from the notion of a pure will comes a new concept of causality: freedom. It is
possible for causality to be re-conceived outside of the bounds of the empirical precisely because
the understanding does not limit the application of concepts to intuitions alone. Since we can
only think by means of concepts and it is possible for thought to breach the bounds of possible
experience, it is at least possible for concepts to think about the noumenal, albeit only from a
practical interest. 1341 Categories can thus be given significance in at least one of two ways: by
means of either intuitions or the moral law.
…thus I have, indeed, no intuition that would determine [the objective theoretical reality of the
concept of an empirically unconditioned causality], but it has nonetheless a real application which
is exhibited in concreto in dispositions or maxims, that is, it has practical reality which can be
specified; and this is sufficient to justify it even with regard to noumena. 1342

The very fact that the will can conform its maxims to the moral law gives us license for judging
the will to be free. From this eventually follows postulates concerning the immortality of the
soul and God’s existence, each ‘demonstrable’ based on practical necessity alone.
The Categories of Freedom as Clue (Leitfaden)
Kant notes that practical reason determines its principles first, starting with the faculty of
Reason, and only after that is secured, determines its concepts of freedom with the faculty of the
Understanding. That’s because if the concept of the good (object) preceded the mere form of
lawfulness (i.e. the principle of morality) we would fall into heteronomy of choice.1343 This is
what Deleuze refers to as the third great ‘reversal’ of the Kantian revolution, its ‘third poetic
formula’:1344 “the concept of good and evil must not be determined before the moral law…but
only…after it and by means of it.”1345 While a full account of the moral law has yet to be
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given,1346 the derivation of these categories of freedom is necessary to provide a clue as to how
the categories of understanding can be used to derive categories that satisfy a different interest of
reason. These new categories of self-constitution, in turn, frame my engagement with Kant and
Foucault’s ethical works (the latter of which I will reinterpret in this chapter).
We have already explored how the category of causality can be pushed beyond its
speculative limits because a category is produced by the understanding, which is intelligible in
nature rather than sensible, and need not be shackled to phenomenal applications. Insofar as this
category is not deployed in the speculative interest, but rather the practical interest, it is not
misapplied. Causality pushed beyond these sensible limitations is reinterpreted by the practical
interest as ‘will determination in accordance with the moral law rather than empirical
inclinations,’ is called ‘freedom.’ But since all categories derive from the same spontaneous
faculty and apply to any object in general rather than just objects of possible experience,
hypothetically the categories of theoretical cognition (also called ‘categories of nature’) can all
be pushed beyond speculative limits, insofar as they remain in the service of the practical
interest. Kant does this when he drafts twelve moral categories – the categories of freedom - to
parallel the categories of nature.
They are…without exception, modi of a single category, namely that of causality, insofar as the
determining ground of causality consists in reason’s representation of a law of causality which, as
the law of freedom, reason gives to itself and thereby proves itself a priori to be practical. 1347

Each category of freedom is but a moral analogue of a category of the understanding interpreted
as a kind of free causality. In fact, Kant will go on to argue that the intelligible world of the
thing-in-itself (the noumenal) should be analogously understood as a world of laws just like the

As will be seen, the moral principle in question is that ‘all maxims should be rendered capable of being
universalized without resulting contradiction.”
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sensible world of appearances (the phenomenal).1348 The former, intelligible laws are moral,
while the latter, sensible laws are natural.
But why must these ‘categories of freedom’ be derived from the categories of nature?
Because while moral actions are determined by laws of freedom (the moral law), they are also
events in the sensible world. Therefore the categories of the understanding must be used,
…but not with the view to a theoretical use of the understanding, in order to bring a priori the
manifold of (sensible) intuition under one consciousness, but only in order to subject a priori the
manifold of desires to the unity of consciousness of a practical reason commanding in the moral
law, or of a pure will.1349

This passage, arguably one of the most crucial to the project at hand, implies that the categories
of freedom achieve a task similar to the categories of nature, one of organizing a manifold in
accordance with a unitary consciousness. Furthermore, this unity is constitutive of subjectivity
itself. As Christine Korsgaard says in Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity,
…particularistic willing eradicates the distinction between a person and the incentives on which he
acts. And then there is nothing left here that is the person, the agent, that is his self-determined
will as distinct from the play of incentives within him. If you have a particularistic will, you are
not one person, but a series, a mere heap, of unrelated impulses. There is no difference between
someone who has a particularistic will and someone who is the cause of his actions. So
particularistic willing isn’t willing at all. 1350

The heteronomous subject is thus not a subject at all, but rather a confusion of impulses. The
theoretical interest and the practical interest thus effect a parallel unity in their respective
manifolds by means of either the transcendental unity of apperception (the application of the
categories of nature) or the pure will (by means of the categories of freedom). Apperception and
the pure will seem to be different expressions for the same unifying ‘I.’ However, the practical
interest attempts to deliberately unify the manifold of experience; it aims to create a moral
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subject. The only analogue theoretical reason has is the deliberate use of reason to organize
cognitions into a unifying system by means of syllogistic reasoning.
However, for the heteronomous desires that comprise the inner manifold of an unfree
desiring entity to be truly bound up in the phenomenal world, would they not have to be unified
by means of categories of nature, since it is by means of the application of Causality and the
subsequent application of the Second Analogy of Experience that we can claim that such desires
are implicated in the natural world of time-determinations that make freedom impossible? If
that’s the case, then there seem to be two distinct classes of unity effected by the same ‘I,’ one
that unifies the manifold of desire in accordance with nature and produces a natural being (a
passive animal) and one that produced a free rational agent. This is in perfect accord with the
function of categories of nature to produce objects, not subjects. And as seems evident, the
categories of freedom produce me as a free agent but leave the Other relatively undetermined,
except as a free rational being. How I encounter an Other as a subject is left undecided (which
will be addressed in the final section of this chapter).
But how is ‘free’ unity effected in the manifold of desire? To understand that, we must
turn to the categories of freedom. We are familiar with what makes theoretical cognition
possible: the subsuming of an intuition under a category of nature, typically in the form of a
judgment where the Subject term is the intuition and the Predicate term the concept (Let’s say,
“This body is a substance”). But practical cognition does not require pure intuition, but instead
.the pure will. From the pure will come the categories of freedom which in relation to ‘the
supreme principle of freedom’ produces a particular disposition in the will. The sufficiency of
this pairing to effect such a dispositional change implies that the categories of freedom
themselves become practical cognitions when they do so. In other words, categories of freedom
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produce the very reality (a disposition of the will) to which they refer.1351 It is now evident what
Kant means when he says that rational principles allow for self-determination. “Reason is thus
that faculty which legislates immediately in the faculty of desire. In this form it is called ‘pure
practical reason.’ And the faculty of desire, finding its determination within itself (not in content
or in an object) is strictly speaking called will, ‘autonomous will.’”1352
Kant is slightly more helpful explaining the derivation of the categories of freedom, albeit
he believes their derivation to be mostly intuitive to the reader: “I add nothing further here to
elucidate the present table, since it is intelligible enough in itself.”1353 Each category is a mode
of free causality, making twelve categories of freedom in total - three quantitative categories,
three qualitative, three relational, and three modal - just like the categories of nature. Like with
the categories of nature, there is a triadic dialectical pattern in each of the four category groups.

categories of freedom – for this is what we are going to call them in contrast to those theoretical concepts which
are categories of nature – have an obvious advantage over the latter, inasmuch as the latter are only forms of thought
which, by means of universal concepts, designate only indeterminately objects in general for every intuition possible for
us; the former, on the contrary, are directed to the determination of a free choice (to which indeed no fully corresponding
intuition can be given but which – as does not happen in the case of concepts of the theoretical use of our cognitive faculty
– has as its basis a pure practical law a priori); hence, instead of the form of intuition (space and time), which does not lie
in reason itself but must be drawn from elsewhere, namely from sensibility, these, as practical elementary concepts, have as
their basis the form of a pure will as given within reason and therefore within the thinking faculty itself; by this it happens
that, since all precepts of pure practical reason have to do only with the determination of the will, not with the natural
conditions (of practical ability) for carrying out its purpose, the practical a priori concepts in relation to the supreme
principle of freedom at once become cognitions and do not have to wait for intuitions in order to receive meaning; and this
happens for the noteworthy reason that they themselves produce the reality of that to which they refer (the disposition of
the will), which is not the business of theoretical concepts. But one must note well that these categories concern only
practical reason in general and so proceed in their order from those which are as yet morally undetermined and sensibly
conditioned to those which, being sensibly unconditioned, are determined only by the moral law. Ibid 192 – 193 [5:65 –
66]
1351These

We can now see why the moral law can give categories of freedom significance rather than leaving them empty:
categories of freedom ‘produce’ the dispositions of will to which they ‘refer.’ They can do this in part because
categories of freedom are based on ‘the form of a pure will as given within reason’ and only determine the will to
act, rather than actually enable the sensible performance of that act. The latter would require mediation akin to the
schematism since it would involve both intelligible and sensible objects. But no such differences in nature exist as a
gulf between concept and determination of the will since the thinking mind determines its own actions based on its
own principles and concepts. This is ultimately how a ‘pure will’ is defined Ibid 192 – 193 [5:65 – 66]
1352
Deleuze Kant’s Critical Philosophy 28.
1353
Kant Critique of Practical Reason 194 [5:67] italics mine.
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The Table of the Categories of Freedom with Reference to the Concepts of the Good and Evil
Concerning the Categories of Quantity:
1.
2.
3.

Unity  Subjective, according to maxims (wishes and desires of the individual’s will)
Plurality  Objective, according to principles (precepts)
Totality  A priori principles of freedom, both subjective and objective (laws)

Concerning the Categories of Quality
4.
5.
6.

Reality  Practical rules of commission (praeceptivae)
Negation  Practical rules of omission (prohibitivae)
Limitation  Practical rules of exception (exceptivae)

Concerning the Categories of Relation
7.
8.
9.

Substance  Relation to personality
Causality  Relation to the condition [Zustand] of the person
Community  Reciprocally, relation of one person to the condition of others

Concerning the Categories of Modality
10. Possibility and Impossibility  The permitted and the forbidden
11. Existence and Nonexistence  Duty and that which is contrary to duty
12. Necessity and Contingency  Perfect and imperfect duty1354

The categories “proceed in their order from those which are as yet morally undetermined and
sensibly conditioned to those which, being sensibly unconditioned, are determined only by the
moral law.”1355 While this formula of derivation seems clear enough, at least two ambiguities
remain: 1) is each category a causal mode of a category of nature or is the table derived purely
from the concept of freedom and merely follow a parallel derivation?, and 2) are the categories
organized into four interdependent groups or are they part of a holistic sequence that ends in the
modal categories, which are strictly speaking, the only categories Kant says are not merely
‘practical principles in general’ but ‘those of morality’?1356 Because of these ambiguities, a strict
exegesis of the text will be required.
Regarding whether or not one (causality) or all categories are in play when deriving the
table of the categories of freedom, Kant says, “…the determinations of a practical reason can

1354

Ibid 193 - 194 [5:66 ]
Kant Critique of Practical Reason193 [5:66]
1356
Ibid 194 [5:67]
1355
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take place only with reference to [appearances] and therefore, indeed, conformably with the
categories of the understanding…”1357 The use of the plural ‘categories’ would seem to imply
that all categories are in play, unless Kant means by this the class ‘categories of the
understanding,’ to which ‘causality’ belongs, rather than the specific categories (i.e. it could still
be a vague reference to causality alone). The second relevant passage immediately follows the
table of categories of freedom:
One quickly sees that in this table freedom is regarded as a kind of causality – which, however, is
not subject to empirical grounds of determination – with respect to actions possible through it as
appearances in the sensible world, and that consequently it is referred to the categories of their
natural possibility, while yet each category is taken so universally that the determining ground of
that causality can be taken to be also outside the sensible world of freedom as the property of an
intelligible being, until the categories of modality introduce, but only problematically, the
transition from practical principles in general to those of morality…1358

It is possible that ‘the categories of their natural possibility’ might refer to the pairing of each
category of freedom with a category of nature, since this would align with the previous
assessment that actions, as appearances, tie the categories of freedom to the categories of
understanding (plural). While the question is still unsettled, it seems plausible that since there is
an undeniable, albeit vague connection asserted between the categories of freedom and
understanding, that we can take superficial similarities between these categories to indicate an
implicit pairing, especially if Kant asserted the derivation to be obvious to the reader.
Sometimes the Table follows the general pattern of the Table of the categories of nature:
A positive category (the first) is opposed by its inversion (the second) and then synthesized into
another category that both contains the preceding categories and moves beyond them (the third).
This is most apparent in the categories of Quality. For example, it is easy to see how ‘Reality,’ a
positive quality, can be converted into ‘Practical rules of commission’ or ‘Negation,’ a negative

Ibid 192 [5:65] The referent is ambiguous and could also be ‘events in the sensible world’ rather than
‘appearances.’ Nonetheless, both referents amount to the same fundamental meaning in this context.
1358
Ibid 194 [5”67] Italics mine
1357
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quality, can be converted into ‘Practical rules of omission,’ since Reality affirms and Negation
negates.
But that pattern doesn’t always seem to hold, leaving the principle of determination
unclear. When considering Quantity, it seems like the only way Unity could imply the
individual at all is if Unity were associated with Singular judgments rather than Universal
ones.1359 Granted that the Universal concerns laws, it makes sense that Totality (paired with it)
would imply moral laws (as the Totality-adjacent category of freedom does). One could argue
that Universality is a form of Unity (it is unit-making, and thus individual), Plurality the form of
material determinations, and Totality the unity of material determinations, in which case the
category order is both maintained and in conformity with the thesis–antithesis–synthesis triadic
structure. Furthermore, maintaining the parallel ordering (Universality-Unity, ParticularPlurality, Singular-Totality) aligns better with the parallel Kant notes between the three
formulations of the Categorical Imperative, in which the form concerning Universality is paired
with Unity, Plurality with particular rational agents, and Totality with a Kingdom of Ends. I can
only conclude that Kant either inconsistently associates the Quantitative judgments and
categories due to an error or that there is something intrinsic to Universal and Singular
judgments that leads to this ambiguity. And in fact, the latter seems, at minimum, the case.
The logicians rightly say that in the use of judgments in syllogisms singular can be treated like
universal ones. For just because they have no domain at all, their predicate is not merely related to
some of what is contained under the concept of the subject while being excluded from another part
of it. The predicate therefore holds of that concept without exception, just as if the latter were a
generally valid concept with a domain with the predicate applying to the whole of what is
signified.1360

1359

Beatrice Longuenesse notes this category confusion in Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and
Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason Charles T. Wolfe (trans.) (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1998), 248-249, but not in context to morality.
1360
Kant Critique of Pure Reason 207 [A71/B96]
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While it is not clear how this ambiguity, in each case, could play out, it does not seem a
coincidence that this judgment-category pairing is the only ambiguous pairing.1361
The second ambiguity, concerning whether or not there are four independent sequences
or one sequence of categories, does not have a similar suggestive tell. We’ve already seen above
that the categories ‘proceed in their order from those which are as yet morally undetermined and
sensibly conditioned to those which, being sensibly unconditioned, are determined only by the
moral law’ and that only the categories under modality are properly moral (the others are merely
practical principles). This is presumably because only the modal categories refer to duty or have
the force of imperatives, which requires necessity to back it. That alone would seem to suggest
one rather than four distinct sequences of categories, even if the formula for derivation seems to
be lacking. The concluding paragraph of the section, while supporting this claim, does not
provide an explicit method for derivation:
…one knows at once from the above table and its first number where one has to set out from in
practical considerations: from the maxims that each bases on his inclination, from the precepts that
hold for a species of rational beings insofar as they agree in certain inclinations, and finally from
the law that holds for all without regard for their inclinations, and so forth. In this way one
surveys the whole plan of what has to be done, every question of practical philosophy that has to
be answered, and also the order that must be followed. 1362

The fact that Kant does not give an example of transitioning between category groups suggests
perhaps that explaining how such a transition takes place may prove difficult.
However, one may say that the categories that precede Modality seem sufficiently moral.
Certainly the final quantitative category ‘a priori principles of freedom’ seems to hold the force
of the moral law even though it is not Modal (are not the principles of freedom the same as moral
principles?). Is it possible that there is an alternative derivation of these categories of freedom
The remainder of the passage does seem to connection the Singular judgment to Unity: “If, on the contrary, we
compare a singular judgment with a generally valid one, merely as a cognition, with respect to quantity, then the
former relates to the latter as unity relates to infinity, and is therefore in itself essentially different from the latter.”
Kant Critique of Pure Reason 209 [A71/B96]
1362
Kant Critique of Practical Reason 194 [5:67]
1361
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that starts with Modal categories and proceeds to Quantitative categories? And is it possible that
such a derivation might better explain how to transition from triad to triad?
Whether or not there is a necessary sequence in Kant’s various tables of categories has
been a matter of scholarly debate. In The Completeness of Kant’s Table of Judgments, Klaus
Reich argues that the sequence found in the tables of logical judgments is essential to proving the
completeness of the table, and runs from assertoric judgments, to categorical judgments, then
hypothetical judgments, problematic judgments, disjunctive judgments, and from here, apodictic
judgments, affirmative judgments, negative judgments, universal judgments, and particular
judgments.1363 Is it possible to analogously derive the categories of freedom from the concept of
duty as such (the correlate to the assertoric judgment)?
If the pattern holds, the sequence of derivation would be the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Duty and what is contrary to duty
Relation to personality
Relation of condition to the person
What is permitted and not permitted
Reciprocally, relation of one person to the condition of others
Perfect and imperfect duty
Practical rules of commission
Practical rules of omission
A priori principles of freedom, both subjective and objective (laws) (assuming Totality
corresponds with Universality)
10. Objective, according to principles (precepts)

It seems that duty assumes a subject that complies with it, which assumes that duty acts as a
determination of the will. But for this determination of the will to be moral, it must assume
1363

The argument is intricate but seems to be the following: He starts with the definition of a judgment as
objectively valid (the assertoric judgment), and from here deriving the categorical judgment (since judgments are
relations between a subject concept and a predicate concept), then the hypothetical judgment from relating two
categorical judgments to each other, then the problematic judgment from the observation that each judgment in a
hypothetical judgment does not assert a truth claim. From here is derived the disjunctive judgment, which is the
unity of two mutually exclusive judgments that together make a cognition. From the disjunctive judgment come the
rest of the judgments, as a mutually exclusive relation assumes an apodictic judgment, an affirmative judgment, a
negative judgment, a universal judgment, and a particular judgment. Neither the infinite judgment or the singular
judgment are derived by means of this method. Reich, Klaus, The Completeness of Kant’s Table of Judgments. trans.
Jane Kneller and Michael Losonsky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992) 41-59.
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actions that are permitted and forbidden. These actions are performed in a community of rational
beings (a kingdom of ends). If the parallel holds, then the analogue to the disjunctive judgment
(a Moral Community) is the cornerstone upon which the rest of the categories can be derived. If
it is fair to interpret a moral community as a Kingdom of Ends (the third, most developed
formulation of the Categorical Imperative), then it’s possible. Kinds of duties are distinguished
based on whether or not they could hold as moral for a kingdom of ends. If a duty is a logically
necessary duty for a community, it is perfect; if not, it is imperfect. From here could be derived
practical principles of commission and omission. From the distinction between logically
necessary duties and duties that are not may then derive universal laws and objective principles.
However, such a derivation borders on fanciful. Reich’s argument may provide the
grounds for a theoretical sequence of logical functions that may implicate an analogous sequence
for categories of nature, but this sequence seems counter to the sequence Kant proposes for the
categories of freedom. It seems likely that Kant sees a systematic principle unfolding in
sequences throughout each table, even while asserting the primacy of each individual category,
but there is no guarantee that the sequence is commensurate between tables. And insofar as we
are merely trying to gain a clue as to how to derive Categories of Self-Constitution, it may be
sufficient to recognize that such categories hug both the natural and moral worlds and thus, in
like manner, the categories of nature may be appealed to for guidance.
The Paralogisms as Clue
But since our concern is with the subject and the Paralogisms already determine the
categories which uniquely ‘think’ the subject, it is possible that only those categories need to be
translated into Categories of Self-Constitution (Or, at minimum, we may resort to references to
the four category headings). We already determined the following:
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1. The first Paralogism fallaciously concluded the subject to be a substance (based on the
speculative application of the concept of Substance and Inherence).
2. The second Paralogism fallaciously concluded the subject to be simple (based on the
speculative application of the concept of Reality).
3. The third Paralogism fallaciously concluded the subject to be a persisting personality
(based on the speculative application of the concept of Unity).
4. The fourth Paralogism fallaciously concluded the subject to be distinct from the body and
surrounding world (based on the speculative application of Existence/Non-Existence).
If it is fair to take Kant’s lead on both accounts (both his derivation of the categories of freedom
and his derivation of the categories that when inappropriately used produce the Paralogisms)
then we can use these four categories as clues, or correlative categories of nature for outlining
four distinct ascetic practices for self-constitution. These in turn can be converted into
principles, which, being drafted by Reason, by implication, render us free by following them.
The activity is grounded in freedom when these principles condition the will. In this way we
conceive of the subject qua subject, as an agent that becomes what it is.
Granted the speculative nature of this task, I will briefly outline this Table of SelfConstitution, only to highlight the architectonic and how it will frame my further discussions of
Kant and Foucault. Then I will fit these results into the ethical framework Foucault provides us
in Volume II of The History of Sexuality. However, it is not the task of this dissertation to fully
explain or justify this architectonic, which would be a task that exceeds the bounds of a
dissertation, merely to introduce a larger project.
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The Table of Self-Constitution
Category of the Understanding
(with underlying logical
function)

Paralogistic Category and
Speculative Predicate

Category of Self-Constitution

Kantian Ascesis:
Unify consciousness
(The pure will conditioned by the
form of universal law)
Deleuzian Counter-Actualization:
Remove all barriers
(representation,
territorialization, molar
identities) to what one can do
Badiouian Ideation:
Retain a faithful relationship to
the Event;
Identify with the Immortal within
by cleaving to the Idea

Unity
(Universality/Singular)

Personality

Reality
(Affirmative)

Simplicity

Substance and Inherence
(Categorical Syllogism)

Mental Substance

Existence/Non-Existence
(Assertoric)

Distinctness from Body and
World

Foucaultian Askesis:
Explore new modes of existence
that allow more efficient
resistance to power

If Foucault’s ethical categories are applied, the Table of Self-Constitution resembles this:
Ethical Telos
(Subject-Form)

Ethical Ascetics

The Universal
Subject

Affirmation
(Reality)

CounterActualization

BecomingImperceptible

Belief
(Loyalty)

Fidelity to the
Event
(Substance)

Ideation

Subject of Truth

Pleasure

Intensification
(Existence)

Homosexual
Ascesis

Homosexual

Ethical Substance

Kant1364

Intention

Deleuze

Power

Badiou

Foucault

1364

Elaboration of
Ethical Work

Thinker

Mode of
Subjection
Unify by means of
the Categorical
Imperative
(Unity)

Foucault, “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” in The Essential Foucault 111,125.
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Divine Cognition as Clue
I have made the bold claim that practical reason is capable of determining not merely
what we should do but what we should become (in order to be free beings). I then determined
that Kant may have provided the grounds for outlining the parameters for determining what we
can become by reinterpreting the four speculative predicates of the Paralogisms as four subjectideals. I called the discipline that derives this architectonic and that conceives of the subject as a
subject practical psychology. Practical psychology sacrifices knowledge of the origin for
rationally determined knowledge of the destination. I would like to conclude the introduction to
this speculative agenda by discussing why practical reason seems most appropriate for not only
determining this rational end but also creating it. I will do so by bridging the theoreticalpractical divide by means of a comparison between practical reason and Divine cognition.
The faculty of desire can be defined as “a being’s faculty to be by means of its
representations the cause of the reality of the objects of these representations.”1365 We have
already seen that pure practical reason, which determines its principle – the moral law immanently, and the will, are the same. This effectively means that the will acts freely insofar as
it creates its own determining principle. Let us now compare this account of pure practical
reason’s capacities with Divine cognition. Divine understanding (or intuition) “would not
represent given objects” but would instead “give” or “produce” its objects by means of its
“representations.”1366 Since practical reason creates its principle, it also determines its ends
similarly to how the Divine understanding effectively understands (and intuits) by creating its
object. It is because of the ideal model of Divine cognition that it seems possible to know what
one can become based on the practical use of reason because one makes that reality happen.

1365
1366

Kant Critique of Practical Reason 144 [5:10]
Kant Critique of Pure Reason 253 [B143]
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6.2: Kantian Ethics - How a Subject Preserves Its Freedom and Subjecthood
Kantian Ethics Proper
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant attempts to find the conditions for something to be
an object of possible experience. Neglected is the correlative task of finding the conditions for
someone to be a subject of possible experience. With rare exception, we immediately distinguish
people from inert objects. Why? Kant address the problem of subjectivity in at least two ways:
1) by demonstrating that the persisting personality that underlies the observable behaviors of
rational beings (the soul) cannot be an object of possible experience and instead can only act as a
regulative idea for systematizing psychological cognitions, in the Critique of Pure Reason, and 2)
by attempting to determine the conditions that define rational beings as moral agents qua
subjects in the Critique of Practical Reason. I have fully demonstrated the first approach in
Chapter 1. Furthermore, I demonstrated the exhaustive ways in which Kant theorizes that the
subject subverts his own freedom (makes himself into an object) in Chapters 2 and 3. I will
explore the second approach in this chapter.
In Chapter Three, I discussed Kant’s theory of heteronomy of choice. A principle is
heteronomous if it is a practical principle which subverts the subjecthood of the moral subject,
rendering the determination and success of practical efforts contingent upon the external
phenomenal chain of cause and effect rather than its own self-determined rational legislation.
According to the Third Antinomy, freedom and time are mutually exclusive, so there can be no
phenomena of freedom:
The concept of causality as natural necessity, as distinguished from the concept of causality as
freedom, concerns only the existence of things insofar as it is determinable in time and hence as
appearances, as opposed to their causality as things in themselves. Now, if one takes the
determinations of the existence of things in time for determinations of things in themselves (which
is the most usual way of representing them), then the necessity in the causal relation can in no way
be united with freedom; instead they are opposed to each other as contradictory. For, from the
first it follows that every event, and consequently every action that takes place at a point of time, is
necessary under the condition of what was in the preceding time. Now, since time past is no
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longer within my control, every action that I perform must be necessary by determining grounds
that are not within my control, that is, I am never free at the point of time in which I act. 1367

Despite their incompatibility within experience, Kant demonstrates that freedom and necessity
are both compossible in the Critique of Pure Reason (necessity belonging to phenomena while
freedom remaining a logical possibility belonging to noumena). Nonetheless, all that could be
said from a theoretical perspective was that speculative reason cannot pass a verdict on freedom.
In that respect he has only accomplished a negative task, saying what Reason cannot know about
freedom, rather than what it can. As previously covered, it is not until his ethical works that
Kant develops a positive account of freedom, defining the subject as a moral agent, and
irrevocably binding the fate of the subject to both freedom and morality. As I will explain in this
chapter, without a rational and, ultimately, noumenal (timeless), determining ground for making
decisions, a subject is nothing more than an object driven by sensible inclinations, inclinations
bound up in our animal nature. And while humanity in its sensible (or phenomenal) capacity
may be inclined towards happiness, this happiness will always be the mechanical aftermath of a
confluence of sensible causes outside of my control.
After defining what up until his time had masqueraded as morality1368 amongst the
learned, Kant attempts to identify the criteria a principle would need to measure up to in order to
be properly moral. In the previous section I referred to this as the moral law. Kant determines
this ‘supreme principle of morality’1369 in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785),
and then attempts to “present the unity of practical with speculative reason in a common

1367

Kant Critique of Practical Reason 215-216. [5:94]
Covered in Chapter 2. “..anything empirical that might slip into our maxims as a determining ground of the will
makes itself known at once by the feeling of gratification or pain that necessarily attaches to it insofar as it arouses
desire…” Kant Critique of Practical Reason 213. [5L91-92] In other words, any practical principle that is
conditioned on something material (an actual object) rather than the immediate form of the maxim is ultimately
mediated by the faculty of sensibility (‘feelings of gratification or pain’).
1369
Kant Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 47. [3:392]
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principle”1370 in the Critique of Practical Reason (1788). It will not be until The Metaphysics of
Morals (published in two installments, ‘Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right’
and ‘Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue’ in 1797)1371 that a full sketch of
duties will be outlined. Most of my attentions will be directed towards the first two texts, the
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason. Rather than try
to synthesize these three accounts into one section, I will take each individually, starting with the
earlier text, the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, and then supplementing it with those
innovations found in the Critique of Practical Reason and The Metaphysics of Morals. If one
text provides a richer account of something found in both texts, I will reserve that topic for the
discussion of that particular text. That said, The Metaphysics of Morals is much too immense a
text to do justice to in a chapter that is already grappling with the intricate conceptual apparatus
of Kant’s fundamental ethical theory found in the first two texts. Theory, such as is mostly found
in the first two texts, typically takes precedence over application since application requires an
outline of principles in order to be accomplished. For the sake of manageability, discussion of
the Metaphysics of Morals will be limited to the parts most salient to elucidating previous
discussion, especially so-called ethical ascetics.
The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
At the beginning of the Groundwork, Kant frames the question that will drive his entire
ethical enterprise:
Since my aim here is directed properly to moral philosophy, I limit the question proposed only to
this: is it not thought to be of the utmost necessity to work out for once a pure moral philosophy,
completely cleansed of everything that may be only empirical and that belongs to anthropology?
For, that there must be such a philosophy is clear of itself from the common idea of duty and of
moral laws.1372
1370
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Evident in this passage is the familiar indictment of empirical considerations, as well as what is
assumed to follow from this exclusion: ‘the common idea of duty and of moral laws.’ The
implication of this curious wording is 1) that the common man already has an implicit
understanding of pure moral philosophy, and 2) that pure moral philosophy is comprised of duty
and law. In a certain respect, all of Kant’s ethical theory follows from his interpretation of ‘duty’
and ‘law’.
From ‘law’ is derived not only necessity but also universality, since the bounds of a law
are absolute and universal. Granted that the natural connotations of law are commensurable
with these qualities, the moral law, by analogy, is also absolute and universal. But while natural
laws are descriptive, moral laws are prescriptive. Therefore the moral law commands absolutely
and universally (As can already be ascertained from Chapter Three, in order for the moral law to
be universal and necessary it must “lie a priori in our reason,” rather than be empirically
derived).1373 Essentially, the moral law is the form of universality itself. A command, such as
“Thou shall not lie” would not be conditional on circumstances or parties affected. It would be
applicable to all rational beings with the same unequivocal binding force.1374 In Kant’s
terminology, the moral law must take the form of a categorical imperative rather than a
hypothetical imperative. I do not choose which moral laws I obey based on my desires. If I
chose the ends of my imperatives, I could just as easily abandon them and all moral obligations
to that end would go with it. Rather the moral law commands regardless of my desires,
inclinations, and, ultimately, any factor that distinguishes me in my particularity from other
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rational beings. Kantian ethics necessarily strips away such particularities in order to arrive at
the proper moral plane, populated solely by rational wills.
From ‘duty’ comes the motive for complying with the moral law. If compliance with the
moral law is not conditional, then we must choose to comply with the moral law for its own sake,
out of duty.1375 Ultimately the two expressions - ‘out of duty’ and ‘for its own sake’ - mean the
same thing. An act may conform to the moral law but if it is not done for the sake of duty it is
merely legal, rather than moral.1376 In other words, the attempted act is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for morality. In those cases in which the action is ‘legal’ but the proper
motive absent, no moral worth can be attributed to the agent of the action. Why this is the case is
easily demonstrable and intuitive to even the most hardened consequentialist. Take the example
of a dishonest man, a knavish stockbroker. Let us say that he not only has the reputation for
dishonesty and knavery but is also self-aware of this reputation and uses it to his personal
advantage in business. If a suspicious client asks him for his professional advice regarding
investments, he tells the truth, knowing full well that his client will not believe him and will
invest counter to his suggestions, leading to his profits and the client’s loss. On the surface the
knave has told the truth, but he spoke true with the intention to deceive. None, neither the
deontologist, nor the consequentialist would regard the knave as virtuous. The consequentialist
may respond that the negative consequences of this subterfuge with the veneer of honesty are
likely to outweigh the benefits but if the benefit to the knave equals the cost to the client, as in
this case it seems to, are there any grounds for such a negative evaluation? Furthermore, even if
the malicious stockbroker was henceforth saddled with miscalculations, subsequently telling the
truth to the gullible and lies to the suspicious, leading to the fruitlessness of his schemes of
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honesty and the boon of his clients, no one, not even the consequentialist would applaud the
knave or give him credit for his actions.
But Kant takes the consequentialist further to task in the Groundwork (further than in his
other ethical works), first by dismissing empirical concerns, such as consequences, from being
suited to the standards of a categorical imperative, but by then revisiting consequences in a
roundabout way that will show that by consequentialism’s own standards only one thing can
make a successful bid to the status of ‘good without limitation’: the good will.1377 Consider all
of the attributes of a moral agent typically considered good: talents of mind (such as
understanding), qualities of temperament (like courage), gifts of fortune (power, wealth, health,
even happiness itself). Each one is as equally capable of causing harm as well as benefit if the
character of the moral agent possessing them is wicked. Moreover, possession of many of these
even enables an agent to do more harm than he would otherwise be capable. A genius can better
anticipate how to outsmart an opponent, a strong man how to overcome him, a patient,
dispassionate man capable of biding his time until his opponent is weak. Only the possession of
a good will always makes good use of these attributes without exception.1378 The reader, now
familiar with Stoicism, can hear its echoes in this conclusion.
Since Kant is suggesting that proper moral conduct is no mystery to any besides the most
sociopathic or insincere of speculative and moral philosophers, he can appeal to the
consequentialist on grounds that even he will implicitly accept even if the implications of his
moral principle contradict it. Mark Timmons refers to this evaluative criterion as ‘internal
support.’ A moral theory cannot contradict a moral belief that is implicitly taken as morally self-
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evident in society.1379 In other words, there seem to be incontestable moral truths. No one, not
even the most hardened utilitarian, would argue that it is good for a self-serving man to gain
pleasure from heinous actions, even if those actions only marginally affect others. That is
because we implicitly believe that happiness is for those with moral worth, which is proportional
to the extent one is in possession of a good will. A grave miscarriage of justice with the moral
weight of an indictment cast against the universal order itself would arise if the contingencies of
life were to properly align so as to consistently bless cruel men with happiness and virtuous ones
with the fates of slaughtered sheep (and in fact Kant is aware that common sense seems to
suggest such an indictment since no earthly reward for virtue seems evident). In response to this,
a utilitarian could never provide an adequate justification for this turn of events, could never
provide grounds for why cruel men ever deserve happiness, and can at best skirt the question of
virtue and character entirely.
I pause here to offer possible criticisms. Arthur Schopenhauer argues in On the Basis of
Morals, that Kant is not justified in assuming that morality is based on either law or duty, and
that without an explanation for why it must be so Kant must inevitably assume a Christian
theological ethics that’s based both on an ethical principle he’s previously rejected (objectiveexternal material practical principles concerning the Will of God) as well as an implicit
eudaimonism, since one can only be compelled to comply with law by appeal to either reward or
punishment.1380 Furthermore, a heartless man devoid of compassion, when obligated, can only be
motivated by fear.1381 The subsequent postulates of practical reason (the Immortality of the Soul
and God) are subsequently not derived from morality as much as they are already implicitly
1379
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assumed by it and, like planted seeds, eventually sprout as if new.1382 Nor can Kant maintain for
too long that morality and happiness are divorced before he slipped happiness back in by means
of the doctrine of the highest good, which promises eternal happiness to the dutiful.1383 To these
criticisms I say the following: there is no necessary connection between a moral principle based
on law and duty and a theological ethics, merely a plausible historical connection that is not
necessarily material to the matter at hand. Nor must we assume that compliance to a law must
necessarily be precipitated by fear of punishment or promise of reward. Respect is meant to
demonstrate how it is possible to comply with the law out of duty. Finally, Kant does not dispel
the notion of the Good, only base it upon law and duty. It would be absurd to argue that the
Good and happiness are not related since it is evident to all that the happy life is preferable to the
sad one. One should not be motivated by the reward of happiness but it’s fair to expect it if one
is a good person. Schopenhauer has not demonstrated that this is contradictory.
However, I will grant Schopenhauer’s charge that Kant’s contention that duties of love
are nothing more than ‘maxims of benevolence (practical love’)’ rather than ‘delight in the
other1384’ bears little resemblance to the common experience of love. In fact, Kant speaks
negatively of compassion, since to share the pains of others can only needlessly increase the
number of those who suffer, which we could never be obligated to do. 1385 However, he notes
that we have a duty to ‘actively sympathize’ with others and to “cultivate the compassionate
natural (aesthetic) feelings in us, and to make use of them as so many means to sympathy based
on moral principles and the feelings appropriate to them.”1386 In such cases, sympathy can
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properly motivate us when ‘representations of duty’ alone will not suffice.1387 Thus, Kant does
not distain affective love, but only admits that it is impossible to obligate someone to feel a
particular way.1388 Schopenhauer’s criticisms stem from the assumption that only people who
are already good-natured can feel compassion, feel moved by the plight of others, and thus act
morally, making morality as such superfluous. Schopenhauer seems to base ethics on
compassion only at the cost of the notion of moral obligation.
The Categorical Imperative
If morality is composed of categorical imperatives rather than conditional, hypothetical
imperatives, is there a fundamental categorical imperative to determine our actions and make us
free? Kant identifies three versions of the same categorical imperative. Each version is derived
in two ways, which will be explained in context to each imperative. The first two categorical
imperative versions are also provided with examples of duties that follow from each version that
can be gridded based on two different axes:
Kinds of Duties

Narrow Duty
(Based on logical
contradiction)
Wide Duty
(Based on contradiction of the
will)

1387
1388

Duty to Self

Duty to Others

E.g. Self-Preservation

E.g. Honesty

E.g. Cultivation of Talents

E.g. Beneficence
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The First Formulation of the Categorical Imperative
This categorization of duties is primarily derived from the first version of the categorical
imperative. The first categorical imperative can itself be articulated in two ways, and is likely
the most well-known of the three. This may be because Kant singles out the first categorical
imperative version as the best (‘strict’) standard for testing maxims (i.e. for ‘moral
appraisal’).1389 The first articulation is “Act only in accordance with that maxim through which
you can at the same will that it become a universal law.”1390 The second articulation is mostly
an abbreviation of the first: “Act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a
universal law of nature.”1391 Thus, the moral law that determines the free will must be capable of
being a universal law for every rational will. This version is derived from the form a proper
maxim must take: the form of universality.1392 This may be said to be the purest form of the
categorical imperative, since Kant prioritizes ‘formal’ principles over ‘material’ ones, concerned
with an object (heteronomy of choice). Each version of the categorical imperative also derives
sequentially from the categories of Quantity, with the first categorical version deriving from “the
unity of the form of the will (its universality).”1393
The concept of contradiction is essential to the first formulation of the categorical
imperative. If a contradiction results when any rational agent attempts to universalize the maxim
of its actions, that maxim cannot be properly moral. Kant recognizes two kinds of contradictions
that result from testing ‘bad’ maxims by this criterion: a contradiction in thought and a
contradiction of will. Some maxims are logically impossible if universalized, while others,
despite passing the logical test, would nonetheless never be willed to be universalized by a will.
1389
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Universalized maxims that are logically impossible violate a ‘perfect,’ or ‘narrow’ duty. Allen
Wood says narrow duties are those duties that are both required and “whose omission is wrong
or blameworthy.”1394 Universalized maxims that contradict the will are called ‘imperfect,’ or
‘wide’ (‘meritorious’) duties.1395 As can be seen from the above graph, Kant considers each kind
of duty in context to oneself and others. Thus, Kant limits his discussion of explicit duties in the
Groundwork to four:1396 1) the duty against committing suicide, 2) the duty against making false
promises, 3) the duty to cultivate those personal talents which “could make [one] a human being
useful for all sorts of purposes,”1397 and the duty to aid others in achieving those ends which aim
towards their personal happiness (the duty of beneficence).
The first example of duty is of a perfect duty to oneself. Regarding suicide, Kant derives
the following maxim: “From self-love I make it my principle to shorten my life when its longer
duration threatens more troubles than it promises agreeableness.”1398 But if self-love is the
feeling instilled by nature to encourage the continuation of life, it cannot also incite life’s
extinction, which is its opposite.1399 But does a logical contradiction really result from this?
Kant assumes that there is a purpose to self-love, and that the maxim of suicide, when
universalized, would contradict this purpose. Can we say that self-love by nature aims at selfpreservation if it has been observed to do otherwise? And why is it assumed that all suicide is
precipitated by self-love? A dying husband may want to spare his spouse the burden of taking
care of him, a woman diagnosed with Alzheimer’s might want to preserve her dignity.
Would maxims drafted with those aims also contradict if universalized? Does a change of
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motive change the status of contradiction? And how much are these ‘logical’ contradictions
obfuscating empirical a posteriori reasoning rather than rational a priori reasoning?
The best example Kant provides for demonstrating a perfect duty is ultimately predicated
on truth-telling: One cannot make false promises. This is Kant’s second example of duty (the
perfect duties we have towards others). Take a potential borrower who promises to repay a loan
on false pretenses, since he never foresees having enough money to repay the debt. Kant
formulates his maxim as the following: “When I believe myself to be in need of money I shall
borrow money and promise to repay it, even though I know this will never happen.”1400 But a
lender lends only on condition of getting repaid. If the dishonest borrower’s maxim were
universalized, all potential lenders would know that such promises were mere subterfuge and that
they would never be repaid. Subsequently lenders would never lend money in the first place.
Furthermore, no potential borrower would even ask for a loan because he would know the futility
of the dishonest gesture. This is the best illustration of how some maxims, if universalized,
would make their very willing logically impossible. A dishonest borrower cannot exist in a
world in which borrowing is always assumed to be stealing since the conditions for lending
would not exist.
A few things can be noted from Kant’s example. First, all loans must become dishonest
loans for it to work. The willing of the maxim renders it a natural law, so all potential borrowers
(all rational agents) would have no choice but to attempt subterfuge when lending. It cannot be a
matter of all lenders knowing it is possible that the borrower is lying, since that would be no
different than how things already are. Each attempt to universalize a maxim attempts to generate
a simulated world. Only those maxims that can actually generate a world are proper maxims.
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This is the same thing as saying that only those maxims that can be made into universal laws
comply with the first categorical imperative, since a world is a world by virtue of its laws.
Schopenhauer’s critique here is that such an example is based less on logical
contradiction than on the fact that no one would want to live in a world in which they would be
lied to in the same way they intend to lie. It’s neither ‘pure’ nor based on principle, but is rather
a hypothetical imperative based on self-love and happiness.1401 To this I note that Schopenhauer
obscures the truth of the matter by putting the perfect duty of honesty next to the imperfect duty
of beneficence, as if to imply that the grounds for both duties are the same, which they are not.
A perfect (narrow) duty must be logically consistent while an imperfect (wide) duty must merely
be consistent with the desires of a will. Only the latter is potentially eudaimonistic.
The problem in my calculation lies in the ambiguity between what can be known a priori
and a posteriori about a rational agent. If we look at this merely from the perspective of the
purpose attributed to the loan (that it is something given with the purpose of being returned),
perhaps the contradiction is a logical one based on a contradiction of the purpose of the act or
what is essential to either a rational being or the nature of desire (that it aims for ends). And
perhaps that’s the case, given that, as Iaian Morrison notes, Kant provides a ‘function-based’
definition of desire: “a desire is composed of something imagined in the future and the possibility
of this thing coming into being because it is imagined.”1402 But if the contradiction is based on
the psychological preferences of a rational agent (that they would prefer not to give a loan they
would not have returned) then it seems like an a posteriori claim. Put another way, can we know
a priori that a lender would not lend to a borrower, knowing in advance that the loan would never
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be repaid? Does this not presuppose that the lender is self-interested? But haven’t most of us
lent money to another without expectation of repayment?
One could argue, as Kant similarly contends in On a Supposed Right to Lie from
Philanthropy that regardless of the motives of either the lender or the borrower, an act of
dishonesty has taken place: By lying I always…
…do wrong in the most essential part of duty in general…that is, I bring it about, as far as I can,
that statements (declarations) in general are not believed, and so too that all rights which are based
on contracts come to nothing and lose their force; and this is a wrong inflicted upon humanity
generally.”1403

Thus, on the basis of lying alone, I commit an act which, if universalized, would make it
impossible to lie, since lying presupposes a deception ruled out by the awareness all rational
beings would have that nothing true would ever be spoken. No possible world could exist in
which all people lied. The irony of ironies of the matter is that a lender who lends without the
intention of being repaid is technically dishonest as well, since the loan was given under the
pretense of repayment.
Nonetheless, given that perfect duties leave no room for variant expression (unlike
imperfect duties), would not a world in which everyone complied with perfect duty be
phenomenally indistinguishable from one in which everyone was programmed to act a certain
way? In what way then can we say the former world is inhabited by free beings and the latter
not? Only from a noumenal perspective, from which the motivation of action could be known,
could the distinction be maintained, making the noumenal a necessary idea for morality.
With Kant’s third example we cross from perfect duties into imperfect duties. According
to Wood, a duty is ‘wide’ if “that action or striving on behalf of them is meritorious, but the
omission of such action or striving is not blameworthy unless it involves a principle to refuse to
Kant, Immanuel, “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy,” in Practical Philosophy, ed. and trans. Mary
Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 612 [8:426]
1403
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strive in that direction and to omit all actions of that kind.”1404 In other words, we have options
as to how we practice wide duties. A violation of a wide duty can be determined if a
universalized maxim is logically possible but not something the will can will (a contradiction of
the will results).
Kant’s third example (of an imperfect duty to oneself) concerns the obligation to cultivate
one’s talents, demonstrated by testing whether it’s opposite can be universalized: ‘I will neglect
the cultivation of those natural talents which make me a human being useful for all sorts of
purposes for the sake of enjoyment.’1405 In other words, this maxim implies a life abandoned to
the pursuit of pleasure rather than accomplishment. But can this maxim be universalized without
contradictions resulting? A world in which no one cultivated their talents is conceivable, at least
according to Kant, who cites ‘South Sea Islanders’ as a possible (very problematic) example.1406
Nonetheless a contradiction of the will would result since those capacities the hedonist considers
abandoning “serve him and are given to him for all sorts of possible purposes.”1407 Kant
assumes that the will has necessary ends that cannot be obstructed. In a certain respect, Kant is
suggesting here that rational beings have a duty to rise above their animality and respect their
fully rational, moral nature. The paradox lies in how, in this case, the moral law, which is
typically allergic to exceptions and calls for an indiscernibility of moral agents, actually calls for
agents to distinguish themselves in accordance with their personal talents. Duty does not compel
us to develop all of our natural talents. We have the prerogative to decide which talents to
cultivate. That said, not all talents are good, so arguably these talents must be tested
individually. Furthermore, the notion of natural ends seems arbitrary. Given that an ‘is’ cannot
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imply an ‘ought,’ prejudices often slip in to bridge the divide. In that way, a natural tendency
such as the pursuit of pleasure is arbitrarily deemed unnatural while procreation is deemed
natural, etc.
The final example of duty Kant gives (that of an imperfect duty to others) concerns
helping others to achieve their ends so that they can be happy. Its opposing maxim is: ‘I will
neither help nor hinder others in their respective pursuits towards happiness.’1408 It is also upon
the basis of the necessary ends of the will that this maxim would also contradict the will. “For, a
will that decided this would conflict with itself, since many cases could occur in which one
would need the love and sympathy of others and in which, by such a law of nature arisen from
his own will, he would rob himself of all hope of the assistance he wishes for himself.”1409
Here we see Schopenhauer’s criticism in full-force. Do we only have a duty of
beneficence because my own will would be frustrated otherwise? We’ve seen that self-love, the
pursuit of one’s own happiness can never be a duty, so how can the duty to help secure the
happiness of others be rooted in self-love? Is Kant contradicting himself? Kant is much clearer
in The Metaphysics of Morals:
For everyone who finds himself in need wishes to be helped by others. Bu if he lets his maxim of
being unwilling to assist others in turn when they are in need become public, tht is, makes this a
universal permissive law, then everyone would likewise deny him assistance when he himself is in
need, or at least would be authorized to deny it. Hence the maxim of self-interest would conflict
with itself if it were made a universal law, that is, it is contrary to duty. 1410

From this passage it is clear that what is at stake is not that I would be unhappy in a world
lacking beneficence, but that a maxim guided by self-interest refutes its very conditions (one
who pursues self-love can’t get it) But even granted this, does it follow a priori from the concept
of a will that it is finite and thus dependent on the cooperation of others if it is to accomplish its
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ends, or is such a determination made a posteriori? Insofar as a will is considered under moral
obligation rather than being divine, it is implicit that such a will is limited in its capacities, in
large part due to its hybrid sensible-intelligible nature. But it is unclear whether this limitation
somehow implies the necessary mutual benefit found within a dutiful community of finite
rational wills.
Few would argue that most of the duties that Kant outlines are not moral. Suicide,
making false promises, laziness, and disregard for the welfare of others are only exempted in rare
occasions, even for the consequentialist, and never valorized. Yet it’s evident that the
universality test does not always produce morally-viable judgments. Allen Wood, for example,
notes that careful wording of a maxim can either produce a false negative (judging a morally
permissible maxim to be wrong) or a false positive (judging a morally forbidden maxim to be
permissible).1411 Let’s take an example of a false negative maxim: ‘I will be a teacher for the
benefit of others.’ The maxim is ambiguous. If it is taken to mean that, as a teacher, I can never
be a student, then it cannot be universalized, since then all those who teach could not themselves
be taught by others abiding by the maxim. But common sense would tell us that it’s possible to
be both a teacher and a student. The maxim would have to be modified: ‘I will reciprocally
teach and be taught for the benefits of others.’ In order to universalize the maxim it is necessary
then to recognize that one is in a reciprocally-determined community. But does this make sense?
Why should a teacher also need to be a student?
Let’s consider the opposite problem – the false positive: ‘I will steal only what will not be
noticed missing.’ No logical contradiction seems to result from universalizing this maxim. It’s
also not apparent that a contradiction of will would also result. I could even specify a heinous

1411

Wood Allen W., Kantian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 72.

362

maxim in such a way as to refer only to my circumstances:1412 ‘On Tuesday, March 3rd, I,
Matthew Valentine, will forge a lottery ticket for the sake of easing my student loan debt.’ This
maxim, being applicable only to one circumstance and one person, can be universalized without
a contradiction resulting. And while some maxims may still be judged accurately as wrong, they
may seem inappropriately classified: “The maxim for ‘convenience killing’ (“I will kill other
human beings whenever that is a safe and effective way of promoting my own self-interest”)
presumably must violate a perfect duty, yet it only seems to violate an imperfect duty since
universalizing it is logically possible but never something the will could will.1413 Yet what
would appear to be a lesser duty towards others, a duty to keep promises, is clearly identified as a
perfect duty.
The problem is usually attributed to the formal nature of the first formulation. If the
material of the maxim is ignored, is it not conceivable that a duty to evil would be
indistinguishable from a duty to good? Would Kant then be indistinguishable from the Marquis
de Sade? Much has been made of this possible indiscernibility in psychoanalytic literature, from
Lacan to Alenka Zupancic . 1414 But is not such a criticism disingenuous? A society of
murderers and thieves could not possibly exist, especially if it were a duty to lie, steal, and kill.
The Second Formulation of the Categorical Imperative
Nonetheless, presenting the categorical imperative in a less formal manner, makes it more
intuitive and easier for our common moral sensibilities to digest. This is likely because we are
used to material practical principles (i.e. grounding ethics on a Good rather than the moral law),
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and the second formulation implicitly posits an analogue to such a Good. The second
formulation of the categorical imperative is: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a
means.”1415
Kant arrives at the second formulation in three ways. First, the will is determined by the
pursuit of ends. Those ends can either be subjective or objective. A subjective end, which we
have an incentive to acquire, has a worth wholly conditional upon the need or inclinations of an
individual. This subjective end (an object), can thus never acquire anything but a general yet
contingent worth (Subjective ends are heteronomous). Only something with intrinsic worth can
qualify as an objective end for all wills (in this case, we refer to a motive rather than an
incentive). Only rational beings (or persons) are ends in themselves, since rational nature exists
as an end in itself. Thus we can see that we are obligated to treat all rational beings as ends in
themselves. That said, Kant is forced to qualify this statement by recognizing that it is inevitable
that human commerce necessitates treating one another as means to our own ends as well. The
latter can just never be the sole way we treat another.1416 The second and third derivations are
more familiar. The first categorical formulation derived from a maxim’s proper form. The
second derives from a maxim’s proper matter, or end. Whereas the first formulation derives
from the category of Unity, the second formulation continues the Quantitative progression and
concerns “the plurality of the matter (of objects, i.e., of ends).”1417
Kant applies the second formulation to the same four examples which were submitted to
the first. Regarding suicide, Kant says I cannot harm myself with the intent of escaping suffering
because to do so would be to treat my own person as a thing, or as a means for securing that
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escape rather than as an end in itself. In The Metaphysics of Morals Kant describes this as
‘annihilating the subject of morality in one’s own person’ which in turn neglects the fact that
both morality is an end in itself and that one cannot opt out of one’s duties.1418 But selfreflective acts are always wrought with conceptual difficulties. If I treat myself a certain way for
my own ends, am I victimizing myself? As previously noted, there are scenarios in which it can
be argued that self-abuse or self-annihilation are done precisely for the sake of preserving the
humanity within me, and Kant notes various possibilities in his ‘casuistical questions’ following
the discussion of suicide, but without apparent resolution.1419 As Wood notes, “[Kant] claims
correctly that only “a worthless man values his life more than his person…but is fainthearted in
drawing the obvious conclusions on the subject of suicide.”1420
It seems like such duties prioritize a humanity within myself that is not me per se, which,
some could argue make of it a tyrant that subverts my freedom. Is a self-destructive act an attack
on a person temporally distinct from myself (namely, my future self)? But the solution to
clarifying a duty to oneself cannot be to find a roundabout way of separating the self into a self
and an other, since that would make it a different kind of duty (a duty to others). It is possible
that Kant runs into so many issues with suicide because his system resonates so much with
Stoicism, a philosophical position that sanctions suicide in the right instances.
The second example, once again, is the most intuitive example, most likely because
morality as such seems to focus mostly on the perfect duties we have towards others. If I make a
false promise, I am using someone as a mere means, since I am circumventing the free choice of
the deceived. Presumably I would not deceive if I thought in advance that the other would
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willingly cooperate towards achieving a given end.1421 That said, coercion itself, bereft of
deception, still makes a mere means of another, even if it does explicitly target the person of
another rather than treating them as a stubborn physical force, or body, to maneuver. A threat is
only effective if it recognizes the desires of the intended victim qua person. An honorable man
may withstand threats to his own life but acquiesce if loved ones are threatened.
The third example, an imperfect duty to oneself, considers whether neglect of one’s
talents is at odds with respecting the humanity within ourselves.
It is not enough that the action does not conflict with humanity in our person as an end in itself; it
must also harmonize with it. Now there are in humanity predispositions to greater perfection,
which belong to the end of nature with respect to humanity in our subject; to neglect these might
admittedly be consistent with the preservation of humanity as an end in itself but not with the
furtherance of this end.1422

Since imperfect duties are meritorious, it is not enough that we do not undermine our own
humanity. Each of us must also actively promote it. In this respect, the duty to better oneself
resonates with what it means to be a subject, or agent, since it is a formula for practicing
selfhood. When seen through the lens of the second formulation, it becomes clear that wide,
imperfect duties are positive duties rather than negative ones.
Finally, Kant considers whether or not we can neglect the task of aiding others in need.
Presuming that the natural end all human beings (or perhaps even rational beings) seek is
personal happiness, and that truly respecting the humanity of others implies respecting their
personal ends, I am behooved to aid others in their various pursuits of happiness if I am to
positively acknowledge their humanity as an end in itself. Interestingly enough, in order to
acknowledge another rational being as an end in itself, I must help them acquire an object which
can never be morally obligated for me, myself, to acquire (since Kant consistently remarks that
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we cannot be obligated or commanded to do what we actually want to do).1423 But does this not
forever split the indiscernibility of rational self from rational other and restrict the manner in
which I can respect my own humanity?
The Third Formulation of the Categorical Imperative
The third formulation of the categorical imperative is supposed to be the most developed
version of the moral law: “All maxims from one’s own lawgiving are to harmonize with a
possible kingdom of ends as with a kingdom of nature.”1424 The third formulation is neither
merely form, nor matter, but the “complete determination of all maxims by means of that
formula.”1425 It is further determined by the category of Totality as the “allness or totality of the
system of [the unity of the form of the will and the plurality of the matter of objects, or ends]”1426
From the perspective of a progression, it also seems like the third formulation is the most
complete.
And yet, on the surface, this formulation doesn’t seem to have much normative force.
Application of this formulation to the four examples of duty is surprisingly absent. The
importance of the third formulation may lie outside the bounds of explicit prescriptions, or better
stated, beneath them. Kant notes that it is only by granting that the will is not merely under law
but the legislator of the very laws it obeys that it’s possible to conceive of a categorical
imperative at all, free of self-interest.1427 In this respect, the third formulation is paramount,
since it shows how moral obligation is commensurate with freedom, so long as its law is of our
own drafting rather than externally imposed.1428
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For, if one thought of him only as subject to a law (whatever it may be), this law had to carry with
it some interest by way of attraction or constraint, since it did not as a law arise from his will; in
order to conform with the law, his will had instead to be constrained by something else to act a
certain way. By this quite necessary consequence, however, all the labor to find a supreme ground
of duty was irretrievably lost. For, one never arrived at duty but instead at the necessity of an
action from a certain interest. This might be one’s own or another’s interest. But then the
imperative had to turn out always conditional and could not be fit for a moral command.1429

Before the third formulation, the danger always remained that the law was merely something a
will was subjected to rather than gave itself. This in turn would subvert self-determination, since
the will could only then direct itself towards such a law if it were provided an incentive (For
example, ‘I will comply with the law to avoid punishment’). One may see this as Kant’s
preemptive response to Schopenhauer’s criticisms regarding fear of punishment as incentive.
This is also another way of stating the problem of heteronomy: If the will does not give itself its
own law, but instead sets before its sights an object, that object determines the law for the
will.1430 Thus the law given to the will to acquire the object is none other than a law of nature, a
law that can only be derived empirically rather than by reason.1431 Now Kant closes this
loophole, guaranteeing that the moral law is the sole determining ground for a free will.
As soon as we grant that we give ourselves the moral law and that the noumenal world is
also, from a practical perspective, ‘the world of understanding’ analogously bound up in moral
laws like the world of sense is causally bound up in natural laws, a categorical imperative is
demonstrated to be possible.1432 And as soon as we grant that there is an intelligible self, or
personality distinct from the sensible self, and that we are obliged to comply willingly with the
moral law, practical reason provides the grounds for ‘demonstrating’ the immortality of the soul
and the existence of God, both of which only apply to this ‘world of understanding.’ The latter
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proofs, however, the Groundwork is not equipped to provide, and are only found in the Critique
of Practical Reason.
The Critique of Practical Reason
The Highest Good, the Antinomy of Practical Reason, and Postulates of Practical Reason
The kingdom of ends Kant posits in the third formulation of the categorical imperative is,
in a certain respect, the intelligible world of moral law itself, or rather the ideal community of
intelligences that obeys the moral law.
As a member of such a realm, I would govern all my actions by the principle that my deepest ends
must not conflict with the deepest ends of other rational beings but these ends must be drawn from
the rational system of ends that I ought to pursue in common with others. The realm of ends
would therefore be…a free association in which the free development of each would be the
condition for the free development of all.1433

But the kingdom of ends is but one part of a bigger puzzle, one that has a place not just for moral
worth but happiness. What effects this unity is not a principle per se like the categorical
imperative, however, but the concept of a summum bonum, or highest good. In so doing, Kant
effects a further unity that integrates the sensible man with the intelligible man, as well as the
sensible community with the intelligible one. One may even see this transcendental idea as a
regulative idea that effects the highest unity.
But what is the highest good? In Chapter Three, we discovered that the Ancients
misunderstood what the highest good was and then centered their ethics on achieving it. There
was recognition that the highest good was some manner of relation between virtue and
happiness, but the nature of that relationship was confused, since the Ancients presumed that
happiness was attainable in the sensible world. Contrarily, Kant dethrones happiness from its
entrenched meta-ethical primacy by subtracting it from the moral law, but still recognizes that
the highest good must include it:
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Hence, though the highest good may be the whole object of a pure practical reason, that is, of a
pure will, it is not on that account to be taken as its determining ground, and the moral law alone
must be viewed as the ground for making the highest good and its realization or promotion the
object.1434

This point seems commensurable with Kant’s privileging of form over matter. But Kant
continues, and seems to imply that once the proper form is given, the highest good, or object
upon which it is based, presents itself pre-informed by the moral law.
It is, however, evident that if the moral law is already included as the supreme condition in the
concept of the highest good, the highest good is then not merely object: the concept of it and the
representation of its existence as possible by our practical reason are at the same time the
determining ground of the pure will because in that case the moral law, already included and
thought in this concept, and no other object, in fact determines the will in accordance with the
principle of autonomy.1435

So virtue is the ‘supreme’ good. However, it can only be a ‘complete’ good (therefore the
highest) for an agent if “happiness [is] distributed in exact proportion to morality.”1436 This is
the very doctrine Schopenhauer claims makes Kantian deontology eudaimonistic.
Kant claims that an antinomy of practical reason results when it seems like “either the
desire for happiness must be the motive to maxims of virtue or the maxim of virtue must be the
efficient cause of happiness.”1437 But both possibilities are impossible: Any maxim with
happiness as its end is not moral, since duty can never guarantee happiness. Contrarily,
happiness cannot result from a ‘moral disposition of the will’ but only from knowledge of natural
laws and how to use them to achieve one’s ends.1438
Now, since the promotion of the highest good, which contains this connection in its concept, is an
a priori necessary object of our will and inseparably bound up with the moral law, the
impossibility of the first must also prove the falsity of the second. If, therefore, the highest good is
impossible in accordance with practical rules, then the moral law, which commands us to promote
it, must be fantastic and directed to empty imaginary ends and must therefore in itself be false. 1439
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The resolution of the antinomy ultimately folds back onto the kingdom of ends. While we can
never be virtuous merely by pursuing happiness, it is conceivable than a non-sensible causal
relationship could exist that would allow virtue to produce happiness.1440 In other words, God,
who exists in the intelligible world, must exist (from a practical perspective) in order to reward
the good with happiness and punish the wicked. Here the kingdom of ends takes on a fuller
context: namely, as the Kingdom of God, a realm in which Nature is supposed to align with the
moral, intelligible order of just desserts. God’s existence is rendered a postulate that guarantees
the existence of happiness to those who merit it, since the highest good is only complete if
happiness is in this manner guaranteed.1441
Furthermore, if we are required to promote the highest good, its supreme condition,
namely perfect conformity of the will to the moral law, must also be assured. It is based on this
impossible standard, one a finite, sensible being can never attain, that the second postulate of
practical reason is posited: the soul’s immortality. The best a finite will can do to comply with
the moral law perfectly is to strive for it endlessly, which presumes the soul must live forever.
“This endless progress is, however, possible only on the presupposition of the existence and
personality of the same rational being continuing endlessly (which is called the immortality of
the soul).”1442 Only by presuming both the soul’s immortality and God’s existence is the highest
good possible. Important to note here are the predicates ‘existence’ (which we know to not be a
true predicate, granted Kant’s theological critiques) and ‘personality.’ Here we see how two
categories previously used in the Paralogisms to improperly cognize the soul – Existence and
Unity – are appropriated by practical reason to practically posit theoretical predicates of the soul:
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its continued existence and its persisting personality respectively, predicates theoretical reason
aimed to prove but could not. Furthermore, freedom (which was one of the predicates of the soul
theoretical reason tried to prove) is also secured by practical reason since it is possible by means
of the moral law and the intelligible realm.1443
Finally, (the concept of) God Himself performs a final unification of my moral strivings:
For a rational but finite being only endless progress from lower to higher stages of moral
perfection is possible. The Eternal Being, to whom the temporal condition is nothing, sees in what
is to us an endless series the whole of conformity with the moral law, and the holiness that His
command inflexibly requires in order to be commensurable with His justice in the share He
determines for each in the highest good is to be found whole in a single intellectual intuition of the
existence of rational beings.1444

Here it becomes evident that God’s intellectual intuition is a kind of unity that, from its
perspective, reveals the infinite manifold of moral strivings to constitute a whole life. Since God
is outside of time, it cannot be the case that He produces this unity by means of synthesis
(Synthesis seems to be necessitated by the passage of time). Thus, in a sense, Kantian ethics,
understood as a practice of self, is an attempt to make the self adequate to the Divine vision of
our eternal selves.
Kantian Ethical Ascetics
Kant finishes the Critique of Practical Reason with the ‘Doctrine of the Method of Pure
Practical Reason.’ Practical reason, unlike pure theoretical reason, does not so much require a
method of cognition so much as a “way in which one can provide the laws of pure practical
reason with access to the human mind and influence on its maxims, that is, the way in which one
can make objectively practical reason subjectively practical as well.”1445 In other words, the task
of identifying what principles we must follow must lend an ear to the manner in which we must
discipline ourselves to comply with those principles. By no means should ethical principles be
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determined by these limitations. Nonetheless, a doctrine of ethics is meaningless if it’s not
actually possible to practice it. And on the surface, that seems to be what Kant has left us with.
By nature and by culture we are predisposed to pursue enjoyment rather than duty, so it is no
small task to determine the means of overcoming this amoral inertia.1446
In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant identifies a limitation of Reason: “…One does not
acquire the power to put the rules of virtue into practice merely by being taught how one ought to
behave in order to conform with the concept of virtue…Virtue cannot be taught merely by
concepts of duty…”1447 A theoretical understanding of what we ought to do is not a sufficient
condition for virtue. “Virtue is the strength of a human being’s maxims in fulfilling his duty. –
Strength of any kind can be recognized only by the obstacles it can overcome, and in the case of
virtue these obstacles are natural inclinations, which can come into conflict with the human
being’s moral resolution.”1448 A virtuous character possesses a certain disposition – the respect
for law – since “all duties involve a concept of constraint through a law,” be that law externally
or internally given.1449
Given that the unshaped or unscrupulous are not receptive to the moral law or the inner
dignity, a preparatory step is required to help the soon-to-be subject overcome the inertia of
inclinations. Initially a “machinery” of “leading strings” must be instilled within a nascent mind,
constructed by means of either appealing to an agent’s “own advantage” or “[alarming] it by fear
of harm.”1450 But this alone could never comprise a proper moral disposition, nor give its agent
the sense of freedom “from all sensible attachments” like a will disposed towards the moral law
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feels,1451 since it is ultimately nothing but a system of natural restraints. If moral education
limited itself to such parameters we would be no different from “a turnspit, which, when once it
is wound up, also accomplishes its movements of itself.”1452
Kant refers to the human propensity to derive great pleasure from discussing the merits
and demerits of actions and persons in casual conversation, suggesting that this gives insight into
the best possible way to introduce and cultivate moral judgment in the young.1453 By making
practical education a “game of judgment,” particularly by assessing the moral worth of historical
figures, children would progressively refine their moral judgments and learn to pair the feeling of
esteem with moral purity and disgust with wickedness.1454 In this regard, biographical
storytelling is a necessary pedagogical tool. That said, accounts of “so-called noble
(supermeritorious) actions” typically cloud our judgment with romantic sentimentality rather
than prepare us for the duties of everyday life.1455 Such intense inspired emotions are quick to
fade, leaving the agent dependent on a momentary flourish of feelings that cannot provide a
dependable, perpetual motor for virtue. Nor can such feelings constitute a properly virtuous
determining ground for the will at all.1456 For this reason, hyperbolic accounts of heroism are
typically best omitted from moral education.1457
Nonetheless, the account Kant provides as an example of “pure morality” still concerns
life-or-death stakes. Kant tells us the story of a man who is tempted to turn against an innocent,
yet powerless person. First the man is offered “gifts” and “high ranks,” which he refuses.
Having refused gain, he is then threatened with loss, first from friends who threaten to abandon
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him, then family that threatens to disinherit him, and finally from the prince, who threatens to
take his life. Finally, his loved ones beg him to conceded and spare them from suffering the
costs of his virtue. At every stage of the story, the child’s sense of reverence is meant to awaken
and grow: first from “mere approval,” then to “admiration,” then “amazement,” “and finally to
the greatest veneration and a lively wish that he himself could be such a man [of virtue].”1458
Kant has crafted a story that step-by-step strips away all inclinations that act as a ‘hindrance’ to
the influence of the moral law, finally stripping away the trappings of love and compassion, until
only respect for the moral law remains, leaving the moral law to stand alone in its purity. All of
sensible nature is then thrown beneath one’s feet with scorn as a king lords over his kingdom and
one’s freedom is secured.1459
Kant outlines the method as follows: first we have but to practice morally assessing the
actions of ourselves and others until that assessment becomes a habit. By means of this we also
will practice determining duties and distinguishing them, as well as distinguishing whether or not
an action conforms to the law or is performed for the sake of the moral law. By developing our
practical reason, we feel its powers expand and an “interest in reason’s law” and its accompanied
moral actions arise.1460 “For, we finally come to like something the contemplation of which lets
us feel a more extended use of our cognitive faculties…”1461 At this stage we would only have
an aesthetic appreciation for the moral law but not necessarily a respectful obedience to it. 1462
Further moral development requires a second stage. By presenting examples of those who
embody a moral disposition, we first notice and admire how virtue emancipates us from the thrall

1458

Ibid 265 [5:156].
Ibid 265 – 267 [5:156 – 159].
1460
Ibid 267 [5:159 – 160].
1461
Ibid 267 [5:160].
1462
Ibid 268 [5:160].
1459

375

of inclinations, giving us a sense of our own freedom.1463 Once we become conscious of our
freedom we transition from the negative task of becoming aware of our potential to be free from
nature and instead perceive our “positive worth” and come to respect ourselves. With the
dawning of that realization, the moral disposition reaches maturity, and nothing becomes more
important to us than guarding our own virtue from blemish.1464 Kant provides a similar
educational rubric when he discusses a ‘moral catechism’ at the end of The Metaphysics of
Morals.1465
Theoretical reason thus annihilates the pretensions of our animal nature by showing our
insignificant station as flesh and blood beings in a near-boundless universe, while practical
reason reveals the infinite worth of our intelligible nature as moral beings, or intelligences. Such
an intelligence is not a mere manifold of disordered desires flickering like a candle or jerking
about madly like the needle of a compass borne by a foreign play of forces, always leaning
towards the ever-changing directions of our inclinations but is instead a (potential) unity, a
personality that matures infinitely throughout the expanse of time.1466
Concluding Remarks on Ethical Ascetics
At the end of Kant’s last great ethical work, The Metaphysics of Morals, we finally see
the moral ascetic for what he is: not the “monkish ascetic” who punishes his every transgression
and secretly holds morality in contempt, but the “valiant and cheerful” ethical ascetic whose
cheerful heart is not secretly brooding over his animal nature but a secure master of it, indulging
it within its proper bounds and gently restraining it from transgressing them.1467 Always the
philosopher not only of boundaries, but of the human flourishing that results from the harmony
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that results from respecting them, we cannot help but be reminded of Plato’s own conception in
The Republic of the human soul at peace with itself once its constituent powers fall in line with
Reason and obey their appropriate principles. But while Plato secures by his investigations the
essence of Justice in a restrained society, Kant finds in the soul’s harmony its ultimate freedom.
6.3 The Problem of Others: Towards a Critical Anthropology
Introduction
In the preceding sections, I explored Kant’s practical doctrine of the soul. But Kant can
only say that it is plausible that the soul is free, which rational principles the soul must obey in
order to be free, and that it is plausible to believe that the soul is immortal. When I encounter
others, I must assume that they are rational if I am to have any ethical obligations to them.
Subsequently, since rational beings can determine their own actions, I must assume that others
are also beings of duty like me, and likewise immortal. Nothing else can be said.
Arguably, the entire apparatus of faculties Kant deduces throughout the first Critique
provides a rich doctrine of the subject, but this account of the faculties only explains how I, the
knower, judge the world and, at best, distinguish myself from it. It cannot explain how I
distinguish another rational being from a rock or automaton, since my theoretical gaze only
encounters objects, not subjects. And while Kant’s moral account can explain why I judge a
rational being to be distinct from a rock or automaton due to moral obligations, it cannot explain
how I classify others on the basis of non-moral obligations. Not only do I live in a world of
equivalent rational agents, but also of lovers, friends, and family, each owed something different.
Only by means of these non-moral obligations do I genuinely encounter another subject without
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that other either dissolving into the general multitude of the kingdom of ends or becoming
reified as a particular phenomenal object.1468
In this final section, I will provide a speculative account of how the Kantian system could
account for why we encounter others as distinct others rather than as objects. I will do so by
exploring an apparent asymmetry in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. Here Kant classifies
the objects of both the lower faculty of the feeling of pleasure and pain, (called ‘the Agreeable’)
and of the higher faculty of the feeling of pleasure and pain, called the Beautiful and the
Sublime. There are four kinds of pleasant objects: the Agreeable, the Good, the Beautiful, and
the Sublime, each corresponding with a Category group (the Agreeable with Quantity, the Good
with Modality, the Beautiful with Quality, and the Sublime with Relation). The last three
correspond with higher faculties,1469 while the categories of Quantity lack a corresponding form
of higher pleasure. I conjecture that Kant has omitted a higher form of pleasure and pain: that
produced by the Loveable.1470 Kant’s account of the Agreeable is a rhapsody of lower pleasures
that should be systematically divided into four kinds. I will correspond each lower object of
pleasure with one of the four category groups, as well as with one of the four kinds of objects of
desire that Kant notes in his theory of heteronomy of choice (external-subjective, internalsubjective, internal-objective, and external-objective). I will present these correspondences in a
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table of lower pleasures, alongside the table of higher pleasures. I argue that deriving both may
suggest how we encounter other people as subjects.

Drafting a Table of Lower Pleasures
In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant attempts to complete the system he left
cleaved in two in the first two Critiques:
The understanding legislates a priori for nature, as object of the senses, for a theoretical cognition of it
in a possible experience. Reason legislates a priori for freedom and its own causality, as the
supersensible in the subject, for an unconditioned practical cognition. The domain of the concept of
nature under the one legislation and that of the concept of freedom under the other are entirely barred
from any mutual influence that they could have on each other by themselves (each in accordance with
its fundamental laws) by the great chasm that separates the supersensible from the appearances. 1471

In order to bridge the chasm between the sensible and the supersensible, a faculty must mediate
between the Understanding (or faculty of cognition) and Reason (or faculty of desire). The
faculty of judgment is such a mediator. It not only relates the cognitions of the Understanding to
the principles of Reason, but also concerns the feelings of pleasure and pain1472 since a specific
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kind of judgment relevant to aesthetic experience (reflecting judgment), is subjective and thus
tied to sensation and those feelings that accompany sensation.1473
All faculties have higher and lower forms. A higher faculty is autonomous and
determines itself, while a lower faculty is dependent on something external to itself. If we divide
the faculties into faculties of cognition, desire, and pleasure, Kant’s architectonic is revealed.
Given that, a synopsis of the faculties bears repeating. The higher faculty of cognition provides
the transcendental categories, like cause and effect, which organize intuitions into cognitions.
Contrarily, the lower faculty of cognition is inductive and only derives probable natural laws by
generalizing from repeated observation.1474 Similarly, the higher faculty of desire drafts its own
laws as well (the categorical imperative), which then determine the conduct of the will.
Alternatively, the lower faculty of desire depends on an object of desire external to itself to be
satisfied, which leaves its satisfaction ultimately up to the caprice of contingent circumstances
(heteronomy of choice).
The lower faculty of desire and the lower faculty of pleasure are not easy to distinguish,
since pleasure is the ultimate aim of the lower faculty of desire.1475 The lower faculty of desire,
as we have seen, can seek out one of four kinds of objects: external subjective objects, such as
compliance with customs and laws, internal subjective objects, such as feelings, internal
objective objects such as perfect character, and external objective objects, such as compliance
with God’s Will.1476 Each example is, arguably, the highest object of its kind. Principles that
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aim to attain objects are called ‘material practical principles,’ since they are concerned with the
content of desire rather than the form maxims take.1477
Furthermore:
All material practical principles as such are, without exception, of one and the same kind and
come under the general principle of self-love or one’s own happiness. Pleasure arising from the
representation of the existence of a thing, insofar as it is the determining ground of desire for this
thing, is based on the receptivity of the subject, since it depends upon the existence of an object;
hence it belongs to sense (feeling) and not to the understanding, which expresses a relation of a
representation to an object by concepts, not to the subject by feelings. It is, then, practical only
insofar as the feeling of agreeableness that the subject expects from the reality of an object
determines the faculty of desire.1478

Thus the four kinds of objects of desire indicate four different kinds of the Agreeable.1479 I will
divide the Agreeable into the Enjoyable, the Useful, the Charming, and the Thrilling, and then
correspond each with a specific object of desire.
The Higher and Lower Forms of the Enjoyable
The lower form of Enjoyment is sensible pleasure. I will call it the Satisfying. It has
three features. Firstly, the Satisfying is subjective. To be satisfied by something means only that
the subject is in a pleasant sensible state relative to an object; no quality can be objectively
attributed to the object itself. Secondly, the subject must take an interest in possessing the
object. Satisfaction is felt when an object is acquired. 1480 Thirdly, the Satisfying “always
signifies something that pleases immediately.”1481 Thus, we are only ‘satisfied’ by those who
immediately please us. This communicates an essential distinction insofar as social life presents
us with a paradox: Assuming that we pursue those that please us, why should we care for those
who immediately pain us? If the answer is ‘Love,’ then the Satisfying must be distinct from the
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Loveable, which I will later argue to be the higher form of the Enjoyable. Since the Satisfying
concerns a pleasing internal state, it is a Subjective-Internal object.
The Higher and Lower Forms of the Esteemed
Kant next explains the pleasures that derive from the Good. There are two forms of the
Good: The Useful and the Morally Good.1482 The Useful is that which “pleases as a means to
some agreeableness or other,”1483 while only the Morally Good is intrinsically good. To judge
something good, I must have a concept of what it should be. 1484 There is some ambiguity here
what Kant means by ‘good,’ since properly speaking ‘the good’ must be defined in accordance
with the moral law (‘the right’). Certainly there can be no question that the Useful is an object,
since it is a mediate good, and thus if it immediately pleases, it can only do so by means of a
lower faculty. The dichotomy between the Useful and the Morally Good has traditionally
manifested as a distinction between the temporal law and the divine law. The temporal law is a
social contract, or set of pragmatic rules established to maintain social order. Its virtue lies in its
usefulness. Thus, the Useful, whose highest form is the law and custom, is a SubjectiveExternal object.
The higher faculty of desire is concerned with the form of law, not objects. The moral
law is the higher form of the legal law. The pleasure derived from the moral good “pleases by
means of reason alone, through the mere concept.”1485 Assuming that Kant is referring here to
the moral law, what I striking is that it does not immediately please; it humiliates. The moral law
is a jealous principle, and commands us to sacrifice all sensible inclinations for the sake of duty.
Once natural inclinations are restrained, a curious psychological effect results:
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For, all inclination and every sensible impulse is based on feeling, and the negative effect on
feeling (by the infringement upon the inclinations that takes place) is itself feeling. Hence we can
see a priori that the moral law, as the determining ground of the will, must by thwarting all our
inclinations produce a feeling that can be called pain. 1486

Negatively, the moral subject feels judged for all traces of self-conceit, since only moral
compliance is praiseworthy. 1487 A positive feeling does result however: respect for the moral
law. Curiously, respect for the law can only be felt if the faculty of sensibility is in play, since it
is only by its suppression that respect is felt. Respect, as a moral feeling, is then produced by
Reason,1488 and cognized a priori. 1489 “Since [the moral] constraint is exercised only by the
lawgiving of [our] own reason, it also contains something elevating, and the subjective effect on
feeling, inasmuch as pure practical reason is the sole cause of it, can thus be called selfapprobation.”1490 Since no inclination incites us to comply with the moral law, we become
aware that the effort to comply with it is a free action which produces esteem based on moral
worth.1491 What respect for the moral law reveals when it elevates us is our own supersensible
personality, or Soul, and with it a higher moral vocation that towers above all natural
concerns.1492
Aesthetic Pleasures
Both the Beautiful and the Sublime produce pleasure. However, unlike both the
Satisfying and the Good, neither Beauty nor Sublimity seeks out an object. Thus both are
disinterested and belong to a higher faculty.
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The Beautiful
There are two kinds of beauty: free beauty and adherent beauty.
The first presupposes no concept of what the object ought to be; the second does presuppose such
a concept and the perfection of the object in accordance with it. The first are called (selfsubsisting) beauties of this or that thing; the latter as adhering to a concept (conditioned beauty),
are ascribed to objects that stand under the concept of a particular end. 1493

Whenever we consider the beauty of a determinate object, such as a human being, we judge it
favorably based on how closely it approximates a (perfect) standard.1494 Since adherent beauty
concerns the adequacy of a representation towards an end, its content is relevant to its status as
beautiful. The content of a beautiful representation is referred to as its charm. Charm is often
mistaken for beauty, like when we call vibrant colors or moving musical tones beautiful.1495
Since content is empirical and particular to specific objects, adherent beauty is the lower form of
Beauty, and corresponds with a lower faculty of feeling. Kant identifies the ideal of adherent
beauty with perfect moral character paired with the ‘normal’ (or average) image of a human
figure.1496 Therefore, I link it together with the Objective-Internal Object, which Kant
associates with moral perfectionism, like Stoicism.1497
Free beauty is associated with the higher faculty of pleasure. What distinguishes the
lower faculty from the higher is that the latter is not connected with the faculty of desire, 1498 but
instead arises when a representation produces either concord between the Imagination and the
Understanding (Beauty) or discord between the Imagination and Reason (Sublimity). Aesthetic
judgments are reflective, occurring when the mind seeks a universal for a given particular. This
is opposed to determining judging, which assumes an already-established universal law, or
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concept, under which particulars are subsumed.1499 Beauty arises when the form of an object –
which is either a particular shape (design) or dynamic play of shapes – places the imagination
and the understanding into a harmonious relationship.1500 The form an object needs to elicit this
free play of the faculties is called the form of purposiveness. Something is judged purposive
“when [its features] are so related to one another that their relations involve a coherence that
might have been the product of a design readily grasped by the understanding.”1501 Since
judgments of beauty are subjective, concepts are not deployed, so nothing is said about the object
itself. Nonetheless, the impulse to attribute beauty to the object is not mistaken, but instead can
be accredited to the awareness all observers have that everyone ought to judge the same things to
be beautiful or ugly because all minds operate similarly.
The Sublime
Sublimity is characterized by the feeling of overwhelming awe. Like beauty, it is
disinterested. Therefore, to find the lower pleasure that corresponds with the sublime,
disinterestedness must be subtracted. Since a sublime experience is a fearful situation
experienced from a safe distance,1502 it stands to reason that the lower form corresponds to the
pleasure experienced once that safe distance is removed. Although fear, which is painful, arises
in the face of imminent threats, so does a kind of transgressive pleasure: the thrill of danger. Life
is felt more intensely when endangered. I identify Thrill with the Objective-External object,
since we experience thrill when confronted by an external threat. God’s will is the most potent
external danger.1503
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Like the Good, sublime experiences are initially painful. We experience the sublime
when confronted by objects of incomprehensible magnitude or overwhelming power. Like
beauty, the pleasure that results from the sublime is derived from a judgment of observed
purposiveness.1504 Unlike beauty, sublimity occurs when there is a discord between the
Imagination and Reason. The two forms of sublimity correspond with Reason’s two roles: a
cognitive role and a moral role.
When we encounter objects of unimaginable size, like the night sky, we experience the
mathematical sublime. Our imagination is in discord with Reason acting in its cognitive capacity
since the scene defies comprehension. Our imagination then fails us, producing displeasure,
since we fall short of the cognitive standard Reason sets before us to understand things in their
totality. Thus, we are reminded of our inadequacies as sensible beings and of our higher calling
as rational beings, “arous[ing] the supersensible vocation within us,” which is felt as pleasure.1505
Thus, objects of magnitude are not themselves sublime, but merely provide the occasion for us to
experience the superiority of our rational capacities over our sensible ones.
When we encounter objects of immense power, like a hurricane, we experience the
dynamical sublime. The dynamical sublime engages Reason’s moral capacity. When we
experience Nature at her most threatening from a safe distance, we recognize two things about
ourselves: that as sensible beings we are nothing compared to Nature’s might, but that,
nonetheless, Nature cannot compromise our moral being. We are free to sacrifice our sensible
comforts, even our lives, in the service of our moral vocation. Thus, Nature, although not
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sublime, provides an occasion for us to recognize our own supersensible superiority over her,
which is pleasurable.1506
This exhaustive analysis of the four pleasures yields us the following Table:

The Case for a Higher Pleasure of the Agreeable: Love
By drawing attention to the four kinds of the Agreeable, I have attempted to demonstrate
that the Table of Higher Pleasures is incomplete and that a higher pleasure corresponding to the
categories of Quantity could exist. I contend that this higher pleasure of the Agreeable is the
ecstasy of love, since the beloved is loved neither on the basis of beauty, sublimity, nor virtue,
although these, like ornaments,1507 can accentuate the beloved. Furthermore, love cannot be a
lower form of the agreeable either, since we often love those that are not a source of immediate
gratification. The only available position left in the architectonic is the higher pleasure of the
Agreeable.
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Therefore we arrive at the following Table of Higher Pleasures:

I contend that in loving encounters we encounter subjects of possible experience which
correspond with the different forms of love. I conjecture that love is a subjective feeling that
results from judging another person adequate to an Idea, in contrast to respect, which is felt when
one judges something (sensible nature) to be inadequate to an Idea. The following account will
illustrate how each form of love (erotic, platonic, and familial) results from a specific kind of
judgment.
Kant talks about these three kinds of love on practical grounds, but he is never able to
escape the language of objecthood. Take for example his discussion of lovers in a marital union.
Marriage is defined as “sexual union in accordance with law” or “the union of two persons of
different sexes for lifelong possession of each other’s sexual attributes.”1508 Sex can only take
place within the bounds of marriage, since only monogamous marriage creates a reciprocally1508
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binding sexual ownership of the other that allows the other to be treated as a person rather than a
thing: “acquiring a member of a human being is at the same time acquiring the whole person,
since a person is an absolute unity.”1509 Here is an exclusive group, as well as a preoccupation
with Unity, but in what way to mutual ownership preserve the subjecthood of the lover?
Friendship and Family are also dealt with in The Metaphysics of Morals. Kant’s account
of friendship is more promising and establishes some precedent for my proposed solution.
Friendship (considered in its perfection) is the union of two persons through equal mutual love and
respect…But it is readily seen that friendship is only an idea (though a practically necessary one)
and unattainable in practice, although striving for friendship (as a maximum of good disposition
toward each other) is a duty set by reason, and no ordinary duty but an honorable one. 1510

Friendship is grounded on equality, beneficence, and a mutual respect of the other’s moral
person, but given human limitations, true friendship remains a practically necessary idea to strive
towards only. That said, Kant roots friendship in the duty of beneficence, a duty we have
towards everyone, so presumably everyone has the potential to become a friend. We see here an
inclusive group, which implies an open Plurality.
As for parental relations,
…from procreation in this community [comes] a duty to preserve and care for its offspring…from
a practical point of view it is a quite correct and even necessary idea to regard the act of
procreation as one by which we have brought a person into the world without his consent and on
our own initiative, for which the deed the parents incur an obligation to make the child content
with his condition so far as they can. 1511

A child emerges within a community (a family), which makes the group to which it belongs both
exclusive and inclusive (let’s call it ‘expansive’). Only within such an expansive set is
differentiation possible (it should not be taken as a coincidence that Community, and by
implication disjunctive judgment, is mentioned ). Nonetheless, Kant admits that parents still
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have a right to their child “akin to the right of a thing.”1512 When Kant approaches love
relationships in context to practical reason alone, he cannot help but slip into the obligations
implicated by the ownership of property. Only once he considers friendship as an idea do we
seem to get some idea of a way out of this embarrassing impasse.
But let’s turn to not just to practical reason but also aesthetics to try to explain love
relationships and see if we find there a model that makes up for the shortcomings of the former
one. If love belongs to a higher faculty, it must concern ‘form’ rather than content, just like
aesthetic and moral judgments do. And if we look to the form rather than the content of a loving
relationship, it appears to be a kind of mathematical ‘set’ or form of belonging.1513 Following
Kant’s suggestion, the Agreeable corresponds to the categories of Quantity:1514 Unity, Plurality,
and Totality. Furthermore, upon reflection, it seems plausible that each category corresponds
with a different kind of set. Thus, for Unity, an other belongs to my own exclusive set of one.
For Plurality, an other belongs to an open set to which I belong. For Totality, an other belongs to
my closed set, each element a specialized part of an expansive whole.1515 Given that these sets
are derived in parallel with a comprehensive triad of Quantitative categories, we can see that the
list is exhaustive, since we have taken an exclusive set, countered it with its opposite (the
inclusive set), and then synthesized the two together (the expansive set).
Eros, or romantic love, is the form of love typified by Unity, as is conveyed by the
common referent ‘my other half.’ One has but to consider the account of love Aristophanes
recounts in Plato’s Symposium to grasp this metaphor of romantic love. Furthermore, just as the
act of sex attempts a temporary union of two bodies, marriage is often described as a covenant
1512
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that unites two souls. These metaphors are not accidental, but instead are derived a priori from a
specific judgment of belonging. Philia, or platonic love, is derived from Plurality, and is
characterized by open-ended inclusiveness and equality. Finally, Storge (or familial love) is
derived from Totality, the only category which is both closed and yet expansive, insofar as a
whole can further differentiate itself into parts. One will notice an interesting resonance between
Unity-Substance, Plurality-Causality, and Totality-Community, insofar as Eros concerns subjectbelonging, Philia cause-belonging, and Storge community-belonging (I will return to some
interesting implications of this momentarily). Lovers identify themselves as a united couple and
friends as an open group of equal individuals united under a cause, and family units are
differentiated yet reciprocally-defined between parent, child, and sibling. Thus, the three
categories of Quantity are transfigured into social (or anthropological) Ideas which allow us to
classify others based on judgments of belonging.
Social interactions would be much too fragile if there were not posited some fundamental
form of belonging that remained unchanged as momentary feelings of attachment wax and wane.
Social relations require a ‘something’ not bound to fleeting feelings, much like a transcendental
object acts as the ‘something’ that holds together representations of a thing. That posited
‘something’ must be timeless, namely noumenal. If love were based on that persistent
something, it would explain how it endures between two people through the vicissitudes of life.
This move seems necessary insofar as the Kantian project of subjective unity has been left
incomplete. The manifold of our intuitions is synthesized by means of the categories of nature.
The manifold of our desires is partially synthesized by means of the moral law. But not all
desires are concerned with the good. Some quite legitimately concern happiness (prudence). We
see that ancient philosophy recognized the need to apply a unifying principle to these
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eudaimonistic desires, but, as Kant pointed out, they made the mistake of conflating this pursuit
with ethics. Now with ethics properly classified, we are now in a position to consider happiness.
Higher pleasure, as we have seen, is produced when a concord exists between the
faculties, a feeling that is likely instigated by Reason’s systematic impulse. We’ve also seen that
when the Imagination and Reason are put into discord, a powerful feeling – sublimity – results
that dwarfs our sensible nature. The supersensible vocation awakened in us in sublime
encounters awakens us to an eternal, unchanging substrate: the soul. We are thus awakened to
our subjecthood by means of this discord. But, analogously, it is conceivable that we can
encounter an Other and judge them adequate to the Idea of a supersensible self as well, which
would strike a concord between the Imagination and Reason and produce a higher pleasure. The
resulting feeling, which can be anticipated a priori, is called love. It is essential that this be
based on a concord rather than a discord, since a discord repulses while a concord attracts. It is
also essential that this love aims at something timeless, which gives it persistence over time.
We must consider, much as Kant does, what the function of desire is, and whether or not
there are different kinds of desires requiring different kinds of synthesis. Let’s take erotic desires
(desires for intimacy). As even the ancient Greeks recognized (and Plato recounts in the
Symposium), erotic desires based on the beloved’s body are fleeting since that body changes,
leading to despair and inner disorder. The ‘soul’ to which they claim true love aims is thus a
transcendental idea that gives erotic desire fixity, unifying a tumultuous manifold of lusts and
infatuations into an orderly one (romantic love). Eros does not merely make me noble; it makes
me a coherent desiring self. Nobility of soul is a mark of subjecthood.
Furthermore, as the ancient Greeks also recognized, romance ends and friendship begins
once the bond of exclusivity is effaced. Arguably pederastic relationships were possible, given
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Greek presumptions about sex roles, only before the boy could be considered a possible member
of society, or as belonging to an open set of equals. As such an equal, the Friend, as a
transcendental idea, no longer unifies the same manifold of desires. Given that friendship relates
to the duty of beneficence (the pursuit of ends), it seems to align with both cause-relationships
and hypothetical judgments. Duty obligates me to aid others in achieving their ends but
friendship unites me with others in the pursuit of a shared end. True friendship presumes a
perfect trust that the ends of two people are the same (ultimately the welfare of each other). This
is the precondition for a shared world and engagement in it. One without friends is like one
without a world.
Finally, one is only completely determined as a self insofar as one figures into a
community of similarities and differences (a Family). United in the concept of Family is both
self-identity and collective purpose. Perhaps no other kind of belonging is associated with
identity more than family. A surname itself acts as a unifying principle, collecting the distinct
members of a lineage together, each branch on the genealogical tree being a disjunction that
nonetheless actualizes parts of a potential whole.
I argue that insofar as such unity and coherence of the manifold of desire is a
precondition for subjecthood then these three ‘anthropological ideas’ are necessary. In that way,
I am only truly a Subject when I encounter an Other as Subject. From this perspective, a Critical
Anthropology may be possible, one that not only indicates the necessary conditions for
intersubjectivity but also the errors of reason that lead to its subversion.
Then what errors can lead to the subversion of intersubjectivity? If intersubjectivity is
undermined by means of fracturing a necessary unity, the form of belonging is the principle of
unity, and there are only three forms of belonging, then it’s likely that an error occurs when the
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purity of the Ideas is undermined, or when the boundaries between them is blurred. This may be
referred by us as a Category Mistake. Traditionally there are three forms of ‘deficient’ love:
Ludus, Pragma, and Mania.1516 Ludus is non-exclusive love, Pragma is exploitative love, and
Mania is obsessive love. If it can be demonstrated that each is based on a category mistake (or
error of judgment which conflates one form of belonging with another),1517 then I will have
outlined a Critical Anthropology that delimits social relations and love.
Ludus refers to playful, open, non-committed romantic relationships. 1518 The unitary
principle for Eros is exclusivity. Therefore, its counter-principle is inclusivity. Therefore, Eros
is undermined if it takes on the traits of Philia, since it treats what is exclusive as if it’s inclusive.
Furthermore it’s possible that Philia could be eroticized. Both the philialization of Eros and the
eroticization of Philia are improper conflations: Ludus.
Pragma is a one-sided, exploitative relationship. Kant describes a balance between love
(which draws near) and respect (which pushes apart) as a necessary condition of friendship.1519
Therefore, the necessary condition for Philia is equality, making the counter-principle of equality
inequality. But there can be inequality only in a closed yet differentiated set, such as one that
characterizes a totality. We find this in Storge, which I argue corresponds with familial
relationships (which are both exclusive, since not anyone can be in a family, but also inclusive
insofar as families can add members by differentiation). Therefore, when Philia is made unequal
1516
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by taking on traits of Storge (i.e. when the Philia is conflated with Storge), a relationship like
Pragma results. Furthermore, when Storge takes on traits of Philia, duties that are hierarchically
owed (such as parent to child) are abdicated, which is another instance of Pragma.
Storge is a total set based on differentiation. If what distinguishes Storge from Philia is
differentiation, then its counter-principle is indistinction. In other words, if Storge takes on the
Erotic traits of merging, Storge blurs, and boundaries that need to be maintained are dissolved.
Storge with the traits of Eros becomes Mania. Furthermore, Eros with the traits of Storge
(totalization) is also Mania, since it totalizes Eros (someone becomes another’s everything).
Finally, Agape can be found in any of these relationships if love is felt unconditionally.
The completed system of love looks like this:

Just as when we looked to the form of belonging when determining the kind of judgment
made in matters of love, we must refer not to the content of the Beloved, but their form. The
form of another is their character, since character is the form underlying a person’s particular
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behaviors. When I encounter another and their character is in harmony with my own in a
particular way, I judge that person and me to be members of the same set. But since I judge
myself to be a supersensible rational being with duties towards others, I encounter others in their
full supersensible personhood when I judge them to be in the same set as I am. When I judge
others to be like myself, I judge them to be in harmony with the Idea of a supersensible
personality. When someone is judged to be in harmony with an Idea, love arises a priori since
the faculties are most enlivened when the highest sensible faculty (imagination) aligns with the
highest intelligible faculty (reason), just as respect arises when our sensible nature is humiliated
before the unconditional standards of the moral law. Because love is a feeling based off of a
relationship between the imagination and Reason, a commitment carries with it the force of law,
what could be called a law of the heart.
The way I experience another as a subject depends on the judgment of belonging. Each
kind of judgment aligns with one of the three Transcendental Ideas. When another’s character
resonates with my personal character, I judge that other to be a like soul that harmonizes with my
own, and thus a lover. This coincides with the Idea of the Soul. When another’s character
resonates with my social character as an agent in the world, I recognize that we share the same
social ‘world’ (perspective and goals), and thus encounter that other as a friend.1520 This
coincides with the Idea of the World. Finally, the notion of Family is akin to the Ideal of
Reason, or God, insofar as it is grounded upon a hypothetical ideal, or collection of all possible
family character traits that can be passed down to children. For example, when I judge myself to
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married or single or how he earns his living. What have all these “unconcerning things, matters of fact” to do with
the real question, Do you see the same truth?” Lewis 103.
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actualize certain traits of another, I judge that person to be a relative. In this way I encounter
others as subjects in their full personhood.1521
This finishes my account both of how a Kantian science of the subject qua subject is
possible and how it is possible to encounter others as subjects. It should come to us as no
surprise that a Kantian-based system of love would seem so traditional. If I had drafted a
Foucaultian-based system (if such a system is possible at all), love would not likely emerge at
all, since Foucault means to diversify pleasures (which is the purpose of his asketic style). Kant
seeks to unify the manifold of desires and intuitions to produce a unitary subject, a project he left
unfinished that I have attempted to complete.

1521

What causes the heart to long for one person rather than another has been a question reserved for poets rather
than philosophers for good reason; an antimony results from contemplating it. Consider the following question: Is
the judgment of love based on empirical grounds or rational grounds?
Thesis: It would seem that judgments of love are based on rational grounds. Assume the judgment of love is based
on empirical grounds. Then it would be a judgment of the agreeable, which concern relationships which
immediately gratify. But it is not a necessary quality of loving relationships that they immediately gratify.
Therefore, judgments of love must be rationally grounded.
Antithesis: It would seem that judgments of love are based on empirical grounds. Assume the judgment of love is
based on rational grounds. Then someone that does not love another could be rationally convinced to love that other
based on an outline of preferable qualities. But no one deliberately loves another. Therefore, judgments of love
must be empirically grounded.
The key to resolving this antinomy rests in Kant’s account of the ideal of beauty. An ideal of beauty is “the
representation of an individual being as adequate to an idea.” However, an ideal requires that beauty be “fixed by a
concept of objective purposiveness.” Thus, the ideal of beauty can only be an archetype of a perfect human being,
insofar as it “has the end of its existence in itself.” An ideal has two parts, an idea of reason and an aesthetic normal
idea of the species of human which anchors the ideal to an image. A normal idea is “an individual intuition (of the
imagination) that represents the standard for judging it as a thing belonging to a particular species,” generated by
overlaying and averaging out all observed human figures into one average indistinct figure. The idea of reason
“makes the ends of humanity insofar as they cannot be sensibly represented into the principle for the judging of its
figure.” The normal idea gives an ideal figure while the idea of reason is the moral character that is adequate to it.
Thus, the ideal of beauty is produced when the imagination is in harmony with Reason.
In the ideal of beauty we find a model similar but not identical to the one that characterizes a judgment of love. The
ideal, like the beloved exists in both empirical and supersensible dimensions. The body, be it the glance, the smile,
or the tone of voice, gestures to the personhood lying beyond the sensible. Like beauty, what seems relevant is not
the empirical content of the other, since empirically the other can be disagreeable at times, but instead the form or
pattern of behavior abstracted from it: what we might call the other’s character. However, love is not concerned
with an ideal of perfection, which implies that it, like any other aesthetical judgment, is without a concept. Only an
indeterminate harmony between the imagination and the Ideas of Reason is necessary for love.
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7.1 Conclusion: The End?
This has been a long journey through the landscape of the human sciences, inspired by a
wanderlust to traverse its expanse, encounter its species, and reach its limits. What marks the
peculiarity of a philosophical journey though is its penchant to start where other journeys end: at
its limits. The first steps of a philosophical journey often trace a boundary. To be sure, these
limits no more restrict the development of that inquiry than the cell wall of a fertilized egg
hinders its development. From a simple state it develops, but never is the integrity of its whole
compromised if it perseveres. Rather a boundary is the necessary condition for its
differentiation. So where then does an inquiry end if not at its limits? Perhaps its end lies at the
center of that new continent, the heart of the matter, when the purpose of the inquiry has been
fully articulated. If that’s the case, then the final words to this work should be more than a
summary of ground covered, but the iteration of its ultimate aim.
7.2 Summary of the Dissertation
The beginning of this inquiry into the human sciences started with a negative task:
demonstrate the limits of previous attempts to understand the subject. In this task I had two
allies: Immanuel Kant and Michel Foucault. Both, despite their marked differences, had a shared
sympathy and suspicion: Both thought the human sciences were problematic. Of all the human
sciences held in suspicion, I focused most of my inquiry on that human science alleged to know
the subject qua subject most intimately: psychology. This science claims not only to know the
subject but to know the ends best suited to it and the therapeutic means to acquire them.
Kant and the Division of Subjects
Historically, not all psychological disciplines treated the same subject (or at minimum,
they treated the same subject in different respects). Likewise, any critique of the discipline as a
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whole would require a partitioning of the task into smaller critiques aimed at each sub-discipline,
amounting to a comprehensive classification. In that spirit, I divided the subject into a
theoretical subject and a practical subject in order to align my critique with the general division
between the theoretical and the ethical. Thus, there seemed to be a psychological discipline
concerned with the self as a passive theoretical object of study, in contradistinction with another
discipline concerned with the self as an active subject of ethical action. It is in this context that
the psychological ‘patient’ gains its ambiguity: there is the patient examined during an
experiment and the patient treated during therapy.
However, the former, theoretical subject could be divided further into an empirical ego
and a rational soul. The empirical ego, I argued, was the object of inquiry for empirical
psychology, and the latter, rational soul, for rational psychology. Kant’s Critique of Pure
Reason and Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science targeted both sciences as illegitimate.
No amount of introspection could ever yield up to the observing eye a coherent empirical ego.
That is not to say that nothing is yielded up by such inquiries, only that the flux of images,
thoughts, and feelings seized by such a gaze could not properly be mathematized due to the onedimensional temporal nature of all phenomena of inner sense. But rational psychology, which
attempted an a priori, rather than an a posteriori, approach, fared no better Any attempt to
theorize about the soul and derive its predicates in this manner inevitably produced four errors of
reason: the paralogisms. The ‘I’ was said to be a substance, to be simple, to be a unified
personality, and to be certain and distinct from the body and all else. By pointing out an
equivocation underlying these four arguments, Kant repudiated rational psychology and scaled
back metaphysical pretentions that we could ever know the metaphysical soul (the self beyond
the veil of appearances). Ultimately, the only thing rational psychology could prove was that it
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was logically necessary for an ‘I think’ to accompany all representations and unify the field of
experience by rendering all representations ‘mine.’ But this ‘I’ has no content, and cannot be
used as the basis for a doctrine of the soul: “This I is no more an intuition than it is a concept of
any object; rather it is the mere form of consciousness, which accompanies both sorts of
representations and which can elevate them to cognitions only insofar as something else is given
in intuition…”1522
But what of the practical subject: the subject of ethics? This subject can also be
bifurcated intoa heteronomous agent and an autonomous agent. The difference lies between
whether the subject determines its actions based on a ‘material’ principle or a ‘rational’ principle.
All material principles ultimately require the bringing about of an object external to the will,
rendering the ethical success of the action contingent and dependent on factors outside of its
control. On these grounds such a will cannot be free, but is dependent on something different
from, or ‘heteronomous’ to it. Only a rational principle derived by and from the faculty of
reason can act as a self-determined impetus to act. Only by means of the universal form of law,
or categorical imperative, can the will be free.
Furthermore, all such heteronomous principles are predicated upon establishing a
relationship between the agent and the esteemed object, a relationship that could only be
mediated by the faculty of sensibility. Such an established relationship between an esteemed
object and the sensibility amounts to happiness. Because of this, Kant claims that all
heteronomous principles, regardless of whether their objects seem empirical or intellectual, are
concerned with happiness. From our in-depth study of the heteronomous theories Kant
proposes, such a claim seems to be borne out well: the Ancients most certainly seemed
preoccupied with achieving a mental state of contentment, for example. On the other hand,
1522
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rational principles are not mediated by the sensibility but instead by those faculties (reason and
the understanding) that are not bound up in the phenomenal world or concerned with achieving
particular effects in it. In fact, rather than attempting to acquire happiness, the categorical
imperative humiliates our animal nature, a humiliation felt as pain. At best, the respect for law
we feel can give us a sense of self-worth, but not happiness. Morality is not concerned with
happiness. It only guarantees autonomy.
Thus Kant leaves us at an impasse: we can either prioritize happiness or freedom. At
best, happiness can be an amoral concern always trumped by moral imperatives followed at
one’s sensible expense. Motivations to secure personal benefit always lurk in the empirical
psyche, ready to taint the pure will committed to act out of duty. As Kant notes, we can never be
sure whether we ever act out of duty or for the sake of satisfaction, which threatens the autonomy
morality is meant to guarantee. Most certainly a charitable (or even honest) reading of Kant
shows that life is not as austere as this picture presents. But inevitably, even when happiness is a
duty, it is not my own but instead for me to give to another. This is a drawback of attempting to
save morality and freedom by separating it from the realm of the human animal and securing it in
a world beyond possible experience.
It is this impasse that grounds the task of this dissertation, and, I would argue, is the
antinomy that therapeutic psychology alone cannot resolve. Therapy certainly concerns itself
with both happiness and autonomy. Nonetheless, the subject to which it appeals is not the
noumenal subject of reason, but the phenomenal object of affect.
To resolve this impasse, I supplemented my task with Foucault, a philosopher who
attempts to find a place for both freedom and pleasure. It is his engagement with Ancient ascesis
that provides such an alternative. I also argued that Kant lays the groundwork for such a
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Critique, one that recognizes a new kind of higher pleasure (based on Love) and draws its limits
and proper uses. It is love that acts as a supplement to duty, is the missing link that completes
the architectonic, and provides rational principles for happiness that allow the human animal to
attain the heights reached by the soul. The diverse manifold of desires partly unified by the
categorical imperative can now be fully unified by love’s laws, replacing the waxing and waning
of infatuations with a stable law of the heart, completing the self.
Foucault recognized this impasse differently because his metaphysical model was
different. Nonetheless, the same locus of concern between pleasure, freedom, and their ideal
relationship exists. No longer did freedom cleave to the noumenal (an outside) and pleasure to
the phenomenal (the inside). Freedom was a condition of this world that didn’t need a
supranatural support, the metaphor best capturing it being ‘the struggle.’ There was no escaping
power, but there were always a means of resisting it and fighting back so as to prevent a
totalizing control (or ‘domination’). Therefore, the problems inherent to the human sciences
Foucault highlights are political in nature, namely, power and its dominating effects.
It was my contention that Foucault’s early and middle work could be mapped onto Kant’s
Table of Heteronomy precisely because the former concerns the different manners in which
Western man has been dominated, and the latter concerns the exhaustive manner in which the
will’s freedom can be subverted by something external to it (presumably a power relation with
something external to, and yet constitutive of it). The forms of domination and their
corresponding subjects are included in the following table:
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Having left us at the mercy of a seemingly-monolithic network of power, and all
knowledge of the self turned against us as a tool of reification, Foucault proposes an alternative
to psychology: ascesis, a revived ‘aesthetics of existence.’ This ascetic practice was invented in
ancient Greece to resist the power of its day. Out of that resistance and its call to the moderate
life was born the philosopher. Today Foucault and Halperin note another ascetic practice, among
many, has emerged to combat biopower: homosexual ascesis. Rather than be tempted by
psychology’s promise of inner truth, Foucault calls on ‘becoming’ homosexual, on inventing a
new homosexual way of life, ethics, and culure. For Foucault, the way out of the psychological
quagmire was not to discover the truth of one’s desiring Self, but to invent oneself, to create new
pleasures, to become other than oneself.
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7.3 Solving the Impasse
This is the key to resolving the impasse Kant initially leaves us with when he says the
true self (the soul) cannot be known and sciences of the subject (such as empirical and rational
psychology) fail to grasp the subject qua subject. Foucault has shown us of the dangers of
psychology and how it can be used by power to regulate us and restrict our freedom. It may then
be a helpful regulative idea to assume, as Kant does, that the Self cannot be known, that it lies
behind an impenetrable metaphysical veil, and that we have no choice but to determine our
options and invent the Self anew to maximize its autonomy and its freedom.
This may be overly idealistic, granted that there are very real mental disorders that the
psychological discipline has adequately grasped and treated. Let us grant that psychology should
not be jettisoned. But let us also concede that psychotherapy is also not equipped to resolve the
antinomy between happiness and autonomy, or pleasure and virtue, that becomes manifest to any
philosopher. Are not the perennial nature vs nurture debates of the discipline the result of a
blindness to this impasse, since one is driven to condone or condemn the acts of others and
allocate blame or pardon? Surely neither freedom nor virtue can be found on either side of the
divide. If Kant is right about the sole source of autonomy lying in the moral law, it may be that
freedom cannot be found on either side because the ‘care of the self’ that psychology practices,
perhaps despite itself, is no longer an ethic.
It was with this resolution in mind that I turned back to Kant’s paralogisms, and, inspired
by the way Kant deduced new categories from the old, I considered the possibility that the
paralogisms identified the right categories capable of thinking the subject qua subject (and by
this I mean the subject that acts rather than passively contains an essnce), but did not apply them
properly. Those categories were unity, reality, substance-inherence, and existence-non-
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existence. Rather than applying these categories to the subject as it allegedly is (as an object of
knowledge), I considered the possibility that it identified those categories that indicated a way of
life, a becoming for a subject attempting to emancipate itself from objecthood (heteronomy). If
this were so, I had but to look to the various forms of ascetic practices philosophers have already
suggested to see if this architectonic of self-constitution was evident.
From this hypothesis and subsequent reflection I discovered an ascetic practice of
universality and unity, of which Kant was the pinnacle. Kant attempted to achieve two forms of
unity meant to unify the self: unity of knowledge (by means of regulative ideas) and unity of
desires (by means of the categorical imperative). Understanding Kant as the pinnacle of a
millennia-long ascetic practice, Pierre Hadot’s characterization of Ancient forms of ascesis made
sense:
…all spiritual exercises are, fundamentally, a return to the self, in which the self is liberated from
the state of alienation into which it has been plunged by worries, passions, and desires. The “self”
liberated in this way is no longer merely our egoistic, passionate individuality: it is our moral
person, open to universality and objectivity, and participating in universal nature or thought. 1523

The path of ‘universality and objectivity,’ of a self not restricted to its sensible individuality, is
most clearly and purely articulated in Kantian ascesis, wherein the way to freedom is the
universal moral law itself.
From my own speculations on the Kantian system, I then tried to resolve Kant’s
antinomy between happiness and autonomy in the only way that the Kantian system allowed: by
showing a shortcoming in the pre-existing architectonic. What was missing, I argued, was a
missing higher pleasure to complement the pleasures pertaining to Beauty, Sublimity, and the
Good: Love. If this feeling and pleasure could be shown to correspond to the higher use of a
faculty, and the higher use of a faculty depends on it obeying its own principles rather than those
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determined by the sensible world, then both a stable pleasure (happiness) and freedom would be
compossible. I claimed to find these principles in the transcendental accord of the imagination
with Reason, and accord that was felt as both a feeling of love and a higher pleasure. That
accord was nothing short of the judgment that an Other was adequate to the transcendental idea
of a supersensible self. In this manner, I encountered an Other as a person, like myself. Thus, in
theory, this explains how we can encounter others as subjects. There were three kinds of accord,
or three different ways to judge another to be like my suprasensible self: three forms of
belonging, or sets, I determined by turning to the categories of Quantity. I could judge someone
to belong to the exclusive set to which I alone belong (the Lover, or Soulmate – corresponding to
the category of Unity), or to the open set to which I belong (The Friend – corresponding to the
category of Plurality), or to the expansive set to which I belong (Family – corresponding to the
category of Totality). These ‘anthropological ideas’ (the Lover, the Friend, and Family), derived
from the mind’s desire for unity, could stabilize desire and maintain social cohesion and unity,
while deriving from an autonomous play of the faculties.
The meaning of this is quite concrete: the transcendental ideas of love are akin to the
Object = X that correlates to the transcendental I and that synthesizes an assortment of qualities
into a thing. Anthropological ideas determine the exclusive object to which a certain class of
desires and pleasures belong and by means of them, desires, emotions, and pleasures of a certain
class are stabilized rather than in constant flux (since they have a unified ‘target’). From the
tumultuousness of infatuation can come the deep-seated, persisting feeling of Eros because of the
transcendental idea of a soulmate. From the 'friendships of utility and pleasure' Aristotle
discusses, with waxing and waning affections, can come the permanent affection (Philia) of a
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genuine friend, a 'kindred spirit' (friendships based on good character).1524 And finally, from the
chaotic dependencies of the child or the instinctual attachments of the parent can arise a deep
love, Storge, strong enough to push a parent to sacrifice itself to save the child or to bolster the
child's determination to take care of the aging parent.
Without these 'anthropological ideas' society would fall apart. They are so essential to it
that we take them for granted. But nonetheless, is there ever an empirical basis for them? Do
particular experiences of benefit ever explain why we would not merely see another as useful but
also worthy of sacrifice and love? How does a relationship based on extracting utility and
pleasure from others transmute in such a marvelous way into its opposite: namely, a concern for
how I can be of use to or source of pleasure for another? Is it not by means of these
anthropological ideas that selfishness becomes selflessness and we find instances of duty to
others without concern for our own happiness? And yet, is not the greatest happiness secured by
such acts of love? Thus, love seems to connect happiness and duty, and by means of duty,
connect happiness to autonomy. In this subtle art of the soul, this law of the heart, which
transmutes the grossest pleasures into the most sublime ones we see the highest that man is
capable of achieving. With each new duty (to the lover, to the friend, to the child), does not
man’s station also grow? Is this not the Kantian paradox borne out in life: namely, that we can
only become more than ourselves and take pride in ourselves only by means of our obligations?
After Kant, it seems, other forms of ascesis developed, perhaps because the former path
was now exhausted, perhaps because it had been perfected. Foucault would reflect back on those
very same Ancient ascetic practices and make of them an ‘aesthetics of existence.’ I took it as
no coincidence that Foucault articulates ascesis in terms of modes of existence, and that his
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archaeological and genealogical methods sought to reveal the contingencies of subjectivity, and
how it could be different. Foucault’s task was to redraw the lines of contingency and necessity
for the sake of inventing new modes of existence.1525 Foucault's take on the problem of the self,
autonomy, and pleasure, is in many ways opposed to Kant’s. He is not concerned with finding a
transcendental basis for stabilizing the manifold of desires as much as he is interested in
destabilizing ossified power relations as both an act of invention and resistance. By styling one’s
freedom, one resisted. This stylization of freedom Foucault called ‘the aesthetics of existence.’
The 'aesthetics of existence' (or ascesis) he advocates may still possess the praxical resources to
stabilize the manifold of desires enough to not merely attain but maintain happiness (for
example, ‘self-mastery’), but one gets the sense that Foucault's concerns are less with happiness
than pleasures and limit-experiences (moments of pleasure that shatter the ego). Here we see
dispersion as an aim rather than unity. In this way, Kantian and Foucaultian asceses could be
said to be mutually exclusive: one means to unite the self and the other to scatter it,1526 to
disavow it in the name of something new.
As for the other two forms of ascesis (corresponding to reality and substance-inherence),
little can be said without more research. I argue that Gilles Deleuze's latter work with Felix
Guattari attempts to articulate another path, one based on pure affirmation of life and the
counter-actualization of all limitations to that pure affirmation: “The only positive or affirmative
thing that a creatural force can do is to dissolve itself. The only creative way of responding to
reaction is to overcome it. For any actual individual, what is essential is ‘finally to acquire the
1525
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power to disappear.’”1527 The ultimate goal of this Deleuzian care of the self is its undoing, its
becoming-imperceptible, its ‘becoming everybody/everything.’1528 From a molar identity one
deterritorializes in accordance with a particular 'minoritizing' regimen: one becomes-woman,
then becomes-child, then becomes-animal, and then becomes-molecular. One becomesimperceptible.1529 There is no Foucaultian gay male becoming: Deleuze and Guattari
do not dwell on the possibility of a similarly revolutionary becoming-man that would push the
masculine stereotype beyond its threshold of recuperation (following, for example, strategies of
the kind employed by some segments of the gay and lesbian S/M communities who theatricalize
“masculinity” in order to take it to a deconstructive extreme).1530

Deleuze prefers becoming-woman, or becoming-girl, since it, in effect, acts as a
reclaiming of what was stolen from us as children when we were introduced into a molar
order.1531

The same nexus of pleasure and freedom is found here as well, as

deterroritializaion removes what restricts our power and produces a kind of joy within us
(life unbounded). But one gets the sense that what is at play here is not the cultivation of
new pleasures (Deleuze prefers 'desire' to Foucault's 'pleasure,' possibly because their
‘ascetic’ practices and aims are different). One is affirming what one can do while the
other is fabricating new selves: Deleuzian ascesis is a Nietzschean ascesis rather than a
Foucaultian ascesis (albeit, for sure, Nietzsche heavily influenced Foucault both in
method and project). So while there may be similarities between Deleuzian and
Foucaultian aims (both favor a form of dispersion over a unitary ego as well as the
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sensible over the intelligible encounter), they appear to be different since one affirms
while the other denies.
Finally, I argue that Badiou articulates a version of the last form of ascesis. For Badiou,
the Subject in question is not the individual.
If there is no ethics ‘in general’, that is because there is no abstract Subject, who would adopt it as
his shield. There is only a particular kind of animal, convoked by [an event] to become a subject –
or rather, to enter into the composing of a subject. This is to say that at a given moment,
everything he is – his body, his abilities – called upon to enable the passing of a truth along its
path. This is when the human animal is convoked to be the immortal that he was not yet. 1532

In other words, the animal individual is swept up by a truth procedure and becomes part of a
Subject. Thus, there are two kinds of Relation that go into the creation of a Subject: the relation
of inclusion, such as is indicative of a categorical judgment (the relation between members and
classes) and the relation the human animal has to the Event and its Truth-procedure (the relation
between substance and inherence, namely, the attributes of fidelity and specific truth-procedure
to the Subject, e.g. Faithful Amorous Subject). For Badiou, there are three kinds of subjects
(Faithful, Reactive, and Obscure) that relate to four different kinds of truth procedure (Amorous,
Artistic, Scientific. and Political). Each truth procedure pertains to an Event, or moment that
something that was not presented in the situation becomes presented, challenging the given order
of ‘veridical’ knowledge. The human animal can thus relate to the Event in one of three ways: it
can either stay faithful to its revealed universal Truth, accommodate it to the old system, or
violently reject it (the faithful, reactive, and obscure subject, respectively)1533 That choice is
free, granted that there is no certain evidence available to determine that decision for the
individual. One faithful to the event and its truth experiences a kind of affect: politics elicits

1532

Badiou, Alain, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, trans. Peter Hallward (London: Verso, 2002) 40.
Badiou, Alain, Second Manifesto for Philosophy, trans. Louise Burchill (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011) 91104.
1533

410

enthusiasm, the arts pleasure, love happiness, and science joy.1534 Thus we see a connection
between a free choice and higher pleasures indicative of a higher manner of living. This form of
ascesis is similar to Kant's insofar as there is an identification with the universal, the intelligible,
and unity. Even fidelity in the face of a truth that cannot be proven, which seems to pertain to
practical reason, finds a place in Badiouian ascesis. But nonetheless, Badiou’s truth is of this
world, the ethics he espouses (as we saw above) is not a ‘general’ ethics, and the subject he
describes is a material one. All of these differences preclude Badiouian ascesis from being a
form of Kantianism, making it a stand-alone ascetic form.
7.4 Final Words
By no means do I think these examples exhaust the ascetic practices pertaining to each of
the four categories. Presumably, the potential for diversifying subject-regimens in accordance
with these broad principles of thought could be as diverse as material and intelligible conditions
allow. But what such an engagement with the subject allows, even if the specifics of this attempt
to flesh out a system are wrong, is a grappling with the subject qua subject, as a doer that can
make itself, that can muster its resources and attempt to achieve both happiness and autonomy by
means of everything at its disposal. It is unlikely that therapeutic psychology could grasp any of
these regimens by means of its own internal resources, nor could empirical psychology ever
study the ideals towards which the subject should or at least could aspire.
Fittingly, the very science of the subject, 'practical psychology' (if I may be permitted to
coin a term), springs forth from the very autonomy it seeks, defying the precision of the
empirical in order to grasp what is not merely actual but conceivable. If I have at the very least
provoked thought in the matter or made the notion of a science of the subject qua subject
conceivable, or made the aspiration to derive and systematize what we are capable of becoming
1534

Badiou, Alain, Logics of Worlds: Being and Event II, trans. Alberto Toscano (London: Continuum, 2009) 77.

411

intelligible, or even provided the groundwork or key to pursuing that agenda, I will consider this
investigation a success.
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